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Why have Islamic insurance systems developed well in some countries, but not in others? 
Malaysia is considered as Islamic insurance elite due to its relatively large number of operators it 
houses as well as the sustained growth of Islamic insurance sales within the country, while 
Indonesia and Pakistan are still in early stages of development. Analyzing the political and social 
history of Islamization of insurance systems in these three Muslim majority countries in Asia since 
1980s, this dissertation demonstrates the development gap between these countries on Islamic 
insurance results from; firstly, complex bargains made between various groups within each 
country polity, and those bargains are structured by the country’s fundamental political 
institutions. Secondly, the gap is also an outcome of different societal transformations during the 
Islamization that ‘produce Islam(s)’ in these countries. The revival of Islamic principles in these 
countries does not only create Sharia-compliant financial products but produces Islamic norms, 
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Alim (pl. ulama): religious scholar in Islamic disciplines, gives opinions or issues rulings (fatwa) 
on religious questions 
 
Bancatakaful: combination of Islamic banking with Islamic insurance 
 
dawah: propagation of the Islamic faith  
 
faqih (pl. fuqaha): a legal expert, jurist in Islamic law 
 
fatwa (pl. fatawat): authoritative religious injunction without legal binding 
 
fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence based upon the Quran and Sunnah 
 
halal: that which is lawful, permitted, good, and praiseworthy in Islam 
 
Hanafi school: one of the four religious Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence. It is named after 
the scholar Abu Hanifa an Nu’man ibn Thabit (d.767). 
 
haram: actions that are unlawful and forbidden in Islam 
 
hijab: clothing for the purposes of modesty and dignity according to Islamic dress code 
 
ijtihad: independent reasoning. It is recognized as one of the legal methods of reasoning in 
Islamic law (Sharia), which is completely independent of any school (madhhab) of jurisprudence 
(fiqh). 
 
madhhab (pl. madhahib): school of legal thought or jurisprudence that interpret the Quran and 
hadith for followers. There are four main madhahib; Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali. 
 
mudharabah: the commercial profit-sharing contract according to Islamic law 
 
qadi: judge in the Islamic court system 
 
pesantren: madrasah/traditional Islamic boarding school within Southeast Asian context 
 
Shafii: one of the four religious Sunni schools of Islamic law. It was named after Imam al-Shafii 
who lived in the early 9th century. 
 
Sharia: Islamic law 
vii 
 
Sukuk: Islamic bonds 
 
tajdid: renewal. In Islamic context, tajdid refers to the revival of Islam in order to purify and 
reform society. 
 
Takaful: mutual guarantee. In the modern context, this term is used to name Islamic alternative 
for conventional insurance 
 
riba:  usury 
 
ushr: specific type of religious tax implemented on agricultural products 
 
wakalah: a principle in Islamic commercial law, which is based on the idea that the operator, 
acting as an agent of the participants, can charge its management expenses on the Islamic  
insurance contributions or premium paid. 
 
zakat: religious tax, or obligatory distribution to the needy 
 
zameen: Pakistani term for land, which along with family (zan) and wealth (zar) are the most 
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Since the establishment of the first modern commercial Islamic bank, Dubai Islamic Bank 
(DIB) in 1975,1 Islamic financial instruments (IFIs) have been largely promoted as a panacea for 
many national economic problems, particularly throughout the Islamdom.2 This initiative 
happened together with a growing common presumption that the economic development at that 
time was a secular project that needed a thorough reexamination. Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, and 
Sudan led the way for a national program of establishing Islamic economy. 
Furthermore, the Islamic finance market is a dynamic and rapidly expanding sector. IFIs 
are primarily comprised of Islamic Banking, Sukuk (Islamic Bonds), Takaful (Islamic insurance), 
and Islamic Mutual Funds.3 Some scholars even argue these instruments help to maintain the 
stability of the financial system as a whole by the simple fact that it provides an alternative to the 
existing financial services. S. Nazim Ali and Shariq Nisar suggest, “The liberalization and 
globalization of the financial systems have led to a homogenized financial system with the same 
set of incentives and motivation, which led to global instability. Therefore, diversity in the 
structure is considered a stabilizing factor.”4 Scott Schmith, an international trade specialist at 
 
1 Ibrahim  Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000). 
2 A historian Marshall G.S. Hodgson introduced the term Islamdom and it refers to the society in which the 
Muslims and their faith are recognized as prevalent and socially dominant. He prefers not using the term Islamic 
world because this term implies there are many separate and mutually exclusive worlds.  See detail discussion in 
Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam Conscience and History in a World Civilization (Chicago: Chicago : 
University of Chicago Press, 1974). Page 58. For this dissertation, I will use term Islamdom to emphasize the 
transnational dimension and uniformity of Muslims beyond their local and national identity, and I will use ‘Islamic 
societies’ or Muslim societies talking about their diversity or particularities. Islamic societies and Muslim societies 
are used by another historian, Ira Lapidus, in his magisterial work Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 2nd 
ed.. ed. (Cambridge New York : Cambridge University Press, 2002); ibid. 
3 The word insurance or banking when prefixed by “Islamic‟ means that all theories and practices are examined 
from the perspective of Islamic laws and values as enshrined in the Quran (holy book) and Hadith (sayings of 
prophet Muhammad). See  S. U Farooq et al., “An Analytical Study of the Potential of Takaful Companies,” 
European Journal of Economics Finance and Administrative Sciences 20 (n.d.): 55–75. 
4 Finance Harvard University Forum on Islamic, Takaful and Islamic Cooperative Finance : Challenges and 
Opportunities / Edited by S. Nazim Ali, Shariq Nisar, Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting and Governance. 




the International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, USA, indicates other positive 
effects of Islamic finance. He shows in his report that the growth of Islamic finance has helped to 
diversify markets and institutional structures, particularly in oil-rich Muslim countries, and in 
countries with significant Muslim minorities.5  
Furthermore, several studies confirm the role of Islamic-based economies in dealing with 
global financial crises. Studies conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show that 
co-operative banks-including local credit unions- and Islamic banks are among those financial 
institutions that survived the 2007-2008 economic crisis. They were relatively distant from 
‘speculative’ financial market that made them more resilient to any financial shocks. Both 
institutions are different from commercial banks because they share some risk with the 
depositors.6 During financial panics, Islamic banks especially were less prone to deposit 
withdrawals, but even so, their lending is consistently less sensitive to change in deposits. 
Therefore, during the recent crisis, these banks were able to provide more loans compared to 
commercial banks.7 
Besides banking, another financial instrument that has gained prominence recently is 
Takaful or Islamic insurance. Takaful is a term for ‘mutual guarantee’ utilized by modern Muslim 
societies in times of economic insecurity- illness, unemployment, widowhood, old age, etc. 
Currently, Islamic insurance companies provide various Islamic insurance products such as life 
and family (i.e., education fund), medical, marine and aviation, property and accident, and auto 
insurances. Also, Islamic insurance has been used to unlock the potential for insurance 
penetration in the Islamdom. Insurance markets in this area are largely at nascent or growth 
stage of development with a very low insurance density, even in the most developed Muslim-
majority countries.8 
 
5 Scott Schmith, Islamic Banking Experiencing Rapid Growth (International Trade Administration, 2005), 
https://www.trade.gov/MAS/pdf/Islamic_Banking.pdf. 
6 Saeed Al-Muharrami and Daniel C Hardy, "Cooperative and Islamic Banks : What Can They Learn from Each 
Other?," Working Paper No. 13/184  (2013), 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Cooperative-and-Islamic-Banks-What-can-they-
Learn-from-Each-Other-40888. Accessed September 20, 2016. 
7 Moazzam Farooq and Sajjad Zaheer, "Are Islamic Banks More Resilient During Financial Panics?" IMF Working 
Paper Research Department and Strategy, Policy, and Review Department (2015), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1541.pdf (accessed September 20, 2016).  




Islamic insurance has experienced substantial growth globally; however, there has been 
an uneven development of Islamic insurance between countries throughout the Islamdom. Some 
countries, such as Iran, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are Islamic insurance elites due to their 
relatively large number of Islamic insurance operators their houses as well as the sustained 
growth of Islamic insurance sales within their countries, while others including Indonesia, 
Pakistan and Sudan are having limited development. This dissertation seeks to understand the 
factors that influence the different developments of Islamic insurance of the three most 
significant Islamic insurance markets in Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan.   
Islamic insurance: fate, faith, and good faith 
 The idea of insurance itself is a profoundly religious insight. We live in a world of 
uncertainty. We look around and still see potential disaster or risk at every turn. Illness, fire, 
earthquakes, economic slowdowns, global warming, terrorist threat shows that our ability to 
control our lives is not total. Religious scholars would say that in those big things, we are at the 
hands of fate or luck or God's will.  We can be discipline exercising at the gym, eat healthy food 
and do not smoke to maintain our health. However, we have no control over healthcare cost. 
Insurance was designed with this awareness. It protects us from the powers beyond our control.9  
Insurance works by enabling us to ‘spread and transfer risk’. We pay a small amount of 
money regularly so-called premium to an insurance company to get protection when our time of 
need comes. Takaful or Islamic insurance goes beyond that. According to its proponents, Islamic 
insurance follows the principles of religious injunctions strictly. It is a risk-sharing arrangement 
based on Islamic law with a purpose to address the moral issues of speculation, interest-based 
practices, and financial exclusion of conventional insurance. 
Takaful comes from an Arabic term kafala meaning ‘cooperative’ or mutual indemnity. It 
refers to the mutual assistance between members of society, be it a person, a society, an 
institution or a government. It came from a pre-Islamic Arab tribe’s practice of giving blood 
money. It is argued by many Islamic scholars that Prophet Muhammad embraced and validated 
 
9 Steven Waldman, "Is the Health Insurance Industry Immoral?," the Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2009, accessed 




it as part of the Islamic faith within the early Muslim society afterward.10 Later, the Muslims used 
the concept of mutual assistance when they extended their trade by sea to the Far East. The 
merchants put aside a sum of money as a collective fund to compensate for any loss incurred by 
any of them during the trading journey.11 
 In the context of contemporary Islamic insurance, the initial official forum that discusses 
the legitimacy of insurance in the Islamic world was the Congress of Islamic Research in Cairo 
back in 1965. Afterward, at the first international conference on Islamic economics in 1976 in 
Mecca, Saudi Arabia, Islamic scholars from various countries met and reached a consensus that 
conventional insurance for profit was deemed as contradicting Islamic law.12 In the early 1980s, 
Muslim scholars together with Muslim financial practitioners started to develop this concept as 
modern private-based insurance services where primarily a group of participants donating funds 
into a pool managed by a company that members could use in the event of personal or business 
contingencies.  
The first Islamic insurance company -the Islamic Insurance Company of Sudan- was 
founded in Sudan in the year 1979. Another declaration was proclaimed in the Second 
Conference of International Council of Fiqh Academy of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) in Jeddah in 1985, which declared all forms commercial insurance is prohibited. 
13 Also, this council recommended cooperative insurance as the preferred alternative.14 Several 
countries followed it up by issuing specific Islamic insurance regulations, rules, and guidelines. 
 
10 There were three kinds of mutual financial protection created by traditional Arab merchant: hilf, daman khatr 
al-tarid and Aqila. Hilf is mutual risk fund to assist victims of natural disasters or hazards of trade journeys. Daman 
khatr al-tariq (a kind of surety) was placed to recover the losses caused by bandits or pirates. Aqila was practiced 
preventing bloodshed among tribal members by extending compensation to ransom captives or to settle a claim 
from an accidental killing. For more detail, see: Abdullaah Jalil et al., The Concept of Social Security in Islamic 
Economy, Islamic Economic System Conference 2015 (iECONS 2015) (Krabi, Thailand: 2015). 
11 Syed Othman Alhabshi Shaikh Hamzah Shaikh Abdul Razak, "Takaful: Concept, History, Development, and Future 
Challenges of Its Industry," Islam and Civilisational Renewal 1, no. 2 (December 2009). 
https://www.icrjournal.org/icr/index.php/icr/article/view/268  
12 Muammar Dahnoun and Basil Alqudwa, "Islamic Insurance: An Alternative to Conventional Insurance," American 
Journal of Humanities & Islamic Studies 1, no. 1 (2018). 
13 The term ‘commercial’ was used before the establishment of Islamic bank and Islamic insurance. After the 
establishment, it is more common to use term ‘conventional’ Vis a vis ‘Islamic’ to differentiate the new method of 
Islamic commercial bank and Islamic commercial insurance and the common ways of banking and insurance. 
14 The Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy, Resolutions and Recommendations of the Council of the Islamic Fiqh 




For example, after experimentation for more than a decade, Sudan promulgated a 
comprehensive Islamic insurance regulation in 1992, Pakistan replaced its old Insurance Act with 
the Insurance Ordinance in 2000, and Saudi Arabia enacted the new Supervision on Cooperative 
Insurance Act of 2003 and so on.15 Before these regulations, Islamic insurance companies in those 
countries operated under conventional insurance or cooperative laws. Except for Malaysia, 
Islamic insurance companies in Malaysia started to run only after the promulgation of the Takaful 
Act of 1984. 
Currently, there are two types of service provided by an Islamic insurance company: 
General Takaful and Family Takaful. General Takaful is usually a short-term policy where Islamic 
insurance participants pay contributions and operators undertake to manage risk. General 
Takaful gives protection to the participant for losses arising from perils such as accident, fire, 
flood, liability, and burglary. Family Takaful provides protection and long-term savings where 
participants or their beneficiary will be presented with financial benefits if they suffer a tragedy. 
At the same time, they will enjoy long-term personal savings because part of their contribution 
will be deposited in an account for savings. Participants will be able to enjoy investment returns 
from the savings portion based on a pre-agreed ratio.16 
Nonetheless, there is no religious requirement for joining Islamic insurance. Not only 
Muslim but also everyone can use this service. Islamic insurance does not require the buyer to 
adhere to other Sharia principles within the religion of Islam or becomes a Muslim, but it only 
needs the buyer to comply with the Sharia or Islamic law principles of the conduct of business. 
Like conventional insurance the issues of "insurable interest" and uberrimae fidei (of the fullest 
confidence) are equally valid in Islamic insurance contract also. Islamic law emphasizes the 
principle of uberrimae fidei in any form of contractual agreement. According the Islamic jurists, 
the contract is void unless there is honesty, full disclosure, truthfulness, and utmost good faith 
 
15 Ajmal  Bhatty and Shariq Nisar, "Takaful Journey: The Past, Present and Future," in Takaful and Islamic 
Cooperative Finance: Challenges and Opportunities, ed. S. Nazim  Ali and Shariq Nisar (Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2016). 




among the parties. Non-compliance of these makes the contract unenforceable, and it applies 
fully to any Islamic insurance contract. 17 
Islamic scholars mention that the primary purpose of Islamic insurance is to deal with the 
prohibited or haram practices of modern finance: the payment of prohibited interest (riba), the 
existence of uncertainty in a transaction of inordinate risk and insufficient transparency (gharar), 
gambling (maysir), and investing in prohibited activities such as alcoholic beverage production, 
gambling, drugs and tobacco. It places great importance on the moral consequences of financial 
transactions. Besides that, Islamic insurance is different from other conventional finance in 
respect of risk mitigation. It uniquely emphasizes risk sharing rather than trading and shifting of 
risk. According to these scholars, Islamic insurance alters the practices of modern financial 
transactions in two ways: enforcing Sharia-compliant contracts and creating a mutual 
organizational framework.18  
Sharia prohibits the use of the interest-based instrument and certain types of equities 
companies. According to Muslims’ understanding, the use of interest creates possibilities of 
exploitation of the one who needs money by the one who has plenty. The basic premise of Islamic 
finance is the parties involved must mutually share risk and reward. The uncertainty of 
conventional insurance lays on lack of transparency as to what premium is for management 
expenses, how much portion is for claim payments, and what portion is for policyholders or 
shareholders a return.19 
Moreover, many Muslim scholars consider the joint-stock insurance model speculative. 
In the joint-stock insurance model, participants seek to profit from the risk of an indeterminate 
event will occur.20 This model comprises an undertaking by an insurer in exchange for 
consideration to make a payment to the insured if a specified event occurs. This commutative 
 
17 Uberrimae fidei contracts or contracts of utmost good faith refer to a class of contracts where certain material 
facts to the contract are within the exclusive knowledge of one party and hence, the other party depends upon the 
good faith of the party with knowledge to disclose it. See Haemala Thanasegaran and Mohammed Shaiban, 
"Harmonisation of Takaful (Islamic Insurance) Regulation- a Realistic Goal or Improbable Ideal?," Singapore Journal 
of Legal Studies  (2014). 
18 Ajmal Bhatty, The Growing Importance of Takaful Insurance, Asia Regional Seminar (Kuala Lumpur: 2017). 
19 Bhatty and Nisar,  in Takaful and Islamic Cooperative Finance: Challenges and Opportunities. 
20 Serap Oguz Gonulal, ProQuest, and C. S. A. ProQuest, Takaful and Mutual Insurance [E-Book] Alternative 




contract of the mainstream conventional insurance is specifically objectionable by Sharia. This 
type of contract unduly limits uncertainty and ambiguity in human lives. Muslims can take steps 
to minimize the impact of events; however, they believe that what happens is predetermined by 
God’s will. Furthermore, Muslim scholars consider conventional insurance is prohibited because 
the insurers pay for a loss of human life which is priceless, and they aim to generate profit for 
their stakeholders not whom there are insuring. This conceptual paradigm is the essential 
differences between mainstream conventional insurance and Islamic insurance.21 
Nonetheless, Islamic insurance is not a health care sharing ministry as developed by many 
faith-based communities in the United States, such as Samaritan Healthcare ministry, Medi-
share, Liberty HealthShare, etc. Islamic insurance operator is a for-profit company and regulated 
by the government as an insurance service. Meanwhile, these faith-based communities 
established health care sharing ministry as non-profit entities and with the purpose of promoting 
certain religious values.22 The Affordable Care Act or Obamacare gives exemption to the 
members of health care sharing ministry plans due to this religious reason (which will end after 
2018). They are exempt from the mandate to purchase insurance or face financial penalties.  
These health-sharing plans necessitate the religious devotion of the members. The 
members need to obey specific behavior rules; for instance, they are not allowed to smoke, to 
use illegal drugs, to drink heavily, and to abuse prescription medications. These plans also are not 
covering medical expenses that are incurred from behavior that is deemed immoral, such as out-
of-wedlock births or drunken-driving accidents, or medical procedures that conservative 
Christians oppose, such as abortion and gender-reassignment surgery, or even birth control, as 
required under Obamacare. The members must sign documents agreeing to obey those rules 
including going to church regularly and being faithful in their marriage. Their pastor had to affirm 
that they were active in their faith community. Liberty HealthShare, based in Canton, Ohio, for 
example, requires its members to follow God’s commandments in their daily lives. The provider 
 
21 Hussein A Abdou, Ali Khurshid, and Roger J. Lister, “A Comparative Study of Takaful and Conventional Insurance: 
Empirical Evidence from the Malaysian Market,” 
Insurance Markets and Companies: Analyses and Actuarial Computations 5, no. 1 (2014): 22–34. 
22 Serap Oguz Gonulal, Takaful and Mutual Insurance [e-Book] Alternative Approaches to Managing Risks, 




is also constantly reminding them that the purpose of the plan is not to save money and gain 
profit but to honor the biblical teaching to “share one another’s burdens”.23 
However, there is no unanimous agreement among all Muslims concerning the lawfulness 
of insurance transaction mentioned above. Muslim scholars from different legal schools of 
thought have different opinions on each detail of financial transactions, particularly on Islamic 
insurance. Some scholars even argue that conventional insurance is lawful under Sharia due to 
its benefits for individuals and society. Shaikh Abd al-Rahman Isa and Shaikh Muhammad al-Bahi, 
Professors of Al-Azhar University; Shaikh Muhammad Yusuf and Shaikh Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf 
from University of Cairo; Bahjah Hilmi, advisor of high court of Egypt; Muhammad Dasuki and 
Shaikh Muhammad Najatullah Shiddiqi from King Abdul Aziz University; Shaikh Muhammad 
Ahmad, economist of Pakistan; Shaikh Muhammad al-Madhani and Shaikh Mustafa Ahmad al–
Zarqa from University of Syria, are example of Islamic scholars who do not prohibit conventional 
insurance services.24 According to them, insurance is a cooperative; therefore, there is no usury 
applied in this type of transaction.  
This disagreement is beyond the scope of this dissertation, although it may have some 
effects on the level of public acceptance toward insurance services. This dissertation focuses on 
Islamic insurance as a global social phenomenon, which was introduced, regulated and 
implemented widely by Muslim societies to replace conventional insurance. 
Why is this important? 
Islamic insurance’s geographical penetration is overgrowing. Islamic insurance is 
regionally significant in Gulf Cooperation Countries/GCC mainly in Saudi Arabia (KSA), Iran where 
the government prohibits conventional insurance and South and Southeast Asia with Malaysia at 
its core development. Islamic insurance’s growth has primarily outpaced the insurance sector 
growth in these regions. The demand has grown particularly within the GCC, as there is a shift 
 
23 Paul Demko and Renuka Rayasam, "Why Desperate Families Are Getting Religion on Health Coverage," Politico, 
last modified February 4, 2018.https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/02/04/obamacare-religion-health-
care-216933  
24 Syakir Sula, Asuransi Syariah, Konsep dan Sistem Operasional, page 71–76, as cited in Muhammad Maksum, "The 




toward ethical, innovative and Sharia-compliant financial solutions. This growing need has also 
resulted in the launching of new Islamic insurance products, and these services are not only 
provided by Islamic countries, but also by American, European and Asian companies.25 Islamic 
insurance is growing fast and reaching new places where conventional insurance has not been 
able to succeed, especially in life insurance.26 In other words, the future development of global 
insurance cannot be separated from the development of Islamic insurance. 
Despite its growing importance within the global financial system and in the daily lives of 
individuals, Islamic insurance is the least understood compared to the other Islamic Financial 
Instruments (IFIs).  Islamic insurance’s gross contribution (gross premiums) is estimated at 
around $14.9 billion in 2015.27   After four decades, Islamic insurance’s total contribution has 
grown from $750 million in the year 2000, to $2.5 billion (2006), and then $12.4 (up to 23.9 billion 
including Iran in 2012). With an annual growth rate of 20%, growth Islamic insurance contribution 
is expected to be around $52.5 billion in 2020. Islamic insurance has also brought many players 
in the business. It started by a handful of operators in 1980s, increased by 58 operators in 2003, 
and then 241 operators in 39 countries in 2012 with total global employees are estimated 70,010 
(2013).28 After 37 years (2016), there is a total of 308 Islamic insurance companies globally with 
mainly delivering insurance services in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Even American 
International Group, Inc., or AIG has also been offering Sharia-compliant home-owners insurance 
in the US through its subsidiary, Lexington Insurance Company. This company provides custom-
tailored Sharia-compliant insurance solutions to consumers across the United States by working 
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together with a New Jersey-based insurance brokerage firm, Zayan Takaful.29 Despite this 
auspicious development, scholarly articles on the industry are sparse, particularly compared to 
the study on Islamic banking.  
If the industry is less understood, it is more so than the politics involving the Islamic 
insurance industry. Although insurance, in general, is one of the largest state-regulated 
industries, scholarly literature on insurance has ignored the political economy aspects of 
insurance regulation. Most of the studies on insurance stress on the economic structure of the 
insurance industry and the economic theory of regulation. The economic theory of regulation 
contends that regulation is sought by the industry and designed for its own benefit. “The 
argument is because insurance issues are generally complex and rarely salient; the insurance 
industry should have a great advantage over consumer groups, bureaucrats, and political 
elites.”30 This theory sees insurance as a ‘non-political’ issue. Arguably, the same reason has 
made political scientists reluctant to discussing the Islamic insurance industry.  
Furthermore, political scientists prefer to focus on social insurance, which is provided by 
the government rather than the one that is promoted by the private sector such as Islamic 
insurance. Governments spent much money through social insurance, which produced a 
substantial level of public expenditure in many developed economies. This scheme was the 
manifestation of what John G. Ruggie once called ‘embedded liberalism’: a global order made up 
of free-market societies with a compromise that allowed compensation for those who lost out 
from trade liberalization.31 Protecting the population against economic insecurity is a way of 
ensuring the dynamism of the economy to be politically sustainable and morally defensible. 
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The Political Economy of Regulation the Case of Insurance (Albany : State University of New York Press, 1988). 
31 In his essay published in 1982 by the Journal of International Organization, Ruggie describes how the global 
market system cannot last without social legitimacy. For that reason, the post-war global economy was created by 
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However, the acceleration of automation and globalization limit the ability of the national 
government in protecting its domestic workers. There has been a transfer of risk from previously 
managed by the state or employer to the individual. Everyone must decide by him or herself how 
to handle his or her pension plan, investment, and saving.32 As a result, insurance companies 
have become the dominant service provider for individuals and organizations to plan their future 
and protect them from losses. Rather than seeing this process as natural, we need to examine 
the homogenizing trend of the current neoliberalism. Perhaps, the growing importance of 
private-based Islamic insurance is as an instance of “The Retreat of the State” in the Islamdom.33  
Furthermore, even though the development of Islamic insurance is a clear manifestation 
of Islamic revival,34 political scientists have rarely put attention to this development compared to 
the issue of political Islam, radicalization, or even terrorism. It is surprising, especially when we 
understand that Islamic finance instruments including Islamic insurance are Muslims’ responses 
to capitalism as a social and economic phenomenon.35 One of prominent contemporary Islamic 
scholars in the West, Shaikh Hamza Yusuf, suggests that the single most important aspect of the 
Sharia after personal law of marriage are the commercial laws. Also, he adds that most Islamic 
books on Islamic law deal with issues on commerce.36  
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Islamic insurance shows how modern Muslims adapt their traditions to engage with 
today's world particularly the growing economic insecurity. It is an example of strategies that 
have enabled Muslims to remain true to their faith while engaging effectively with a world, not 
of their own making.37 This dissertation wants to present the transformation of Muslim societies, 
particularly about the interaction between what Muslims believe (religion) and what, as a 
consequence, they do in politics and economics.  
Furthermore, this research intends to give a scientific contribution toward the existing 
literature on Islamic insurance and International Political Economy (IPE) in several ways. Firstly, 
most research on Islamic insurance up to now has been survey driven and quantitative. This 
dissertation argues for qualitative research as a means of adding breadth and depth to existing 
studies of insurance implementation. Secondly, it intends to fill the gap within the studies of 
Islamic insurance development from its political determinants. The purpose is to understand how 
fate: potential harm, risk, crisis, economic insecurity, are manufactured and controlled in cultural 
and politico-economic context. Thirdly, it broadens the discussion of comparative IPE by including 
the social dimension of its analysis. It concerns how meaning ascribed to insurance changes over 
time, which is the behavior, the habit, and action of the consumers and providers within the 
system. The following paragraphs provide these expected contributions in further details.  
Aside from rational calculation, historical circumstances are also essential to understand 
the context of an economic institution such as Islamic insurance. The defining characteristic of 
the historical view is its emphasis on `path dependence': ways in which the cumulative past, 
including the history of shocks and their effects, change the structure of the economy. Most 
studies on Islamic insurance have an underlining assumption that Islamic insurance will 
eventually be accepted by Muslim societies universally. As they become more modern and 
religious, they become more acceptable toward modern financial schemes such as Islamic 
banking and Islamic insurance.  
On the contrary, the study of its historical context might push us to review this modernist 
view. A country with under-developed Islamic insurance may show a different path of response 






for that country. Some Muslim majority countries may pursue other ways of providing economic 
protection to their citizens such as through state or community-based assistance. The 
development gap in Islamic insurance and the various adjustments help us to identify different 
patterns of national response. This political process may depend not on the influence of doctrinal 
forms of Islam, but on historically, sociologically, and ideologically determined pattern of political 
agency.38 In line with that, it may refute a simple notion of homogenization of global Islamic 
finance.  
On the other hand, we cannot easily ignore the force of globalization of finance. It creates 
institutions and standards across different national boundaries. Thus, studying Islamic insurance 
can help us to examine the patterns of change within the Muslim societies especially in its 
relation to the economy. The consensus among historians suggests in the pre-modern Muslim 
societies economically defined social classes were relatively less significant as the famous Islamic 
historian, Ira Lapidus had claimed. 39The remaining puzzle would be whether this claim is still valid 
within the current context of economic globalization.  
In conclusion, this study is expected to broaden the theoretical discussion on comparative 
IPE. The works of such notables as Lindblom along with economists Robert Heilbroner and Lester 
Thurow argue that states and markets do not exist in a vacuum.40 There are usually many 
different social groups within a state who share identities, norms, associations based on tribal 
ties, ethnicity, religion, or gender. Examining the societal aspect helps us to understand the 
context where political economy institutions exist. Studying a value-laden financial service such 
as Islamic insurance helps us understand the relationship between political economy and cultural 
differences. Economic activity is not merely a process of producing, accumulating and distributing 
wealth, but it is also a cultural process where people construct meaning. Therefore, removing 
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cultural particularities in political economy analysis means dismissing context where our 
institutions exist.  
Finally, yet importantly, studying the context of institutions has practical consequences. 
Unless we learn to link cultural, local, domestic to the economic, international, and global, we 
will not be able to identify predictions and policies that work better. 
Case studies: three countries, three trajectories 
This study investigates the causes of Islamic insurance development gap between three 
Muslim majority countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan. Malaysia has shown a significant 
growth rate in Islamic insurance demand and outpacing conventional insurance, while other 
countries including Indonesia and Pakistan, the home for 225 million and 200.3 million or 12.7% 
and 11% of the world’s Muslims,41 are still standing far behind Malaysia. Not only different in 
growth, but these three countries also seem to have different strategies in developing their 
Islamic insurance industries. 
Since the 1980s, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan have experienced globalization in two 
folds: Islamization and economic liberalization. The 1979 revolution in Iran had an enormous 
global effect. It was for the first time Islamists gained power in a modern state. This event 
coincided with, and some have argued spurred, a broader resurgence of Islam around the world, 
including in these three countries.42  
Abbot and Gregorios-Pippas define Islamization as ‘the intensification of Islamic influence 
on social, cultural, economic and political relations.’43 There was an increasing religious 
commitment toward Islam among the middle classes in these countries. For instance, many 
Muslim women started using the veil in public. In many urban areas, Madrasahs or Islamic 
schools were established. The number of Muslim middle classes were increasing; consequently, 
it also led to an increase in their political demand and economic influences. They demanded the 
expansion of Sharia law in the judicial system. Some scholars prefer to use the term ‘Islamic 
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revival’ instead of Islamization to label specifically the phenomenon that happened in the post- 
1970s and to underline the growing universalistic Islamic identity, which transcends national and 
ethnic customs.44 In this dissertation, both terms are used interchangeably.  
At the same time, the economic stagflation of the 1970s encouraged many countries to 
look for a new economic system. Starting with Chile in 1975, various governments adopted and 
implemented liberal economic policies. Adding to that, the collapse of the Communist bloc at the 
end of the late 1980s generated political opposition to state interventionism in favor of 
unregulated market policies.  
Beginning in the early 1980s, Indonesia embarked on the most comprehensive trade 
liberalization program in its history under President Soeharto. The long-term goal of the reform 
program was to replace Indonesia's industrial development strategy of import-substitution 
industrialization with one of export-oriented industrial growth. In Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamad was inaugurated as the Prime Minister of Malaysia in 1981 with main agendas to boost 
Malaysia’s economy and to respond to the growing political threat from the Malaysian Islamist 
political party of PAS. Meanwhile, the government of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) was ousted 
in a coup d'état led by a former Army general, Zia-ul-Haq. He then became the sixth President of 
Pakistan with two cornerstones economic policy, including liberalization and Islamization of the 
economy. Islamic finance emerged within this context, in which the waves of Islamization and 
economic liberalization were sweeping the globe. 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan were the pioneers of Islamic finance, not only in the 
region but also in the world. Currently, these countries are the three most significant Islamic 
insurance markets in Asia. They are similar in many important dimensions. Islam has a prominent 
role in the social and political lives of the countries. Their population is majority Muslims. Pakistan 
declares itself as an Islamic state, while Malaysia gives special status for Islam as the religion of 
the Federation. Indonesia is not an Islamic state nor gives higher status to Islam, but Islam is the 
most adhered to religion in Indonesia, with around 87.2% of the population are Muslims. The 
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majority of Indonesian and Malaysian Muslims follow the Shafii School of law (madhhab).45 
Meanwhile, most Pakistanis are Hanafis with an also significant number of Shafii followers.46 The 
government of Indonesia provides legal protection and financial support for not only Islam but 
also other five other religions. The Constitution of Indonesia also states that Indonesia is not a 
secular but a religious country.  
 The political economy situation of these three countries before the year of 2000 was also 
similar. They had authoritarian governments who controlled their social and cultural institutions. 
These countries had elements of democracy, such as general election and mass media, but the 
governments had enormous power and resources to ensure that these democratic elements did 
not work against them. There was widespread government favoritism in the distribution of fiscal 
expenditures and extensive political influence in the allocation of credit. On the other hand, the 
governments did not provide vast social security benefits for their general populations. These 
governments had been looking to several approaches of reducing the burden on their fiscal 
budgets arising from benefits being paid out to their growing population, particularly since the 
1980s.  
Moreover, there was no compulsory insurance introduced in these countries (except for 
Indonesia after 2014 with a universal healthcare system of JKN). The leaders had preference over 
liberal economic policies but wanted to maintain their political control at the same time. The 
ability to distribute economic resources among their supporters was the key to their political 
successes.  Leaders in each country were avowed nationalists and maintained extensive personal 
control over the formation of economic policy.  
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan are multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries. There 
are over 300 ethnic groups live in an archipelago of 17,508 islands of Indonesia with Javanese 
constitutes the largest group. There is also diversity in the religious affiliation among Indonesians. 
The government only recognizes six official religions, but there are more than 245 non-official 
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religions in Indonesia, according to the Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP).47 
Malaysia society consists of three major ethnic groups: Malays, Chinese-Malaysian, and Indian-
Malaysia. In the eastern part of Malaysia, there is also a small number population of indigenous 
Bornean. Islam is the official religion, but Malaysia acknowledges the freedom of religion. As of 
the 2010 Population and Housing Census, 61.3 percent of the population practices Islam; 19.8 
percent Buddhism; 9.2 percent Christianity; 6.3 percent Hinduism; and 3.4 percent traditional 
Chinese religions. The remainder is other faiths, including Animism, Folk religion, Sikhism, Baha'i 
Faith, and other belief systems.48  
Meanwhile, Islam is the state religion of Pakistan, and around 98% of Pakistanis are 
Muslims. The majority are Sunni, and 6% of them are Shia.49 Other data shows that Shia-Pakistani 
population reaches 10-15% of the total Muslim population of Pakistan.50 Pakistan consists of 
diverse ethnic communities. The major ethnic groups in Pakistan in numerical size include 
Punjabis, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Siddis, Saraikis, Muhajirs, Baloch, Hindkowans, Chitralis, Gujarati and 
other smaller groups.51 
Indonesia and Malaysia are two neighboring countries located in Southeast Asia region 
and share many similarities beyond the similarity in religion. These include standard frames of 
reference in history and culture. Furthermore, Indonesia and Malaysia are also working closely 
together regionally and internationally. They are the founding members of ASEAN and APEC, and 
members of the Non-aligned Movement and Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).  
Despite sharing so many similarities, they achieve different levels of Islamic insurance 
development and Islamic finance in general. Malaysia has become the hub of Islamic finance of 
Southeast Asia and the world, while Indonesia still has a vast untapped market. Not only in Islamic 
insurance but Indonesia life insurance penetration was also 0.99% in 2015, lower than 
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neighboring Malaysia with 3.33%.52 It is partly due to the differences in the compulsory insurance 
regulations. The mandatory portion of insurance in both countries are small. However, Malaysia 
has a higher requirement than Indonesia. For instance, Indonesia requires only a basic life and 
accident insurance for a driver of an automobile, which includes in the vehicle registration and 
driver license fee. Although the tariff is standardized, Malaysia requires third-party protection in 
vehicle insurance.  
Furthermore, Malaysia has been officially developing Islamic finance since 1983 (Islamic 
insurance in 1984) with high government commitment and top-down approach comprehensively 
and pragmatically. On the other hand, the Government of Indonesia only started to support the 
development of Islamic finance in 1992 and Islamic insurance in 1994. There are less government 
support and more community initiative from below in Indonesia’s Islamic finance development.  
In 2016, total premiums and contributions of Malaysia’s insurance sector increased by 
4.4% to RM 61.3 billion or USD 14 billion (2015: +4% to RM 58.7 billion), while combined 
insurance and Islamic insurance assets expanded by 5% to RM 277 billion or USD 64 billion (2015: 
+5.7% to RM 263.8 billion). There were also 55 insurers and Islamic insurance operators, including 
reinsurers and Islamic re-insurance operators, in the industry as at end-2016.53 Altogether, 
Malaysia has been contributing by 70% of the total regional market of Southeast Asia and 13% of 
the global market of Islamic insurance, respectively.  
 Meanwhile, Indonesia Islamic insurance sector has been showing significant growth too 
by having the contribution of 19% of the total regional market. In 2016, Islamic insurance in 
Indonesia accounted for 6.2 percent of the overall Indonesia insurance market with asset more 
than 42 trillion IDR (3.1 million USD).54 Islamic insurance was introduced to Indonesian society 
through the establishment of PT Syarikat Takaful Indonesia (Takaful Indonesia) on 24 February 
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1994. It was the first Sharia-compliant insurance company in Indonesia, which was endorsed by 
ICMI (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals) and promoted through Islamic informal and 
formal organizations. Since then, Indonesia’s Islamic insurance has now developed into 20 Family 
Takaful companies, which consist of 3 Family Takaful companies and 17 units of Family Takaful, 
and 25 General Takaful composed of 2 fully-fledged Takaful companies and 23 units, and three 
Islamic re-insurance windows.55 In 2015, the Islamic Insurance Association of Indonesia (AASI) 
had 61 Islamic insurance companies listed as its members.56 The introduction of the new 
insurance law of 2014 was partly responsible for this positive development.  
Moreover, microtakaful or micro-Islamic insurance has been utilized to help poor 
especially in rural Indonesia. Through this micro Islamic insurance program, poor people only 
need to buy monthly premium of 5,000 IDR (50 cents) to receive proper health care against 
dengue fever. Micro Islamic insurance in Indonesia is an instance of the bottom-up approach of 
Indonesia’s Islamic finance strategy. It is based on Indonesia’s communitarian tradition, which 
has provided a strong foundation for the national economy. On the other hand, micro-Islamic 
insurance is lacking in Malaysia. Malaysia’s Islamic insurance companies focus more on the 
middle class and affluent Malay Muslims. Instead of providing social insurance, the state 
governments rely on the religious charity of zakat to assist their poor population. 
 In sum, Malaysia’s Islamic insurance industry has higher growth compared to Indonesia.  
Moreover, there is not the only gap in the level of development, but also differences in strategies. 
These two neighboring nations have different priorities related to the development of their 
Islamic insurance structure.57 
Pakistan shows another different story on its Islamic insurance development. In 2016, 
Pakistan was the third largest Takaful market in Asia along with Malaysia and Indonesia.58 
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Pakistan is an Islamic state. The creation of Pakistan was to establish land for Muslims. 
Demographically, Pakistan is more like Indonesia. Almost 95% of 180 million Pakistanis are 
Muslim. 
The government of Pakistan has been very involved in promoting various programs to 
bring Pakistan law in line with the principle of Sharia law. For instance, approximately 7,000 
interest-free counters were opened at all the nationalized commercial banks in January 1980, 
making Pakistan the first country in the Muslim world with the largest number of Islamic banking. 
In 2012, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, through notification S.R.O 
877(I)/2012 dated July 16, 2012, issued the Takaful rules 2012, allowing conventional insurers to 
operate Islamic insurance windows alongside their existing conventional insurance business, and 
conduct Islamic insurance business.  
Nevertheless, Pakistan has a very small Islamic insurance market (both total Islamic 
insurance penetration and density) compared to Malaysia, and even to Indonesia. There was no 
Islamic insurance company in Pakistan before 2006, and then only five companies operated in 
2012. In 2010, the gross premium of Islamic insurance in Pakistan was just US$ 25.92 million, 
which is quite small compared to Malaysia with US$ 1.5 billion within the same year.59 Pakistan 
started the Islamization of its economy since the 1980s, but it is not clear why Pakistan delayed 
the development of Islamic insurance until 2012. Pakistan preferred to focus on the 
implementation of Zakat (poor-due) to provide economic assistance for most of its poor 
population. 
Indeed, there are some differences in their economic characteristics, such as the level of 
poverty and globalization that influence the growth and the direction of countries’ Islamic 
insurance development. Pakistan has a higher level of poverty and a lesser connection to the 
global economy compares to Indonesia and Malaysia. However, this economic factor alone does 
not drive outcomes. Moreover, if this is more about religion as many insurance scholars 
suggested, what influence the acceptance toward Islamic insurance among the three countries’ 
population who profess the same religion of Islam? The variation between countries is still 
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puzzling. Consideration of the political and social aspects of Islamic insurance development in 
these countries is needed to complete the story. This dissertation project investigates various 
socio-political factors contributing to this gap and their different trajectories.  
‘Political life’ and ‘social life’ of Islamic insurance 
My theory on the development of Islamic insurance rests on the analysis of Islamic 
insurance as a product of political decision and social practice. It focuses on how the decision of 
political actors to embrace and regulate Islamic insurance as a state’s policy and the acceptance 
of public of Islamic insurance in their daily lives influence the development gap of Islamic 
insurance between the three countries. This dissertation aims to understand the whole picture 
of Islamic insurance development; therefore, it concerns less on how an increase or decrease in 
a unit of independent variables influences changes in the unit of dependent variables. 
The literature on Islamic insurance suggests most demographic and economic factors for 
conventional insurance demand are also responsible for the development of Islamic insurance in 
the countries. Although Islamic insurance was designed as an alternative to conventional 
insurance, it needs similar conditions to grow. The factors such as inflation, income, education, 
urbanization, and dependency ratio are affecting the country’s Islamic insurance development. 
These factors are essential; however, they cannot fully explain the reason why the government 
and its people supporting or rejecting Islamic insurance as an accepted and normative practice 
within society. Those findings are beneficial only when we disregard the historical context and 
socio-political particularities of the countries. For instance, the increase in income does not 
necessarily affect Islamic insurance development if the government outlaws its practice in the 
first place.  
Moreover, those variables also cannot depict the reasons why Islamic insurance is 
organized and structured in a certain way; for instance, the way dispute should be solved. The 
law in Malaysia gives that authority to civilian court, while in Indonesia dispute settlement is 
managed under Islamic court jurisdiction. So, why they introduce it in the first place? Why the 
government regulates it? These are political and cultural related questions, which cannot be 




As mentioned before, most research on insurance to date has been survey-driven and 
quantitative. This dissertation makes a case for qualitative research on the ‘political life’ and the 
‘social life’ of Islamic insurance in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan as a means of adding breadth 
and depth to existing studies of insurance implementation. 
The term ‘political life of Islamic insurance’ is developed based on the argument that 
Islamic insurance arrangements are not a passive response to some efficiency criterion but rather 
the product of political deals within country’s polity that determine which laws are passed.60 The 
payment, involving all the details of how providers are paid, incentives, and so on; and 
organization, the structure of Islamic insurance system, risk pooling and the division of labor of 
institutions within it are an outcome of political decisions. The political life of Islamic insurance 
in these three countries is examined through the analysis of political coalitions behind the 
institutionalization of Islamic insurance and Islamic finance in general since the 1980s.  
The usage of the term ‘social life of Islamic insurance’ refers to a framework for 
understanding Islamic insurance as a commodity whose worth lies both within and beyond its 
exchange value.61  It calls attention to how insurance moves between registers of value among 
different stakeholders and at various scales of analysis. It also encompasses how meaning 
ascribed to insurance changes over time. It is the behavior, the habit, and action of the consumers 
and providers within the system. Based on Ami Dao’s ideas on the social life of health insurance, 
we can analyze the social life of Islamic insurance through the interaction of various factors, 
including the sociocultural, economic, political, historical, and “global-local” that contribute to 
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Figure 1-1: Theoretical Framework 
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The diagram above summarizes the arguments of political life and social life of Islamic 
insurance. Chapter II, literature review, presents the reasoning behind this theoretical framework 
in further detail. However, the purpose of this dissertation is not to test hypotheses nor to make 
a generalization. The theoretical framework shown above is a descriptive tool and it should not 
be treated as a universal model. This dissertation is case studies that observe, explore the cause 
and effect relationships between variables over time and across scales, and trace processes of 
Islamic insurance development of these countries. The intention is to trace the political coalition 
processes behind the development of Islamic insurance, examine the influence of political and 
economic actors and institutions, look at the effect of ‘path dependence’ on each country, and 
to show in detail the ebb and flow of religious devotion, ideologies and self-definition of Muslims 
interacting with modernity and capitalism.  
Global Islam & 
neoliberalism 














Data and methods 
This dissertation draws on secondary works in several other disciplines: not just political 
science and history, but also anthropology, economics, sociology and religious studies. The design 
of this study mostly follows a qualitative research methodology specifically case study and 
combines a range of primarily qualitative approaches. It analyzes political parties and coalition 
platforms, organizations’ charters, and press releases to trace contemporary and prior political 
norms, priorities, and strategies. Ethnographic and historical studies, documents, and secondary 
sources help to understand the social and cultural circumstances. Quantitative resources such as 
survey data and statistics are used when possible.  
This dissertation focuses on the period between the initiations of Islamic insurance 
regulation in each country until the present time. However, the major part of this research will 
be dedicated to examining the socio-political process surrounding the enactment of those 
regulations. The different starting date of Islamic insurance development is in itself a puzzle as 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan started the whole project of Islamization of economy relatively 
at the same time in the early 1980s.  Therefore, the development of Islamic insurance cannot be 
separated from the development of other Islamic financial institutions such as Islamic bank and 
the implementation of religious tax of Zakat, and the role of Islam in these countries in general.  
Moreover, it is necessary to discuss the historical background as far as since these countries 
became independent nations.  
Data on national Islamic insurance growth of each country are available from many 
sources. However, Malaysia has an abundance of quantitative data on Islamic insurance; 
meanwhile, reliable quantitative data from Indonesia and Pakistan are scarce. In Malaysia, Bank 
Negara Malaysia provides both data on conventional insurance and Islamic insurance along with 
other economic indicators. The Central Bank of Indonesia does not regulate Islamic insurance 
and other insurance products. Indonesia Financial Services Authority (OJK) is the one who 
regulates, monitors, and provides up to date data on insurance including Islamic insurance. Data 
on Islamic insurance in Pakistan is still limited. The State Bank and Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan offer insurance data in one package; therefore, data on insurance 




used.  Auditing and consulting firms provide annual growth data, market research and normative-
juridical reports on insurance and Islamic insurance of many countries.  
The primary goal of this research is to understand the Islamic insurance phenomenon by 
focusing on the total picture rather than breaking it down into variables. It is to see a holistic 
picture and depth of understanding of Islamic insurance development.63 Therefore, this 
dissertation uses a method suggested by Calomiris and Faber in their study of the political origins 
of Banking Crises.  
Different from other economists, Calomiris and Faber write ‘narrative history’ of six case 
studies to draw some general lessons on the banking system. They argue that considering the 
historical context to understand the factors that shape complex systems such as the banking 
system are important. Without that, we omitted the most important dimension that is time, 
which can lead to misinterpretation of the deeper meaning of the correlations between variables. 
They said: 
Researchers who do not take history seriously wind up reducing the study of complex 
banking systems to an analysis of correlations among various influences… This approach 
often fails to find the connections because the influences being modeled are considered 
without taking context into account. And when such a modeling approach does find 
empirical correlations, the meaning can be misinterpreted because the correlations 
identified by the researcher reflect deeper, omitted influences on all the variables being 
measured. 64  
Similarly, with its emphasis on the context-bound and holistic approach of theory 
generation, this dissertation seeks to understand Islamic insurance development by identifying 
and categorizing vital elements of the phenomenon that emerge from data, rather than to verify 
theory or to describe data. This method helps us to understand the complexity of the problem of 
Islamic insurance development in these three countries. 
Lastly, Islamic insurance is part of a bigger Islamic finance regulatory structure. Some 
countries regulate it separately and in a very detail manner. Malaysia, for instance, has a very 
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sophisticated Islamic insurance program. In this case, we can expect more information and 
specific data on the political processes of Islamic insurance. Meanwhile, other countries regulate 
it together with other Islamic finance instruments. Therefore, there are not many specific data 
available except the data within the general discussion of the political processes of Islamic 
finance.  
Dissertation organization 
The dissertation consists of six chapters. As shown above, the Introduction Chapter 
provides an argument for the significance of the problem, contextualizes the study, and 
introduces the fundamental component of this dissertation. Islamic insurance has been rapidly 
growing in the Islamdom since the 1980s. However, there has been a development gap between 
countries. This dissertation is an effort to explain that gap in selected countries. 
 Chapter 2 is a literature review of this study. This chapter places the dissertation in the 
context of the previous research and scholarly material on Islamic insurance, insurance in general 
and International Political Economy (IPE). It addresses a gap in the literature on the lack of study 
on the political and social determinants of Islamic insurance development. This chapter provides 
a strong theoretical basis for the dissertation for analyzing the ‘political life’ and the ‘social life’ 
of Islamic insurance within Muslim societies.  
The next three chapters are the empirical chapters of this dissertation. These chapters 
organize and report the study’s main findings, identifying what is significant, and making sense 
of large amounts of data concerning the Islamic insurance development of the three countries. 
These chapters are organized similarly, and each country is fully discussed in one complete 
chapter. All chapters start with a brief introduction of the country, particularly the role of Islam 
in the country’s political economy ecosystem. Then the chapters continue by elaboration of data, 
including quantitative and qualitative (narrative data), on the development of Islamic insurance 
in each country. The discussion on coalitional politics and social aspects of Islamic insurance are 
provided afterwards. These chapters synthesize and discuss the results considering the study’s 
research questions, literature review, and conceptual framework.  The three empirical chapters 




Pakistan. These chapters are the foundation for the reflections, conclusions, and 
recommendations that will appear in the next chapter. 
The last chapter, Chapter 6, provides the conclusion of this research project and 
recommendation for further research. Moreover, this chapter offers a thorough reflection on the 
study’s findings, and the practical and theoretical implication thereof. The goal is to discover what 
meaning we can make of them by comparing the findings both within and across country case 
studies, and with those of other studies. This chapter ends with the identification of relevant 










This literature review chapter discusses the factors of Islamic insurance development 
provided by the current research on Islamic insurance. It is also a detail elaboration of the 
theoretical framework presented previously in the introduction chapter. In general, the literature 
show most demographic and economic factors for conventional insurance demand are also 
responsible for the development of Islamic insurance in the countries. Although Islamic insurance 
was designed as an alternative to conventional insurance, it needs similar conditions to grow. 
The factors such as inflation, income, education, urbanization, and dependency ratio are 
affecting the country’s Islamic insurance development. These factors are essential; however, they 
cannot fully explain for variations among the three countries of our case studies: Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Pakistan. Therefore, it is essential to understand the correlations between those 
factors by considering the political and social institutions within which Islamic insurance systems 
are constructed.  
This chapter starts by providing a general overview of the importance of insurance in 
international political economy (IPE) discourse. Then, it continues by reviewing the common 
explanations offered by conventional economists on Islamic insurance development. Almost all 
studies provide a static comparison by presenting Islamic insurance as a universal product that 
necessitates similar determinants to grow, regardless of countries’ particularities. Next, this 
literature review elaborates alternative explanations consisting of two categories: political and 
social explanations. Lastly, this chapter provides a comprehensive synthesis of the literature 
review, arguing the importance of socio-political factors to understand Islamic insurance 




Insurance: an institutional history  
 Insurance is an institution created by humanity to handle the risk of economic loss. It 
provides constraints that structure how we manage economic risk.65 The practice dates back to 
the Hammurabi Code, which offered basic insurance in that a debtor did not have to pay back his 
loans if some personal catastrophe made it impossible (disability, death, flooding, etc.).66 Then, 
it developed into a sophisticated actuarial science when in 1654, Blaise Pascal and Pierre de 
Fermat discovered a way to understand the level of risk, thereby, actuaries can calculate the 
insurance rates. Using the probabilistic method, they counted the amount of capital needed to 
overcome future losses. Since then, insurance shifted the focus from preventing to compensating 
possible losses. This innovation makes insurance as an important part of the development of the 
market economy. It has enabled capital accumulation, especially for risky business ventures.67 
In general, contemporary insurance can be categorized into two mechanisms: spreading 
risk among large numbers of people and/or moving risk to entities that can handle it. The 
collective insurance fund of the guild system during the Middle Ages was an example of spreading 
risk among group members (cooperative), while the practice of underwriting during voyages to 
the New World was an example of moving risk- the origin of joint-stock enterprises. Both are the 
core practices of contemporary insurance.68 
 Every civilization has been dealing with economic insecurity for so long. However, the 
concept of risk is quite modern. Risk is a concept to transform the unpredictable into something 
that calculable. The traditional society emphasizes on anticipation of the actual prevalence of 
life-threatening dangers, which lead to economic insecurity. God or Nature is the source of this 
unpredictable insecurity. Anthony Giddens argues that there has been a substantial historical 
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transformation of the nature of risk -and security.69 People in the modern age are relatively more 
secure than they were in previous ages. They have longer life expectation and freedom from 
serious disease.  
Nonetheless, the physical security of modern people is balanced by new risks: war, 
nuclear threat, motor accident, environmental degradation, etc. These risks are not generated 
by natural causes, but as results of modern social organization or so-called abstract system.70 
Furthermore, these new risks affect everyone or at least very large numbers of people on the 
planet.71 The new risks are considered as manufactured risks, which resulted from the human 
activity. Therefore, instead of merely anticipation from the impact of natural causes as happened 
during the traditional society, control of risk is the essential feature of responding toward 
manufactured risks of modern society.  
Modern Insurance is a modus operandi for modern society to control economic risk. It 
has been developed through the role of the state and the market, which are the two most 
important parts of four dimension of modernity discussed by Giddens.72 State and market 
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becomes more and more commonplace. Anthony Giddens, The Consequence of Modernity (Stanford, California: 
Standford University Press, 1990). 
71 Ibid. 
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global political order, corporations are the dominant agents within the world economy. See Anthony Giddens, 
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become crucial actors because the traditional institutions and culture can no longer provide the 
necessary protection for modern people. Giddens argues:  
The security 'threat' which individuals face is, at base, the threat to their very identity 
from the ways in which abstract systems instead of Nature operate. The challenge to 
individuals is to construct and reconstruct their own identity, which is no longer given for 
them by traditional institutions and cultures but are constantly at risk. 73  
Adding to that, the informal mechanisms have become obsolete also because of the 
‘actuarial technique’ itself. There is no need for ‘community’ or ‘social capital’ for modern 
insurance to work. In his work of The Emergence of Risk Society: Insurance, Law, and the State, 
Jonathan Simon asserts that the modern way of managing risk reconstructs individual and social 
phenomena as risk object rather than a moral agent and member of society. It focuses on one’s 
risk profile rather than biographical individuals. Individual identity is a combination of variables 
associated with different categories and level of risk.  
Furthermore, insurance provides a sense of security not by disciplining individuals and 
prevent harm through moral tools (e.g. rituals, punishment, and excommunication) but by 
calculating the aggregate cost in order to compensate for the harm. Using the example of auto 
insurance, Simon argues that the actuarial technique creates a new social fact. A traffic accident 
is no longer considered as a deviance act to be eliminated but as just a part of the consequences 
of living in society and has a significant probability of happening.74 Statistics has replaced taboos 
and traditions in structuring the way we deal with economic risk.  
Insurance managers offer us comfort for this economic insecurity through a promise to 
pay compensation for the losses. They convert our liability to risk into a liability to themselves to 
pay the cost of compensating us. Later on, this type of personal risk is multiplied by the increase 
in economic transactions. In a planned economy such as the former Soviet Union, State was the 
universal insurer. The government decided whose risks should be translated into costs, and it 
was the state that decided who should bear the cost. Mostly, the cost was imposed on the citizens 
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in forms of taxes, inflation, in shortages, and poor public services. Usually, some resource 
transfers as in progressive taxation are used in this state-scheme mechanism.  
On the contrary, the power to decide about risks is more mixed in the market economy. 
The main responsibility for insuring against risks of economic insecurity is left by the State to the 
individual that empower players in the market to decide. This means the individuals as potential 
buyer of insurance service and the seller are free to negotiate and take the decision on access, 
price, and availability of benefits. For that reason, Susan Strange argues insurance practices entail 
power relations. It lies on who is translating risks into a cost.75  
Moreover, insurance as a global practice was indispensable for the development of the 
market economy. Strange considers insurance business as an instance of diffusion of power in 
the world economy. It is one of Strange’s empirical proof of diffusion of power in the world 
economy: “that power has shifted “sideways” from states to market and other non-state actors 
who derive power from their market shares.” The power relations are also reflected in whose 
favor it operates. As in the case insurance within the market economy, Strange states: 
When the insurance business is left to the market, the result is usually the rich, 
individually or collectively, can choose whether to translate, through insurance 
premiums, some element of risk into a cost. Insurance gives them the option. The poor, 
unable or unwilling, or both to pay the premiums are left with the risk.76 
Competition does not necessarily eliminate the opportunity of monopoly by big 
companies. As the service becomes more global, the big global companies have a comparative 
advantage, especially compares to the developing countries, which act as state insurer. 
Therefore, developing countries tend to be more protective in term of their insurance businesses. 
Allowing saving to be converted into foreign currency -in the form of insurance premiums- out of 
national currency is considered as a threat to the well-being of their economy. According to 
Strange, therefore Brazil and India, among others, opposed the American proposal of extending 
 





the liberalization of goods into services including insurance in the mid-1980s during the GATT’s 
Uruguay round.77 
 Many scholars argue that the institutionalization processes are in the direction toward a 
more economically efficient, complex, global and impersonal institution or market. It seems there 
is no place for the informal institution of insurance within the modern and globalized economy. 
It is far from it. Rather than disappearing, the personal and social alternatives of insurance are 
gaining importance in many places.78 People turn again to the informal when ‘the state is 
retreating’ and at the same time, the market is operating against their favor. As some researchers 
have documented, poor farm-households are less keen to adopt high risk/high return 
technologies than rich households are. The consequence, there has been a very low insurance 
penetration among the poor. However, introducing formal insurance to the poor is not an easy 
task. It often generates a moral hazard among this community.79  
 Regarding Islamic insurance, Atiquzzafar Khan argues the Muslims first became aware of 
the practice of insurance because of trade contacts between Europe and the Ottoman Empire.80 
However, the Muslims did not develop insurance until the 21st century. In addition, in 1914, there 
were around 170 insurance companies offering insurance services: life, transport, and life 
insurance, in Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire. All of them were European companies 
with roughly one-thirds of these were German-speaking companies.81The possible reason is that 
cooperative practices in both personal and business life substantially reduce the need for 
insurance – a society is expected to take care of those in need. Insurance was not needed in the 
original Islamic Empire, despite the existence of an extensive global trade network.82 
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Furthermore, the central question related to insurance within Muslim societies is always 
about its permissibility. When questioned about the permissibility of insurance, scholars of 
Islamic law have generally given negative answers. While they recognized the utility of the 
practice, they found that it conflicts with Islamic law on several grounds of the uncertainty about 
the product received, the element of usury, and gambling as discussed before in the introduction 
of this dissertation. 
Given the nearly unanimous verdict on the prohibition of insurance, the next question is 
what alternatives might be possible. Many of the Islamic scholars reject the approach of 
modifying existing institutions to conform to Islamic law and suggests that Muslims should 
develop Islamic alternatives to clarify the radical differences between Islamic and capitalist forms 
of insurance. They call this alternative insurance with unique name, Takaful. The scholars 
examine the purpose of various types of insurance contract, assesses the conformity between 
their purpose and Islamic law and historical precedence in the Islamic tradition, and suggests 
different methods to achieve the same purpose that are within the domain of Islamic law.83  
Takaful or Islamic insurance has been promoted as an Islamic alternative for the 
immorality of conventional insurance. According to its supporters, Islamic insurance is not simply 
a compromised form of Western risk management. It is argued that the motivation of Islamic 
insurance is different from how the Victorian recasting of Christian duty to provide the family’s 
future. Islamic insurance is claimed to be a tool not only for the benefit of individual and family, 
but also to reduce unequal wealth distribution in the society, which resulted from the interest-
based economy.84 
According to the Sharia, government-sponsored plans are generally acceptable. The 
reason is because Sharia provides ruling that governments are responsible for taking care of their 
citizens. Meanwhile, private sector insurance schemes are acceptable but with some conditions. 
The general principles on which private scheme of Islamic insurance are based are different from 
conventional insurance contracts. According to the Sharia, the foundation of assurance can be 
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based only on cooperation, mutual sympathy, brotherhood, and mutual guarantee. The system, 
which the real and basic aim is business, profit-making, and money is hoarding cannot be 
adopted. Islamic law permits only mutual insurance, where a group collectively safeguards the 
interests of its members and acts to support them in the case of damage.85  
What we know about its determinants 
Like conventional insurance, the country’s Islamic insurance development is commonly 
measured by insurance penetration and density. Insurance penetration is expressed as a ratio of 
premium to another financial measure like Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while Insurance 
density refers to a product's number of customers by geographic area (country, state etc.). It is 
usually expressed a ratio of premium to a population. Both indicators comprise the insurance 
demand of the country. 
In the literature of economics and finances, determinants of insurance demand in 
national level are divided into two broad categories of macroeconomic and demographic factors. 
A comprehensive study by Feyen, Lester, Rocha86 concludes that life and non-life insurance 
sectors premiums ‘are driven by per capita income, population size and density, demographic 
structures, income distribution, the size of the public pension system, state ownership of 
insurance companies, the availability of private credit, and religion’. Income is considered as the 
best predictor of insurance demand as it leads to more affordability and ultimate higher demand 
for an insurance product. Other studies regarding the demand for life insurance in the Muslim 
majority countries are also confirming this conclusion. Baharul-Ulum and Yaakob found that the 
GDP of the country plays a vital role in reshaping insurance demand in Malaysia.87 In addition, 
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Zerriaa and Noubbigh findings show the positive impact of GDP per capita income toward 
insurance demand across the MENA region.88 
Demographic factors also play an important role. Expansion of cities and towns due to 
industrialization and urbanization provides opportunities for the insurance sector to grow 
especially in developing economies. Hwang and Gao found a positive impact of urbanization on 
saving propensity of urban people in China. They argue that insurance can play a vital role in 
providing protection and financial security to small families living in China’s new urban centers. 
Not only China, life insurance products and urbanization are found positively related in other 
Asian countries too. 89 However, some studies have found an insignificant impact of urbanization 
on life insurance in Central and East European countries.90 However, there is contradictory 
findings related to non-life insurance demand. Park and Lemaire found positive relationship of 
urbanization to non-life insurance demand while Treerattanapun found it insignificant.91Also, 
Simona Laura Dragos’s comparative research founds a positive and significant impact on non-life 
insurance for both Asian and Central and East European countries (CEE). However, regarding life 
insurance, Dragos founds urbanization only has positive and significant impact in Asian region 
only. 92 
Financial sector development plays a vital role in economic growth through strengthening 
the financial institutions and building investors’ confidence. Cash flows and financial assets 
securitization create a close link between financial sector developments and insurance demand. 
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On the other hand, after the global financial crisis, financial sectors (especially banking 
developments) more focused on insurance backed investments to minimize the unexpected 
losses. Financial sector development encourages investors to obtain ownership of financial assets 
to secure their future income and to expand their operations. Therefore, it generates the need 
to secure these assets through insurance products results in their increasing demand.93  
Interestingly, Islam as religion is considered by many researchers as an obstacle to 
insurance development. According to their findings, most Muslim majority countries have a very 
low insurance demand. It is thought that the reason is that prohibition of usury and speculative 
economic activities. Researchers consider this prohibition makes Muslim population reluctance 
in buying conventional insurance premium. Presumably, this prohibition encourages the 
development of Takaful or Islamic insurance as alternative insurance.  
Inflation is also an important factor, which has an ambiguous correlation with insurance 
development. Customers are sensitive to the change in inflation realized or anticipated, and this 
might result in reducing the consumption of insurance products.94 It results in a decline of 
insurance demand. On the other hand, Hwang and Gao found that insurance demand, in the case 
of China, was not adversely affected by higher inflation. It is because the higher inflation period 
happens when there is also higher economic growth. In summary, people using these products 
were less responsive towards change in their demand for insurance products.95  
Another significant demographic factor is education. Education is used as a proxy for the 
level of risk aversion and awareness. Most the studies indicate a positive relationship between 
general insurance and education illustrating that education enhances knowledge regarding 
financial stability threats, insurance benefits and awareness of risk mitigation.96 
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Adding to education, the ratio of average family member’s young and old dependent for 
support within the family is also an essential factor. It is defined as dependency ratio. Providing 
protection from financial hardships to their dependent family members is the basic driving force 
for the demand and consumption of these insurance products. Some studies have documented 
a positive relationship between dependency ratio and insurance demand.97 
Several studies on Islamic insurance confirm similar findings. For example, a survey by 
Rahman, Rosylin, and Faizah98 founds a positive relationship of GDP per capita and Islamic 
insurance demand in Malaysia. Both conventional insurance and Islamic insurance tend to 
develop well in the country with high GDP per capita. As the people are getting wealthier, they 
can spend some of their income for insurance, regardless the type of the insurance. Other 
economic aspect that relevant to Islamic insurance is inflation. Redzuan et al. depicted a negative 
but insignificant relationship of inflation with Family Takaful demand. They asserted that inflation 
depresses the value of financial assets, life insurance and Family Takaful products.99  
Studies on factors of education have shown consistent relationship with conventional 
insurance, but it show mixed evidence in relation to Islamic insurance.100 Hawariyuni in her study 
indicated that education is not a significant variable affecting Islamic insurance demand, as it is 
not necessary that highly educated people buy these Islamic insurance products. 101 Sherif 
determined that education was found having a positive influence on Islamic insurance demand. 
102 Abdullah found a positive but insignificant impact of education on demand for life insurance 
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and Family Takaful. 103 Redzuan, in his study analyzing Malaysian life insurance and Family Takaful 
from period 1970–2008 using ARDL approach, found a significantly positive and long run impact 
of education level on life insurance and Family Takaful demand. 104 Islamic insurance is even more 
limited in highly educated people according to Akhter & Hussain. 105 Altogether, education might 
not be considered a true measure and proxy for awareness of Islamic insurance. 
Likewise, Akhter, Khan and El-Gammal conduct a parallel study between conventional 
insurance and Islamic insurance by using similar determinants. They also compile all existing 
literature of Islamic insurance. They observe 33 countries worldwide where both Islamic 
insurance and conventional insurance operators exist. They conclude: 
For conventional insurance demand, income, urbanization, financial sector 
developments, inflation and education are the significant factors, while for Islamic 
insurance demand, inflation, income, education, urbanization and dependency ratio are 
significant factors affecting their relative demand. For the ASEAN region, income, 
urbanization, and financial sector developments have significant positive impact for both 
insurance and Islamic insurance demand but dependency ratio shows negative impact. 
Inflation shows positive impact for Islamic insurance demand while negative impact on 
insurance. In case of Middle East region, income, inflation and urbanization shows 
positive impact on both products demand while dependency reveals negative impact. 
Education shows positive triggering insurance demand while affecting negatively to 
Islamic insurance demand due to due to lack of its awareness. 106 
From that observation, it can be inferred that the very similar domestic factors influencing 
for conventional insurance demand are also responsible for the development of Islamic 
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insurance. A possible explanation for this similarity is because Islamic insurance, despite its initial 
intention of being alternative insurance, still needs similar conditions to grow.  
Altogether, previous studies on insurance and Islamic insurance have provided various 
useful explanations for the national demand of Islamic insurance. However, almost all of them 
consider these financial services develop in an institutional, historical, and cultural-absent space. 
Those factors are unable to fully account for variation in Islamic insurance development among 
the three countries included in this study. In addition, these countries have many commonalities 
in these factors. Moreover, Akhter, Khan and El Gammal suggest that literature on Islamic 
insurance are lack of discussion on its institutional and political factors. According to them, 
‘future studies could be conducted using insurance and Islamic insurance product lines (life or 
nonlife insurance with family or general Takaful) considering the global financial crisis, 
institutional and political factors impact on their demand’.  Without dismissing these findings, 
there is an urgent need to understand Islamic insurance development in a more comprehensive 
manner. Islamic insurance is designed as a private-based mechanism, but its development has 
been shaped by political, legal, institutional, and cultural limitations of the country.  
The figure below shows the current state of study on Islamic insurance. Most of the study 
are focusing on the economic determinants of Islamic insurance. Meanwhile, the discussion on 
its politics and social aspects of Islamic insurance is quite scarce. 
 





Islamic insurance as a political product 
The existence of the global financial crisis is part of an international environment that can 
be influential in the development of Islamic insurance. According to Ercanbrack, the process of 
producing Islamic finance law, products and services illustrate complex fields of action driven by 
power dynamics, neoliberal paradigms and the institutional momentum of the global 
economy.107 The timing of Islamic insurance establishment in a country can be decisive for its 
development.  As a global service, insurance needs global linkage in order to grow. This is the 
environment where the company can re-invest and gain capital. Some of the Islamic insurance 
companies have managed to develop sophisticated Islamic re-insurance portfolios that sustain 
their development.108 This statement shows that political institutions are a vital element in the 
development of Islamic insurance. 
Political coalition formation 
In Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises & Scarce Credit, Charles 
Calomiris and Stephen Haber argue that the modern Banking arrangements are ‘not a passive 
response to some efficiency criterion but rather the product of political deals that determine 
which laws are passed’. 109 They provide a rich history of banking over the last couple of centuries 
to convince us that banking instability has its roots, not in any fragility inherent to commercial 
banking, but in deals struck between governments and various interest groups.  The book 
discusses the question of why banking systems are unstable in so many countries, but not in the 
others. For instance, the United States has had twelve banking crises since 1840, while Canada 
has had none.  Economists have been developing models to explain those crises. Banking 
performance is shown in two indicators: credit abundance and the propensity of crises. They 
understand that the monopolization of banking will tend to result in reduced supply credit, which 
leads to low banking performance and decreases prosperity. Nonetheless, the models cannot 
explain why such a system of monopolized banking would arise in some countries.  
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According to them, the banking performance of a country is related to the bargaining 
process within the banking system or so-called the Game of Bank Bargains. It is a strategic 
interaction between the government and private sectors. The game operates according to the 
logic of politics, not the logic of efficiency. The game governs entry and competition, the pricing 
of credit and its terms, and the allocation of losses when banks fail. Who is in the partnership 
varies across countries and within countries over time--because who else is in the partnership 
depends on who is politically crucial?  
Three political realities shape this bargaining game. There is active encouragement of the 
government, the political coalition in charge of banking policy, and regulatory framework. 
Successful banking cannot develop without government support. For instance, if the government 
is lacking the desire to allow a competitive environment to flourish due to fiscal needs, the 
banking system will be repressed. On the contrary, as in England before 1820s, the government 
permitted a competitive bank system to develop thus, created a stable system with an 
abundance of credit available for private sectors. Bank crises can happen in autocracies and 
populist democracies. It is not the political system per se, but what kind of political coalition 
designs the country’s banking system. Crises occur in the countries with political coalition ‘that is 
willing to tolerate instability as the price for obtaining the benefits that it extracts from 
controlling banking regulations.’110 
Moreover, the discussion on regulations should focus on the outcome of the regulations. 
It should not focus on whether the institution needs more or fewer rules or regulations. Some 
countries create more regulations but facilitate better market outcome, while others initiate 
deregulation that ends up at market failure.   
The domestic institutional arrangement especially the insurance regulation is crucial for 
Islamic insurance development. Meier suggests insurance regulation is similar to other forms of 
regulation, that it is inherently a political process whereby political actors seek to allocate the 
powers of the state for their benefit. Furthermore, he identifies four major political actors (or 
sets of actors) in the literature: the regulatory agency (i.e., the insurance commission), the 






not exclusively in this case consumer interest groups), and political elites (legislators, chief 
executives, federal officials, et. al.) 111  
 The political elites are particularly crucial within Muslim societies throughout history. 
Nonetheless, the support from the political elites or government does not always give a positive 
impact on Islamic insurance development. Calomiris and Haber have shown in the case of the 
banking system that the issue is on how and what support the government provides.112 
However, a single political actor cannot determine the development of Islamic insurance 
in a country. Islamic insurance development is a result of the interaction of different political 
actors. Therefore, Islamic insurance flourishes when there are institutional support and 
regulatory framework as a product of the coalition among the political actors involved.   
The scholars of State-Society relations elaborate on the interactions between the state 
institutions and societal groups to negotiate how public authority is exercised and study how 
people can influence it. They consider states and societies are both mutually dependent and 
mutually constitutive.113 The following paragraphs explain the relevance of state-society 
scholarship with Islamic insurance.  
Islamic insurance developed within a broader popular demand for Islamization or Islamic 
revivalism. The 1979 revolution in Iran had an enormous global effect. It was for the first time 
Islamists gained power in a modern state. This event coincided with, and some have argued 
spurred, a broader resurgence of Islam around the world, including in these three countries.114 
Abbot defines Islamization as ‘the intensification of Islamic influence on social, cultural, economic 
and political relations.’115 There was an increasing commitment toward Islam among the middle 
classes in these countries. The state has a range of options from to co-opt, to accommodate, and 
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to repress those demands. Furthermore, this state-society relations framework provides us with 
a deeper understanding of how incentive is generated, and legitimacy is acquired by the state.  
The nature of the political settlement can greatly affect upon state-society relations. In 
many fragile and conflict-affected states, relations are based on patronage and lack of 
accountability. The prominence of informal institutions and relationships and unofficial processes 
result in divergences between formal systems and rules and actual practice. As we will see in the 
case study of Pakistan, the Pakistani political elites, who benefit from patronage and income from 
natural resource rents and criminal activities, often have little incentive to engage with citizens 
and to build effective public authority. The concentration of power in a few elites also limits the 
participation of citizens from public life. In some situations, citizens may be excluded from public 
life through state repression and violence. This results in a legacy of negative and weak state-
society relations. Efforts to promote an inclusive political settlement can re-shape relations and 
contribute to political and social transformation. Moreover, to understand the reason for the 
elites to support or reject Islamic insurance, we need to put greater attention to questions of 
power and altering elite incentives.116 
The country’s fundamental political institutions structure the complex bargains made 
between various groups within each country polity. This understanding leads us to the concept 
of path dependence. Path dependence is the idea that decisions we are faced with depending on 
past knowledge trajectory and decisions made and are thus limited by the current competence 
base. In other words, history matters for current decision-making situations and has a strong 
influence on strategic planning. 
 
Institutional economics 
Institutional economics would argue that the emergence of Islamic insurance or any 
contemporary economic models could be explained from the institutional evolutionary process 
within certain society in the past. Specifically, on insurance, the transformation of uncertainty 
into risk marked the final shift of primitive/traditional exchange into a modern system. 
 





Accordingly, the process is influenced by the interaction of the intensity and extensity of 
economic activity (capital), innovations, and the role of a political institution or the state. 
Institutional economists develop analytical frameworks specifically to explain the 
influence of institutions on economic performance through long periods of time. According to 
them, the current forms of political, economic, and even military organization are derived from 
the opportunity set provided by the institutional structure that evolved incrementally. This idea 
is often called path dependence. Moreover, institutions are the key to understand how people 
make choices under conditions of (economic) uncertainty and ambiguity. Therefore, by using that 
approach, this section elaborates variables derived by this school of thought that shape 
institutional structure of risk.  
Their works started by questioning the rationality postulate of the neoclassical model. 
They argue people do not determine their choices directly through an elaborate rational process. 
Rationality cannot sufficiently answer why people make the choices they do. Admittedly, that 
model explains clearly the options and tradeoffs people have, but at the same time people are 
also facing difficulties in deciphering their complex circumstances. There are constraints 
preventing people from choosing the best response. Indeed, they need ways to reduce 
uncertainty and to create order in human interaction.  
Likewise, a simple cost-benefit analysis cannot satisfactorily explain the way people 
choose the strategy against economic insecurity.117 As mentioned above, an ideology such as the 
religious prohibition of commercial insurance is partly responsible for the low insurance 
penetration in Muslim majority countries and the emergence of Islamic insurance. In other 
words, it gives constraint for people to choose specific strategy. Therefore, we need an analytical 
framework which incorporates an understanding of how ideologies and ideas determine the 
choices people made in responding to an economic situation. 
Thorstein Veblen, a Norwegian-American economist and sociologist, laid the foundation 
for the development of American institutional economics through his criticism on the traditional 
static economic theory. Influenced by Darwinism, he added historical and evolutionary processes 
 





to economic analysis.  According to him, the economy is embedded in social institutions, 
therefore it should not be treated as an autonomous and static entity. Evolutionary process and 
institutions have significant roles in shaping economic behavior. This perspective enables 
economists to explore economic problem as part of broader socio-cultural development and to 
consider the economy as an evolving entity of bounded rationality.  
Veblen defines institutions as both units of evolutionary selection and repositories of 
knowledge. But rather than being the determinant factor of the individual action, institutions 
develop in the process of coevolution with the other. In other words, the economy can be 
considered as the locus for dynamic interaction between the individual as agency and institutions 
as social structure.   
In 1904, he published The Theory of Business Enterprise, where he utilized evolutionary 
principles to explain the development of new industrial processes in America at the time. He saw 
them because of the growth of industrial processes in the context of small business firms that 
had evolved earlier to organize craft production. Veblen's institutionalism was a central element 
of American economics during the interwar period post-1919, but then it never managed to take 
hold due to mostly the emergence of positivism within social sciences and also due to the 
misused of principles of biological evolution to justify racist, sexist and imperialistic practices, 
such as the Nazis. 118 
Since the 1960s, several scholars have been tried to refine the institutionalist approach in 
the understanding the economy. Rather than merely criticizing neoclassical economy, it builds 
on, modifies and extends it. This approach, so called New Institutional Economics, incorporates 
a theory of institutions into economics. What it means is the approach retains and builds on the 
fundamental assumption of scarcity and hence competition - the basis of the choice theoretic 
approach that underlies microeconomic.119 One of the influential scholars in this school is the 
1993 Nobel laureate, Douglass North.  
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In his 1991 journal article Institutions, he describes how innovations in systems of 
exchange, long-distance trade in early modern Europe from the 11th to the 16th centuries 
enabled Europeans to transform the tribal system of exchange into a sequentially more complex 
organization that eventually led to the rise of the Western World. Those innovations include 
techniques and methods to evade usury laws and actuarial science that are crucial for 
transforming society into the modern capitalistic economy.120  
The institution evolution started within tribal or village community in which people relied 
heavily on a dense social network. People have an intimate understanding of each other; 
therefore, they were able to create, for instance, pool resources out of mutual trust and the 
threat of collective violence (punishment) for preserving order. Although the societal cost in this 
tribal or village is very high, it will not create additional transaction cost. As of the economic 
interaction is expanding beyond village or tribal community and become a regional exchange, the 
dense social network is replaced by more infrequent clientization of the players. Typically, there 
is no central political authority governing this regional network. Instead of a unified political 
structure or formal rules, religious precepts-imposed standards for players’ behavior. The 
religious precept of “thou shalt not defect” acts as a paternalistic divine command that enables 
people from diverse geographical backgrounds but embracing the same religion cooperate. The 
next stage shows economic exchange becoming more complex, therefore impersonal and kinship 
ties, a voluntaristic constraint such as the religious rulings, and other informal mechanisms are 
no longer effective. Coercive political order and judicial organizations are needed in an age of 
capital markets and manufacturing firms.121 Arguably, the increase in the volume of trade is partly 
responsible for this evolution process. It necessitates the society to find ways to lower the 
transaction cost to achieve what so called economies of scale. 
The term ‘partly’ above means that volume of trade cannot be the only cause. In fact, 
many societies have developed differently. After centuries, certain society relies more on formal 
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mechanisms while others still maintain the use of informal ways. Douglass North examines the 
differences between Suq (Bazaar economies engaged in regional trade) which has existed for 
thousand years and still exists nowadays in North Africa, the Middle East, and the modern market 
of Western World in order to illustrate different paths of development. The question is; what 
factors make the difference?  
Suq is characterized by widespread, relatively impersonal but clientized exchange, and 
relatively high costs of transacting. It is widespread because it consists of a multiplicity of small-
scale enterprises, low fixed cost, and an enormous number of small transactions. It is not based 
on kinship ties, but nonetheless, it is still based on face-to-face contacts where trading involves 
a continual search for specific partners (clientization). There is no institution specifically for 
distributing market information and at the same time, there is a minimal and decentralized 
governmental control. The transaction is performed by raising the costs of transacting to another 
party to exchange. People are seeking gains at the expense of others. In this context, one makes 
a profit by relying more on having better information and bargaining skills than one’s 
adversary.122 
Information asymmetries make regional trade of Suq inefficient. Based on the previous 
generic model, it is expected that there would be an evolution of voluntary organizations. The 
organizations then would be able to reduce uncertainties and mitigate any upcoming hazards 
due to the asymmetries. On the contrary, these voluntary organizations are missing in the Suq 
system due to the lack of innovations in legal institutions and juridical enforcement, which make 
the organizations viable and profitable. As a result, there is no incentive to alter the system.123  
North argues that the modern market of the Western World was created not only because 
of the expansion and because of the enormous number of trade transactions. Some innovations 
enabled them to lower transaction cost.  
These innovations occurred at three cost margins:(I) those that increased the mobility of 
capital, (2) those that lowered information costs, (3) those that spread risk. For instance, 
European created innovations in the form of techniques and methods to evade usury laws 
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that later enhanced the mobility of capital.  From 11th to the 16th centuries, European 
created innovations that enhanced the mobility of capital were the techniques and 
methods evolved to evade usury laws. The variety of ingenious ways by which interest 
was disguised in loan contracts ranged from "penalties for late payment," to exchange 
rate manipulation, to the early form of the mortgage; but all increased the costs of 
contracting. The costliness of usury laws was not only that they made the writing of 
contracts to disguise interests complex and cumbersome, but also that enforceability of 
such contracts became more problematic. As the demand for capital increased and 
evasion became more general, usury laws gradually broke down and rates of interest 
were permitted. In consequence, the costs of writing contracts and the costs of enforcing 
them declined.124 
Another innovation to increase the mobility of capital was the development of techniques 
and instruments of discounting methods125 along with development of the centers that could 
specialize in that-such as the Champagne fairs, then banks, and finally financial houses. This 
method enabled people to develop credit by which increased the mobility of capital. Moreover, 
the standardized system of accounting is also important for maintaining control of agents 
involved in long-distance trade. Previously, people relied more on kinship and family ties to do 
that. Accounting system and notarial records provides an evidence-based mechanism to monitor 
trade transaction. It is different to the tribal/traditional mechanism which relies more on agency 
or witness.  Adding to that, information cost was lowered through printing of prices of various 
commodities as well as the materials containing information on weights, customs, brokerage 
fees, postal system, and exchange rates.126 
 The transformation of uncertainty into risk marked the final transformation of the 
primitive/traditional exchange into a modern system as previously discussed in the section of 
‘insurance: and institutional history’. Actuarial science enables people to convert uncertainty into 
risk and thereby reducing the costs of the transaction through the provision of a hedge against 
variability.127 As the economy grew, there was a need to pool huge capital in financing risky 
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business activities. Besides the development of actuarial science, the commenda was developed 
as an institution that permitted a large number of investors to engage in a new venture. 128  The 
commenda itself was originated from Jewish, Byzantine, and Muslim traditions that later 
developed by Italian merchants to English regulated company. It was promulgated by The Marine 
Insurance Act 1743 and became the first commercial insurance of the modern economy. 
In the later development, transfer risk mechanism of insurance is not only used for risky 
activities but almost on all economy. The market can transfer risk to institution or people who 
can handle risk effectively. For instance, the cost of rebuilding house due to environmental 
disaster is beyond individual’s capacity, but by buying insurance premium the individual can let 
insurance company with many properties and shareholders, to manage that loss efficiently. 
 It is also crucial to mention the innovation in the form of legislation to ‘distinguish’ 
speculation and gambling. One of the major issues was the close relationship between insurance 
business, future trading and gambling. Even an economist, John Kay argues that the whole of 
capitalism is based on gambling. A speculative investment that led to several contemporary 
economic crises is not something that is unusual. Speculation is the main feature of the modern 
economy.129 Following the enactment of the Marine Insurance, Sir John Barnard’s Act of 1743 
states that the ‘evil practice of compounding or making up differences to the great 
discouragement of industry, and to the manifest detriment of trade and commerce.130 Of course, 
the controversy of gambling and speculative investment was not over. It is part of the 
contemporary debate. Nevertheless, the legislation had enabled capital markets to grow. People 
had no hesitation to put their money in investments despite how speculative they are because 
they were convinced that it was not gambling. 
As a side note, it is important to put aside our normative judgment in discussing these 
two types of institutions. Exchange in Suq or even in tribal or village communities is not simple 
and always inferior compares to the modern market. It is inefficient, but arguably, that is the best 
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way considering the local circumstances. It happens because there is an incentive or disincentive 
for the society to develop certain mechanisms.  
The innovations on contract monitoring and enforcement such as accounting method, 
notarial records, and merchant organizations would not be sufficient to create an efficient capital 
markets without enforcement by the state. The state was the major player because there was 
continuous link between the fiscal needs of the state and its relationship with merchants and 
general citizen. North uses the comparison between the state that encourage innovations during 
the evolution of the modern market such as the Netherlands and England, and the empires in 
decline Spain and Portugal. The main difference was the declining empire set up a centralized 
system that generated rent-seeking behavior while the Netherland and England created a more 
decentralized system that encouraged check and balance. For instance, the establishment of 
Bank of England and a fiscal system in which expenditures were tied to tax revenue in England 
had laid the ground for both a healthy financial basis for government and the development of 
private markets. Acemoglu and Robinson use terms of extractive and inclusive institutions. The 
extractive institutions hamper or block economic growth while inclusive are the ones do not.  For 
them, how a political institution is designed is the key to the success or failure of the nation.131 
Altogether, the ability of the state to restrain itself for not confiscate assets or using its coercive 
power to increase uncertainty in the economy made it possible for evolution of the modern 
market.132 
Deriving from North’s explanation on these several institutional structures, we can 
identify that there are three variables involved in the evolution of institution. An institution is 
evolved primarily from “interplay between two fundamental economic forces: the economies of 
scale associated with a growing volume of trade, and the development of improved mechanisms 
to enforce contracts at lower costs. The causation runs both ways. The increasing volume of long-
distance trade raised the rate of return to merchants of devising effective mechanisms for 
enforcing contracts. In turn, the development of such mechanisms lowered the costs of 
contracting and made trade more profitable, thereby increasing its volume.” Nevertheless, it is 
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not the whole story. The state is crucial in ensuring this process runs without experiencing 
disruption, either due to external factors or more importantly from the state itself.133  
As mentioned before, the prevalent cooperative practices in both personal and business 
life of the Muslim societies substantially reduce the need for insurance – a society is expected to 
take care of those in need. This may be why insurance was not introduced in the original Islamic 
Empire, despite the existence of an extensive global trade network.134Besides that, the decline 
of trade and ‘the absence of state’ within the Islamdom during the European colonization 
probably had a role in it too.  
It seems there was no incentive for Muslim societies to develop institutionalization of risk 
beyond kinship based common pool resources. The information on individual moral characters 
and skills seem more important than generating data to calculate risk. Actuarial science did not 
develop and shape the way the Muslims deal with economic insecurity within this society. The 
development of probabilistic thinking as the essence of the innovation of actuarial science 
possibly the most important key to understanding the difference. The development of 
probabilistic thinking depended on the Enlightenment’s rejection of argument from authority 
and the diminished influence of religious doctrine.135 It is expected that probabilistic thinking in 
the modern sense would not develop in a society where religious authority or tradition is still 
intact. Therefore, it is interesting how contemporary Muslim societies integrate it into the 
construction of Islamic insurance. 
Overall, institutional economics’ approach suggests that the emergence of Islamic 
insurance or alternative insurance, in general, should be explained not only from its 
contemporary development but also more importantly how the past specifically its historical 
evolution influences its current emergence. Arguably, those variables compose a path 
dependence, which provides constraints for people choosing the best response against their 
economic insecurity.  
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Islamic insurance as a social practice 
How do people respond to economic insecurity- illness, unemployment, ‘widowhood’, 
and old age? Moreover, if commercial insurance, the 300 years old industry with the gross 
contribution (gross premiums) of $4.6 trillion (2014),136 can be considered as the most efficient 
way to do that, what makes people choose other strategy over this?  In a traditional society, they 
relied mostly on family support and social networks in coping with these unforeseen events. For 
instance, peasants created collective rice barn as a type of insurance at the time of crop failure 
or natural disasters. Afterward, modern society considered this informal mechanism insufficient. 
It is because the nature of modern insecurity or so-called risk is different from the previous one.  
There are some theories inform people attitude toward insurance. 
Social action 
One theory is theory on social action. The social action theory by Max Weber explains that 
human actions are meaningful and that certain reasons push people into various kinds of actions. 
To Weber, there are three kinds of action: traditional (based on customs and habits); affective 
(based on the emotional state of the individual at a particular time); and rational (based on a 
clear awareness of a goal).137 This also implies that certain factors tend to influence one’s 
behavior toward insurance. People might choose to prefer insurance due to intuitive or cultural 
underpinnings. On the other hand, people can rationally decide to have an insurance policy for 
clearly economic reasons. 
The social action theory also suggests that there is a societal factor for the development 
of Islamic insurance services. Islamic insurance is a private-based service and not a social 
insurance because the state is not the one who provides the services. Therefore, an Islamic 
insurance company needs to be able to convince the consumers to buy it. 
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Support from the Muslim population in the societal level is also important for its 
development, along together with its political dynamic in the state level. Moreover, it is not only 
the support toward the product but also the support toward the agency, which provides it. As 
private sector or market138 has become the dominant agency of Islamic finance recently, a 
positive attitude toward the private sector from the population will be crucial for Islamic 
insurance to flourish in the country. In addition, the middle class has always been essential for 
the acceptance of any type of reform, either in the form of radicalism of Islamic state or 
modernism such as Islamic insurance.  
According to Charles Tripp, the reliance on the private sector has been one of the 
dilemmas in the Islamization of the economy in general. Islamic insurance was intended as an 
alternative of conventional insurance, but then it could not escape from the existing paradigm of 
market capitalism.139 Consequently, Islamic insurance tends to be more developed in capitalistic 
countries where there is high support for the private sector and market mechanism.  
Also, economic modernization and globalization have created a new global Islamic 
identity, which defines an individual’s preference on using Islamic insurance. The more global a 
Muslim is, the more likely this individual to embrace Islamic financial services.140 Timur Kuran 
argues the real purpose of Islamic economics has not been economic improvement but 
cultivation of a distinct Islamic identity to resist cultural globalization. Based on his literature 
survey, Islamic banking differs from conventional banking mainly in symbolism and terminology. 
141 The Islamic sub-economies that have sprung up across the Islamic world are commonly viewed 
as manifestations of Islamic economics. In reality, Kuran demonstrates, they emerged to meet 
the economic aspirations of socially marginalized groups. The bottom-up process of Islamic 




140 Mark Smyth, "Islamic Finance in an Almost Postcrisis and Postrevolutionary World: As in Politics, All Islamic 
Finance Is Local," in Contemporary Islamic Finance: Innovations, Applications, and Best Practices, ed. Karen Hunt-
Ahmed (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013). 
141 Timur Kuran, “Islam and Economic Performance: Historical and Contemporary Links,” Journal of Economic 




these sub economies provide advancement opportunities to the disadvantaged. By enhancing 
interpersonal trust, they also facilitate intragroup transactions.142 
Furthermore, several ethnographic studies on Islamic business networks documented by 
Timur Kuran show various non-economic motivations for members joining the networks. The first 
is that network membership is akin to belonging to a club. Members receive support from other 
members in return for contributions to the group and, sometimes, to the wider society as well. 
For instance, the members of the global Hizmet network led by Fethullah Gülen, Syria’s 
Damascus-based Jama‘at Zayd, the Bilal Muslim Mission of sub-Saharan Africa, or Eastern 
Indonesia’s Hadhrami network coordinated by the Islamic organization Al-Khairaat, give each 
other business, and they support one another financially in times of need. In return for these 
advantages, they help to finance the group’s activities and participate in its recruitment 
campaigns. Their economic interactions are embedded in deeper social and cultural relations. 
They also provide charity, both on their own and jointly with the group. Thus, the members of 
Jama‘at Zayd finance mosques, schools, and hospitals affiliated with the group. They also fund 
poverty alleviation programs, provide care for orphans, and help impoverished youths get 
married.143 Spending some of their profits for helping others bring them many benefits. This 
generous gesture is considered as an integral part of their economic activities. Through its 
members’ donations, the Hizmet movement has established schools in 130 countries, along with 
thousands of mostly volunteer-staffed outreach centers.144 
Secondly, Islamic networks benefit from alliances with politicians who give them access 
to rents. In providing social services, the Gülen network has also pursued political power in its 
homeland, Turkey. During the first decade of Islamist rule in Turkey under the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), Gülen’s network shared in the privileges of power, including 
preferential treatment in government hiring and contracts. 145 These mixed motivations exist and 
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compete against each other as part of popular support over the development of Islamic 
insurance.  
In line with arguments above, the scholars of insurance have pointed out the significant 
of religion and culture in consumer’s decision of buying insurance. Treerattanapun shows 
empirical results of how consumers may respond to insurance solicitations according to their 
cultural belief, not only economic rationality.146 For example, the prohibition of conventional 
insurance by Islamic law is often used as the explanation for the low insurance demand in the 
Islamdom. Insurance markets even in the most developed Muslim-majority countries are largely 
at nascent or growth stage of development. Studying several Muslim majority countries, 
Rahmane (2009) and Yazid et al. (2012) find that the determinants of Islamic life insurance are 
like those of conventional life insurance on all points except religion. According to them, religion 
plays significant role in encouraging Muslim population to take Islamic life insurance because this 
type of insurance is considered consistent with Islam.147  
Furthermore, by using a regression analysis in 1980 and 1987, Browne and Kim investigate 
the factors that lead to variations in the demand for life insurance across countries. They report 
a negative correlation between the demand for life insurance and Muslim countries.148 Also, 
based on a study of 45 developing countries, Outreville finds that personal income, inflation, and 
the development of the country’s financial sector have the most important impact on the 
demand for life insurance. In line with Browne and Kim’s study, the author reports that in Muslim 
countries, the demand for life insurance and Muslim religion are negatively correlated.149 
However, other researchers emphasize on the characters and attitude of the religion or 
culture, rather than on the religious doctrine of the religion itself. Chui and Kwok (2009) using 
Hofstede's cultural dimensions, and data from 1976–2001 across 41 countries. They argue that 
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culture with strong individualism indeed has a significant, positive effect on life insurance 
consumption. People with a culture with emphasis on independence and autonomy tend to 
rely more on market life insurance and less on social network security (financial help offered 
by fellow kinsmen to one's dependents upon one's death) than people with culture of 
interdependence or collectivism.150   
Other scholars do not consider religion or culture as a socio-demographic characteristic 
at the country level, but at the personal/individual level (i.e. at the consumer level). Muslims 
might have different interests in Islam (as a faith/religion) or attribute a different importance to 
it in their lives. Thus, they may expect that Muslims vary in terms of their Islamic beliefs, and that 
their behaviors and attitudes will depend accordingly. For example, Souiden and Jabeur argue 
that the higher (lower) the Islamic beliefs of individuals, the less (more) favorable their attitude 
will be toward conventional life insurance and the more (less) favorable their attitude will be 
toward Islamic life insurance.151  
In addition, Stasavage and Scheve provide an interesting study on religiosity and social 
insurance. They argue individuals who are religious will prefer lower levels of social insurance 
than will individuals who are secular. To the extent policy outcomes reflect individual 
preferences, then countries with higher levels of religiosity will have lower levels of welfare state 
spending.152  
Informal economy 
Besides a theory on the growth of Islamic insurance, we also need theory on the lack of 
its development. The literature on informal economy suggest that market failures responsible for 
the existence of economic activities outside the formal economy. Market failures in the form of 
regulation constraint, tax evasion, state’s weaknesses, economic crises or conflict have made 
people take alternatives. It is not because of the path dependence as suggested by institutional 
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economics, but more of the current events that disrupt the efficiency of the market. It means 
even a highly modern society can roll back to informal in certain circumstances. 
Islamic insurance has been presented as an alternative to conventional insurance. 
However, Islamic insurance is built on a similar platform, which is a formal and private-based 
scheme of insurance. After almost four decades of the introduction of Islamic insurance, the 
demand for Islamic insurance is still considered very low. The literature on informal economy 
might help us to understand why many Muslims are still reluctance in using the modern scheme 
of Islamic insurance and maintaining their informal ways to deal with economic hardships. 
 During the 1950s and 1960s, many economists believed that low-income, traditional, 
subsistence, and informal economies of developing countries could be transformed into dynamic 
modern, capitalist, wage-employment, formal economies through a combination of correct 
economic policies and enough resources: capital, plentiful labor, and technology. As the countries 
gaining more economic growth or industrial development, the labor forces from the informal 
economy will be absorbed by the modern sector, which offers higher wages.  
Many models including the dual-sector or the Lewis model, which was invented by an 
economist W. Arthur Lewis in 1954, describe this process. The model assumes that the 
developing country has a surplus of unproductive labor especially from agricultural sector. This 
assumption is based on the classical economy’s argument such as Adam Smith who argued before 
that unlimited supply of labor was available at subsistence wage. Later, these workers become 
attracted to the manufacturing sector where higher wages are offered. At the beginning, due to 
the ‘unlimited’ supply of labor, the capitalist of the manufacturing sector can expand without 
necessarily increase. As a result, the capitalists can charge a price above the fixed wage rate, and 
then reinvest the profit into fixed capital and enables this sector to expand more. At the final 
stage, the country will eventually shift from traditional economy into modern economy. This 
universal model combines an analysis of the historical experience of Japan and Western 




process. Moreover, this model emphasizes income per capita as the measurement of economic 
success.153  
Other common models during those years, whether it was Raul Prebisch’s ‘center vs. 
periphery’ (1949) or Harvey Leibenstein’s ‘big push’ (1957) or W. W. Rostow’s ‘stages of 
economic growth’ (1960), had also suggested a linear and gradual model of social change. Those 
models argued that the informal and subsistence economy of all developing countries would be 
transformed into a modern economy regardless of their differences in size, history, culture, 
endowment, etc.154 
Contrary to this optimism, many research projects conducted in the 1970s had shown the 
persistence of the informal sector especially within rural areas. British anthropologist, Keith Hart 
stated that despite the external pressure from the capitalist economy, most of rural migrant 
workers in Accra, Ghana were still engaged in informal activities.155 This pioneering study was 
confirmed later on by similar study by ILO World Employment Commission, which was conducted 
in Kenya in 1972. Moreover, this study concluded that the informal sector was not only persisted 
but it was expanded to include profitable and efficient enterprises as well as marginal 
activities.156 It means that rather than simply a low-income and backward economic activity, the 
informal sector is considered by these studies as creative, efficient and resilient activities. 
Therefore, some experts found that the term ‘informal’ is misleading. Robert Neuwirth prefers 
to use the term of System D, which comes from French word débrouillard. This word literally 
means resourceful and ingenious. System D is used to define the inventive, self-reliance, and the 
do-it-yourself economy that exist by not being regulated by the government, and for most part, 
without paying taxes. Not only that, this sector is also growing around the world including within 
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developed economies. According to Neuwirth, "Estimates are that the informal economy around 
the world is [worth] about $10 trillion a year and if it is combined into a one country, it would be 
the second-largest economy on Earth, rivaling the United States economy.”157 
ILO defines informal sector as “a sector may be broadly characterized as consisting of 
units engaged in the production of goods or services with the primary objective of generating 
employment and incomes to the persons concerned. These units typically operate at a low level 
of organization, with little or no division between labor and capital as factors of production and 
on a small scale. Labor relations - where they exist - are based mostly on casual employment, 
kinship or personal and social relations rather than contractual arrangements with formal 
guarantees.”158 Furthermore, informal sector activities are largely ignored, rarely supported, 
often regulated and sometimes actively discouraged by the Government. 
That definition suggests that informal does not indicate a location of the activities such as 
rural or the periphery of the cities. It also does not limit the meaning to certain economic jobs or 
economic activities. Informal is the way of doing things, characterized by: 
(a) ease of entry; 
 (b) reliance on indigenous resources; 
 (c) family ownership of enterprises; 
 (d) small scale of operation; 
 (e) labor-intensive and adapted technology; 
 (f) skills acquired outside the formal school system; and 
 (g) unregulated and competitive markets.159 
There are many debates related to the emergence of the informal economy. One is 
questioning its impact whether this sector brings benefit to the system as a whole. Some see it 
as a pathology that need to be cured, but others regard it as an alternative that makes the 
economy continues to grow and stabilize. The first group considers informal economy represents 
unprotected workers, excessive regulation, low productivity, and unfair competition, evasion of 
the rule of law, underpayment or nonpayment of taxes, and work “underground” or in the 
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shadows. Many believe that informal enterprises should be brought under the formal regulatory 
environment to increase the country’s tax base and reduce the unfair competition to formal 
businesses. The second group considers diversification as a good thing. It helps individuals and 
society becoming more resilient toward shocks.  
There are also scholars who are focusing on the issue of its relationship with the formal 
economy. The Dualist as presented by the Lewis model argues that both sectors operate 
separately or with a very few linkages. In this situation, the informal sector comprises the less 
advantage sector. Contrary to the Dualist, many experts argue on the interconnectedness of 
these two sectors. The Structuralists see the informal and formal are intrinsically linked where 
Capitalists subordinate workers from both sectors in order to keep the price of goods and services 
low.160  These questions are important in defining the direction of the current research on the 
informal economy. 
In 2007, the Latin America Division of the World Bank published Informality: Exit and 
Exclusion, a book co-authored by Guillermo Perry, William F. Maloney, Omar Arias, Pablo 
Fajnzylber, and Jaime Saavedra. The co-authors proposed a holistic model of the composition 
and causes of the emergence of the informal economy or informality. Regarding the causes or 
drives informality, they specified three different forms of both Exit (voluntary informality) and 
three different forms of Exclusion (involuntary informality). The term ‘exit’ is appropriate for the 
individuals or enterprises that used to be in the formal sector then move to informal, while 
‘exclusion’ is for the ones who never been formal. The scholars believe there is no single factor 
that is able to explain it comprehensively, and most of the cases are considered as result of a mix 
interaction between voluntary and involuntary informality.161 
The three forms of Exit are opportunistic evasion, defensive evasion, passive evasion or 
state irrelevance. Opportunistic evasion is informality that is caused by motives of evading tax 
and labor codes or law and conducting illegal activities. The informality is considered as defensive 
evasion when the informal workers and entrepreneurs move to informal activity in response to 
burdensome, captured, and weak state. For instance, the conflict in Iraq had weakened the state 
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in providing the livelihood for Iraqis. Governmental job had been the main sources for Iraqis to 
get income for the past years, thus when the Government collapsed, they turned to the informal 
economy to earn a living.162 Other instance is how global economic crises makes people in 
Johannesburg to work informally by selling at the city street.163 Lastly, the passive evasion is a 
voluntary informality, which is caused more by the prevailing pre-modern institutions such as 
Bazaar economy or a non-state institution such as traditions within the localities.  
Different from the previous ones, the informality happens involuntarily mostly due to 
structural reasons. For instance, worker cannot get formal jobs due to labor market 
segmentation. A study on informal childcare work concludes that migrant workers stay in 
informality because when it is formalized, it will become too expensive. There is no incentive for 
the family (or the mother) to use the informal childcare services because it cost more than they 
earn.164 The economic activities inside refugee camps are also kept informal due to the nature of 
the legality of the camp itself. Informal economy has become the lifeblood of the camp, but at 
the same time, it also has made the non-permanent settlement ‘permanent’.165 Another reason 
for Exclusion is burdensome in entry regulations or excessive taxing which prevents firms from 
formalizing. Many informal health care practices such as herbal medicine or faith healers are 
maintaining their activities within informal framework because of the regulations. Many of these 
practices are still exist in many parts of the world.166 
Informality also exists in insurance. A study from the World Bank notices the persistence 
of informal insurance in many households in low-income countries. The examples include 
drawing down savings, engaging in a reciprocal gift exchange, selling physical assets, and 
diversifying income-generating activities. Those are not arranged through a legally binding 
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contract or state bureaucracy. The mutual help is ensured through the existence of social norms 
and trust. Everybody helps with the expectation to receive similar help in the future. This 
arrangement is often very effective in the right circumstances, but it is hardly able to cope with 
large-scale economic shock or huge natural disasters.167  
Altogether, these theories of informality help us to understand the reasons why people 
in majority Muslim countries maintain their traditional risk management (as we will see in the 
case of Pakistan), instead of using the modern, formal, Sharia-compliant of Islamic insurance. 
Furthermore, the sophisticated approaches on informality of the recent literature enable us to 
consider traditional risk management not as pathology or backwardness, but a sign of 
resourcefulness and ingenuity. 
Social capital 
This next group of literature on social capital proposes a parallel explanation of the 
phenomenon of the lack of Islamic insurance development. It comes naturally on the list after 
the discussion on the informal economy. It suggests that a society with rich social capital will have 
more capability to develop alternative mechanisms. The informal insurance services use social 
capital as the basis of their activities. Even for the formal one such as mutual or cooperative 
insurance, it still depends also on the existence of trust between its members. As most individuals 
could not deal with an economic loss only by themselves, the solution would be to develop a 
mechanism of risk sharing through mutual insurance. This effectiveness of this mechanism 
depends on the extent of the availability of social capital within the community.  
Social capital has been an essential part of Sociology for a long time. Emile Durkheim did 
not use the term on his discussion on Suicide (1897), but he referred it conceptually when he 
talked about how individual’s connection to society can protect the individual from anomie and 
self-destruction. Durkheim explores the differing suicide rates among Protestants and Catholics, 
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arguing that stronger social control among Catholics results in lower suicide rates.168 The other 
French writer, Alexis de Tocqueville, also highlighted the importance of social participation within 
the American society as he observed during his visit there in the early 19th century. According to 
him, Americans were prone to discuss public matters collectively. The social participation of the 
people along with a high level of transparency were the reasons for American democracy to 
work.169  
The next scholar on social capital would be Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu can be considered 
as the pioneer for the recent study of social capital. He identified the value of social capital, which 
he defined as “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group 
by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition.” 170As a neo-Marxist, he examined the role of different types of 
capital including social capital in the reproduction of power relations within society.  
Furthermore, James Coleman developed Bourdieu differentiation of capitals and 
provided a clearer theoretical framework on social capital. According to him, social capital has a 
similar function as other capitals: physical, financial, and human capital, which provides structure 
for facilitation human actions. Social capital can take three forms; firstly, obligations and 
expectations which depend on the trustworthiness of the social environment, secondly the 
capacity of information to flow through the social structure in order to provide a basis for action 
and thirdly the presence of norms accompanied by effective sanctions. In his discussion on 
obligations and expectations, he describes the situation of doing favors for someone as "credit 
slips." Should an individual need a favor, he is essentially giving someone else a credit slip, which 
signifies that he will be paid back for his goods and/or services. He mentioned how the strong 
ties among members of the Orthodox Jewish community in Brooklyn enable them to trust each 
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other then make trade transaction easier. 171 The existence of social capital can be measured 
from the level of trustworthiness, which enables that process to happen.  
Robert Putnam completed the conceptualization of social capital. His works have 
expanded the discussion of social capital beyond academic circle to a wider public, but more 
importantly, he strengthened the conceptualization of social capital as an attribute of 
communities rather than individual. Putnam started his research on social capital by studying the 
local governments in Italy. In Making Democracy Work: Traditions in Modern Italy, Putnam wrote 
that northern Italy's history of community, guilds, clubs, and choral societies led to greater civic 
involvement and greater economic prosperity. Similar with Tocqueville’s finding on the American 
society, the ‘networks and norms of civic engagement’ allows to build trust. Therefore, trade and 
democracy flourish in this locality. Meanwhile, the agrarian society of Southern Italy is less 
prosperous economically and democratically because of less social capital.172  
Similarly, Francis Fukuyama compared the relative economic performance of different 
nations and cultures based on differing levels of trust. He underlines the interconnectedness of 
economy to the cultural life of society.  He believes that nation cultures contain underlying 
principles that foster social and economic prosperity. It is a certain set of informal values or norms 
shared among the members of a group, which permit cooperation among them. In his book,  
Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity, he concluded that society with high level 
of social trust will be able to create the flexible, large-scale business organizations that are 
needed to compete in the new global economy.173 Coleman, Putnam, and Fukuyama agreed that 
trust as the main feature of social capital. 
At later development, social capital had started to gain attention in the economics 
discourse too. This importance of social capital in economic development has captured the 
attention of many international development agencies such as the World Bank and OECD. Not 
only focusing on technical assistance, these organizations has been adjusting its strategy to 
 
171 James Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," American Journal of Sociology 94, no. 
Supplement S95-S120 (1988). 
172 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1994). 




include the development of the social fabric of the society: the institutions, relationships, and 
norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions.174 Regarding 
insurance, many of these agencies have tried to find alternative ways to provide healthcare to 
low income communities. Many of these new alternatives or unknown policy for instance 
Community-Based Health Care need to be supported by a cohesive community. They believe that 
a community with a high level of social capital will be more inclined to go through change.175 
Beyond the component of trust, Putnam provides a more comprehensive definition on 
social capital by adding other crucial components. He defines social capital as ‘trust, norms, and 
networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions’.176 This 
definition involves three aspects of social capital: trustworthiness (how people anticipate that 
others will behave in the future), norms (the informal laws that govern exchanges and daily life), 
networks (the connections between individuals). According to Putnam, these three aspects can 
be observed through the level of increase/decrease level of membership of professional, 
political, or religious organizations and informal socializing.  
The recent scholars have enriched Putnam’s basic definition resulting a more 
sophisticated understanding on social capital. Some of them have tried to improve Putnam’s 
methodological approach by focusing on the changing pattern of membership rather than simply 
its number. Others are focusing more on the term ‘social’ rather capital meaning that they 
approach the concept not as properties of individual or collective that can be identified 
independently but more social properties that can only be accessed through ties in the network. 
Putnam focuses on ‘wires’ where information and resources run, hence the network and 
relationship are its core component, but others focus more on ‘electricity’ or information and 
resources that running through the wires.177 
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The recent scholarship on social capital acknowledges that social capital is not panacea 
for social problem. Social capital is not necessarily to be societal goods. The reason is social capital 
works in certain circle or social connection. For instance, Fukuyama asserts that trust does not 
work equally across society. He refers to a “radius of trust” which means a circle of people among 
whom cooperative norms operate. In some societies, a narrow radius of trust produces a two-
tier moral system, with good behavior reserved for family and personal friends, and a lower 
standard of behavior in the public sphere. This explains the practice of nepotism and corruption 
in many countries.178 
This differences on how it works has led to a further study on the differentiation of social 
capital. As networks, social capital can be categorized into three types of connections: bonding, 
bridging, and linking. Bonding (exclusive) social capital refers to relations amongst relatively 
homogenous groups such as family members and close friends and is similar to the notion of 
strong ties. Putnam mentions the examples of bonding social capital as being ethnic fraternal 
organizations and church-based women's reading group. This form of network centers on 
horizontal ties between individuals who are quite similar to each other and may live the same 
area. This type of network can produce negative externalities as documented by Daniel Aldrich 
in his study on post-disaster recovery. He acknowledges that social capital has more role 
compares to financial assistance in the recovery process, but it also has a downside.  
Aldrich provides a thorough empirical study of how a strong bonding hampered the 
recovery process for instance in the case of Hurricane Katrina, 2005. FEMA had trouble to locate 
temporary housing/trailers in the area with strong political participation. The local citizens 
successfully opposed the existence of FEMA trailers in their area. Moreover, strong sense of 
belonging to a group can create indifference or even hostility to non-members.179 Bridging 
(inclusive) social capital refers to relations with distant friends, associates and colleagues. It refers 
to the horizontal network to extra local, crossing ethnic, racial, and religious cleavage, for 
instance civil rights movements and ecumenical religious organizations. Linking social capital 
refers to vertical relations between individuals and groups in different social strata in a hierarchy 
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where different groups access power, social status and wealth. This to include the capacity to 
leverage resources, ideas and information from formal institutions beyond the community.  
 Understanding how the networks work can help us to understand informal insurance. 
Aldrich notes that in disaster recovery, social ties can serve as informal insurance, by providing 
information, financial help, and physical assistance as alternative of market-based insurance.180 
Some scholars even argued, “Being embedded in a network of higher kin composition, greater 
density, larger size, and lower diversity increased the probability that a respondent received 
recovery support”.181 In other words, the higher the bonding is, the most likely that people rely 
more on informal and community based insurance mechanisms. 
Overall, this section shows the significance of social capital, understood as trust, norms 
and networks in examining the emergence of alternative insurance. Furthermore, the literature 
on social capital pushes us to ask the question of economic security beyond framework of 
economy. The argument for modern insurance company is the need to have a financially capable 
entity to handle economic insecurity. The risks are simply too difficult and too expensive to be 
handled by a single individual. To the contrary, social capital provides us with a different approach 
on the problem. As many studies on post-disaster recovery show that, the financial capability has 
less role in community recovery. The difference between resilience and disrepair lies in the depth 
of communities’ social capital. Likewise, those communities rely more on alternative risk 
managements due to the existence of robust social networks which help them in providing better 
economic security.  
Summary: from static comparisons to a dynamic conception of the ‘political life’ and the ‘social 
life’ of Islamic insurance 
In considering the central question of why Islamic insurance systems develop well in some 
countries, but not in others, this chapter provides various possible theories to answer it. The 
literature on Islamic insurance up to this date have provided us with a wealth of insight and 
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information. However, almost all of them treat Islamic insurance as an autonomous and static 
entity. In fact, Islamic insurance is part of a complex economy that is embedded in the country’s 
particular social institutions. Moreover, evolutionary process and institutions in each country 
have significant roles in shaping their population economic behavior, which is mostly neglected 
in many studies of Islamic insurance. This dissertation offers a new as a means of adding breadth 
and depth to existing studies of Islamic insurance implementation. 
By using the various theories mentioned previously in this chapter, this dissertation offers 
a qualitative research on the ‘political life’ and the ‘social life’ of Islamic insurance in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Pakistan. The development gap between these countries on Islamic insurance rests 
on the analysis of Islamic insurance as a product of political decision and social practice. It 
explores Islamic insurance development gap as part of a broader socio-cultural development and 
to consider economy as an evolving entity of bounded rationality. In other words, our theory 
focuses on how the decision of political actors to embrace and regulate Islamic insurance as a 
state’s policy and the acceptance of public of Islamic insurance in their daily lives influence the 
development of Islamic insurance in these countries. 
The term ‘political life of Islamic insurance’ is developed based on the argument that 
Islamic insurance arrangements are not a passive response to some efficiency criterion but rather 
the product of political deals within country’s polity that determine which laws are passed.182 The 
payment, involving all the details of how providers are paid, incentives, and so on; and 
organization, the structure of Islamic insurance system, risk pooling and the division of labor of 
institutions within it are an outcome of political decisions. The constitution, political pattern, and 
institutional arrangement provide a ‘path dependence’ for each country in operationalizing the 
Islamic reform. In the upcoming chapters, the political life of Islamic insurance in these three 
countries is examined as a result of complex bargains made between various groups within each 
country polity, and those bargains are structured by the country’s fundamental political 
institutions.  
The usage of the term ‘social life of Islamic insurance’ refers to a framework for 
understanding Islamic insurance as a commodity whose worth lies both within and beyond its 
 




exchange value.183  It calls attention to how insurance moves between registers of value among 
different stakeholders and at various scales of analysis. It also encompasses how meaning 
ascribed to insurance changes over time. It is the behavior, the habit, and action of the consumers 
and providers within the system. The concepts of risk, risk sharing, distributive justice, 
generalized reciprocity, and hedging against financial catastrophe are understood and addressed 
in relation to the values, social capital, and culture in local worlds. In fact, different stakeholders 
have presented insurance as both a concept and an institution to the public in various ways. 
Public perceptions of and demand for insurance are not static. They are sensitive to changing 
policy, practice, experience, and flows of information.184 According to Amy Dao and Mark Nichter, 
we can analyze the social life of Islamic insurance through the interaction of various sociocultural, 
economic, political, historical, and global and local that contribute to the “careers” of Islamic 
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Since the enactment of the Takaful Act 1984, Malaysia’s Islamic insurance industry 
continues to demonstrate a positive growth rate. It becomes a significant contributor to 
Malaysia’s overall Islamic financial system. In 2015, Malaysia had the largest Islamic insurance 
market in South East Asia with a 62% market share and the largest Family Takaful market globally. 
There were eight composite companies (i.e., selling both Family and General Takaful business) 
and three pure Family Takaful operators in Malaysia. In the same year, the market share of the 
Islamic insurance industry in Malaysia was 12% of the total conventional insurance. Malaysia is 
also considered as the leader in Islamic insurance regulations. Malaysia is the first country in the 
world to implement a risk-based capital (RBC) framework for Islamic insurance. This novel 
framework requires Islamic insurance companies to be more transparent by disclosing its agency 
fees in its sales.186  
Islamic insurance of Malaysia develops within a dual banking and financial system. The 
Islamic financial system coexists with the conventional financial system. The Islamization in 
Malaysia was not presented as an aspiration of replacing the existing political economy structure 
of the country. The Islamic financial system is regarded as a supplement to the existing system. 
Malaysia is considered as the first country to implement this dual system. Many Muslim majority 
countries recognize Malaysia’s Islamic finance as the model to emulate.  
This chapter discusses the development of Islamic insurance in Malaysia. It begins with a 
brief introduction of Malaysia as a multi-ethnic Islamist state. This section stresses the status and 
role of Islam in the state building, the ethnic-based politics, the economic structure, and the 
political actors of Islamic politics of Malaysia. Also, this introduction explains the structural and 
cultural environments of Malaysia where Islamic insurance develops. After this brief 
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introduction, this dissertation continues with a section on Islamic insurance development in 
Malaysia. It provides detail information on the fact and figures of Islamic insurance in Malaysia, 
and more importantly the characteristics of Islamic insurance as a political product and social 
practice within Malaysian polity and society. We can consider this section as the dependent 
variable of this dissertation. The next two sections explain this development through the 
independent variables of ‘political life’ and ‘social life’ of Islamic insurance in Malaysia.  The first 
independent variable explores the catalysts and the political coalitions behind Islamic insurance 
during the Mahathir (1981-2003) and the post-Mahathir regimes. The second independent 
variable relates to Malay’s social transformation, which is responsible for the development of the  
‘modern’ redefinitions of Islamic economic beliefs that have shaped the Malay understanding of 
entrepreneurship, human agency, Islamic duty, and financial obligation.187 This modern 
understanding of ‘Islam’ is influential in how Islamic insurance has been presented to the public. 
The structure of a multi-ethnic Islamist State 
Malaysia is a federal constitutional monarchy consists of thirteen states and three federal 
territories. Although Islam is the official religion of the country, Malaysia is not a state where the 
law is ultimately derived from Islam. Ethnicity is important in Malaysia’s politics. A coalition 
government dominated by Malay Muslims has ruled Malaysia since its independence in 1957. 
Malaysia can also be described as an illiberal democracy. The country has procedures and 
institutions characteristic of democracy, such as regular elections, minority rights and free press. 
However, the government maintains control and intervenes in most aspect of social life of its 
citizens.188  
The British colonialism had a prominent role in shaping the political and economic 
structures of Malaysia. This prominent role includes influencing the religious life and the 
relationship between Malay states and Muslim communities. The British consolidated the 
apparatus of centralized government and Malaya’s capitalist economy for almost 100 years of 
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colonial rule in the Malay Peninsula and the Northern Borneo. After a brief period of Japanese 
occupation during World War II, the British Military Administration returned to Malaya and 
proposed the formation of a newly independent country. The decision of giving independence 
was due to the lack of financial resources and popular support to maintain the British’ colonies 
in the post WW II. However, the proposal clearly showed British’s intention in ensuring their 
economic interests would be safeguarded after independence.189 Therefore, rather than 
breaking up with the colonial past, the formation of independent Malaysia in 1957 was designed 
to inherit the colonial political, legal, and economic system.  
Later, the Islamic dimension was added in the overall system since the 1980s. The 
inauguration of Mahathir Mohamad as Malaysia’s Prime Minister in 1981 set Malaysia gradually 
‘as the fruit of a happy union between strict Islam and modern capitalism’.190 That concept shows 
Malaysia’s ambition to be the Islamic financial hub of the Southeast Asian region and the world, 
but at the same time, it wants to maintain the religious conservatism in the social life. The 
following discussion provides a brief introduction of Malaysia as a state, particularly in its relation 
to the role of Islam in state building, its multi-ethnic/religious circumstances, its capitalistic 
economy structure, and its essential political actors. 
Malay nationalism 
Historically, Malaysia has its origins in the Malay Kingdoms present in the area, which, 
from the 18th century, became subject to the British Empire. Based on the latest United Nations 
estimation, the population of Malaysia in 2019 is around 32 million or equivalent to 0.42% of the 
total world population.191 The territory of this federal constitutional monarchy is separated by 
the South China Sea into two similarly sized size regions, Peninsular Malaysia and Malaysian 
Borneo. The Peninsular Malaysia also known as Malaya or West Malaysia, which contains the 
capital city of Kuala Lumpur, accounts for the majority (roughly 92%) of Malaysia’s population 
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and economy. Malaysian Borneo or East Malaysia is less populated and overall less developed in 
its settlements than its West. However, East Malaysia’s land mass is larger, and it has more of 
many natural resources including oil and gas reserves.  
As mentioned earlier, the independent Malaysia was not a result of a nationalist 
opposition against the British rule, but it was a formation of an independent Malay state 
governed by its traditional elites with a full support from the former ruler of the colony. In 1946, 
upon the return of the British to Peninsula Malaya after Japanese occupation, the British Military 
Administration proposed for the creation of the Malayan Union, which consists of the federated 
and un-federated Malay states, Singapore, Malacca, and Penang. According to this proposal, 
there would be a central government for the whole region where Malay, immigrant Chinese and 
Indian communities have equal access to political power.  
This initial proposal was in fact bypassing the traditional authority of the Sultanates. The 
Malay nationalists strongly opposed this proposal and successfully pressured the British to 
replace the Malayan Union with the Federation of Malaya in 1948. The modified proposal of the 
Federation of Malaya preserved the separate existence of the several Malay states and 
guaranteed the supremacy of Malay interests.192 The Malayan Communist Party, which primarily 
supported by Chinese workers, was the only one who opposed the formation of the Federation. 
The Malayan Communist Party, who had organized anti-Japanese resistance in the 1940s, 
condemned the Federation as a reunion of “British imperialism and Malay feudalism”. 193 
At the same time, the Malay elite knew that the British would not grant independence 
unless the Malays could convincingly demonstrate that they could work with the immigrant 
Chinese and Indian communities. In order to convince the British, the Malay elite initiated the 
formation of an inter-ethnic political coalition called the Alliance in 1954 comprising the United 
Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malayan 
Indian Congress (MIC). The Malay elite gained more confidence after their landslide victory in the 
first elections for the legislature in 1955. This victory showed that the Malay elite could lead a 
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culturally and religiously diverse nation. Moreover, the coalition and its electoral triumph had 
shown the overwhelming political support among the masses upon the idea of power-sharing 
governance of this new federation. 
In 1957, an independent Malayan state was officially formed with the support of Malay 
officials, Chinese merchants, and Indian intellectuals under the leadership of Tunku Abdul 
Rahman. Under the new constitution, the dominance of Malays or Bumiputera in education, job, 
the state bureaucracy, and reservation of land and of non-Malays in the economy were 
established. The Federal Constitution declares Islam as the official religion of Malaya, but it also 
guaranteed freedom of worship for other religious communities. Article 52 of the Constitution 
stated that Malay language (Bahasa Melayu) as the official language of the Federation. Bahasa 
Melayu would soon replace English, Chinese, and Tamil in state schools. In 1993 the Federation 
of Malaya was reorganized to include North Borneo and Singapore (though Singapore withdrew 
in 1965), and the extended federation was officially renamed Malaysia. 
Ethnicity is the backbone of Malaysian politics. Malaysia’s population is just over 50 
percent ethnic Malay, with Chinese Malaysians composing 22.7 percent, Indian Malaysian 
making almost 7 percent, and non-Malay Bumiputera and other Indigenous groups another 11.8 
percent.194 The law defines Bumiputera as consists of Malays and non-Malays indigenous 
communities. It includes Malays, Thais, Eurasian, hill peoples in the Malay Peninsula (known as 
orang asli), and indigenous Borneans (i.e. Dayak, Kadazandusun, and many others) but excludes 
Malaysian of Chinese and Indian descent. Article 160 of the Constitution only states the criteria 
for a person to be considered a Malay; which is to profess the religion of Islam, habitually speak 
Malay language, conform to Malay custom and be born to a Malaysian parent.195 
 In the mid-year of 2017, the Department of Statistics Malaysia estimated the country’s 
population as slightly over 32 million citizens and non-citizens. The 28.7 million citizens consisted 
of the Malays and non-Malay indigenous groups that reside in Malaysian Borneo (Bumiputera) 
at 19.78 million and the Chinese at 6.66 million and Indians just below 2 million. Chinese 
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Malaysians include both long-settled Peranakan or Chinese descents and the larger group of 
immigrants that arrived in the 1800s and early 1900s, which can be divided still further among 
different provincial or dialect groups. The Indian community, though mostly Tamil, contains 
significant numbers of Telugu and Malayalam speakers in addition to Punjabi, Sikh, and Indian 
Muslim minorities.196  
The non-Malay communities have been vital for the economy of the country. Chinese and 
Indian labor skill was crucial to the tin mining and rubber industries, respectively, which were the 
two principal revenue earners for the country during the colonial era. The vital significance of 
these communities was one of the reasons why the British colonial regime included them as 
citizens in the British’s initial proposals of the formation of the Federation. Chinese and Indian 
labor skill was important for maintaining the British’ economic interest in the post-colonial era of 
Malaysia.  Moreover, both the British and the Malay elite did not want the immigrant Chinese to 
support the Communist cause to break the colonial economic structure of the country. 
The Federal Constitution does not necessarily exclude the non-Malay from the political 
domain. There have been some of the prominent non-Malay legislators at both federal and state 
levels. Non-Malay can achieve senior public service positions, such as ambassadors and 
counselors in mission abroad. The Malaysian judicial service boasts of an array of non-Malay 
judges. However, there is political power imbalance between the Malay and non-Malay 
communities. Non-Malay has no reasonable representation in the federal cabinet, the 
parliament, the various state executive councils, and state assembly.197 The prime minister and 
deputy prime minister have always been Malays, though there is no constitutional provision 
restricting others. The Malay also dominates the civil service and the armed forces. As agreed, 
since independence, the political system of having a Malay core is preserved to maintain the 
historical character of Malaysian society. This dominance has continuously supported by 
government policies that usually give preference to Malay Bumiputera over other groups. 
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Malaysia was relatively successful in operating a system of consociational democracy 
based on multi-ethnic elite bargaining until the breakdown of the Alliance due to the ethnic riot 
of May 1969. Since 1971, Malaysian political system cannot be considered as consociational. 
Malaysia under the leadership of Mahathir Mohamad of the UMNO has been transformed into a 
Malay authoritarian government where the Malaysian regime has promoted institutions and 
policies that favor more Malays (who are also Muslim) at the expense of non-Malays (Chinese 
Malaysian, India-Malaysian). There were regular elections and a parliament, but these 
democratic institutions did not make government turnover possible, instead of lending the 
regime legitimacy and encouraging some political responsive.198 However, the UMNO under 
Mahathir was more responsive toward constituent interests than Indonesia’s Golkar Party was 
under Soeharto. Soeharto’s New Order regime was far more repressive than Mahathir’s 
Malaysia. 
The Malaysian regime since the early 1970s has relied on two groups, each of which 
receives benefits from the regime in exchange for political support. The regime relies on the 
explicit system of Malay favoritism targeting ordinary Malays and rewarding wealthy Malay 
cronies. The favoritism was actualized through the implementation of the New Economic Policy 
(NEP), an affirmative government policy to improve the economic wellbeing of the Malays. In 
fact, the wealthy Malay elites were the result of this affirmative policy. In sum, the actual 
Malaysian political system under Mahathir rests on an explicit cross-class alliance between the 
Malay masses and a group of wealthy Malay elites with extensive involvement in both the 
corporate world and politics.199  
The Chinese Malaysian minority is economically dominant but have mostly been left out 
of the ruling coalition. Moreover, the Chinese Malaysia had not been able to create a strong 
communal-wide organization. The new wealthy Malays and Chinese Malaysian entrepreneurs 
are the corporate business sector in Malaysia. Both favor a more liberal legal regime that 
facilitates business activities. The difference is that the wealthy Malays have the capital 
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investment that is fixed in Malaysia, while Chinese Malaysian have mobile capital.  According to 
Pepinsky, this is the reason Mahathir relied on policies of capital controls and an exchange rate 
peg in dealing with the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Malaysia implementation of these policies 
reflects the Mahathir regime’s dependence on an alliance between Malay fixed capital and Malay 
labor.200 
Islamic supremacy 
Islamic matters were under the control of the state level administrators, and not the 
federal government. The British set out a special place for Islam in their administration of the 
Federated Malay States, granting the sultans, or the traditional rulers, authority and status, but 
only in limited matters concerning religious practice, ritual, and the laws of Muslim personhood, 
family life, and marriage (munakahat). Sharia courts adjudicate matters concerning Sharia 
matters in the individual state-based jurisdictions. The single exception to that legacy is 
muamalat, the regulation of Islamic finance, which, since its inception in Malaysia in 1983, has 
been governed by federal law.201  
Despite its centralized politico-administrative system, Malaysia is an agro-urban society 
with a differentiated social formation. Malaysia has an institutional configuration that recognizes 
the division between state and religious spheres.202 The Federal government represents the state 
sphere and the Sultan and State level religious institutions represent the religious sphere. 
Throughout the Malay Peninsula, administration of religious affairs and the creation of chief 
qadies, councils, and Sharia committee brought Islamic legal, educational, ritual, and financial 
affairs under the control of the Sultan, assisted by state level religious agencies, the Majilis 
Agama Islam (Council of Islamic Religion and Religious Council) and the Department of Religions 
Affairs (or Religious Department).  
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There has been a constant federal-state tension over religious authority in Malaysia.203 
However, the role of state-level religious agencies has diminished since the Islamization project 
of the 1980s. The federal government, under the leadership of JAKIM (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam, 
or Islamic Development Department), the central religious authority, managed to minimize a 
‘separatist’ tendency apparent in individual state level religious authorities. According to 
Hamayotsu, this has prevented them from building an entirely separate religious-legal regime 
based on their own localized interpretation in each State.204 This strategy proved to be an 
essential part of the success in Islamic finance project discussed in this dissertation. 
Malaysia is neither an Islamic state where the law is ultimately derived from Islam nor a 
secular state. It is the Federal Constitution and not Islamic Law that becomes the ultimate source 
of legal and constitutional authority. The relationship between the Federal Constitution and 
Islamic law is entirely different from the Pakistan-type model of Islamic State. Nonetheless, Islam 
does have constitutional status in Malaysia. The Constitution (specifically, Article 3) establishes 
Islam at the state religion of Malaysia.205 Therefore, Tom Pepinsky defines Malaysia as an Islamist 
state rather than an Islamic state.206 
The place of Islam within the state system differentiates Malaysia with another country, 
for instance, Indonesia, which rejects the supremacy of Islam over other religions. Under 
Indonesian law, the state through the Ministry of Religion is responsible for all manner of norms, 
standards, and procedures for the organization and functioning of other officially recognized 
faiths. In Malaysia, Islam and Islamic organization receive preferential treatment from the 
government. 
 Sharia courts exist for Muslims in parallel operation of civil courts. However, Islamic law 
is enacted only for Muslims and has no relevance for non-Muslims whatsoever. The 
institutionalization of Sharia court, interestingly, has come with ‘modernization’ of the Sharia 
 
203 Kikue Hamayotsu, “Politcs of Syariah Reform: The Making of the State Religio-Legal Apparatus,” in Malaysia: 
Islam, Society and Politics: Essay in Honour of Clive S. Kessler/ Edited by Virginia Hooker and Norani Othman, ISEAS 
Series on Islam (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 55–79. 
204 Kikue Hamayotsu, "Once a Muslim, Always a Muslim: The Politics of State Enforcement of Syariah in 
Contemporary Malaysia," South East Asia Research 20, no. 3 (2012). 
205 “Constitution of Malaysia,” n.d., http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/malaysia.pdf.  





mechanism. This modernization process is not a novel thing. It is a continuation of the 
modernization process previously conducted under the British colonial regime. This type of 
modernization resulted in a selective approach of Islamic law where the ‘draconian’ elements of 
the Sharia, such as traditional capital punishment, were removed and rejected.207  
The role of Islam in the nation and state building has always become contestation among 
Malaysian Muslims. The expansion of modern state institutions is highly political. On the one 
hand, there is no evidence to suggest that an Islamic vision of state motivated the founding 
fathers of independent Malaysia. The Muslim politicians -Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak, 
and Tun Dr. Ismail- who played a significant role at that time approached the complexity of multi-
ethnic Malaya as liberal and English-educated Malays. On the other hand, a small segment of the 
Malay community represented by the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) who consistently argue for 
an Islamic state. Their argument is the political power in Malaysia must be in the hands of the 
Muslims. According to their understanding of Sharia, non-Muslims can perform various 
administrative and bureaucratic roles, but under the direction of Muslim power holders. Contrary 
to the liberal-minded of Malaysia’s founding fathers, PAS leaders readily use the idiom of religion 
to engage with the process of state building. 208  
Malaysian capitalism 
The British Colonialism introduced capitalism to Malaya through the establishment of 
plantation and mining economy. Initially, the British maintained the ‘non-intervention’ trade 
relations with Malay states. However, as Britain’s need for raw materials supply, particularly tin, 
had increased the British went for further incursion in Malay states’ domestic affairs in order to 
safeguard trade monopoly. Furthermore, there was an opportunity presented by invitation from 
Raja (Prince) Abdullah of Perak to aid him in his conflict against another prince for the throne in 
1873. In his book, Azlan Tajuddin explains the transformation of Malaysian economy in detail. 209 
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Based on this invitation, the British made some treaties with the ruler of the Malayan 
state in the form of residential system. The residential system gave Malaya prince assistance and 
support in their conflict with other states (protectorate), and at the same time gave the British 
monopoly in the tin trade. The residential system was vital in the transformation of Malay 
political economy structure. It strengthened the prestige and position of the Sultan, and 
effectively marginalized the powers of the various local or village leaders.210 The residential 
system also created salaried positions for the multiple members of the aristocrats, thereby 
effectively taking away their traditional prerogatives in controlling local trade.211 The old Malay 
government machinery soon gave way to modem western style bureaucratic administration with 
a centralized structure under the Resident. These transformations, along with the enforcement 
of standardized British-type laws, helped shield the processes of tin extraction and transportation 
in the Malay States from any civil disruptions.212 
Furthermore, the residential system created a supportive land lease and labor tax laws in 
response to the demands for agriculture and mining. The British declared that all lands were 
vested in the ruler. According to Tajuddin:  
In the decade between 1879 and 1889, General Land Regulations based on standardized 
leaseholds were introduced in Perak, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan. Malays in rural areas 
were now required to register the lease of their lands from the new government for 999 
years in return for quit rent. Lands not actually cultivated or occupied were to become 
'state land’. In effect, the land was transformed into private property with prescribed 
rights and obligations, which greatly enhanced production processes and the 
management of revenues in British hands. It facilitated the growth of the tin trade as well 
as provided the impetus for greater agricultural mass production, particularly pepper, 
gambier, tobacco, sugar, tea, coffee, and later, rubber and palm oil. For the Malays, the 
new land laws enabled the precipitation of sale and losses of their lands to Chinese and 
Indian moneylenders, since many had placed their lands as collateral for loans, as well as 
to plantations and land agents, who regarded lands as a commodity. 213 
 
210 J. M Gullick, Malay Society in the Late Nineteenth Century the Beginnings of Change (Singapore: Singapore, 
1987). 
211 N. J Ryan, The Making of Modern Malaysia and Singapore : A History from Earliest Times to 1966, 4th ed., rev.. 
(Kuala Lumpur: Kuala Lumpur, 1969).,162). 
212 Ryan. 





Furthermore, various types of labor legislation were introduced organizing wage labor 
and revenue collection for the state. This legislation had profound impact in establishing the 
dominant role of the Chinese Malaysian in the economy. Under this system, Chinese towkays 
(headmen or ‘advancers’) were responsible for the recruitment and maintenance of their 
workers into the Malay states. They were also the ones who provided these workers with 
expensive supplies, in which loans were usually made at double the market rates as ‘payments’ 
for their boarding and transport. Although the British controlled the overall tin production 
process, such a profitable enterprise allowed Chinese firms to dominate the tin industry in the 
early years of British colonial administration.214 
Since tin provided the mainstay of the new capitalist economy, lands in which potential 
tin deposits could be found were strictly dealt with in terms of clear and uniformed laws. The 
commodification of land and labor in the Malay States was a process that was highly integrated 
with the use of monetary funds to inject mercantile investments in trade and production. Large-
scale tin mining also fueled other activities of the modem capitalist economy into the Malay 
States such as retail, consumer durables, and supplies. It became largely responsible for the 
urbanization process in this region, which contributed to the growth of Singapore and the cities 
on the western coast of the Malay Peninsula.215 
Tin production serviced the needs of a growing industrial manufacturing base in the west, 
in which case, capital-friendly land and labor laws became important antecedents to the 
consolidation of British economic interests in the Malay states. This system also consolidated the 
labor structure of the colony. Drabble noted that the trading system in the Malay States, 
Singapore, and northern Borneo throughout the nineteenth century was characterized by a 
three-tier participatory structure. At the top is a group of largescale entrepreneurs dealing in 
imports and exports, consisting mainly of Europeans and later in the case of Singapore, some 
Chinese. This group, backed by huge capital, dealt mainly in the vast bulk of wholesale items. The 
second group is made up of medium scale bazaar-type traders, situated usually in the ports in 
the form of small import-export firms. Chinese merchant houses, and to some extent limited 
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Indian companies, performed many of these groups’ activities goods collection and distribution 
and retailing. The third group consists mainly of on-the-ground, small peddlers and market 
traders. This group, which comprises mostly of Malay and other indigenous peoples, operated 
throughout the Malay world in the ports as well as in the hinterlands of deep forests and jungles. 
Goods are usually primary products to be exchanged for small quantities of imports. 
Interdependence of the system is reflected in the finance and credit networks that filtered down 
from the top through banks and manufacturers.216 This structure also explains the persistence of 
ethnic tension in the post-colonial era. 
Capitalist incorporation of the Malay States and the northern Borneo regions was a result 
of two kinds of social process under the residential system. One was the redefinition of land in 
terms of capital in order to generate revenues for both individual entrepreneurs and the state 
and the other one was the establishment of a wage system. Under Residential system, laws were 
formulated to enable the efficient transfer of landed property into the hands of individual 
capitalists. Not only was land now legally owned as individual property, the state also managed 
its transactions through laws that secured its expropriation of minerals and resources. A wage 
system organized labor forces for purposes of extracting surplus value to facilitate the newly 
emerging capitalist production in the Malay states. The shortage of labor compelled the British 
to recruit labor from overseas, which later on influence the ethnic relations in Malaysia. The 
relation between ethnics in Malaysia is dominated by the socio-economic structure of Malaysian 
capitalism.  
Both processes were significant landmarks in Malay political economic history since they 
became the crucial transitory factors that ushered the feudal Malay world into the world 
capitalist economy. They also became the turning points of active Malay involvement in the 
regional economy.217 Moreover, the social transformation of Malay society was a result of 
colonial encroachments. The transformation was not a process resulting from internal dynamic 
forces but rather from coercively external, top-down factors. In the late nineteenth century, 
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further consolidation of British capitalist interests was realized through the unification of some 
of the more affluent Malay states into a formal and autocratic colonial state.218  
The introduction of a capitalist economy led to profound social change. Malay states had 
become an important source of agricultural and forest commodities for export, and a market for 
textiles, hardware, and other foreign goods. These developments led to extensive 
commercialization of the economy, which continued after the formation of independent 
Malaysia. The first decade of Malaysian independence was a period in which the elite classes 
solidified their positions and utilized the state apparatus to advance their political economic 
interests with the support from Chinese entrepreneurs and foreign investment.219 
 In the 1970s, Malaysia replicated the developmental state of Japan and South Korea in 
which the government heavily involved in trade and industrial policies. In this ‘Look East’ policy, 
the government of Malaysia chose strategic industries to be supported through generous 
allocated credit. State-owned enterprises and government-linked companies mostly ran these 
industries. However, Malaysia’s version of the developmental state was more open to foreign 
investment by multinational enterprises. Moreover, the state also encouraged the development 
of public equity markets, which provided domestic firms with and alternative source of capital.220 
Starting 1980s, Malaysia’s Barisan Nasional coalition under Mahathir Mohamad had 
relied more on an alliance between the Malay masses and a class of the new Malay 
entrepreneurs. Chinese entrepreneurs were still important, but the government had 
continuously tried to limit their political role. The ruling Malay government understood that the 
creation of an indigenous Malay entrepreneur class was essential to sustain its regime. However, 
the government preferred to take an instant method rather than nurtured genuine 
entrepreneurs. Many of these Malay entrepreneurs were not professional managers. They were 
senior civil servants who were appointed to senior positions in the Malaysian business group. 
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manager, the usage of bureaucrats enabled the Prime Minister to have personal control over the 
businesses. 221  
 Favoritism in economic and social policy ensures support from ordinary Malays; 
favoritism in corporate and financial policy ties the new wealthy Malays to the regime.222 At the 
same time, Mahathir had started the privatization process of Malaysia’s economy. In overall, the 
capitalist system of modern Malaysia can be described as a combination of developmental state 
and liberal market economies infused with personalized patron-client relationships. This patron-
client relationship, particularly during the Mahathir regime, was very significant for the 
development of Islamic insurance in Malaysia. The following sections discuss this correlation in 
further details.  
Political actors in Islamic politics 
The following paragraphs provide a brief map of the actors of Islamic politics in Malaysia 
particularly on their position on to the institutionalization of Islamic insurance. According to 
Meredith Weiss, Islamization in Malaysia, in general, created a fragmentation of political society 
into three blocks, ‘as the debate over the role of religion inevitably had an impact upon the 
possibilities for democratization and market-led modernization.’223 Weiss mentions the three 
block consists of those who desired Malaysia to become a secular state represented by the 
Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP), those who imagine Malaysia as a democratic 
state imbued with Islamic values, but retaining secular laws and institutions, coalesced around 
the communally organized UMNO and its partners in the ruling BN coalition, and those who called 
for establishing an Islamic state with full implementation of Sharia of the Parti Islam SeMalaysia 
(PAS, Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party). Regarding Islamic insurance, three important actors need to 
be added beside these three political groups; the civil society groups (ABIM and Islamic NGOs), 
epistemic community and the insurance industry.  
 






The governing Barisan Nasional coalition (BN, National Front) comprises about a dozen 
parties. Incorporated in 1974, this coalition is an expansion of a tripartite union called the Alliance 
that contained three race-based parties, UMNO, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and 
the Malaysian Indian Association (MIC). The Alliance was handed power by the British colonial 
government when Independence was declared in 1957. The BN is headed by the United Malays 
National Organization (UMNO), with Mahathir Mohamad (1981-October 2003) and then 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (November 2003) as prime minister. UMNO is secular nationalist, 
though with increasing attention to Islamization since the 1970s; it is the linchpin of BN, and the 
head of UMNO has always been head of government. UMNO had historically catered to 
Malaysian Chinese, Malaysian-Indian, and foreign business interests.224 
Bridging the gap between the heightened religiosity of the society and electoral politics 
have been Islamic NGOs. Most prominent among these in terms of both size and political impact 
has been Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM, Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement). The Islam 
Malaysia (ABIM, Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement). The organization's ventures include a 
network of Islamic schools that annually educate 20,000 students, a corporate arm (Koperasi 
Belia Islam), and substantial property holdings. ABIM's nationwide complex of state and district 
branches stretches down to the grassroots, with a 1,000 strong staff and around 60,000 
members.  
Most members are university graduates, often brought into the dakwah (Islamic 
proselytization) movement. Most have been beneficiaries of federal affirmative-action policies 
that benefit Bumiputera, or Malays and other indigenous peoples, in university admissions, 
career advancement, and other areas. ABIM has produced leaders of PAS, UMNO, and the more 
recently formed Parti Keadilan Nasional (Keadilan, or National Justice Party; multiracial but 
Malay-dominated; centered around former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim and headed by 
his wife, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail). Among them is Anwar Ibrahim helped found ABIM in 1971, 






death in 2002) Fadzil Noor; his deputy and successor Abdul Hadi Awang; and Keadilan supreme 
council member Ghazali Basri.225 
The Malay opposition parties (DAP & PAS), by contrast, has evolved toward two divergent 
positions on the issue of Islamic statehood and democracy. While the PAS has only about 15% 
electoral support, it has managed to push the UMNO to implement elements of its nationalist-
religious agenda. Islamic revivalism has brought heightened emphasis on Islamic rituals, 
implementation of Islamic legal codes, and strengthening of Islamic praxis in all areas of social, 
political, and economic life. For example, in the two states PAS governs, the party has required 
that Muslim women cover their heads, restricted gambling and the sale of alcohol, and tried to 
implement hudud/criminal law (though barred from doing so by the Malaysian constitution).  
Meanwhile, the DAP is claimed to be multi-racial and center-left Malaysian political party 
advocating for social democracy and secularism. The DAP usually draws much of their support 
from secular and liberal voters with a stable electorate from voters of big cities, coastal regions, 
professional middle-class, and working class. The party's strongholds are primarily in the urban 
and semi-urban areas of Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Johor and the Federal 
Territory of Kuala Lumpur. In the 2018 Malaysian general election, DAP contested in 47 federal 
constituencies and won 42 seats and 101 out of 104 state seats contested, most under the ticket 
of its ally People's Justice Party (PKR), representing a win rate of 95%, the highest among the 
major political parties contesting.226 
Foreign players dominate Malaysia insurance industry. Although they are economically 
dominant, they do not have direct political influence on the development of Malaysia insurance 
structure. On the contrary, the government through its central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia 
(BNM) has strictly regulated this sector. Access to the Malaysian insurance market is very 
restricted, BNM issues a limited number of insurer licenses. No direct conventional insurance 
license has been issued since the 1970s. New reinsurance, Islamic insurance and Islamic re-
insurance licenses have been issued from time to time since 1995 to meet specific objectives to 







reinsurance licenses (one life reinsurance license and six general reinsurance licenses) were 
issued between 1995 and 2007 and twelve Islamic insurance and Islamic insurance licenses were 
issued between 2005 and 2010. Not included is the special license for the government backed 
financial guarantee insurer established in 2009.  
Foreign ownership of Malaysian insurers is restricted. The foreign equity limit for insurers 
is 70 percent. A foreign equity limit above 70 percent will be considered on a case-by-case basis, 
particularly for players that can facilitate consolidation and rationalization of the general 
insurance industry. The foreign equity limit for reinsurers is 70 percent. Reinsurers are also 
allowed to be established as branches. The foreign equity limit for Takaful operators is 70 
percent. There is no foreign equity limit for Islamic re-insurance operators. There is a clear trend 
towards consolidation of insurance industry players in the Malaysian market, led by the general 
insurance sector.227  
In Malaysia, the insurance industry has been regulated by Bank Negara Malaysia since 1 
May 1988. Prior to that, the Ministry of Finance regulated the industry as per the Insurance Act 
196343, which outlines the main set of rules and regulations governing operations of insurance 
business in the country. The Insurance Act 1996 subsequently replaced this Act. The regulation 
of the insurance industry by the Central Bank also involves policy development, administration 
and enforcement of the Insurance Act 1996 governing the insurance industry, carrying out the 
actuarial function, supervision of insurance licensees, consumer education and complaints 
handling. The close supervision of solvency and market conduct along with a strengthened 
regulatory framework enforced in the 1990s helped to enhance the professional standards in the 
insurance industry and consumer confidence.228 
There are currently 47 licensed insurance companies operating in Malaysia – general, life, 
composite and Takaful license holders, out of which close to 70% of the units contain stakes held 
by foreign shareholdings. Domestic banks either have their own insurance operators, JV with a 
foreign partner or banc-assurance agreement to offer complete range of general and life 
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products. 15 Takaful companies set up Malaysia Takaful Association (MTA) in 2008. This 
organization is dedicated in promoting the interest of its members and to supervise the exercise 
of self-regulation within the Takaful industry. Moreover, they signed inter-Takaful operator 
agreement to set a common standard among all operators to regulate on and control matters 
related to pre-contract examination for agents, agency registration system and code of ethics, 
and compliance of the general Takaful tariff for motor and fire businesses.229 
Most of the study on finance focus the roles of investors, lenders, analysts, advisors, 
actuaries, and other skilled financial professionals informing and reproducing financial and other 
markets. The unique aspect of Islamic finance is in the prominent role of epistemic community, 
which consist of Sharia professionals, jurists, and adviser in the law-making process. Together 
with practitioners, they formulate rules and regulation on Islamic finance. They are not the 
traditional village religious authority, but they are an urban class of Sharia professional and 
government bureaucrat who are increasingly armed with educational credentials from local and 
foreign universities, they are promoting a more rational scientific approach to Islam and treating 
rural Islam as mystical and ritualistic. The establishment of International Islamic University of 
Malaysia (IIUM) has been very central in this process. IIUM and the International Center for 
Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) has produced a skilled pool of graduates available for 
expanding the Sharia bureaucracy particularly at the federal level.230 
Being amongst the Islamic insurance elites 
The development of the Islamic insurance industry in Malaysia in the early 1980s was 
inspired by the prevailing needs of the Muslim public for a Sharia-compliant alternative to 
conventional insurance, as well as to complement the operation of the Islamic bank that was 
established in 1983.231 Islamic insurance becomes a new venue for both individual and company 
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for investment, joint ventures, and alternative insurance sector with Islamic characteristics.232 As 
an individual, a Muslim has the opportunity to invest in their family’s future and at the same time, 
he or she receives financial protection. Meanwhile, an experienced international insurance 
company can access insurance market in Malaysia by joining with the domestic Islamic insurance 
company to provide Islamic insurance services. All processes have been carefully planned and 
directed by the state. 
History and development 
In June 1972, the National Fatwa Committee declared that the concept of conventional 
insurance contravened the rules of Sharia.233 Insurance transaction contains elements of interest, 
gambling, and speculation, which are prohibited in Islam. In 1982, the Task Force to Study the 
Establishment of an Islamic Insurance Company in Malaysia was formed by the order from Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad. This Task Force has a task to investigate the possibility of launching 
Islamic insurance as a complement to Islamic banking. Datuk Mohd Fadzli Yusof, the current chief 
executive officer of Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. was one of the members of this task force. 
Later, when Takaful Malaysia first started operation in 1984, Fadzli was made the chief executive 
officer, a position he has held until today. He is known as the first Takaful man in Malaysia due 
to his prominent role in initiating Islamic insurance.234 Following the recommendations of the 
Task Force, the Malaysian Parliament enacted the Takaful Act 1984, thus giving birth to the 
Takaful Scheme in Malaysia.235   
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Malaysia has developed Islamic insurance gradually within three phases since that 
moment. The first phase (1984-1992) started by the enactment of the Takaful Act 1984, the 
establishment of Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. (the first and the sole Islamic insurance 
operator in the country) and placement of the basic infrastructure for the industry. In this phase, 
the government focused its effort on setting the foundation for Islamic insurance by providing 
basic regulation. The main investors/shareholders of Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. during 
this phase were an Islamic bank and state religious councils and foundations, and the customers 
were mainly Muslims. The products offered were quite limited consisted of motor, fire and 
mortgage Islamic insurance. Similarly, the investment avenues were confined to Islamic deposits 
and government Islamic securities.236  
The second phase (1993-2000) marked the introduction of competition, with MNI-Takaful 
Sdn. Bhd. (now known as Takaful National Sdn. Bhd.) entering the scene as Islamic insurance 
operators. In 1993, MNI Takaful was licensed and has since been operating in Malaysia. This latter 
insurer currently focuses on enhancing customer services technology and developing new 
marketing channels, e.g., policyholders' services through post offices. Malaysia National 
Insurance Company, the largest local insurance company, currently owns about 80 percent of the 
shares of MNI Takaful. This phase also witnessed greater regional cooperation amongst Islamic 
insurance operators, with the establishment of the ASEAN Takaful Group in 1995 and ASEAN 
Retakaful International (L) Ltd. in 1997 to facilitate Islamic re-insurance arrangements in the 
region.237 They have a wider range of investment instruments issued by the Government and the 
private sectors. There was a broad range of products features with more than 71% share of Family 
Takaful products of the dominated market.  
 Next, the third phase (2001-2010) then began in tandem with the introduction of the 
Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) by the Central Bank, which has as its objectives the 
enhancement of the capacity of Islamic insurance operators and the strengthening of the legal, 
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Sharia and regulatory frameworks. The Malaysian Takaful Association (MTA) in 2002 was 
established during this phase. The association was formed as an association for Islamic insurance 
operators to improve industry self-regulation through uniformity in market practice and to 
promote a higher level of cooperation amongst the operators in developing the industry. As at 
February 2008, there were eight registered Islamic insurance operators in the country, namely 
Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Berhad, CIMB Aviva Takaful Bhd., Hong Leong Tokio Marine Takaful 
Bhd., MAA Takaful Berhad, Takaful Ikhlas Sdn. Bhd., Prudential BSN Takaful Bhd., HSBC Amanah 
Takaful (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., and Etiqa Takaful Bhd.   In addition to this, the Central Bank in 
September 2006 approved the licenses of 2 additional Islamic re-insurance companies, namely 
Munich Re and MNRB Holding Bhd. The policy was intended to strengthen the institutional 
infrastructure of the Malaysian Islamic insurance industry as well as synergize the overall financial 
sector. Also, particularly since 2004, this phase witnessed the increasing interest from the non-
Muslim costumers with different expectations, experiences, and demands toward Islamic 
insurance.238 
Furthermore, the Financial Sector Master Plan (a 10-year plan to be implemented in 3 
phases) was launched by the Central Bank on 1 March 2001 and provided the blueprint for the 
development of the financial sector (of which Islamic insurance is a part). At its core are 
recommendations aimed at developing a competitive and dynamic financial system resilient to a 
more challenging and globalized environment ahead.239 
Malaysia has been developing Islamic Insurance of Takaful since 1984 with high 
government commitment and top-down approach comprehensively and pragmatically. With 
support from the business sector and universities particularly IIUM (International Islamic 
University of Malaysia), the Central Bank has managed to gradually develop Islamic insurance 
industry in Malaysia. In 2016, total premiums and contributions of Takaful sector increased of 
Takaful by 4.4% to RM 61.3 billion or USD 14 billion (2015: +4% to RM 58.7 billion), while 
combined insurance and Takaful assets expanded by 5% to RM 277 billion or USD 64 billion (2015: 
+5.7% to RM 263.8 billion). There were also 55 insurers and Islamic insurance operators, including 
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reinsurers and Islamic re-insurance operators, in the industry as at end-2016.240 Altogether, 
Malaysia has been contributing by 70% of the total regional market of Southeast Asia and 13% of 
the global market of Takaful respectively. 
 
Figure 3-1:  List of Islamic Insurance Operator in Malaysia 





1 Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Berhad 1984 Foreign (F) 
2 Takaful Ikhlas Sdn. Bhd 2003 Local (L) 
3 CIMB Aviva Takaful Berhad 2005 L 
4 Prudential BSN Takaful Berhad 2006 L 
5 HSBC Amanah Takaful (Malaysia) Sdn.Bhd 2006 L 
6 Hong Leong MSIG Takaful Berhad 2006 L 
7 MAA Takaful Berhad 2006 L 
8 Etiqa Takaful Berhad 2007 L 
9 AmFamily Takaful Berhad 2010 L 
10 Great Eastern Takaful Berhad 2010 F 
11 AIA AFG Takaful Bhd. 2010 L 
12 AIA Public Takaful Bhd 2010 L 
          Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, October 2018 
 
 
Figure 3-2: List of Islamic Re-Insurance Operator in Malaysia 
 Name of company 
 
Ownership 
1 ACR Retakaful Berhad Foreign 
2 MNRB Retakaful Berhad Local 
3 Munchener Ruckversicherungs-
Gesellschaft (Munich Re Retakaful) 
Foreign 
4 Swiss Reinsurance Company Ltd. (Swiss 
Re Retakaful) 
Foreign 
           Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, October 2018 
 





Those successes cannot be separated from the constant effort by the Malaysia 
government to institutionalize its Islamic insurance industry through Public-Private Partnership 
scheme. Mark Smith who assessed the contemporary state of Islamic finance in Malaysia said, 
“Malaysians have seen consistent high-level government support of the industry within the 
country and internationally, are exposed to large marketing campaigns, and have seen Islamic 
banks on the main street for a generation. In such an environment the level of wholesale 
suspicion of something new has largely been erased, though increased customer education about 
the products remains a challenge.”241  
Malaysia is the first country who created specific and separate Islamic insurance 
regulation from conventional insurance, the Takaful Act 1984. The role of Islamic insurance 
within the Malaysian secular common law system is clearly delineated by the Malaysian Federal 
Constitution.242 In Malaysia, Islamic insurance is considered to be a part of mainstream 
mercantile law, and hence a part of civil law and subject to the civil court structure of the country. 
Therefore, the Federal Parliament has jurisdiction to legislate over it (as it has done via the 
Takaful Act 1984), as opposed to being regulated by Sharia law and the Sharia courts. At this 
moment, only Saudi Arabia and Sudan (and Iran) take the conservative approach of treating 
Takaful as being a part of Sharia.243 
The Takaful Act 1984 states that Bank Negara (the central bank of Malaysia) was 
appointed to regulate Takaful insurance operations and to monitor the compliance of Takaful 
insurers with the Sharia. Section 54 of the act entrusts the Central Bank with the responsibility of 
administering the Act, whereby the Governor of the Bank is also the Director General of 
Takaful.244 Moreover, this is apparent from the combined effect of Articles 73, 74, 75, 121(1), 
121(1A), and the 9th Schedule of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia and is in line with Malaysia 
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being a moderate Islamic country, with Sharia being confined to personal and inheritance 
matters.245  
However, Sharia still plays important part of Islamic insurance in Malaysia. The operation 
of Islamic insurance in Malaysia must conform to Sharia or Islamic rulings on the commercial 
transaction. Unlike health care sharing ministries or other non-profit schemes, Islamic insurance 
is confined in the commercial or private sector. As a result, its operation is regulated based on 
the Islamic commercial profit-sharing principle of Al-mudharabah. Al-mudharabah is recognized 
as the commercial profit-sharing contract between the providers of funds for a business venture 
(participants) and the entrepreneur who actually conducts the business. The principle of the Al-
mudharabah contract has been successfully modified and developed into the Malaysian model, 
where the participant of an Islamic insurance product is entitled under the contract to enjoy a 
return on the contribution or premium paid in consideration for participating in the product. This 
contrasts with the Al-wakalah principle, which is based on the idea that the operator, acting as 
an agent of the participants, can charge its management expenses on the Islamic insurance 
contributions or premium paid. 246 
Islamic insurance is defined in section 2 of the Act as a scheme based on brotherhood, 
solidarity and mutual assistance whereby the participants mutually agree to contribute to 
providing for mutual financial aid and assistance in case of need. The Act also classifies Islamic 
insurance business into the family solidarity business, which is defined as Islamic insurance for 
the benefit of the individual and his family, and general business, which is defined as all Islamic 
insurance business that is not family solidarity business. In the terminology of conventional 
insurance, family solidarity business refers to life insurance while general business is equivalent 
to general insurance.247 
Family Takaful is like an endowment policy.  A participant decides on the maturity period, 
the amount of annual contribution (provided it is above the minimum amount set by the 
company), and the frequency of contributions.  The money goes into two different accounts, 
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namely the Participants’ Account (PA) (a savings and investment account) and the Participants’ 
Special Account (PSA) (which is for contributions made for the purpose of Tabarru or donation), 
whereby the participants agree upon to relinquish as donation a certain portion of their Islamic 
insurance installments as contribution to a common pool out of which is paid the compensation 
as agreed upon in the contract of Islamic insurance. In this way is realized the goal of assisting 
and helping the participant who may suffer some loss.   Money from both accounts is invested in 
accordance with Islamic principles. The General Takaful protects participants against losses from 
personal accidents and loss or destruction of property. The contract specifies the amount of 
contribution that the participant must make. All contributions are paid into the General Takaful 
fund. 
Part of the fund is used to cover the expenses while the rest of the fund is invested like in 
family Takaful.  Profits in the fund are then shared between the company and the participants. 
The registration of Islamic insurance operators is covered in section 8 of the Takaful Act 1984.   
Section 8(5) states that the applicant must satisfy the Director General of Takaful that the aims 
and operations of the Islamic insurance business will be in accordance with Sharia, and that the 
Articles of Association provides for the setting up of a Sharia Supervisory Council.  
According to Thanasegaran, the concern shown in the Islamic insurance contract to 
specify every detail is not only Islamic but also a definite improvement on the existing nature of 
conventional insurance contract. However, despite every effort to spell out details of the Islamic 
insurance contract, there may still be some uncertainties. For example, how much the Islamic 
insurance company must pay to settle a claim under a third-party motor policy may only be 
known after actual happening. Such uncertainties are inherent in the contract of insurance and 
are condoned under the doctrines of necessity and public interest.248  
Like conventional insurance, the issues of "insurable interest" and uberrimae fidei (of the 
fullest confidence) are essential in the Islamic insurance. Thanasegaran further explain, “The 
nature of family Takaful is such that the issue of insurable interest is automatically taken care of; 
the participant himself is both the insured and the policy-holder. In case of the General Takaful 






general provisions of the Contract Act 1950 against wagering contracts may be applied to these 
contracts requiring the participant to show enough interest in the subject-matter, both at the 
inception and the time of loss.”249 
The principle of uberrimae fidei is emphasized equally under the Islamic law of contract 
and its rules regarding honesty, full disclosure, truthfulness and utmost good faith. Non-
compliance of these makes the contract un-enforceable and it applies fully to any Islamic 
insurance contract. As the Takaful Act 1984 does not state the whole of the law governing an 
Islamic insurance contract, it is presumed that section 5 of the Civil LAW Act 1956 applies. This 
section says inter alia that "in all questions or issues with respect to life, and fire insurance, and 
with respect to mercantile law generally, the law to be administered shall be the same as in 
England."250 
The Malaysian government has however taken steps over the years to enhance the 
industry in terms of its infrastructure and education. In 2003, it launched a 10-year Consumer 
Education Program to educate consumers of their rights and responsibilities arising under 
insurance and Islamic insurance contracts. This policy was followed by the amalgamation of the 
Insurance and Banking Mediation Bureaus into the highly effective Financial Mediation Bureau 
in 2005 which handles most of the insurance and Takaful complaints to date. The Law 
Harmonization Committee was in turn established in 2010 to facilitate a more conducive legal 
system to achieve certainty and enforceability of Malaysian Islamic finance laws. This law was 
followed in 2011 by the Central Bank’s Sharia Governance Framework for Islamic Financial.251 
The Malaysia government undertook several regulatory reforms to enhance the role of 
the critical organs responsible for executing Sharia compliance. In 2013, the government issued 
the Financial Services Act 2013 (Malaysia) and the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013. Both these 
statutes came into effect on 30 June 2013 following a much-awaited repeal of their predecessors, 
the Insurance Act 1996 (Malaysia) and the Takaful Act 1984 (Malaysia). 
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Special features and challenges 
Malaysia is well known for its clear guidelines for halal (permitted) investment, as Bank 
Negara issues directives regularly on such investment. As a result, the participants of Islamic 
insurance as well as other Islamic investors, in Malaysia and abroad, can now invest in 
approximately 480 securities from the companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 
Besides, Malaysian Islamic insurance participants have identified, with help from the 
government, other similar investments. For example, those insureds that have a life insurance 
policy with Syarikat Takaful Malaysia can invest the fund in their individual account to Bank Islam 
Malaysia for a period ranging from one month to over 60 months. This bank also helps this insurer 
lend its funds for special accounts to large corporations and individuals.252 
Furthermore, the Malaysian government currently gives a tax relief of up to RM 5,000 for 
residents for their Takaful insurance premiums plus additional tax relief of RM 2, 000 specifically 
for such premiums for medical and educational purposes. As a result, 41,170 new life Takaful 
policies were issued in 1996 for coverage totaling RM 1.92 billion253. The total assets for life and 
non-life Takaful insurers in 1997 were approximately RM 300 million and RM 170 million, 
respectively.254  During the same period, life Takaful insurance generated profits amounting to 
about RM 60 million and non-life Takaful gained about RM 40 million from the investment.  
Malaysia Islamic insurance growth to soar beyond the expected growth rate is its 
competitive market structure of Islamic insurance industry. The rapid liberalization of Malaysia's 
Islamic financial industry has encouraged foreign institutions' participation in Malaysia, thus 
creating a diverse and growing community of domestic and international Islamic insurance 
operators. There are currently eight Islamic insurance operators and two Islamic re-insurance 
operators, with five foreign participations from the UK, Bahrain, Germany and Japan. This 
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diversity of Islamic insurance operators helps in the reduction in the cost of doing insurance 
business.255 
Moreover, Malaysian companies are considered to have higher re-insurance capacity 
even though they are less capitalized in relation to the amount of business managed by them. 
They use a smart investment strategy by giving priority to the liquidity of shareholders’ fund 
investment portfolio, where the investment accounts represented almost 48% of total Malaysian 
shareholders’ fund investment portfolio. Most investment accounts both in the GCC and in 
Malaysia are invested on a short-term basis. This is because the Islamic insurance operating 
companies perceive the investment accounts as the safest, easiest, and most liquid asset class 
available in the market. Although Sukuk (Islamic bonds) is a good alternative, the Takaful 
operating companies are reluctant to use this asset class to manage their liquidity due mainly to 
illiquidity of the Sukuk market. Globalization contributes to the development of vibrant Islamic 
insurance structure in Malaysia. 
Despite its success, there are some lack of Islamic insurance development in some 
geographical areas and key market segment. The eastern states of Sabah and Sarawak have a 
very low Takaful penetration along. The study conducted in 2012 by Malaysia Takaful Association 
on Protection Gap showed that the low income, high cost, and challenges in product distribution 
contributed to the low Takaful and insurance penetration, in which made larger protection gap 
in these states. 
 Islamic insurance and other insurances in general are considered as not attractive among 
younger working population of age 30 and below. They are prioritizing their expenses on their 
immediate needs rather than long-term objective such as insurance or investment. It is noted 
that the key market segment with a large protection gap is attributed to those below age 30 years 
old who are largely single and are in the lower income group given that they would have only 
recently entered the workforce and would receive entry-level pay. This is consistent with the 
observations highlighted by the head of distribution channels of various Takaful operators 
interviewed in this study, whereby the younger generation are often reluctant and would delay 
purchasing insurance or Takaful protection cover. Furthermore, there has been low participation 
 




also from senior age population (50 and above). This is because the limitation on maximum age 
of entry and underwriting requirement.  256The demand from low-income population has not 
been met with the suitable Islamic insurance product. Micro Islamic insurance products were 
identified as lacking in Malaysia. At this moment, the lack of product variety is also considered as 
one of the challenges for Islamic insurance development in Malaysia. 
Altogether, the usage of very specific Islamic terms and contracts in Islamic insurance 
does not necessarily mean that there is new method invented in Malaysia. The method used is 
combination of several practices of Islamic financial contracts which is adapted to the existing 
conventional insurance regulatory framework in Malaysia. Companies have freedom to choose 
any method if the model does not breach Sharia principles. Their main goal of creating different 
methods of the application of Islamic insurance is to make the Islamic insurance business ‘a 
profit-seeking commercial venture’. As a result, Malaysia has been contributing by 70% of the 
total regional market of Southeast Asia and 13% of the global market of Islamic insurance 
respectively.   
Moreover, Malaysia has been developing Islamic insurance as a complete and diverse 
Islamic insurance service that is linked to other Islamic and non-Islamic financial services. These 
achievements are a result of a comprehensive institutionalization through public-private 
partnership scheme and sophisticated regulatory frameworks, with the government takes the 
major role in its development. Islamic insurance operation is regulated separately from the 
conventional insurance but still under mainstream mercantile law of civil court structure. It 
means Islamic insurance in Malaysia is not regulated under the Sharia court. Unlike other faith-
based insurance schemes, The Takaful Act 1984 confined the operation of Islamic insurance 
within commercial or private sector. For this reason, Malaysia has become a model for many 
other countries to follow suit.  
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Making Islamic insurance ‘national’ 
The 1979 revolution in Iran had an enormous global effect. It was for the first time the 
Islamist group gained power in a modern state. This event coincided with, and some have argued 
spurred, a wider resurgence of Islam around the world, including Malaysia.257 There was an 
increasing demand for Islamization in Malaysia. There was growing popularity of the Islamist 
opposition political party Partai Al-Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), dakwah (Islamic missionary) activities 
in Malaysia’s schools and campuses, and demand for wider implementation for Sharia law. 
Islamization process in Malaysia took various expressions; from a formulation that like a 
type of religious intolerance to the one that acceptable by different groups outside Muslim. 
Recently, the Arabic word for God, Allah, widely used by Arab and Indonesian Christians, is now 
reserved for Muslim use only.258 On the other hand, Islamic finance is a kind of Islamization that 
is accepted by the public. One record shows almost half of the clients of Islamic finance are non-
Muslim Malaysian. This section elaborates the coalition building behind Malaysia’s Islamic 
insurance successes. 
 Also, the examination on Islamic insurance includes the assessment of Islamic finance 
infrastructure as a whole. As the Malaysian example shows the strength of Bancatakaful 
(combination of Islamic banking with Islamic insurance) has made Malaysia the second largest 
Islamic insurance market globally. There has been growth in Bancatakaful, and half of Family 
Takaful contributions come through this channel in Malaysia. 
A window of opportunity 
Shortly after Mahathir Mohamad was inaugurated as Prime Minister of Malaysia on July 
16, 1981. He ordered the formation of a national steering committee to explore the possibility of 
opening an Islamic bank and Islamic insurance in Malaysia. There were three catalysts for this 
initiative. The first was the establishment of Lembaga Tabung Haji or Hajj pilgrim fund board by 
the government of Malaysia in 1963. Performing Hajj or pilgrimage to the Holy City of Mecca, 
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Saudi Arabia is one of the pillars of Islam. Every Muslim supposed to do Hajj at least once in a 
lifetime. This ritual necessitates Muslims to devote enough financial resource to cover the 
expenses. Not all Muslims have enough financial means to do it immediately; therefore, most of 
them save some of their earnings until it is enough to cover the cost. Before Tabung Haji existed, 
Malaysian Muslims saved their money in conventional Banks.  
Since the 1960s there had been a growing concern among Muslims in Malaysia related 
the use of conventional bank for saving their Hajj fund. The issue was on the use of interest by 
the banks and the un-Islamic way of banks’ investment activities. Muslims of Malaysia demanded 
a financial institution that can facilitate their need to deposit their money for hajj and at the same 
time, avoiding the practice of interest which was considered as usury. Lembaga Tabung Haji was 
established to solve that problem. Currently, it is the only institution in Malaysia managing more 
than RM73billion of deposits (2017).259 The success of Tabung Haji gave incentive for Mahathir’s 
regime to expand the practice of Islamic finance in Malaysia. This institution was considered as 
the embryo of the Islamic bank in Malaysia. Until now, Tabung Haji has become the main source 
of investment for various Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia. 
The second catalyst for the Islamization of finance is the development of Islamic bank in 
international level. The bank, so-called the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) was initiated by the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) with the purpose to generate financial cooperation 
among Muslim countries. IDB is working to improve the lives of those we serve by promoting 
social and economic development in Muslim countries and communities worldwide, delivering 
impact at scale.260Initially, OIC was established as a respond of an arson attack at Al-Aqsa mosque 
of Palestine. Global Islamic resurgence began in the 1970s with the Arab–Israeli war which 
triggered the global Oil Crisis in 1973. Events in the Middle East caused Muslims throughout the 
world to identify with the various plights of their co-religionists, particularly in the Palestinian 
issue. However, the member countries have tried to develop other meaningful cooperation 
beyond international politics. OIC is 2nd largest inter-governmental organization after the United 
Nation. It is "the collective voice of the Muslim world" and works to "safeguard and protect the 
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interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony".261  
IDB was established to serve these purposes through the vehicle of Islamic finance. Malaysia was 
one of the countries who was playing s prominent role in the establishment of OIC including ADB. 
Furthermore, the establishment of IDB provided an incentive for the creation of Islamic bank in 
national level including Malaysia. Tunku Abdul Rahman who was the Prime Minister of Malaysia 
before Mahathir was the committee chair of the establishment of IDB.  
The third catalyst was the investment demand for the Petro dollar, mainly from Saudi 
Arabia. After the Oil boom in the 1970s, Saudi Arabia wanted to recycle their wealth and to assert 
its international influence by investing their Petro dollar to other Muslim majority countries. In 
order to capture this opportunity, Mahathir contemplated the possibility of Malaysia having a 
financial institution that capture this opportunity. They need an Islamic bank. In fact, it was Prince 
Mohamed Al Faisal of Saudi Arabia was the one who convinced Mahathir to open Malaysia 
market to an international Islamic bank. Due to legality issue, it was hard to establish an 
international Islamic bank in Malaysia at that time. Nevertheless, Malaysia already saw its 
importance and later, this has set the motion for Malaysia of building its Islamic banking system.   
Beyond these three catalysts, the dynamics of national politics of under the secular 
regime of Mahathir was considered as the primary driver of Islamization of economy in Malaysia. 
Prior to Mahathir’s accession to the premiership in 1982, UMNO had done little to co-opt Islam 
and Islamists into the umbrella of the Barisan Nasional (BN). According to Shamsul (1997), BN at 
the time was too busy dealing with internal political squabbles for such efforts to take 
precedence.  Mahathir’s prescription to meet the challenge of ABIM and PAS was to effectively 
redefine the debate between the two parties by embarking on a state-led, UMNO-led program 
of Islamization. Islamization was a representation of the religious conscience of the Malays. 
Although the global Islamic resurgence did serve to affect the religious conscience of the Muslim 
population in Malaysia, there are ‘unique aspects to the resurgence of Islam in Malaysia that 
cannot be traced to the wider global dynamics’.262 Unlike many Muslim countries, the promotion 
of Islamization in Malaysia was not an expression of growing disenchantment over the repressive 
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secular nationalism dictatorship and western domination of the relative underdevelopment of 
Muslim societies that led to the promotion of the possibilities of a better life under the auspices 
of an Islamic state. Under Barisan Nasional leadership, Malaysia was experiencing rapid economic 
development, coupled with the redistribution of wealth under the New Economic Policy (NEP), 
and meant that Malays were not in the same economic position as their Muslim brethren in the 
Middle East. Therefore, the domestic factors of Malaysia Islamic politics are more relevant in 
explaining the development of Islamic insurance in Malaysia.  
In the 1980s, the common presumption that economic development was a secular project 
underwent a thorough reexamination in Malaysia. As a result, it created a demand to initiate a 
viable financial system: Islamic banking and Islamic insurance grounded in Islamic prescriptions. 
Indeed, there was a keen interest in Islamic finance across the Islamdom like Iran, Pakistan, and 
Sudan also sought to develop Islamic banking systems in the early 1980s.263 At the same time, 
Malaysia had been facing high unemployment since the 1970s: the unemployment rate in the 
1970 was 7.5%.  
Nonetheless, Mahathir had been consistently voiced his rejection toward “western 
capitalist blueprints” for modernization. Therefore, he came up with plans—in part in response 
to Islamist political critiques—to design techniques for the provision of capital commensurable 
with both Islam and capitalism, but also guarantee autonomy against globalization as the ability 
of UMNO to distribute economic resources (as patronage)  is the key to maintain its power.264 
The creation of a dual financial system and harmonization of Islamization with economic 
liberalization enabled Mahathir to build a political coalition to support the establishment of 
Islamic insurance in Malaysia. The first strategy has generated support from non-Malays to the 
project, and the second has produced continues approval and participation from the Malays 
population. Both policies are pursued as part of the adoption of the managerial role in the Islamic 
economy. As the manager, Malaysian state can incubate a new service economy in which private 
individuals and institutions (not the state) are the primary agents of economic growth. 
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State as the manager of Islamic insurance 
In June 1972, the National Fatwa Committee declared that the concept of conventional 
insurance contravened the rules of Sharia.  Unlike those Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan, which sought 
the wholesale transformation of their banking systems into full-fledged Islamic systems, Malaysia 
“initiated Islamic banking in parallel with conventional banking on a trial basis”.265In 1982, the 
Task Force to Study the Establishment of an Islamic Insurance Company in Malaysia was formed 
to look into the possibility of launching Islamic insurance as a complement to Islamic banking. 
Following the recommendations of the Task Force, the Malaysian Parliament enacted the Takaful 
Act 1984, thus giving birth to the Islamic insurance scheme in Malaysia that was entirely 
government driven and received full governmental support. Mahathir explains why it took that 
path, revealing that the systematic development of Malaysia’s Islamic finance industry mirrors 
the administrative system the country was built on. 
According to Mahathir: “When Malaysia became independent, we adopted the 
administrative system of the West. We adopted that, and we became familiar with having rules 
for everything. If you want to do something, you must have a law for it. Therefore, we had to 
provide a law for Islamic banking. Of course, the law was passed by parliament and not passed 
by some Islamic authority.”266 Creating the most comprehensive Islamic financial system in the 
world and this system operates parallel to the conventional interest-based system through a 
parliamentary framework gave national legitimacy for this initiative.  
This systematic but pragmatic strategy created a much more conducive environment 
within a vulnerable inter-race relation of Malaysia. On the issue of multiracial Malaysia and 
Islamic finance, Mahathir says, “We have to be pragmatic. The world is not peopled by Muslims 
alone. Even in Malaysia, we have non-Muslims, and they have their rights too. We respect their 
rights. I told the non-Muslims that this [Islamic finance] is the Muslim way. They don’t reject it. 
They even accept it.”267 The government set the goal of attaining a developed country status 
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before the year 2020. To this end, establishing a cordial partnership between Muslims and non-
Muslims was essential in minimizing the political and socio-economic costs and risks inherent in 
unstable ethnic relationships.268 
We can confirm this statement with the fact that there was no opposition on Islamic 
finance among the non-Malays including from DAP which was on the outside of Barisan Nasional 
coalition government. Lim Kit Siang, the DAP parliamentary leader, and Gelang Patah MP, once 
quoted the former ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, to make a point that the Chinese-
Malaysian population have no problem with Islamization. He said,” Surin said right up to the 80s, 
Islamization used to be a good word, where people integrated Islamic values and norms into 
every aspect of their life, including in education, work, and economic development. Furthermore, 
he said that DAP party supports Islamization based on the Malaysian Constitution, which 
promotes a nation-building process based on tolerance and mutual respect in a plural society 
and not one which engenders bigotry, hatred, and extremism.269 DAP even agreed to cooperate 
with PAS particularly in 2008 when PAS was pursuing open, tolerant and inclusive policies under 
the leadership of Nik Aziz Nik Mat, Fadzil Noor and Yusof Rawa. 
The affirmation of non-Malays group on Mahathir’s Islamization partly also because they 
were not able to form a strong opposition against BN. There has been a low level of non-Muslim 
(Chinese in particular) in this arena. It is generally assumed that the Chinese in Malaysia were not 
particularly concerned about Sharia-related issues, unless their interests were directly 
affected.270 The non-Malays were too diverse to form a political coalition. For instance, the 
majority of Chinese and Indians were already co-opted under Barisan Nasional. The one outside 
the government such as DAP were left with two options of Islamization: the moderate and pro-
capitalist version of Mahathir’s Islamization or PAS’ version of Islamic State. Although, once they 
cooperated with PAS against UMNO, in general, DAP preferred Islamization that carried by the 
government.  
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Based on its center-left platform, DAP prefers to have more government involvement in 
health care and public service. Nonetheless, DAP stresses the need for government to run 
efficiently. In the issue of 1Care, a reform plan that would give universal healthcare for Malaysia 
in 2012, DAP showed criticism in term of how this program could be supported financially. Lim 
Kit Siang stated,” Healthcare is a human right and each and every government of this world is 
obliged to provide to its citizens the best of healthcare in the form that is most efficient, cost 
effective and acceptable to its citizens.”271 In summary, the development of Islamic insurance 
through a dual system has not been considered as a threat for the well-being of the Malaysian 
minority, particularly compared to the previous economic program of NEP which certainly bias 
toward Malays. They also accept Islamic insurance if it is developed as private-based insurance 
that does not give a financial burden to the state and does not disrupt the existing business 
environment. 
From the perspective of UMNO leadership itself, support from the Chinese in Malaysia 
particularly the Chinese corporate figures are important. The recession in the later 1980s exposed 
the fundamental weakness of Bumiputera entrepreneurs. Mahathir found that vibrant Chinese 
capital, together with the energetic Chinese workforce, was a vital asset to the Malaysian 
economy. This fact became an incentive for Mahathir to ensure Islamic finance project that 
entertains Chinese interest and demands. The UMNO government could not afford to have the 
Chinese community in general, and Chinese capital in particular, lose confidence in its leadership. 
The dual system did not pose a serious threat to Chinese and corporate business in general. The 
Islamic finance law was introduced without replacing paralleling laws on the civil side and the 
administration of these laws remained under the jurisdiction of civil courts. Therefore, they 
welcomed this system and supported UMNO political agenda if Malaysia’s liberal business 
practices were kept untouched. 
Furthermore, there are many non-Muslim Malaysians participants in Islamic finance, 
particularly Islamic insurance. A study by Swartz and Coetzer mentions that Islamic insurance 
 





products have attracted even non-Muslim communities.272Although no hard numbers are 
available, the industry has trumpeted the non-Muslim take-up rate for Islamic banking products 
over the years. It is well-known in the financial sector that most customers of the country's fully-
fledged Islamic banks-such as Bank Islam Malaysia and Bank Muamalat-as well as the Islamic 
banking "windows" of conventional banks, including Maybank, Public Bank, HSBC, Citibank and 
Standard Chartered-are, in fact, non-Muslim. A report released by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 
2008 claimed that more than 50 percent of Islamic banking customers are non-Muslim.273 
Although it was designed as an alternative political and economic framework using 
specific Islamic terms and contracts, Islamic insurance and Islamic finance, in general, are very 
inclusive for various players. In 1993, the central bank introduced the Interest-Free Banking 
Scheme.274 This program offered tax breaks for conventional banks that opened Islamic 
“windows” to offer Islamic financial products, such as home mortgages or savings accounts. 
Similarly, conventional banks could use their existing institutions and infrastructure to expand 
into Islamic banking and Islamic insurance on a gradual basis and offer conventional and Islamic 
financing options under the same umbrella. According to some observers, the Islamic window 
scheme offered the most cost-effective and efficient way to “disseminate Islamic banking on a 
nation-wide basis, with as many players as possible, so as to be able to reach all Malaysians”275, 
and which allowed Malaysia to quickly grow its Islamic financial sector. Furthermore, by 
increasing the number of firms in the sector, the state spurred the innovation of instruments and 
products. 
To further facilitate the growth of Islamic insurance, the Malaysian government had 
increasingly built a network of Islamic financial institutions rather than relying on a single state-
supported Islamic insurance company. Foreign insurance companies have been active in 
acquiring stakes in local insurers through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) since 2010. Between 
2010 and 2016, the Malaysian insurance industry saw the conclusion of around 20 M&A deals 
valued at about RM16bn, notably in the more fragmented general insurance segment. The 
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industry’s consolidation and the entry of global players resulted in larger and stronger insurers, 
as well as greater sophistication for the domestic industry through product innovation, pricing 
and risk-management expertise as well as multi-channel, including digital, distribution. 
At this moment, AIA and Great Eastern are dominant players in the domestic life 
insurance segment landscape, cumulatively commanding close to 50% of market share by net 
premium contribution. AIA, Great Eastern and Zurich have Islamic product offerings. While AIA 
and Great Eastern each has a local partner for the Takaful JV (Public Bank and Koperasi Angkatan 
Tentera respectively), Zurich’s operations are wholly owned. In 2006, Hong Leong Bank - the 
sixth-largest local bank entered the Islamic insurance market.  
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, prime minister from 2003 to 2009, continued the policies 
inherited from Mahathir Mohamad. Abdullah persisted with a developmentalist model that 
promoted Bumiputera capital, but he showed little interest in developing Malay – or Malaysian 
– big businesses. He nurtured SMEs, including cottage industries dealing with halal products, 
dominated by poor rural Malays, as well as Islamic-based financial services as he believed firms 
in these sectors had export capacity potential if developed well. Since the 2005 census of the 
corporate area revealed that SMEs constituted about 99.2 percent of all business establishments, 
this new effort to establish these firms was an astute economic – and political – move. SMEs then 
employed 5.6 million workers and contributed about 32 percent of real GDP. Eighty-seven 
percent of SMEs are in the services sector, 7.2 percent in manufacturing and 6.2 percent in 
agriculture. Ninety-nine percent of firms in agriculture are SMEs. Key sub-sectors within services 
comprise those related to Islamic financial products, including banking and Islamic insurance.276  
Altogether, the state has limit itself on the role of an incubator or manager for Islamic 
insurance rather than as a direct participant. The Malaysian state created the necessary 
infrastructure to facilitate the emergence of viable national and transnational Islamic financial 
systems but did not become involved in creating commercial firms. The key institutions 
developed by the state include special offices within the Bank Negara Malaysia; research and 
educational institutions; and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), which is an international 
standard-setting organization that develops global standards and guiding principles for Islamic 
 




financial institutions. The state’s effort to act as an incubator rather than as an agent of Islamic 
finance is further evident in its insistence that the Islamic sector competes with the conventional 
sector.277 Compared to the affirmative policy of NEP of the 1970s, the creation of a dual financial 
system has been seen as more inclusive and non-discriminative against non-Malays population. 
The dual system model offered the opportunity to maintain order in the conventional system, 
generating political support while simultaneously incubating the embryonic Islamic system. 
Harmonizing Islamization with economic liberalization 
Malaysian government provides more support –particularly in comparison to Indonesia 
and Pakistan- in the establishment of the private-based Islamic insurance of Takaful. The next 
question would be: If Islamization is a tool for the Mahathir regime to gain public support and 
legitimation, why he pursued an Islamic but private-based insurance model rather than using 
populist policy. For example, he could rely on expanding social insurance by utilizing Islamic 
instrument such as zakat (religious tax). Creating Islamic social insurance seems to be the most 
rational option, mainly when there is less disagreement among the scholars of Islam on the 
permissibility of social insurance.278 Mahathir could get Muslim support and at the same time, 
there was no need to devote more resources from public funding. 
There were budgetary deficits highlighted the economic vulnerability in the mid-1980s, 
partly due to the large size of the public sector. Therefore, to overcome the crisis and build a 
stronger foundation for the economy, it was decided that Malaysia needed more economic 
liberalization and deregulation and that the private sector should be the engine of growth. 
Liberalization would introduce more competition, attract foreign capital and increase efficiency. 
So, how the Mahathir government could gain support from the Malay population for his 
economic liberalization agenda? Islamic insurance has a prominent role in this process. 
Therefore, Malaysia as s state needed to take command on the Islamic finance agenda.  
Mahathir understands the Islamdom is not a monolithic homo Islamicus. In his memoirs, 
he writes about Muslims’ different interpretations of Islamic principles and injunctions that lead 
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to factions. Therefore, a centralized body for the Islamic finance industry was needed to create a 
uniform model for an assemblage of religious and economic practices, which are two domains 
that earlier efforts toward secular modernization had presumed separate. This centralized Sharia 
body developed concepts and methods of Islamic finance that both represented Islamic values 
but also serves the goal for economic liberalization of Malaysia.  
The variation in policy responses of the countries stems from difference in the 
preferences of regime supporters over the idea of Islamization in general, and particularly 
Islamization of insurance. In Malaysia case, the establishment of Islamic insurance was tied up to 
a broader privatization project envisioned by Mahathir including privatization of Malaysia’s 
health care, social security and Malaysia economy in general.  While in previous decades, the 
Malaysian Government had prided itself on its achievements in health care and the welfare 
model of federal health care services, under the Mahathir administration the public health care 
sector was increasingly regarded as a burden, which the government would be unable to carry in 
the future. The government's concept of Vision 2020, with the goal of Malaysia reaching 
developed country status by the year 2020, has eschewed the welfare state.  
Prime Minister Mahathir has asserted the need for "a social system in which society will 
come before which the welfare of the people will not revolve around the state or the individual 
but around a strong and resilient family system".  Several schemes for financing health care have 
been articulated by the government. These include the use of compulsory savings, private 
insurance, and employer-funded private coverage.279 At the same time, the success of affirmative 
action of the New Economic Program since the 1970s in creating a Melayu Baru or the new Malay 
elite society encouraged the creation of protection system which both Islamic but also 
economically sound. Malaysia’s health care system required a significant growth in the private 
health care sector, a high proportion of health care expenditure comes from out-of-pocket, to 
sustain high quality and high cost of medical technology. 
There had been demographic changes to the UMNO voters. UMNO traditionally gained 
support from Malay community and peasants in the villages. However, more Malays migrated to 
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cities, worked in a corporate environment, and gained a college degree. This transformation of 
the voter characteristics from rural agricultural to more urban Muslim encouraged UMNO to 
introduce a program that appealing from them. Most of them were not the poor who need 
charity from zakat, but they were more interested in job and business opportunities. The 
characteristics of Islamic finance in Malaysia were designed for this particular urban 
entrepreneurial group. Furthermore, Islamic insurance is an idiom that capture this 
transformation. 
Both Mahathir Mohamad top-down state-directed initiatives and bottom-up societal 
pressures played a significant role in this process. The three-decade regime managed to create a 
coalition between the urban, modern, and middle-class Malay Muslim population and Malay 
entrepreneur in building private-based Islamic finance.  At the same time, there has been a 
continued and continuous pressures from the dakwah movement (Islamic missionary) of 
Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) or the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia.  
Mahathir had been careful enough to limit the role of the traditional religious council (the 
older ulama) as merely supporter and far from being the driver of the Islamization. Developing 
Islamic instrument through private scheme serves both strengthening the Malaysian Muslim 
bourgeoisie or entrepreneur class and facilitate Mahathir’s broad economic developmental 
goals, which would further add to UMNO’s popularity and electoral legitimacy but without 
jeopardizing the authoritarian and capitalist structure of Malaysia. Islamic insurance 
development in Malaysia reflects a continued and continuous dynamic interaction of both 
processes: top-down state-directed initiatives and bottom-up societal pressures, especially from 
the dakwah movement of ABIM.280  
The establishment of Islamic insurance was intended to take the momentum of public 
positive response toward the establishment of Bank Islam one year before and to capture the 
emerging market of the new urban and modern Malay Muslims as a result of the successful 
affirmative action of NEP. The success of Bank Islam had provided a pathway for the 
establishment of Takaful. Syarikat Takaful started operations in August 1985 with a paid-up 
capital of RM10 million. Bank Islam was its majority shareholder, with others being state religious 
 




councils and state religious development agencies. In its first year of operations, Syarikat Takaful 
attracted 6,000 Takaful participants, with the number rising to 50,000 by the end of May 1987. 
In fact, Tan Sri Nor Mohamed Yakcop, who was responsible for the implementation of Islamic 
banking at Bank Negara Malaysia until the early 1990s, explains,” We agreed from Day 1 that we 
would establish, over period of time, an entire ecosystem of Islamic finance consisting of banking 
system, a capital market, stock-broking, and Takaful (Islamic insurance).” 281 
Before the 1980s, Malaysia had proceeded the presumption of a de facto separation of 
religion from the economy. Malaysia’s initial development success stemmed from its position in 
the 1970s and 1980s as a global center for high-tech assembly and offshore industrialization.282 
With the active encouragement of the developmentalist state, firms from Europe, Japan, and the 
United States set up shop in large industrial zones and hired a vast number of workers to provide 
the labor for export-oriented growth.  
Although economic modernization was primarily a secular project, the state took a special 
interest in the economic standing of the Bumiputera. This concern accelerated after the 
widespread ethnic riots in 1969. These efforts became particularly pronounced in the state’s New 
Economic Policy (NEP), which was initiated in the 1970s. The policies provided ethnic Malays, 
who were by state definition Muslim, with privileged access to state benefits such as civil service 
positions, state-held trusts, business licenses, government contracts, and preferential access to 
higher education in the national university system. Secular economic development saw the rise 
in the fortunes of the elites, Melayu Baru (the New Malays). 
By the 1980s, the common presumption that economic development was a secular 
project underwent a thorough reexamination in Malaysia. Indeed, this secular economic 
development helped to improve the economic condition of Bumiputera. Nevertheless, it also 
accelerated the rise of Islamism in Malaysia, especially in the universities. Moreover, these 
university students especially have increased their involvement with campus dakwah 
organizations, which gave rise to the moderate Islamist movement of ABIM.  
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 There were also some unintended consequences. The rise in the fortunes of the elites, 
many of whom were politically connected; and their ostentatious displays of wealth and 
conspicuous consumption became a focus of criticisms by Islamists who viewed newly rich 
Malays as morally suspect, inattentive to Islam, and “corrupt and greedy.283 There has been 
growing dissatisfaction toward the government that was considered as un-Islamic. There were 
demands represented by ABIM and PAS that Islam should not be merely instrumental terms but 
as a comprehensive system of values that should encompass all spheres of human activity. 
When the modernist Mahathir came to power in 1981, Islamism became the most 
effective ideological weapon against the UMNO. After decades of removing the threat from the 
political left, Islamist has become the primary opponent of the ruling power. Rather than 
removing the threat forcefully, the UMNO-led government responded to this Islamic revival by 
supporting the social policy of Islamization. UMNO assume Islamic veneer and to incorporate 
varying Islamic elements in its program. The cooptation of a charismatic and visionary leader of 
ABIM, Anwar Ibrahim, marked the vital point of the Islamization process in Malaysia. 
Prior to Mahathir’s accession to the premiership in 1982, UMNO had done little to co-opt 
Islam and Islamists into the umbrella of the Barisan Nasional. According to Shamsul, the Barisan 
at the time was too busy dealing with internal political squabbles for such efforts to take 
precedence. Mahathir’s prescription to meet the challenge of ABIM and PAS was to effectively 
redefine the debate between the two parties by embarking on a state-led, UMNO-led program 
of Islamization. To give credence to this, nine months later Mahathir spectacularly brought Anwar 
into UMNO’s fold and ‘with Anwar’s help, Mahathir was able to quickly formulate new Islamic 
policies that were received with wide approval from the country’s ulama or the clergy. Anwar’s 
co-option was all the more spectacular since many within PAS had anticipated that Anwar would 
become its leader in the future.284 
It is clear that Anwar’s co-option signaled the beginning of the institutionalization of 
Islamization within the bureaucracy. The first initiative was the introduction of ‘Penerapan Nilai-
nilai Islam’ which was ‘a policy guideline for the incorporation of Islamic ethics in governance’. 
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This policy led to the establishment of an Islamic Consultative Body, the Institute for Islamic 
Understanding, and the IIUM in 1983, and an Islamic Development Foundation in 1985, as well 
as an Islamic insurance company and an Islamic bank (Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad) in 1984.285 
Another important development was the introduction of Pusat Islam which in effect was 
a ‘government sponsored Dakwah group, intended to compete with other Dakwah movements 
and to report on their activities’. Over time Pusat Islam would grow into a fully -fledged 
department of government known by the acronym JAKIM (Jabatan Kemajuan Agama Islam 
Malaysia – Department of Islamic Advancement of Malaysia). Additionally, to ensure Malays 
were educated about UMNO’s ‘progressive’ approach to Islam (as opposed to PAS’s version of 
Islam), the government sanctioned policies that saw an increase in Islamic programs over the 
radio and television. 
Some members of ABIM rose up to become what so called urban ulama. They have a 
background in Islamic studies and well-versed in Islamic law, but unlike traditional ulama, they 
have influence beyond their particular village or kariah. They are professors in universities, live 
in cities, speak in international forum and media, and address contemporary social issues. These 
ulama were recruited by the state to build Malaysia Islamic finance. They are the epistemic 
community behind Islamic finance. They sit together with bankers, actuaries, and bureaucrats to 
formulate regulations on Islamic finance. The emergence of urban ulama is, in part, precipitated 
by an alliance between state elites and Sharia bureaucrats in cities, particularly Kuala Lumpur, as 
Sharia professionals have been placed on state as well as Islamic Finance Institutions’ payrolls. 
Sharia professionals in these institutions and government administration are rewarded with 
higher salaries, power, status, and mobility, especially those recruited to federal agencies in 
charge of administering Sharia compliance. They are more cosmopolitan than their rural 
counterparts actively codifying legal discourses and engaging in Islamic legal theorization.286 
Furthermore, these Sharia experts were interested non-only in upgrading their socio-economic 
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status but also in maximizing their jurisdictional boundaries.287 At this moment, this group of 
urban ulama is known as ‘Islamic business developer’ or ‘entrepreneur’. 
Without questioning Mahathir’s own religious convictions his decision to bring in Anwar 
was clearly a calculated and strategic decision brought in to deliver the Islamic votes to UMNO’. 
However, Mahathir was not only motivated by the desire to blunt the appeal of ABIM and the 
influence of the Dakwah educated students. Analyzing his key policy pronouncements, it is clear 
that Mahathir hoped to utilize Islam as a vehicle to facilitate his broad economic developmental 
goals, which would further add to UMNO’s popularity and electoral legitimacy. Mahathir’s vision 
of Islam was one that he believed could be harnessed to UMNO’s original goals of nationalism 
and capitalism. 
The Islamist party of PAS has been supportive toward the development of Islamic finance 
in Malaysia, but they have been very critical in the way Mahathir’s operated it by neglecting poor 
people. Although PAS always promote the responsibility of the state to take care of its citizen 
including providing free health care, PAS has no principle disagreement on the concept and the 
practice of Islamic insurance. PAS even has been developing its own Islamic insurance schemes 
for PAS member (Takaful Kifalah dan Takaful Armalah). PAS had objection on the way 
government pursued the development of private insurance by reducing its public funding 
especially in health care. Mahathir’s Islamization along with privatization and deregulation 
program have left behind pools of poverty, urban and rural, while only a small group of elite 
Malays have become much better off.  According to PAS leader, “PAS shall continue to assess and 
address the impact of globalization, in so far as it affects the development of a better Malaysia 
and a better world.” Rather than a piecemeal program offered by BN, PAS claim that Islamic State 
would solve the problem. Although PAS was known as the defender of the people, its Islamic 
State idea has never been expressed clearly, compared to the one proposed by BN and Mahathir. 
Moreover, Mahathir has accused PAS of misrepresented Islam by promoting terrorism, 
conservatism, fanaticism, backwardness, poverty, and degrading stereotypes.”288 PAS was hardly 
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able to compete with BN in winning Malay/Muslim voters, particularly after Mahathir 
successfully coopted Anwar Ibrahim into his government. 
Furthermore, the state conducts some regulatory reforms to reduce the ambiguity in 
Islamic finance. The state reduced uncertainty in Islamic finance by reducing conflicts over 
interpretations of Islamic law. Politically, this has been substantial in solidifying support for the 
Mahathir’s Islamization project. For instance, The Central Bank of Malaysia Act, passed in 2009, 
contained key provisions regarding the status of the National Sharia Advisory Council or NSAC. 
These provisions effectively administered compliance with Islamic prescriptions by granting the 
NSAC the status of the sole authoritative body on Sharia matters about Islamic banking, Islamic 
insurance, and Islamic finance. The act itself granted the NSAC the power to prevail over any 
other ruling passed by a Sharia body in Malaysia, and it stipulated that any courts or arbitrators 
were required to refer to NSAC rulings in any dispute pertaining to Islamic financial business. 
Finally, it mandated that any rulings of the NSAC were binding. This essentially gave the NSAC 
supreme authority in the arbitration of matters connected to Islamic finance. Rudnyckyj argues, 
“Efforts to rationalize interpretations of Sharia reveal an important aspect of the afterlife of 
development: the production of new types of knowledge requires intervention to ensure that 
systems operate consistently and predictably. In this instance, the state ensured the efficient 
functioning of the Islamic finance infrastructure by mitigating the potential for conflicting 
interpretations of religious injunctions.”289 
The establishment of the strategic investment fund of the Government of Malaysia, 
Khazanah Nasional Berhad, is to help to maintain economic autonomy and strengthen capital 
expansion. Khazanah is entrusted to hold and manage the commercial assets of the Government 
and to undertake strategic investments on behalf of the nation. It is a novel way to strengthening 
Bumiputera capital ownership in a certain way.  This company also acts as re-Takaful company. 
The world’s largest Islamic re-insurance company are ACR ReTakaful Holdings Ltd, owned by ACR 
Capital Holdings, the Dubai Group and Malaysian sovereign wealth fund Khazanah Nasional Bhd, 
 




with a paid-up capital of $300 million, according to its website.290 Mahathir Mohamad founded 
the sovereign wealth fund, Khazanah, in 1994. 
Khazanah's portfolio features some of Malaysia's most significant and most strategic 
listed entities, such as telecommunications giant Telekom Malaysia and its regional mobile 
operator Axiata Group, financial powerhouse CIMB Group Holdings, national power utility 
Tenaga Nasional, airports operator Malaysia Airports Holdings and IHH Healthcare. Khazanah is 
also the sole shareholder of the country's financially troubled national air carrier, Malaysia 
Airlines. In Singapore, Khazanah and Temasek are joint-venture partners in M+S Pte Ltd, which is 
involved in the development of four parcels of land in Marina South and two land parcels in 
Ophir-Rochor on which Marina One and Duo now stand. It is stated in the website, 
Khazanah’s portfolio cuts across various sectors and industries. Our companies comprise 
some of the most significant companies in Malaysia, as measured by their strategic 
importance to the nation. They include Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) in sectors 
such as aviation, financial services, power and telecommunications. We also invest in new 
sectors and geographies to support the transformation of the Malaysian economy. Via 
these investments, we hope to build new industry linkages and help boost national 
growth and development.291  
Beyond this purpose, this company had been used as a convenient vehicle for the 
government to reward politicians and non-professionals with positions and lucrative 
compensation packages.292 
Although the government of Malaysia does not involve directly in establishing Islamic 
finance companies, the success of Islamic financial institutions is very much dependent on 
deposits of government money, rooted in a rent-based model just as NEP-era businesses had 
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been.293 The government and its subsidiary companies are the primary investors in Malaysia’s 
massive Sukuk issuances. Zakat contributions make up a hefty segment of money on hand in 
Malaysian Islamic banks. The Employee Provident Fund – Malaysia’s pension system – often 
invests its money in Islamic instruments. Think tanks such as INCEIF and ISRA, conferences held 
in Kuala Lumpur, and global promotion and marketing are largely funded by Bank Negara and the 
state.294 
Islamic finance and Islamic insurance serve as meeting point for diverse political interests. 
For Mahathir, UMNO and BN, Islamic finance mitigates the real threat posed by Islamism. 
Dakwah movement of ABIM and Islamists political party of PAS were pushing demand of having 
Islam as a comprehensive system of values within Malaysia polity. To gain support from Malays 
population and present the UMNO government as Islamic, Mahathir responded by supporting 
the social policy of Islamization. Moreover, Mahathir reshaped this Islamization process by co-
opting the leaders of ABIM, especially Anwar Ibrahim, and directed the Islamization project. On 
economic matters, Mahathir reshaped Islamization agenda by creating Islamic finance in a way 
that harmonious with his economic development agenda.  
Moreover, Islamic insurance prepared the transformation toward a social system based 
on a strong and resilient family system. Mahathir has been keen to exploit the dynamism of 
market forces to shake up the bureaucracy and Malay values. On the other hand, the mechanism 
that might transform Malay values - market forces - and help make the Bumiputera more 
"authentic" capitalists and less dependent on either state assistance or politically strategic 
relationships with Chinese businesspeople. Mahathir sought to exploit what he takes to be the 
beneficial, transformative effects of market forces without sacrificing government control or 
oversight. 295 For Malay population, Islamic insurance presents an idea that Malays can be 
modern but still maintain their uniqueness, but for UMNO it was a tool to enter globalization that 
provides control over its patronage relationship with the domestic corporate figures. The goal for 
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autonomy from globalization was the main reason behind his rhetoric against western capitalism 
blueprint. 
Islamic insurance received support from a broad political coalition. For the ruling 
government of Barisan Nasional and private sectors, Islamic insurance has been one of the tools 
to harmonized Islamization and economic liberalization. It was an avenue for the maintenance of 
the UMNO's dominant political position, as this is still dependent on its ability to control and 
distribute economic resources. Meanwhile, ABIM and PAS support this alternative insurance 
because it is imbued by Islamic values and present the ‘more Islamic’ picture of Malaysia. 
Moreover, it was also an alternative avenue for Bumiputera capital growth, job entry to the 
government, and opportunity for expansion of Sharia jurisdictions. At the same time, there was 
no strong opposition against Islamic insurance from non-Malays including the center-left party 
of DAP, insurance businesses and corporate figures because Islamic insurance is a private-based 
scheme thus it is considered as more efficient in term of public funding. Furthermore, its 
establishment did threaten the existing liberal-capitalistic business environment, on the contrary, 
Islamic insurance expanded this system and provided benefits and more opportunities for them. 
Islamic insurance is a deal between the need for Islamic values, liberalization agenda, and need 
for economic autonomy. 
Malaysia’s Barisan Nasional coalition depended on (continues to depend on) an alliance 
between the Malay masses and a class of Malay entrepreneurs. Favoritism in economic and social 
policy ensures support from ordinary Malays; favoritism in corporate and financial policy ties the 
new Malay rich to the regime. The strategic use of ethnicity is the key to continual maintenance 
of this system of exchange and support across classes, for it demonstrates how regime 
institutions embedded each group’s economic interests directly into the system of rule. The new 
coalitional alignments between ordinary Malays and the new Malay rich, pressure from the 
“fundamentalists” PAS, weak opposition from Chinese Malaysian community, and support from 
corporate actors are instrumental for understanding the development of Islamic insurance in 
Malaysia. 
Adding to that, the success of Islamic insurance in Malaysia post-Asia financial crisis can 




maintained political dominance meaning there had been no changes in the Islamic finance 
structure. There was less transaction cost due to political readjustment compared to the 
democratization of Indonesia by the end of the 1990s. There had been no serious challenge 
toward the regime during that time and its institutions. The Islamization project that initiated 
from the center of political power was left untouched. 
Corporate Islam and the acceptance of Islamic insurance  
Insurance markets in Muslim countries are mainly at nascent or growth stage of 
development with a very low insurance density, even in the most developed Muslim nations. 
Based on a comprehensive study by Feyen, Lester, Rocha the reasons are the religious 
prohibitions, underdeveloped financial systems, weak contract enforcement, consumer 
skepticism, corruption, lack of understanding of the benefits and necessity of insurance, limited 
technical expertise and low GDP per capita. 296 So, how Islamic insurance has become accepted 
in Malaysia society in a relatively short time?  
Indeed, the improvement of those variables mentioned by the study above influenced 
the development of Islamic insurance in Malaysia. Because of the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 
May 1969, Malays have become wealthier and taken greater control over Malaysia’s economic 
resources. The steady development with government support of Islamic finance since the 1980s 
also increased consumer trust toward Islamic Finance institutions. Nonetheless, understanding 
the interaction between those variables, particularly the role of religion and Malay’s culture helps 
us to have a more profound understanding of this development.  
This section discusses the ‘social life of Islamic insurance’ meaning how Islamic insurance 
as a commodity has become accepted as a social practice within Malays society. It elaborates the 
redefinitions of Islamic economic beliefs and meanings that have shaped the Malay 
understanding of entrepreneurship and human agency. Patricia Sloane-White argues that the 
development of Islamic finance is not only creating a new class of Malay entrepreneurs but also 






life do not merely produce Islamically regulated things, but produce and emplace Islamic norms, 
ethics, hierarchies, practices, and gendered identities enacted in corporate life. That is, they 
produce Islam.”297 
This section consists of two parts. The first part explains how Malay society reset market 
values inherent in the Islamic insurance to be in line with their Islamic values and the second part 
contains discussion on the emergence of Malay entrepreneurship. This first part focuses on how 
Malaysians consume, rework, and accept Islamic insurance, whereas, the evolution of Malays 
entrepreneurship plays the most crucial role in it. The second part provides a historical 
explanation on how the affirmative policy of NEP and the subsequent Islamization during 
Mahathir created a new class of entrepreneurial Malays. This class is not only different from 
other groups in term of socio-demographic characteristics but also in mindset. Sloane uses the 
term ‘Corporate Islam’ to describe the middle-class urban Malays who are using 
entrepreneurship not only as an occupation but also identity. This identity is integral with their 
understanding of being a Malay, Muslim and modern. Islam is reconfigured as an ethical and 
entrepreneurial religion. This ’altered’ identity provides susceptible ground for novel schemes of 
Islamic finance including Islamic insurance to develop and to be accepted.  
Islamic insurance as an idiom for self-reliant, piety and care responsibility 
 Many studies have been conducted to understand the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and insurance. The findings show how insurance encourages entrepreneurship 
because insurance creates more predictability and manages business risk. The risk-averse 
businesspeople will likely to invest in new business ventures as insurance will overcome a 
possible loss. 298 Many of similar study assume there is singular understanding on insurance. 
However, the concepts of risk, risk sharing, distributive justice, generalized reciprocity, and 
hedging against financial catastrophe are understood and addressed in relation to the values or 
culture in local worlds. Insurance as both a concept and an institution have been presented to 
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the public in various ways by different stakeholders. Public perceptions of and demand for 
insurance are not static. They are sensitive to changing policy, practice, experience, and flows of 
information.299 Golomski argues, “Like biomedicine or finance, insurance tends to travel globally 
as a culture-free form of knowledge,” but then he adds, ”Recent ethnographic research shows 
how insurance is consumed, reworked or rejected in novel ways.”300 Insurance does not have a 
single meaning, logic, or effect but needs to be viewed in practice, in context, and from multiple 
vantage points.301 This part of this chapter focuses on how Malaysians consume, rework, and 
accept Islamic insurance, whereas, the evolution of Malays entrepreneurship plays the most 
important element in it.  
The price of premium and services of Islamic insurance are not entirely different from 
conventional insurance. Islamic insurance companies and brokers were ethnopreneurial in their 
marketing by using language and symbols of ethnic or religious identity. This research founds five 
symbols that are presented in the introduction of Islamic insurance in Malaysia:  
1. Islamic insurance as care responsibility toward a family. 
2. Islamic insurance is Islamic. 
3. Islamic insurance embodies cooperation/risk sharing 
4. Islamic insurance is operated by for-profit companies. 
5. Islamic insurance is supported by the government. 
 
In order to understand the social life of Islamic insurance, we examine five aspects of Islamic 
insurance in Malaysia. I use secondary sources that documented interviews with people who buy 
Islamic insurance, particularly from the qualitative study conducted by Naail Mohammed Kamila 
and Norsham Binti Mat Norb.302  
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The Family Takaful sector in Malaysia is noted to make up the more substantial portion 
of the Islamic insurance operators’ business portfolio, as measured by the size of contributions. 
As at the end of the third quarter of 2016, net contributions for Family Takaful business grew by 
8.7 percent on a year-on-year basis and accounted for 75.5 percent of market share of Islamic 
insurance business in the country. Malaysia is also recognized as the largest Family Takaful 
market in the world, with total contributions of around RM 4.8bn registered in 2014. On the other 
hand, the growth trend of the General Takaful business for the past five years has moderated to 
11.4 per cent average annual growth for 2011-2015, as compared to the growth rate of 17.3 per 
cent in the years 2007-2010.303 
This recent data show two important things; Islamic insurance is used more as an 
investment instead of protection, and individuals/families and not corporations or organizations 
are the main consumer of Islamic insurance in Malaysia. Family Takaful is like an endowment 
policy.  A participant decides on the maturity period, the amount of annual contribution 
(provided it is above the minimum amount set by the company), and the frequency of 
contributions. The example of Family Takaful is an education fund. Insurance is seen by many 
Malaysians as an investment for which a return is expected.  
On the other hand, General Takaful protects participants against losses from personal 
accidents and loss or destruction of property. The contract specifies the amount of contribution 
that the participant must make. Therefore, we will focus on analyzing Family Takaful to 
understand the ‘social life’ of Islamic insurance in Malaysia. 
How is Islamic insurance presented to individuals or families in Malaysia? Before we 
discuss more detail on the preference of Malay on investment type of insurance instead of 
protection, we will elaborate how the concept of risk develops in the Islam modernist of the New 
Malay. Many studies show religion or belief system has correlation with the low level of insurance 
demand. Related to Muslim society of Malaysia, commutative contract of the mainstream 
conventional insurance is specifically objectionable by Sharia. This type of contract unduly limits 
uncertainty and ambiguity in human lives. Muslims can take steps to minimize the impact of 
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events, however, they believe that what happens is predetermined by God’s will. For this reason, 
many Muslims see insurance as unnecessary. Furthermore, in their traditional environment in 
the villages, family and community is the one who will guarantee in a time of emergency. 
The concept of risk is quite modern. The traditional society emphasizes on anticipation of 
the actual prevalence of life-threatening dangers which lead to economic insecurity. God or 
Nature is the source of this insecurity. Anthony Giddens argues that there has been huge 
historical transformation of the nature of risk -and security.304 People in the modern age are 
relatively more secure than they were in previous ages. They have longer life expectation and 
freedom from serious disease. Nonetheless, the physical security of modern people is balanced 
by a new risk: war, nuclear threat, motor accident, environmental degradation, etc. These risks 
are not generated by natural causes, but as results of modern social organization or so-called 
abstract system305 in Giddens’ term.  Furthermore, there is a 'globalization of risk in the sense of 
intensity' and extensity such as climate change and nuclear war. This new risk affects everyone 
or at least very large numbers of people on the planet. The intensification of worldwide social 
relations linking distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events 
occurring many thousands of miles away and vice versa.306 Therefore, instead of anticipation, 
control of risk is an essential part of modern society.  
As Malay migrated to the cities, worked in a corporate environment they have less access 
to their traditional community to provide that guarantee. They also face different types of 
insecurity: bankruptcy, expensive healthcare and college tuition, etc. welfare state situation, the 
state is the one who provide that as during the NEP, Malaysian state provide capital support, 
scholarship, and other material resources for the Malay society. State and market become crucial 
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actors because the traditional institutions and culture can no longer provide the necessary 
protection for modern people.  
Patricia Sloane mentions one interesting example of how the understanding of risk 
developed among the New Malay. The establishment of Amanah (investment trust for Malays) 
by two Malays entrepreneurs is relevant to this case. It can help us to understand how people 
perceive Islamic insurance.  The founders understand that the abundant NEP-era educational 
resources for Malays would not be around forever. Moreover, the government seemed to require 
that Malays begin to take an ever-greater group and individual responsibility for their own 
development-what they felt was the message behind Vision 2020-they believed that Malay 
parents would soon need to put away money to pay for university for their children. Through 
Amanah, Malay parents would learn to take responsibility for educational development of their 
own children; investing small amounts money in the trust every month for 18 years, parents 
would be able to draw out a substantial sum when their children were ready for university.307 
The awareness of risk and future uncertainty mark the New Malay identity as a modern 
and entrepreneurial society. Investment is a language of modern society, particularly the one 
who embrace entrepreneurship as their identity and social status.  On the one hand, it is the New 
Malay’s way to distant themselves from the lazy and fatalistic traditional Malays. On the other 
hand, Islamic insurance is understood not as a way to control uncertainty, but as an idiom of care 
responsibility for their family. Furthermore, subscribing to an Islamic insurance policy to protect 
themselves and invest on the family future are seen as performing religious duty by the New 
Malay generation. Naail Mohammed Kamila and Norsham Binti Mat Norb present an interesting 
interview result on how preparing for future risk is understood as part of being a good Muslim: 
Takaful and religion are very much close to each other. Why? Because in religion, in Islam 
(we’re talking about Islam). So, I refer to Islam, not other religion. In Islam, we have this Maqasid 
of Sharia (the objectives of religious law). So, one of the objectives in this Maqasid is to protect 
your wealth. In that sense, we’re buying Takaful not only for us but also for our generations. An 
example is when you’re buying a Family Takaful product. Maybe you’re protecting yourself for 
now so that not burden your family. In case of any emergency, you must be hospitalized, you’re 
 




well protected. Then, and anything happen to you, also, maybe your family you left behind will 
get some compensation. 308  
Investment is not perceiving merely as a worldly affair but as a religious duty. Being 
mindful of the uncertainty of the future and prepare for that is a way to achieve the objective of 
Sharia. Islamic insurance in Malaysia serves as both protection and investment functions. Islamic 
insurance in Malaysia has been presented as a modern way to deal with future uncertainty, 
particularly in the condition with less government assistance. Buying an insurance policy is also 
considered as a noble act that shows a self-reliant attitude. The attitude that inherent in their 
entrepreneurial identity. Moreover, Islamic insurance is not presented as a tool for controlling 
the future. This would be considered by the Malays as an act of underestimating the power of 
God. The Malays reject this type of secularism. Rather, Islamic insurance is presented as an idiom 
of care responsibility toward the family.  
Investment is considered by the Malay entrepreneur class is an act of piety. For the first 
generation of the New Malay during the first decade of the NEP, investment and being frugal are 
entrepreneurial ethics that consistent with Islamic values. This view is a rationalist view that has 
been promoted by Islam modernists. However, for the Sharia generation who came after them, 
the act of investment and business activities, in general, has to be conducted consistent with 
Islamic values. It has to be Sharia-compliant.  
Sloane argues that Sharia has also emerged as a novel form of corporate culture, 
reconfiguring workplace identities and relations in distinctly Islamic ways many see the growing 
appeal of the Islamic economy in Malaysia not just as an ethical place to bank and borrow, but 
as a place to work. Sloane quotes one young woman who captured this desire well: "We want to 
know that the money with which we feed our children was earned morally.”309 
The perspectives on Islamic business activity of the early Malay entrepreneurs are parallel 
activity to that of Calvinist businesspersons described by Weber, in which work provides rewards 
to capitalists in both this world and the next.310 However, the latest Muslim businesspersons in 
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Malaysia Islamic economy perceive it differently. For them, Islam has its own terms for 
understanding rewards and salvation that do not rely on a Eurocentric model.  
From her field study, Sloane found out that it was evident that an increasing amount of 
Arabic- and Qur'an-influenced teaching and knowledge was reflected in their experience, 
compared to the preceding cohort of Malay entrepreneurs she studied a decade earlier, whose 
Arabic and Qur'anic backgrounds were less developed. The men she interviewed, now mostly in 
their forties, were raised and educated in an Islamized Malaysia. Now many of them participated 
in rigorous study groups that combed Islamic texts for connections between religion and 
economic life and worked closely with local religious teachers and Ustaz to understand the rules 
for commercial and organizational life contained within the Qur'an and the Hadith.311 
Naail Mohammed Kamila and Norsham Binti Mat Norb also notice the importance of 
Sharia-compliant in the decision to buy Islamic insurance. Two of their respondents emphasize 
the important of Sharia compliance in the daily life of Muslims. Therefore, providing Islamic 
scheme for financial protection is an urgent need nowadays. According to them, the compliance 
toward Sharia in economic activity is the indicator of a good Muslim. Moreover, Islamic insurance 
is not considered simply as a financial product, but it is part of way of life.312 
Islamic insurance has been promoted as a scheme that carefully designed by following 
the injunction of Sharia in the business transaction. The companies claim that the scheme has 
been approved and continuously monitored by Islamic scholars who are expert on the field. 
Moreover, they emphasize on where the money is invested. The money must be invested in 
lawful businesses according to Islamic teachings. This is an important aspect of Islamic insurance 
in a low insurance demand society.  
Indeed, many Malaysian Muslims today are firmly placed within the urban middle classes. 
Many live and work in and around the capital city of Kuala Lumpur, employed by private-sector 
corporations. They have higher income that for many researchers as an important factor for 
insurance demand. However, as we see in Malaysia, the demand for Islamic insurance is not 
merely drive by the changes in the socio-demographic factors. There are ideologies and norms 
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with far-reaching social impact, as more and more Malaysian Muslims seek to calibrate their 
politicoreligious orientations to their economic practices, a process Johan Fischer has called 
"halalisation".313 
Insurance plans may be problematic in places where it has long been customary to gift or 
indirectly pay the government and indigenous practitioners for services as an incentive for good 
care or to forge personal relationships.314 Islamic insurance facilitates the transition of the Malay 
society to become more self-reliant and less dependent on the state and society but maintain 
Malay’s traditional value helping each other. In Kamil and Nor, two of their respondents explain 
this idea further. In the word of one of the respondents:  
The most important thing in Takaful is helping each other, is a mutual corporation or 
benefit. Yes. Ta’awun. In that sense, is what our religion, in Islam that we have to help 
each other. So, when we invested in Respondent (S1) said Takaful product, we already 
made ahead that this payment will go to who participated in that. The pool of fund can 
be used to help those people in difficulties. At the same time also, if we are in that 
situation, the unfortunate one, so the same thing will happen. The same pool of fund will 
be used to protect us, to compensate us. And then to the Tabarru’ fund, if there any 
excess to it, it can be shared among the participants. It’s something that other 
conventional not doing it…315 
 The Malay entrepreneurship is unique. Instead of forging individualism for 
entrepreneurial success, it emphasizes obligation to others. The others might be understood 
narrowly as fellow Malays, or even the nation. They believe that Muslims in Malaysia should all 
participate and support Islamic insurance because by doing so, they are strengthening Muslim 
position in the country, improving their funds to assist our Muslim brothers and sister as well. 316 
Furthermore, behind its increasingly sophisticated financial plan, Islamic insurance 
represented what they described as a ‘truly Malay organization’, both spiritually and communally 
focused. It was marketed to a network of Malays-who were moved by the idea of caring for 
others. In their understanding, Islamic insurance brings double rewards: this-worldy and other-
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worldly-rewards. It could anticipate current and future risk, therefore, protection for the 
members, and also the religious reward of helping each other. It is social tools that provided 
multiple rewards, instruments of convergence of devotion to others and to Allah, the means to 
an exemplary virtuoso identity. Islamic insurance is perceived as representing mutual, network 
gotong-royong, compares to the conventional insurance, which is considered exploitative, 
untrustworthy, greedy therefore un-Islamic. 
The Takaful Act 1984 mentions that company and cooperative can offer Islamic insurance 
product. Historically, insurance was initially provided by self-organized mutual societies (guild) in 
the nineteenth century and then pushed aside by the rise of corporate insurance companies and 
statutory social insurance in the twentieth century. Many Islamic scholars argue that mutual or 
cooperative structure is more appropriate for Islamic insurance. Nonetheless, most of the Islamic 
insurance products in Malaysia are offered by for-profit companies. How this for-profit motive 
does not impede the growth of Islamic insurance in Malaysia? 
The general acceptance for for-profit entities cannot be separated with the positive 
attitude of Malay society toward entrepreneurship. Islamic insurance develops in the 
entrepreneurial environment of Malaysia. Sloane summarizes Malay entrepreneurial ideology as 
a whole: “The claim that in development, duty to others must be stated and shown; the belief 
that one must not seek greedily the fruits of success but must generously invite others to partake; 
the insistence that entailments-be they profits, contacts, or opportunities-must be rightfully  
earned through effort, sincerity, and hard work; and, perhaps most crucial of all, the perception 
that the entrepreneur is the cornerstone of modernity, possessing the ability to transform 
simultaneously both society and the economy into the image of development espoused by the 
Malay Muslim doctrine of virtue and the Mahathir government.”317 
Compares to Indonesian society, the Malays has a very high trust in private sector. They 
do not have an issue with profit-motive seeking as long as it is pursued with the guidance from 
the religion. Moreover, they do not have a reservation of having foreign-owned Takaful 
companies.318 
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A certain degree of institutional trust is necessary for people to pay into an insurance 
program, raising the need for sustained attention to this concept. How is institutional trust 
established above and beyond trust in the advocates of particular insurance programs? In 
Malaysia, the government has a prominent role in developing this trust. The government spend 
a lot of money to build the regulatory framework, institutions and educate the public to support 
Islamic finance. Although the Malaysian government acts mostly as an incubator and not a direct 
participant, public sees the image that Bank Negara Malaysia controlling over the business as 
mentioned in the interview above.  
Furthermore, government involvement, in this case, has not seen as a negative thing. 
Moreover, Islamic insurance develops in environment where there is a tight connection between 
Islamic money and Islamic authority. Sloane mentions that these Malay entrepreneurs often 
criticized NEP for providing “handouts” to Bumiputera, because Sharia does not allow earnings 
from transactions that do not involve work. But they did not question the staggering amounts of 
money being channeled by the government and its institutions and by corporations to serve and 
promote Islam and the cause of God. Nearly 1 billion ringgits is allocated yearly from Muslim and 
non-Muslim taxpayers to JAKIM, and huge sums are funneled into institutions and foundations 
that, according to Malaysian tax law, are meant to advantage all Malaysians of all ethnicities and 
religions. But that tax money often actually funds explicitly Islamic activities and singularly 
Islamist ones, while at the same time government policies restrict the kinds of tax advantages 
available to non-Muslims. Criticism of government institutions and policies that provide 
resources and benefits to Muslims and deny them to non-Muslims is always rare in Malaysia 
because of laws that restrict freedom of speech.319 
The emergence of the ‘New Malay’ entrepreneurial class 
 The face of Malaysia’s capital city, Kuala Lumpur, today is entirely different from the year 
1969. The year when ethnic riots happened in Malaysia. The 13 May 1969 (mainly) Malay–
Chinese sectarian violence — one of the darkest episodes in Malaysian history in which hundreds 






conflicts in the aftermath of the 1969 general election. The deeper cause, however, was said to 
be Malay dissatisfaction with their role in the modern economy, and their perception that the 
Chinese had monopolized all economic activities in a nation which, the Malaysian Constitution 
stated, rightfully belonged to the indigenous Malays.320 There was a fundamental contradiction 
within Malaysian society-the concentration of wealth in the hand of the wealthy Chinese and 
monopoly of political power in the hand of Malays. Nowadays, it is common to see a Malay name 
after the title of CEO, manager or director of national or multinational companies. These group 
of people represents the new entrepreneurial generation of Malays or so-called New Malay.  
 The New Economic Policy (NEP) was inaugurated in 1971 as a response toward that ethnic 
conflict. NEP was affirmative policies and strategies provided by the state with the means to help 
the Malays or Bumiputera. This policy replaced the essential laissez-faire economic framework 
established in Malaysia upon Independence. Within the 20-year timeframe (ran out 1990) it was 
expected that the economic equity vis-à-vis the Chinese would be reached when it could be 
demonstrated that Malays had reached 30 percent ownership of and participation in all industrial 
and commercial activities. To reach this goal, an enormous transformation and expansion of 
economy was set in motion, leaving almost no institutional apparatus untouched. There was a 
huge increase in the number of ‘quasi-public bodies and government agencies that were charged 
with aiding program for Malays or that acted as surrogate institutions for the transfer of capital 
shares and ownership to Malays. Over 20 years, Kuala Lumpur was transformed into a modern 
city, built to support the growing policy-led enterprise sector and the public and private interests 
of the mushrooming Malays middle class which have been educated to serve them.321 
 NEP program was designed to increase the percentage of Malays working in the non-
agricultural sector, particularly in the managerial level, and increase the wealth of the Malays. 322 
The program gained success in reducing poverty among Malays and in creating Bumiputera 
middle class. However, some critics suggest that the idea of creating a new and self-sufficient 
Bumiputera through affirmative actions, while compelling and impressive (to a certain degree) 








according to this view is a mere reflection of privileged political access within the patron-client 
relationship of Malaysia’s political economy system. Adding to that, the long-term 
implementation of racially-targeted policies reinforces stereotypical ethnic identities and hinders 
the creation of a more inclusive society.”323  
 Within three years of the NEP implementation, 98 percent of all those recruited for 
government service were Malays, a percentage that far exceeded the 4:1 Malay ratio. During the 
period of the Second Malaysia Plan, Malay employment in the commercial and industrial sectors 
rose rapidly to parallel the rate in the public service. 324Similarly, Malay admissions to institutions 
of higher education also increased dramatically. Malay student numbers at the University of 
Malaya, for instance, increased from 49.7 percent to 66.4 percent between 1970 and 1979. The 
government also actively participated in funding Malay students for overseas studies.325 
The NEP also provided an avenue for Malays to mobilize their capital and increase their 
savings. This was achieved through the establishment of agencies such as the Pilgrims Fund Board 
or Lembaga Tabung Haji and National Equity Corporation or Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB). 
During the Islamization project, the government spends more funding for the establishment of 
several institutes to support the development of Islamic finance. 
Although the NEP managed only 19.4 percent of Malay ownership of public companies in 
1990 against the target of 30 percent, it did create an enlarging Malay middle-class and more 
professionals so that by 2004 there were, in fact, more Malay doctors than Chinese doctors.326 
The presence of these Malays in various professional and employment sectors had, in some ways, 
helped to restore Malay confidence and the perception that the NEP had helped the Malays to 
improve their standard of living and economic position.327 A significant outcome under the NEP 
was the creation of government-owned entities that became directly involved in the commercial 
activities of the nation.328 
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In overall, the new Malays class share similar experiences. Most of them were socialized 
for elite roles by civil-service parents. They went to English-style educational system and then 
continued to overseas or local universities. More importantly, they were rewarded with 
sponsored opportunities for increased legitimacy and power in the modern economic system.329 
They also tend to live the same neighborhood of the cities. In the 1970s, there was rapid Malay 
urbanization of Kuala Lumpur and its surroundings. Quotas were established to ensure that new 
communities reflected blended racial make-up. However, people continue to live in traditionally 
racially segregated areas in most of the city.  
Many critics on the NEP argue that the affirmative program gained success in poverty 
reduction but failed in creating Malay entrepreneurship. Gomez describes Malay 
entrepreneurship as mere reflection of a patron-client relationship built among Malay 
businesspersons and Malay politician, rent-seeking activities, and political privileges, and 
powerful Malaysian state. Nonetheless, many field studies suggest that there has been a radical 
change in the mindset of this small New Malay class that gave profound influence in general 
Malay population. Entrepreneurship has been embraced by many not only as an actual 
occupation but as their new identity, aspiration and social status. 
They believed that full equality with the Chinese would be reached when Malays had 
become true capitalist owners and producers themselves. Many of them, in addition to holding 
down professional jobs in two-career families, had ambitious plans to prove that Malays were as 
business-minded as the Chinese, and were engaged in multiple entrepreneurial plans and 
projects. Indeed, even many of the Malay men and women in civil-service and other wage-paying 
positions, the ‘bureaucratic middle class’, the classic Weberian no-risk category of ‘the middle 
class’ in historians’ analyses of western classes, had some form of an entrepreneurial plan in the 
process.330 
Furthermore, they understand that entrepreneurship is not only a way to achieve wealth 
but it also a way to serve God and others. It is often quoted that Prophet Muhammad was a 
merchant himself. Business venture requires hard work, intelligent, and perseverance which 
 





according to them the qualities that every Muslims should have. Furthermore, having your own 
business means you are independent and do not rely on other people or government to assist 
you. Business creates jobs. Being an entrepreneur means being a good Muslim and helping 
people and the nation. 
This class possesses modernizing ideas, which is different from the old attitudes of Malay 
Muslims in Kampong or villages. The new Malay claimed to be a hard worker, modern and 
entrepreneurial compares to the lazy, traditional and dependent Malay in the kampong or the 
village. This identification actually was part of contestation between Barisan National and PAS, 
particularly during the Islamization process of the 1980s. Islam was a moral standard in this 
political contest. Mahathir offered his vision of so-called modernist Islam: ‘using the rhetoric of 
rational interpretation of Islam’s teachings, and with his political preoccupations in mind, he 
adapted classical modernization theory so that it can accommodate Islamic principles and has 
elevated those Islamic teachings which can be argued to encourage entrepreneurialism.’ Islam 
for the modernist Islam is a guide to motivate Malay Muslims to thrive for the modern lifestyle, 
economic dynamism, and tolerance. 331 Meanwhile, PAS was discredited as a group of zealots 
who cannot face up modernity. 
This New Malay identity is not purely constructed out of Muslim identity. There are 
Muslims in Malaysia who are not Malays-such as Indian, Arab, Filipino, Thai, Bangladeshi, and 
Indonesian Muslims- are often not perceived to be ‘genuine Muslims’, and therefore are 
generally held outside the boundaries of Malay amity and affect. Nevertheless, these 
demonstration of social marginality within the Muslim community are relatively insignificant by 
contras in relation to Chinese. Chinese area considered as social and economic outsiders 
representing a threat.332 
Although, Malays admire the hardworking and frugal characteristics of Chinese 
businesspeople, they are considered as a lack of social virtue. Chinese is claimed to be greedy, 
cheater and self-centered, while Malay is claimed to be more open, hospitable, and generous. 
They also rejected what they understand as the characteristics of Western entrepreneurs: the 
 





unethical and egoistic business ventures. Malays see themselves as virtuoso entrepreneurs: 
submissive, other-centered, and altruistic.333 Islamization certainly strengthened the idea that 
Malays are modern, but they are different from the Western or Chinese entrepreneurs. This 
mentality is what Joel S. Kahn as “self-exoticising discourse” meaning while acknowledging their 
status as modern and entrepreneurial, many Malaysian also claim that their entrepreneurship 
culture is unique.    
Decades of Islamization since the 80s gave birth to what so-called Sharia generation.334 
While they have similar socio-demographic indicators like their parents of the first NEP 
generations, they have more awareness of Sharia-related issues. They continued the modernist 
Islam ideas and practices of the previous generation, but they have stricter observance on Sharia. 
They gave more in charity because the Sharia obligation of zakat, save their money in the Islamic 
banking, they concern on ensuring their business transactions are Sharia-compliant, and many of 
them work in Islamic financial institution. For them, Islam is not only regarded as ethical values 
in business but also a ruling and technical instruction in business. 
Many of them see the NEP had emphasized on ‘Western-style’ of profit accumulation with 
usury and individualism. Now they felt they knew much more about Islam and its Sharia 
requirements and could fully embed religious principles and moral practices in their economic 
ventures and all realms of their modern lives. They are the corporate Sharia elite. Among them 
were Sharia advisors with Islamic pedigrees who set the standards of Islamic finance, authorizing 
the Sharia compliance of financial products in the Islamic economy, marketing their expertise and 
scholarship globally, and serving as business consultants to equally successful corporate 
executives and owners. Connected to each other through business interests and membership in 
Islamic study groups and Islamist pressure groups, the men of the corporate sharia elite shared 
a vision of a new kind of virtuous capitalism – one that would not only refashion the economy 
and people of Malaysia in Sharia-compliant ways but also serve as a model for Muslims 
worldwide, and perhaps even remake capitalism for the world.335  
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The relationships between the New Malay and ‘traditional Malay’, between Malay with 
other the ‘not-genuine’ Muslims, and between Malay with Chinese show the exclusionary power 
of Malay entrepreneurship. However, it also as an inclusionary power among the group member 
itself. Their relationship with other elite Malay business leaders and politician is not seen as a 
traditional feudal or patron-client relationship. They see their relationship as self-and-group 
empowering network based on self- reliant, egalitarian, and meritocratic capitalist society.  
Furthermore, Malays see themselves as affectively bound, dutiful, real and symbolic kin, 
mutually entailed by obligations, and threatened by others. The centrality of entrepreneurship 
in this New Malay lives corresponds to the increase in the importance of material wealth in their 
social relations. Malay life in relationships with parents, spouses, cohorts and the communal 
group is bounded by Islamic duty and financial obligation. For example, the Dakwah activities 
have influenced Malays to be more charitable by performing zakat. They are feeling more 
responsible financially for supporting their relatives. 
The goal of creating Malay entrepreneurs through the NEP might not be achieved as 
expected, but certainly, there has been radical transformation on how Malay perceives 
entrepreneurship, particularly during the implementation of Islamic finance project. 
Entrepreneurship has become the main vector of ethnic, religious, and moral worth and a test of 
virtue and modernity among the beneficiaries of NEP or so-called New Malay. The affirmative 
policy of NEP created rapid social transformation where Malay received an abundance of wealth 
and opportunity. This condition created an ‘altered’ identity of Malayness. They rejected the 
stigma of lazy and backward Malays. They claim themselves as modern, entrepreneurial, and 
pious Muslims. Entrepreneurship demonstrates the process by which moral obligation to others, 
hard works, and Islamic faith have become symbolized together in economic activities, which are 
at once ‘modern’ and ‘Malay’ and later on, also ‘Sharia-compliant’.336 The interpretation of Malay 
entrepreneurship by stressing on the obligation to others, Islamic values, and self-reliant are 
significant on the development of awareness among the New Malay on the concept of risk, 
therefore susceptible for the development of Islamic insurance. 
 




Conclusion: harmonization and Muslim capitalist modernity in Malaysia 
The success of the institutionalization of Malaysia’s Islamic insurance industry is primarily 
attributed to the gradual and systemic approach driven and backed by the state. Unlike many 
Middle Eastern countries, there is no single entrepreneur pioneered the overall Islamic financial 
institution in Malaysia.337 Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad himself was the one who ordered 
the formation of a task force to explore the viability of an Islamic insurance company in Malaysia 
in October 1982.338 However, the state has taken a managerial role that can incubate a new 
service economy in which private individuals and institutions (not the state) are the primary 
agents of economic growth. The Malaysian state created the necessary infrastructure to facilitate 
the emergence of viable national and transnational Islamic financial systems but did not become 
involved in creating commercial firms.339 
Furthermore, Malaysia’s Islamic insurance and Islamic financial institutions, in general, 
have served as a locus where the secular Malaysian government, represented by Barisan Nasional 
(BN) under the leadership of Mahathir Mohammad, to create a coalition with the modernist and 
urban Malay Muslims, to strengthen the economy of the Malay ethnic group or Bumiputera. Even 
after the resignation of Mahathir Mohammad in 2002, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, prime minister 
from 2003 to 2009, persisted with a developmentalist model that promoted Bumiputera capital, 
but he showed little interest in developing Malay – or Malaysian – big businesses. He advocated 
more on policies that nurtured SMEs, including industries dealing with halal products, dominated 
by poor rural Malays, as well as supporting many new Islamic insurance companies.340 This 
political strategy has enabled BN to preserve and consolidate its continuous dominance against 
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the threat from the traditional and fundamentalist Muslim groups represented by Islamist 
political party of PAS, and also from the Chinese minority. 
The Islamic financial institutions were designed and regulated to enhance Malay 
population’s participation in the development process. It is created as an alternative avenue 
rather than a replacement for the existing economic system. It contributed to the savings 
mobilization and capital accumulation of the Malays in order to improve their standard of living 
and bring them up to par with their fellow citizens of Chinese origin. The creation of these 
institutions enabled the Malaysia state to make important concessions to the Muslim interests 
and Muslim identity of the Malay majority, to defuse the political pressures from the Islamist 
political party, and to accommodate its Chinese and Indian minorities and the capitalist structure 
of the economy. All of these has been part of a bigger goal for harmonizing Islamization with 
economic liberalization. 
The Islamization drive has provided Mahathir with a way to position himself as a defender 
of Islam and Malay identity, and to embrace the calls for more Islam in public life, to counter 
critiques of the ruling government of Barisan Nasional (BN) as ‘secular’ and therefore spiritually 
bankrupt. Arguing for ‘secularization’, as classical modernization theorists would have it, would 
therefore unhelpful to Mahathir. Thus, he has argued instead of Malaysia to modernize 
Islamically, using his favored, pro-capitalist Islamic teachings and creating an Islamic rationale for 
the familiar prescription for modernization. Islam, for him, is a moral guide, not politics of Islamic 
state, but a set of values and ethics to guide an individual or privately managed action, to 
motivate Malay Muslims to act in a way which is conducive to national unity and economic 
growth. In pursuing modernization and economic growth, the BN has focused on creating and 
cultivating a small Malay entrepreneurial class, which possess modernizing ideas and can lead 
Malay Muslims away from their ‘traditional’ attitudes. The BN has had to discredit the Islamist 
political party of PAS while ensuring that its own followers also appear sufficiently Islamic. BN’s 
attempt in this area have involved mobilizing selected Islamic teachings, such as those which 




Islam. Mahathir has tried to present his government as an Islamic one. Competition between BN 
and PAS was the main driver for Mahathir’s Islamization of society and state.341  
Islamic finance project has been considered as the most acceptable of Islamization of 
Malaysia. Rather than creating tension as happened in the Islamization of Malaysia’s legal 
system, Islamic finance is allowing a Muslim elite to operate adroitly within (and profit from) 
capitalism, and welcoming Muslim and non-Muslim investors alike. This reality includes the 
development of Islamic insurance or Takaful. Malaysia Islamizes its insurance through the 
institution of Islamic insurance, which is developed as an alternative and not a substitute for the 
still available conventional insurance. Malaysia model of Islamic insurance is Sharia-compliant 
but regulated under secular legislation. The development of Malaysia's dual finance system is 
tied up with its social and economic policy and that is why it was fully supported by the country's 
top leadership in addition to the Central Bank, the Parliament, and the public in general.  
The Government of Malaysia is also using Islamic finance in general for its key entry to 
globalization. Malaysia was of the first countries to take a systematic planning approach to 
develop the Islamic finance system for continuing future progress of its financial industry’s rapid 
development. Malaysian government through Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) invites financial 
institutions across the world to establish Islamic insurance and Islamic re-insurance operations in 
Malaysia to conduct foreign currency business. Altogether, Islamic insurance was a result of the 
convergence of diverse interests among political coalitions within Malaysia polity.342 
The second reason for the impressive development of Islamic insurance in Malaysia 
relates to the social process within Malay society itself. The religion of Islam played a pivotal role 
in the state’s development strategies by fostering New Malays with characteristics supportive 
toward economic development (such as diligence, accountability, and education). Furthermore, 
by promoting a form of Islam fully compatible with its development objectives, the state made it 
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possible for “government policies [to] seek to bring Islam in line with capitalism”.343 This mindset 
originated long before post-colonial Malaysia.  
It was an outcome of a social formation inherited from the British rule in Malaya prior to 
independent Malaysia. The British Empire consolidated the apparatus of centralized government 
and its capitalist economy, but at the same time, ‘weakened’ or coopted its civil society. The 
combination of a centralized government, the coopted religious institutions, and a capitalist 
economy leads to a higher trust toward Islamic insurance industry in Malaysia. The ‘weak civil 
society contributes to the inability of Malaysian society in establishing institutional frameworks 
of economic security outside the market mechanism. Historically, Malaysia has a weak informal 
network such as Waqf (religious endowment). The waqf institution has long been neglected and 
nearly forgotten by the Islamic community in Malaysia as compared to the other Islamic 
institutions). 344  
 However, at the same time Malays can use their social network for economic ends. 
Malays has demonstrated their kampong values-sharing, fairness, equality, and balance- into a 
modern and entrepreneurial society of Malays.  For Malays, among the Malay middle class, 
entrepreneurship has become the main vector of ethnic, religious, and moral worth, and a test 
of virtue and modernity among themselves.345 Rudnyckyj terms this assemblage 'market Islam' 
and contrast it with what has been labeled 'civil Islam'. He argues that, “market Islam seeks less 
to create commensurability between Islam and democracy and is instead designed to merge 
Muslim religious practice and capitalist ethics. Market Islam is thus less concerned with state 
power and the articulation of politics and religion, and more focused on eliciting the ethical 
dispositions conducive to economic liberalism.”346 The truth of that statement can be seen from 
the Malaysia’s Islamic insurance development that is increasingly stressing on its market viability 
and Sharia-compliant contract rather than the mutual organizational framework of Takaful.  
Neslihan Cevik’s work on “Muslimism” in Turkey seems to be relevant to explain the 
development of Islamic insurance as part of Islamic revivalism within Malaysian society. In her 
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study, she shows how Islamic revivalism in Turkey has manifested itself in Muslims’ engagement 
in the markets, political parties, and civic society while still adhering to the Islamic ideals. The 
new Islamic form of Turkey encompasses all aspects from economic and political, to cultural 
expression along with its theological structure.347 
This innovative concept was built on a vibrant empirical research of the post-1980 Turkey. 
Cevik uses the terms ‘a guilt-free modernity’ and ‘Islam without apology’ to describe this attitude, 
which cannot be reduced either to political adaptation or commodification of Islam. “It emerged 
in everyday life spaces in a quest to establish new institutions and lifestyles that allow Muslims 
to rework aspects of modernity”.348 
This hybridity is located analytically and based on the notion of “Islamic three ds”, 
corresponding to major dimensions of the Islamic heritage: din (religion), dunya (this world), and 
dawla (the state). She analyzes the 3ds based on the ontology, agency, and action. The purpose 
is to differentiate Muslimists from Islamists. For instance, in the level of ontology in the 
dimension of din or religion, Islamists perceive Islam as an ideology, while Muslimists understand 
it as identity. At the level of the agency of dunya dimension or worldly affairs, Islamists tend 
towards communitarianism, while Muslimists are more focused on individuation. At the level of 
action of dawla dimension or the public sphere, both approaches are different in terms of how 
to create social improvement. Islamists have a state-cantered political action, while Muslimists 
use a broad social action. Islamists (just like secularists) claim to be the guardians of ‘traditions’, 




















Despite sharing so many similarities, Indonesia and Malaysia are achieving a different 
level of Islamic insurance development. Malaysia has become the hub of Islamic finance of 
Southeast Asia and the world, while Indonesia still has a vast untapped market. Although both 
countries started the Islamization and privatization processes of their economy in the 1980s, the 
Indonesian Government gave official support for the establishment of Islamic financial 
institutions in Indonesia only after 1990s. Islamic finance, in general, was officially introduced in 
1992 and Islamic insurance in 1994 with less government commitment and bottom-up approach. 
However, Indonesia Islamic insurance sector recently has been showing a significant growth by 
having a contribution of 19% of the total regional market. In 2016, Islamic insurance accounted 
for 6.2 percent of the overall Indonesia insurance market with asset more than 42 trillion IDR (3.1 
million USD).350  
Islamic insurance was introduced officially to Indonesian society through the 
establishment of PT Syarikat Takaful Indonesia (Takaful Indonesia) on 24 February 1994. It was 
the first Sharia-compliant insurance company in Indonesia. It was endorsed by ICMI (Indonesian 
Association of Muslim Intellectuals) and promoted through Islamic informal and formal 
organizations. Up until now, Islamic insurance in Indonesia has developed into 20 Family Takaful 
companies, which consist of 3 Family Takaful companies and 17 units of Family Takaful, and 25 
General Takaful composed of 2 fully-fledged Islamic insurance companies and 23 units, and three 
Islamic re-insurance windows.351 The introduction of the new insurance law of 2014 was partly 
responsible for this positive development.  
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Furthermore, there has been a growth in the form of Islamic micro-insurance for the poor 
population and waqf-insurance products in Indonesia. Islamic micro-insurance has been utilized 
to help the poor, especially in rural Indonesia. Indonesian poor only need to buy monthly 
premium of 5,000 Indonesian Rupiah (50 cents) to receive proper health care against dengue 
fever.  The waqf-insurance links insurance protection with a social endowment. With monthly 
payment, Muslims in Indonesia can contribute to the social cause by investing in property such 
as mosque, school, and hospital, and t the same time, receive financial protection for sickness 
and death. The development of Islamic micro-insurance and waqf-insurance in Indonesia 
represent the bottom-up approach of its communitarian tradition that has provided a strong 
foundation for the national economy.   
This chapter examines the reason behind the existing gap and differences between 
Indonesia and Malaysia (also Pakistan) in Islamic insurance. It starts with a brief introduction of 
Indonesia as a multi-cultural religious state, which stresses on the status and role of Islam in the 
state building, its plural and dynamic society, and the dualist economic system of Indonesia. 
Unlike in Malaysia, Islam does not have special status compares to other five official religions in 
Indonesia. All of six official religious groups receive state funding, representation in government, 
publicly funded religious institutions and legal protection.  
The next section provides detail information on the growth and institutional development 
of Islamic insurance in Indonesia. This section also discusses the linkage between Islamic 
insurance with other social tools into the broader context of insurance or social protection in 
Indonesia. Historically, the state has been heavily involved in providing that protection to 
Indonesian citizens, and the private sector has never been the primary provider for economic 
security in Indonesia. Recently, Islamic NGOs have become the most important actors in this 
matter.  
 The following two sections explain the factors for Indonesia’s Islamic insurance 
development through the lenses of ‘political life’ and ‘social life’ of Islamic insurance. The political 
life of Islamic insurance section explores the catalysts, the political landscape of Islamic insurance 
in Indonesia, and the political coalitions behind Islamic insurance, particularly during the 




insurance and other Islamic finance institutions were initiated in the periphery led by non-state 
actors. Many scholars argue that this dynamic has been generating both authentic and Islamic 
version of financial institutions, such as Islamic micro-finance and waqf-insurance schemes. The 
second part elaborates Indonesia’s social transformation, which is responsible for the 
development of the expression of Islam in their ideals for the nation-state of Indonesia and 
economic ethics. Indonesian’s communal economic ethics is influential in the development of 
Islamic insurance in Indonesia. For many Indonesians, maintaining harmony and social solidarity 
are more valuable than personal freedom and achievement. Understanding socio-economic 
ethics is vital to make sense of the development of Islamic insurance in Indonesia. 
The structure of a religious state 
This section provides a brief introduction of Indonesia as a religious ‘imagined 
community’, particularly in its relation to the role of Islam in building a religious state, its multi-
ethnic/religious circumstances, and its economic structure. Both legal and societal facts show the 
significance of religions in Indonesians’ lives. The Constitution declares Indonesia as a religious 
state, protects religious freedom, and supports religious communities. For many Indonesians, 
religion is essential, not only in the formal sense of implementation of religiously inspired laws, 
but religion is considered essential in creating an ideal society.352  
However, Indonesia is also a country rich with paradoxes. The paradoxes are the result of 
its long historical and social-cultural processes, particularly colonialism. Like Malaysia, the 
colonial rule had shaped the structures of contemporary Indonesian society. The continuous 
tension between the secular and the Islamist groups in defining Indonesian politics, economic 
inequality within Indonesia’s social stratification, and the existence of dualistic economy in 
Indonesia are instances of influences generated from the 126 years of the Dutch colonial rule.  
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An imagined community 
Indonesia declared its independence from the Dutch colonials in 1945, and after several 
years of armed and diplomatic conflict with the Netherlands, Indonesia achieved international 
recognition in 1949. Indonesia is the world's largest island country, with more than thirteen 
thousand islands, and at 1,9 million square kilometers (735,358 square miles). Indonesia is the 
14th largest by land area and the 7th largest in the combined sea and land area. Java, the world's 
most populous island, contains about 40 percent (100 million) of the country's population.353 
With over 261 million people (2017), Indonesia is the world's fourth-largest nation in the world, 
the third-largest democracy, and as well as the most populous Muslim-majority country.  
Indonesia is a republic with an elected parliament and president. Since its independence, 
Indonesia has experienced many challenges in establishing a democratic government. After 
almost a decade of parliamentarian democracy, Soekarno turned it into an authoritarian regime 
in the final phase of his reign (1959-1965). Then, Soeharto (1966-1998) ruled an authoritarian 
and repressive regime of the New Order for almost 32 years until the regime fell due to a massive 
protest in 1998. Since the late 1980s, the Soeharto administration had become heavily 
centralized and corrupt. When the financial crisis of 1997 started, the crony-capitalism regime of 
Soeharto was not able to cope with it. The monetary crisis had become a political crisis leading 
to a democratic transition in Indonesia. 
Indonesia is a diverse country. There is no single ethnic, single religion, and single culture 
that unite this archipelago of 17,000 islands. However, this diverse archipelago is, in fact, a single 
nation-state. For instance, the people of Sumatra have more differences to people of Java 
compared to the people of Malaya (Malaysia). Sumatra and Malaya are ethnically Malay, 
speaking Bahasa Melayu, and share many histories as a region. There is no exact reason why the 
territorial border of Indonesia exists as it is, except because the people themselves believe it to 
be so. 
The Indonesian archipelago has been an essential region for trade since at least the 7th 
century, but before the Dutch came, Indonesia was only a fiction. In 1914, the Dutch centralized 
 





political control over the whole archipelago after almost a century controlled by a private 
company of Dutch East India Company or VOC. The Dutch set up a single government for all the 
Indies, formed a new representative assembly, the Volksraad, and introduced new law codes: a 
code for foreign Orientals in 1848 and a criminal code for native Indonesians. 
This centralization certainly gave a sense of unity in the mind of Dutch administrator, but 
not in the mind of native Indonesians. None imagined themselves as belonging to an organic, 
unitary community in any meaningful way. Indeed, the Dutch had a vital role in the creation of a 
unified Indonesia, but Indonesia exists as a nation mostly because Indonesians themselves want 
it.354 The support for this argument is presented in the paragraphs below. 
A nation is real for the people who hold it as true, despite the fact that we cannot sense 
it physically. Benedict Anderson’s well-known book, Imagined Communities, links the creation of 
nations, which he called “imagined communities,” with the advancement of national 
languages.355 Bahasa Indonesia, the national language, was a language of trade, which was 
spread across the archipelago. It is originated from Malay islands, which is now shared by 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. It is an entirely invented language because we cannot find 
any ancient texts, which are written in Indonesian.  Moreover, there were no native speakers 
before the twentieth century.356 Nowadays, Bahasa Indonesia is more consolidated as lingua 
franca thanks to the national education system, the spread of television, and the popularity of 
local sinetrons or soap operas.357 
The spread of newspapers among the native Indonesians accelerated this sense of unity. 
For the first time, these natives spoke, discussed, and shared information as a “one people”. 
Moreover, the second youth congress in Batavia (now Jakarta) in October 1928 marked a 
milestone in Indonesians’ historical conscience. Youth delegates came from various parts of the 
archipelago to discuss a different array of issues concerning their people. In the final day, the 
 










Congress closed with the reading of the Youth Pledge (Sumpah Pemuda), which all delegates 
proclaimed three ideals: one motherland, one nation, and one language. There was no formal 
decision from the Congress, but it did promote the idea nationhood. The idea of a united 
Indonesia. 358   
Also, the social stratification created by the Dutch colonialism partly was partly 
responsible for the creation of this shared identity too. In the nineteenth century, the Dutch 
consolidated colonial social status system based on racial distinction in the Dutch East Indies 
(now Indonesia), and particularly in the island of Java. This system created a notion of 
Bumiputera, which was different, as understood in modern Malaysia. The colonial legal system 
made an explicit distinction between Europeans, Chinese, and Indonesians.  The colonialists put 
all natives of the Dutch Indies into one big pool of lower-class called Indies or pribumi regardless 
of their ethnicity and religions. 
Above them, the Chinese and other ‘foreign orientals’ such as Arab descent formed an 
intermediate group consisting mainly of traders and craftsmen, and the one sit on top of the 
system was the European colonists. This system formed the roots of later ethnic problems. After 
independence, it continues to create tension between the native and the Chinese Indonesian (1.2 
percent of the Indonesian population), particularly in relation to wealth distribution. The Chinese 
minority population in Indonesia has gained an important position in the business sector with 
international business networks. Despite this tension, the identity of Bumiputera or pribumi in 
modern Indonesia has never been based on a single ethnic or religious identity. 
Indonesia was created based on nationalists’ ideals. It is not a nation based on ethnic, 
race, or religion, but a shared idea of Indonesia. Independent Indonesia transcends the great 
maritime empires of Indonesia’s past from ethnically dominated networks of trade and distance 
outposts of commerce and religion into a single nation-state.359 Indonesia is an obvious case of 
fragmented communities trying to achieve an imagined national unity, as its national motto of 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika— “Unity in Diversity”—portrays.  
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Islam in a religious society  
Islam develops not only in a pluralistic, but also a religious vision of the independent and 
modern Indonesia. Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world. There are more Muslims 
living in Indonesia (215 million) that those who live in the entire Middle East. The growing 
influence of Indonesian Muslims has been largely ignored by many orientalist scholars or even 
Arab Muslims. They consider Indonesians practice an inferior form of Islam mixed with non-
Islamic indigenous cultural elements.360  
Indonesia, in fact, is a dynamic Muslim majority country, with incredible diversity. 
Different streams of Islam, different ethnic groups, and different religious communities, live side 
by side in harmony. Surely, there were several incidents. The tension mostly happened in the 
intra-religious relations rather than between religions. The polarization within the Muslim 
community itself between the modernist, the traditionalist, and the nominal Muslims is very 
influential in Indonesian politics.361 This polarization is shown in the debate on Islamic insurance, 
which will be elaborated in the next section of this dissertation.  
  Furthermore, Indonesia has experienced several serious terrorist attacks from the 
extremist Islamic movements and this continuous threat has roots deep in Indonesia’s past.362 
However, this country has also an ancient history of religious tolerance that is far more peaceful 
than the history of religions in Europe or the Middle East. 
The socio-political events in Indonesia are often dominated by religious symbolism of 
Islam. However, the elections show that Islam plays a smaller part in determining political 
outcomes. According to Ricklefs, one of the prominent experts on Indonesia, from 1955 to the 
present, the Muslim political parties have had to adjust to the fact that though Indonesia is 
overwhelmingly Muslim, the Muslim parties are a political minority. Moreover, he argues, “Islam 
and religion, in general, serve more or less as ‘social glue’ that keeps society together, peaceful 
and governable within a society like Indonesia, with weak rule of law, widespread criminality, low 
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levels of administrative competence, endemic corruption and a significant presence of extremist, 
terrorist groups.”363 
 Indonesia is not an Islamic state nor a secular state. Sharia is not the law of the land, with 
the special exception of the province of Aceh. The Indonesian constitution declared in Chapter XI 
“The State shall be based upon the belief in the One and Only God, and the State guarantees all 
persons the freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion or belief”. The belief in 
the One and Only God is also presented as the first of the five principles of the official 
philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state (Pancasila). 
The Constitution establishes the founding principle that the state is religious. This 
statement means the state has a legitimate role in regulating the religious practice, religious 
affairs, and for other religious-related civil matters. Unlike Malaysia, that gives supremacy to 
Islam as the religion of the Federation, Indonesia affirms six religions, including Islam. In order of 
the size, these are Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. All 
these groups receive state funding, representation in government, publicly funded religious 
institution, and legal protection. Religious beliefs act as a basis for obtaining legal documents 
such as identification cards, school registrations, and birth, marriage, or death certificate.364 
In Indonesia, there are religious courts. There is a Ministry of Religions that regulates 
religions, not just Islam but others as well. Not only regulating religions, but the state also has 
the authority to define them. For instance, there is no official law that prohibits Atheism or 
religious sects in Indonesia. However, as many people consider them as defamation against 
religion, the government can use the law against blasphemy and defamation to restrict them. 
The state actor can decide which religious beliefs are normatively acceptable, which ones are 
deviant, and which ones are a threat to social order.365 Atheists can be arrested for defamation. 
The same applies to various sects that are considered heretical versions of one of the six 
recognized religions. The largest group in this category is Ahmadiya. Ahmadis are not forbidden 








Furthermore, majority of Indonesians do not imagine their religion as a private matter. 
They considered religion should affect all areas of life, including politics, economics, social 
relations, media, culture, family life, and education.366 Nevertheless, many Indonesian Muslims 
believe that the substance of Sharia, for example, justice, mercy, and equality, should be 
implemented in the national law, and Islamic law as implemented from many centuries ago 
should not be the law of modern Indonesia. This view is not unique only among Indonesian 
Muslims. Other religious communities in Indonesia share this view also. Adeney-Risakotta states  
Contrary to most of the Malaysian population (64% Muslims) who prefers laws of the 
country should strictly follow the teaching of the Quran, the majority of Indonesian (91% 
Muslims) suggests the laws should follow values and principles of Islam, but not strictly 
follow it. According to many Indonesians, creating a community of justice, safety, and 
peace is closer to the teachings of the Quran than the purity of Arabic culture. Since 
Indonesia’s founding, there have been repeated attempts to make Sharia mandatory for 
Muslims. However, most Indonesians has opposed them.367 
Islam as a political force has always been considered as a threat by the political authority. 
In 1825, the Dutch had already identified kiyayi or village Muslim leaders as their main opponent. 
They were influential in leading peasant resistance during the Java wars of 1825-1830.368 Initially, 
the Dutch tried to curtail Islamic activities and limit the influence of kiyayi by allying itself with 
local aristocracy and customary chiefs. The contrary, this policy increased the resentment of the 
Muslim population toward the Dutch. Upon the recommendation of Christiaan Snouck 
Hurgronje, the Dutch reexamined this policy by distinguishing between the religious and the 
political aspects of Islam, tolerating the former and repressing the latter. Islamic religious 
opposition did not shake Dutch rule; however, Islam became more deeply rooted in Indonesian 
rural society.369 
The policies of the Soeharto government toward Muslim movements in the 1970s were 
an echo of those introduced by the Dutch. The Soeharto regime took a strong secular line and 









but also Muslim identities were challenged by nationalist secular ideologies.370 Islam as an 
ideology was being disputed against the national philosophical foundation (Pancasila). Islamic 
organization and association in Indonesia were not allowed to create by-laws using Islam as their 
organization philosophy. Rather, all organizations had to use Pancasila in their by-laws.   
At the beginning of 1980s, the regime began to respond to the rising middle-class 
commitment to Islam. Soeharto’s policy remained the promotion of personal piety and the 
suppression of political activity, but the government made some concessions, for instance, by 
building more mosques, schools, reinforcing Muslim courts and banning Christian missionary 
activity. In the 1990s, the government started to accommodate Islam and acted less repressive 
toward Muslim movements. Soeharto turned from containment to support for Muslim 
movements. Soeharto reversed previous policy and created an association for Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals or ICMI to promote the Islamization of Indonesia.371 
Nowadays, there is no significant opposition either from the government or from society 
to the deeper Islamization of Indonesia. There is an only difference of opinion about what shape 
Islamic life.372  There are some Sharia by-laws, such as the ruling of wearing the headscarf or 
‘Muslim Clothing’ during the fasting month of Ramadan, implemented in the country’s more 
conservative regions.  However, most of these regulations have come from officials of ostensibly 
secular parties like the Golkar or the Demokrat and not Islamist parties. According to Shadi 
Hamid, the implementation of Sharia is part of a mainstream discourse that cuts across 
ideological and party lines in Indonesia. That phenomena suggests that Islamism is not necessarily 
about political Islam but is about a broader population that is open to Islam playing a central role 
in law and governance.373 
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Indonesia’s dualistic economy 
Unlike the British who laid a solid foundation for a capitalist system in Malaysia, 
colonialism in Indonesia left out a dualistic system of economy. The dualistic system refers to the 
coexistent of capitalist and subsistence economies. The character of state-run cultivation crops 
as a system based on coercion was one of the reasons for the absence of social changes in villages 
in Java, the island where most of Indonesians live. Despite massive commercialization and 
machine-intensive colonial economy, village communities were left socially undisturbed. The 
egalitarian and labor-intensive of village economy had prevailed.374 In the present day, the 
dualistic feature is shown by the high level of informal economy in Indonesia. In Indonesia, 70% 
of the workforce was estimated to be engaged in informal employment, mostly in the agriculture 
sector.375 As a comparison, Malaysia’s informal workers consists of only around 9.4 percent of 
the total workforce in Malaysia.376 
Sir Stamford Raffles introduced a capitalist type of economic development during a brief 
period when the British took control of Java in 1811.  This system was like the one introduced in 
the Peninsular Malaya. However, when the Dutch returned in 1816, they reverted to direct state 
control and compulsory cultivation. The Dutch extracted produce, such as coffee and pepper, by 
forced deliveries for sale in Europe under ‘the culture system’.377  
The culture system was a form of taxation which required by the peasants to devote one-
fifth of their land to government assigned crops-usually sugar, indigo, coffee, tea, tobacco, 
cinnamon, and cotton- and to deliver the produce as a tribute in kind, instead of other rents of 
taxes. At the same time, the peasants could grow rice for their subsistent need. Also, they were 
required to contribute their labor: to build irrigation canals, roads, and bridges, clear wastelands, 
and otherwise build up the economic infrastructure of the island.   
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During the 1840s, the culture system was overexploited, and could not produce adequate 
revenues. As the population of Java rose from approximately 7 million in 1850 to 28.4 million in 
1900, there was no rise in the per capita standard of living. The culture system had made Java as 
the vital link in the global capitalist economy, but the peasants in Java were left out within their 
subsistence farming economy.378  
After the liberal revolution in Holland in 1848, the state control over plantations and 
forced labor were abolished in favor of free enterprise and direct taxation. The development of 
plantation economy, particularly in the island of Sumatra, owed partly to the contract laborers.  
Many of the contract laborers (coolies) came from China and later from Java. Subsequently, the 
Chinese played more as an intermediary trader within the colonial economy. They had a vital role 
in supplying credit and stimulating the cultivation of export crops such as rattan, rubber, and 
copra.379 
In Sumatra, the introduction of the capitalist economy led to profound social change. 
Sumatra became an important source for agricultural and forest commodities. The monetary 
economy was introduced to create a market for textiles, hardware, and other foreign goods. New 
towns were established for the new settlers, and Dutch schools were introduced. A network of 
village banks called the People’s Credit System was established. As opposed to Java, capitalism 
entered the fabric of traditional society to create new classes among the population. 380 
Indonesia’s independence had disrupted the continuation of the colonial economy. 
Although it was not total, the founding fathers of Indonesia envisioned a transformation from 
the colonial economy. For them, independence does mean not only political independence, but 
also economic independence, where people are free from exploitation. Their economic ideals 
were promulgated in the Constitution Chapter XIV. The economic vision of the Constitution is a 
mixed economy of Indonesia combining egalitarian feature of a cooperative system, state control 
over major means of production, and private enterprise. Also, the state has a responsibility to 








Nevertheless, this vision was difficult to achieve during the first decade of independence. 
After independence, the Indonesian economy had to recover from the hardships of the Japanese 
occupation and the war for independence (1945-1949). During the period 1949-1965, there was 
little economic growth, predominantly in the years from 1950 to 1957. In 1958-1965, political 
instability and inappropriate economic policy measures made the economy stagnant. Soekarno 
aimed at self-sufficiency, import-substitution, and estranged the suppliers of western capital, 
even more, when he developed communist sympathies. His efforts to eliminate foreign economic 
control were not always supportive of the struggling economy of the new sovereign state.381 
The ‘New Order’ (Orde Baru) of Soeharto rejected political mobilization and socialist 
ideology of Soekarno and established a tightly controlled regime. This strategy successfully put 
Indonesia’s economy back on the right track.  More flows of foreign investment and foreign aid 
programs came into the countries. Under Soeharto, Indonesia transformed itself from a 
predominantly agricultural economy to an industrializing economy.382 
In the 1980s, Soeharto started to decrease government intervention and initiated the 
deregulation of the economy. However, this liberalization did not create a more competitive 
business environment in Indonesia. On the contrary, national companies were sold cheaply to 
Soeharto families and cronies with the support of a corrupt bureaucracy. Indonesia achieved 
remarkable economic growth during this time, but it was not distributed to the people of 
Indonesia. Soeharto regime was sustained by bureaucracy, military, and a small number of 
conglomerates, which mostly Chinese Indonesian and Soeharto’s family. This crony capitalism 
was responsible for the failure of the Soeharto regime in coping with the financial crisis of 1997.  
The economy of Indonesia during the post-New Order is less centralized than the 
economy during Soeharto regime. Act number 32, the year 2004 serves as a basis for economic 
decentralization in Indonesia. The region has more autonomy to manage their economic affair. 
However, the nature of Indonesia economy system does not entirely change. Rosser argues that 
 







Indonesia ‘oligarchic capitalism’ system has been continually shaped by three contradictory 
agendas:  
(1) the predatory, rent-seeking agenda pursued by the politico-bureaucrats and their 
corporate clients; (2) the market-oriented agenda pursued by controllers of mobile capital 
(and conglomerates when it works to their favors); and (3) the social justice/redistributive 
agenda pursued by peasants, workers, and small business and their allies in the NGO 
community. The first two are still dominant in shaping Indonesia economy; however, the 
political context of Indonesia as democracy creates more space for the third agenda. In 
general, the current Indonesian economy represents a compromise between these three 
competing agendas, in particular, the one that favors the interests of the politico-
bureaucrats and the conglomerates, while accommodating mobile-capital controllers and 
incorporating concessions to peasants, workers, and other marginalized elements.383 
Political actors of Islamic politics 
The considerable diversity within Indonesian society is continually changing the political 
landscape surrounding the development of Islamic insurance in Indonesia. The religious, social 
and cultural realms are influential in the debate over the role of religion in the country’s nation-
building and development. Moreover, competition for political power in Indonesia is complex, 
fought out at multiple levels of government across a nation, in a context of on-going 
democratization and on-going Islamization of the society. This complex process has a deep root 
history in the polarization of the Indonesia (Javanese) society which started back in the 1930s. 
The intensity of the Islamic modernist movement, particularly after the establishment of 
Muhammadiyah organization in 1912, polarized Indonesian society along identity lines between 
santri, abangan and priyayi.384 
The American sociologist, Clifford Geertz identified three cultural stream or so-called 
aliran in Indonesian, namely the santri, abangan, and priyayi.385 The abangan majority were not 
irreligious, for they had a rich spiritual life, but it was only partly touched by reformers regarded 
as the true Islam. Similarly, the priyayi embraces abangan religious identity but comprises the 
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elite cultural identity contras to the abangan masses. The priyayi were used as administrators 
during the Dutch colonial era. Gradually they became professional civil servants of modern 
Indonesia. For this reason, the priyayi as a class were often regarded as Javanese civil servants.  
The santri is a cultural stream of a type of devout Muslim who practice a more orthodox 
version of Islam, in contrast to abangan classes. The santri consists of the Modernists and the 
Traditionalists kyais. In term of religious understanding, the Modernists are more puritan by 
strictly following the injunction of the Quran and early generation of Muslims. Meanwhile, in the 
context of Muslim society in Indonesia, Traditionalism refers to a religious strand which 
emphasizes on preserving traditionally established local rituals and scholarship. Traditionalist 
Muslims refer to themselves as ahlusunnah wal jamaah or aswaja.386  
Furthermore, Traditionalism is often contrasted with modernism, which is inspired by 
modernity and rationalism. These two groups also differ in many political issues. The Modernist 
pioneering a modernization of educational and welfare activities. Modernist played roles in 
nationalist political movements and never shy away from active political involvement and 
leadership. The Traditionalist started to involve in politics just few years before independence, 
and continue to do so, however the combination of their religiosity with politics led to 
questioning of their sanctity. The Traditionalist group tends to be more flexible in their political 
position, which many suggest pejoratively that the political principle of the Traditionalist is having 
‘no-principle’. If the religious interest of Muslims is left untouched, the Traditionalists are willing 
to accept any type of political authority. 387 
The first santri-abangan polarization erupted with the Madiun uprising 1948 which left 
thousands of dead. With this spilling blood the santri-abangan chasm deepened and reinforced 
the bitter political contest between the Communist party of PKI and its abangan followers on one 
side and santri on the other, represented above all by the santri Traditionalist of NU (at that time 
still within Masyumi). The nationalist party of PNI had a more priyayi leadership but also recruited 
for abangan.388 
 







Under Soekarno, the political landscape was strictly represented this polarization. In the 
elections of 1955, ‘Islamic’ and ‘secular’ constituencies were easily differentiated. The table 
below shows the vote distribution among the ‘big four’ parties, who together got 78.0% of the 
valid votes. This result shows the ‘secular’ got 38.7% and the ‘Islamic’ got 39.3%.389 
 During the time of the New Order of Soeharto, the actors and the institutions had changed 
dramatically. However, the political constellation still showed the polarization between those 
cultural streams -at least roughly. Also, it had become more difficult to identify ‘Islamic’ and 
‘secular constituencies. There was no single organization containing one cultural stream 
exclusively. There was more political mixing under the New Order. After taking control of the 
situation in 1965, Soeharto launched an operation to destroy PKI and ensured that the influence 
of Communism was totally eradicated from Indonesia. Masyumi was already dissolved in 1960 
that made Muslim modernist to seek an alternative venue for their aspiration. Although many of 
former Masyumi members went for Islamic party of PPP for their political aspiration, most of 
Muslim Modernists preferred non-political institutions (NGOs, press, universities) and focused 
more dakwah or preaching Islam to the society. 
The paragraphs below provide a rough sketch of the Indonesia political landscape about 
Islamic insurance development, particularly under the New Order regime of Soeharto. This serves 
as a basis for understanding the political landscape behind Islamic insurance development in 
Indonesia. However, it is important to note that their positions toward Islamization are also 
constantly evolving and there is often overlap between groups. Their gradual acceptance toward 
Islamization and Islamic insurance will be discussed thoroughly in the section of Islamic insurance 
as political identity immediately after this section. 
Soeharto regime rested on the support of these three groups: Golkar, Military, and 
Bureaucracy. Golkar or Golongan Karya (Functional Groups) was founded in 1964 and 
participated in in the general election for the first time in 1971. Since 1971 Golkar had been the 
ruling party in Indonesia until 1999. In the 1971 legislative election, Golkar won 62% of the votes 
and an overwhelming majority in the People's Representative Council (DPR).  
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Soeharto claimed that Golkar was not a political party. It was portrayed as a non-
ideological entity without political that hosted diverse groups in society. It promised to focus on 
"economic development" and "stability" rather than a specific ideological goal. Golkar also began 
identifying itself with the government, encouraging civil servants to vote for it as a sign of loyalty 
to the government. The military or the ABRI was one of the strongest factions under Golkar. 
Under Soeharto, Members of the Indonesian armed forces played a dominant role in political 
affairs. The ABRI Commander led this faction in the parliament. 
Besides military and bureaucrat, Golkar was also the house for priyayi, abangan, and non-
Muslims who were not the loyalist of Soekarno under PDIP, and santri who denounced political 
Islam (Islamism) under PPP. Although they had different religious understanding, they had a 
common goal in the eradication of Communism and state control over Islamists. In the early years 
of the New Order, Soeharto was supportive toward Islamic piety but very repressive on political 
Islam. However, it started to change in the 1990s when more santri were joining the military and 
the bureaucrat, particularly Habibie who was recruited by Soeharto to drive the industrialization 
of the country. In 1978, he was appointed as Minister of Research and Technology. He continued 
to play an important role in "strategic" industries in this post. By 1991, Habibie oversaw ten state-
owned industries including aviation, ship- and train-building, steel, arms, communications, and 
energy.390 
Part of the bureaucracy that will be instrumental in the negotiation and implementation 
of Islamic economy in Indonesia is the Central Bank of Indonesia (BI). BI enables the 
implementation of Islamic economy within the existing Indonesia economic system. 
PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) was a center-left political party. It was led by Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, president of Indonesia from 2001 to 2004, and daughter of Sukarno, the first 
president of Indonesia. Because of its affiliation with Soekarno, the New Order had been 
maintaining close surveillance and control to the Party. PDI-P was by far the most popular political 
party coming into the 1999 and the recent 2019 legislative elections.  
 





This party has an ideal of the realization of an independent, sovereign, united, 
democratic, just, prosperous, civilized and religious nation and to fulfill the right and 
responsibility of all the people of Indonesia. Therefore, it requires the involvement of all national 
forces, both individually and organized in democratic people's organizations and open to all 
citizens, regardless of ethnicity, religion, gender, descent and social standing. 
Encouraged by the awareness of the responsibility to realize these noble ideals, and to 
meet the demands of the development of the existing era, the Indonesian National Party (PNI), 
the Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo), the Catholic Party, the Supporting Association of 
Indonesian Independence (IPKI), and Deliberation The Rakyat Banyak (Murba), on March 9, 1970 
formed the Development Democracy Group, which was then confirmed by a joint statement by 
the five political parties on October 28, 1971. And finally, on January 10, 1973, carried out a 
strategic move to fuse themselves into a forum for people's political struggle based on Pancasila 
under the name of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). At the close of the PDI II Congress in 
Jakarta on January 17, 1981, the five fusion parties emphasized that the realization of fusion was 
complete and stated the termination of their respective existence. 
Majority of its member was the priyayi of Soekarno supporters under the nationalist party 
of PNI and other non-Islamic parties. After the dissolution of the communist party PKI, PDI P has 
been the main vehicle for abangan, workers, and labors for their political aspiration. PDI P has 
been a stronghold for the supporter of nationalist ideology based on the official Indonesian 
national philosophy, Pancasila. PDI P has been positioned as the opponent of Islamism and 
opposed many of Sharia-inspired laws and regulations. 
PPP was formed in 1973 as a result of the merger between several Islam-based parties, 
assuming the role of umbrella party for Muslims. PPP is considered to be a nationalist Islamist 
party which conforms to Pancasila doctrine and no longer upholds Sharia as the main goal.  
PPP had been the main political vehicle for both santri modernist and santri traditionalist 
under the New Order. Soeharto forced a merger of political parties following the 1971 Legislative 
Election. The ten political parties were reduced to just two (excluding Golkar) and that the parties 




The PPP seemed to have cemented itself a status as the strongest opposition party during 
the Soeharto regime. However, it would not last long. In 1984, Nahdlatul Ulama, under its 
Chairman, Abdurrahman Wahid withdrew from the PPP and severely weakening it. The PPP was 
also forced by the government to replace its ideology of Islam with the national ideology of 
Pancasila and to stop using Islamic symbols. As a result, the party replaced its logo showing the 
Kabah shrine in Mecca with a star. 
Nahdlatul Ulama (literally translated to Ulama's Revival, abbreviated as NU) is a 
traditionalist Sunni Islam movement in Indonesia following the Shafii school of jurisprudence. NU 
was established on January 31, 1926 in Surabaya as a response to the rise of Wahabism in Saudi 
Arabia and Islamic modernism in Indonesia. The NU is the largest independent Islamic 
organization in the world with the membership of 40 million in 2003.  
NU has been supportive for the implementation of Sharia principles in Indonesia social 
and economic development. However, NU is very critical to the strict interpretation of Islam and 
the stiffness of political position offered by Santri modernists. For instance, on January 2004, the 
Indonesian Council of Ulama (‘MUI’) issued a fatwa restating the Quranic prohibition on riba or 
usury and defining that term broadly as any ‘additional charges levied on the postponement of 
agreed payments’. In April 2010, Muhammadiyah, one of Indonesia’s largest mass Muslim 
organizations, followed MUI’s lead, issuing a similar fatwa. However, Nahdlatul Ulama (‘NU’), the 
largest fatwa-issuing organization in Indonesia, and reputedly the largest Islamic organization in 
the world, sees the matter as khilāfīya, that is, subject to different opinions or unresolved. 
Although many of NU members have become more receptive toward the idea of Islamic 
economy, they do not have a strict position in term of supporting or abandoning the conventional 
system. Moreover, many of them still suspect that the modern Islamic financial institution is 
merely a cosmetic that hinders the profit and political motive of political Islam and does not bring 
more benefit to the Ummah (Muslim community) compared to the existing institutions. 
The modernist of Muhammadiyah and Dakwah movements whose base was mainly urban 
and, in particular, outside Central and East Java-maintained a firmly reformist religious stance 
with a firmly principled political stance. The modernist agenda was about Islamization from 




and exemplified by Natsir, a former leader of Islamic party Masyumi, when he created DDII in 
1967. 391 
The Modernists are often wary with the increase of Christian missionary activities and the 
dominance of the Indonesian Christians under the New Order. Therefore, besides confronting 
Christian missionary activities in the society, their main strategy is infiltrating military and 
bureaucracy under the New Order. The constant tension between the Modernists and non-
Muslims is partly responsible for why the Islamic economy has never received enough support 
among the non-Muslim in Indonesia.  
Another important modernist actor in the late New Order was the Tarbiyah movement. 
This movement was inspired by the global revivalism and to inspiration from the Muslim 
Brotherhood of Egypt. They were active in campus of public universities. Although they are more 
conservative in term of observing Islamic religious duties, they are more politically critical toward 
the Soeharto regime. With freedom of organization and association being severely curtailed, 
many Indonesian Islamic political activists found inspiration in the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Collectively, these activists formed what became known as the Tarbiyah (educational) 
movement. 
At the close of the Soeharto dictatorship in 1998, the Tarbiyah had become sufficiently 
well organized to give rise to Indonesia’s main democratic-era Islamic political party, the PK 
(Justice Party), which became the PKS (Prosperous Justice Party). The members are quite diverse 
from owners of small or medium businesses, civil servants, to professionals.392 Many of them 
become the vital player of the current development of Islamic insurance and Islamic financial 
institutions in Indonesia. 
Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) plays an important role within the 
political system. Under the patronage of B. J. Habibie, ICMI activists infiltrated the central 
government. ICMI advocated the domination of Muslims in the ranks of government, civil 
services, police and military, industries and commerce. ICMI also advocated the introduction of 
Sharia into the Indonesian legal and political system and oversaw the establishment of Islamic 
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courts, an Islamic bank and the promotion of Islamic media. Through ICMI, the modernists 
established Islamic microfinance (BMT) throughout the country, social relief organization such as 
Dompet Dhuafa, and initiated the establishment of Bank Muamalat and Islamic insurance of 
Takaful.393 
MUI (Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars) is a voluntary forum for ulama or Islamic 
scholars representing a wide range of Islamic organizations. Although many Indonesians assume 
MUI is a government agency of some sort, it is an NGO, not a state agency. MUI is endorsed and 
funded by the government as a key source of state policy on Islamic issues since the 1970s. It 
enjoys a lucrative state monopoly on halal certification and a revenue stream from the DPS (fatwa 
body on Islamic economics) system, as well as a significant annual budgetary grant from the 
Department of Religion. MUI was, in the past, a largely compliant agent of the New Order’s 
repressive, statist and developmentalist policies on Islam. 
At the present day, MUI has been able to reinvent itself since Soeharto’s fall as a 
champion of a populist and often ‘hardline’ conservative orthodoxy that sometimes challenges, 
but more often leads, government policy. While doing so, it has managed to retain and exploit 
the aura of state endorsement it has enjoyed since the 1970s, allowing it to remain part of the 
‘Muslim establishment’ of Indonesia — so much so that many Indonesians assume it is a 
government agency of some sort. In this way, it has become the most influential public advocate 
of conservative interpretations of Sharia in contemporary Indonesia. 394 
Besides MUI, the supporters of Sharia-based economy established Islamic Economic 
Society (MES). MES is an intellectual forum serves as an epistemic community in order to 
disseminate the idea of Sharia-based economy in academia and public at large. At the early days 
of Islamic banking in Indonesia, the socialization of Islamic Economic was made by each of Islamic 
financial institutions. After the joint evaluation, it is clear that the socialization of the Islamic 
economic system can only be successful when done by a structured and continuous manner. 395 
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The Islamic financial institutions get together and invite the whole among the required 
group to form an organization, with joint efforts, will undertake structured and continuous 
socialization to the society. This organization is called the “Islamic Economic Society” is 
abbreviated to MES, a reference in the Indonesian language is “Masyarakat Ekonomi Syariah, in 
English, is the Islamic Economic Society or in Arabic is Mujtama’ al-Iqtishad Al Islamiy, established 
on Monday, 26th March 2001.396  
MES’ founders are Individual, Financial Institutions, Educational Institutions, Research 
Institutions and Business Entities which are interested in the efforts to grow the Islamic economy. 
MES based on Islamic Law, also subject to regulatory legislation that valid in Indonesia, therefore 
open to every citizen regardless of their religious belief.397 
The Indonesian government sponsored the establishment of social insurance companies 
that carry out their activities based on statutory provisions, such as: Perum Jasa Rahardja (now 
Persero), Perum Taspen, Perum Asabri and Perum Astek (Social Security). With the birth of the 
New Order regime, the private sector was resuscitated as an important part of the Indonesian 
insurance industry. And in line with the rapid development in Indonesia, the New Order 
government carried out development in all fields including insurance. In an effort to discipline 
and improve the quality of the Insurance Industry in Indonesia, the government has issued 
various policies in the form of provisions and legislation. Regulations that are important in 
disciplining the business this insurance field is the Minister of Finance Decree No. 214 and 215 / 
KMK 013/1988 known as the December Package. Shortly after that a special law was issued 
regarding insurance business as the first time since the Republic of Indonesia became 
independent, namely Law No.2 1992 following the Government Regulation No.73 of 
1992/KMK/No.223-226 which regulates very detailed the steps of the insurance business. 
Indonesian insurance industry consists of five main sectors: life, non-life, reinsurance, civil 
and armed forces, and social insurance. The civil and armed forces and social insurance are 
provided by the government. As mentioned before, the constant support of the military and 
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bureaucrats was essential for the New Order regime, therefore the regime prioritized the 
provision of social insurance for these two groups. Particularly in health care, Indonesian 
healthcare has traditionally been fragmented: private insurance schemes for those who could 
afford it, basic state provision for the very poorest, and NGOs in specialized areas providing 
support in between.398  
Small number companies dominate the insurance business in Indonesia. The top 10 life 
insurers from a total of 46 companies control more than 60% shares of total assets and 
premiums, while the top 10 non-life and reinsurers from a total of 91 companies account for 
more than 50%. Furthermore, the top two among the five social and civil and armed forces 
insurance companies account for over 80% of total assets and premiums.399 
Indonesia's insurance sector has long been open to foreign investment, and while there 
are calls to restrict engagement by global players, there is no overlooking the fact that the 
industry needs more funds to meet elevated capital requirements. As local companies get in 
shape for regional competition in the upcoming ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the industry 
is expected to see further consolidation. All of this should open doors for mergers and 
acquisitions and for foreign firms to enter the market. 
During Soeharto, most of the domestic insurance firms were owned or had patronage 
relationship with Soeharto’s family members. For instance, all insurance contracts from 
Pertamina, state-owned oil and Gas Company, were subcontracted to a company owned by the 
youngest son of Soeharto, Tommy. Then, there was a partnership between Bob Hasan and two 
airlines controlled by Suharto's children. One of business group called the Nusamba group 
controlled many businesses including insurance. 
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A growing niche markets 
After its establishment in 1994, Islamic insurance in Indonesia has experienced significant 
growth. Association for Indonesian Islamic Insurance operators (AASI) recorded a high increase 
in the number of Islamic insurance provider, capital asset, and investment. In 2015, there were 
more than 60 companies provided Islamic insurance service across Indonesia, which contributed 
to 5.0% of entire gross written of entire Indonesia insurance industry.400 With a sizeable Muslim 
population combined with expected good GDP growth, Indonesia has vast potential growth 
opportunities for Islamic insurance development. 
Indonesians prefer to use the term ‘Sharia insurance’ rather than ‘Islamic insurance’. The 
usage of ‘Sharia’ and not ‘Islamic’ is part of the compromise between Muslim activists and 
Soeharto regime who considered the term Islamic as more politically subversive within the 
Indonesian context.401 However, to avoid any confusion, we keep using the word ‘Islamic 
insurance’ in this chapter.  
History and development 
The development of Islamic insurance only exists in the latter half of 1994. In mid-1993, 
ICMI (Indonesian Association of Muslim intellectuals) initiated the establishment of the first 
Islamic insurance company in Indonesia. This initiative was followed up by the formation of the 
Takaful Indonesia Insurance Team (TEPATI) through a partnership between the Abadi 
Foundation, Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI), and Tugu Mandiri Life Insurance in July 27th, 1993. 
According to Syakir Sula, Islamic insurance is needed to support the establishment of the Islamic 
Bank. The establishment of an Indonesian Islamic insurance company in 1994 would protect the 
fund managed by Bank Muamalat Indonesia, which was founded three years earlier.402 
Through various national seminars and after conducting studies with Takaful Malaysia on 









Company on the 24th February 1994. Then PT STI established two subsidiaries, namely PT 
Asuransi Takaful Family Insurance (ATK) and PT Takaful General Insurance (ATU). The birth of 
Islamic insurance in Indonesia is mainly the result of the commitment of the Takaful Insurance 
Indonesia (TEPATI). Furthermore, it was also the fruit of various elements of initiative, namely 
the Association of Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) through the Abdi Bangsa 
Foundation, Bank Muamalat Indonesia Tbk, PT Tugu Mandiri Life Insurance, Ministry of Finance 
of the Republic of Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim entrepreneurs, with technical assistance from 
Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Bhd. (STMB). 
The two Islamic insurance companies were established based on Malaysia’s Islamic 
insurance model. PT Takaful Family (ATK) Insurance inaugurated through Minister of Finance 
Decree No. Kep-385 / KMK.017 /1994. It was opened by Mr. Mar'ie Muhammad as the Minister 
of Finance at that time on 4 August 1994 with 5 billion IDR initial investment. This company 
provides life and other family Takaful services. PT Takaful General Insurance (ATU), established 
later 2 June 1995, offers general Takaful services.403 
The role of these two Indonesia's Islamic insurance companies in the country's economy 
through sharia-based insurance has attracted domestic and foreign investors. In 1997, Syarikat 
Takaful Malaysia, Bhd. (STMB) places its capital in the company to become one of the 
shareholders. STMB then increased the amount of its capital investment to reach a significant 
amount in 2004. The role of Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Bhd. (STMB) as an investor continued 
through direct capital participation in PT Takaful Family (ATK) in 2009. The Islamic Development 
Bank (IDB) also strengthened the company's capital structure in 2004. Domestic investors also 
showed a keen interest in participating in developing Takaful Indonesia. In 2000, Permodalan 
Nasional Madani Persero (PNM) helped strengthen the company's capital structure. Internally, 
PT. General Takaful Insurance standardizes to improve and maintain the consistency of service 
quality and company performance through the application of ISO 9001: 2008, which is the latest 
international standard for the quality management system.  
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The establishment of these two companies has also motivated others to establish a new 
Islamic insurance company or open Islamic insurance window or division. Many Islamic insurance 
companies were established particularly after the year 2000. Asuransi Syariah Mubarakah (1997), 
PT Jaya Proteksi Takaful (2010), and PT Maskapai Asuransi Sonwelis (2015) were set up as new 
family Takaful insurance companies. This type of insurance provides life, education fund, and 
investment services like Takaful Family in Malaysia. Meanwhile, PT MAA Life Assurance (2000), 
PT MAA General Assurance (2000), PT Great Eastern Life Indonesia (2001), PT Asuransi Tri Pakarta 
(2002), PT AJB Bumiputera 1912 (2004), and PT Asuransi Jiwa Bringin Life Sejahtera (2003) were 
established as window or Sharia-unit. Global insurance companies were also interested in this 
new financial service. PT Asuransi Allianz Life Indonesia (2006) and PT Prudential Life Assurance 
(2010) are some examples of global companies that open Islamic insurance businesses in 
Indonesia. Compared to other countries, Indonesia is well known for having many Islamic 
insurance operator in its jurisdiction. 
According to the law, there are four methods of establishing an Islamic insurance 
company in Indonesia. The first method is by founding a new Islamic insurance company. The 
second method is through conversion from a conventional insurance company into an Islamic 
insurance company. The third method is by having a new Islamic insurance unit or window. The 
fourth method is through the conversion of conventional insurance unit or window into an 
Islamic insurance unit of window. Based on the latest OJK database (2018) on the Islamic 
insurance company, there are currently 19 units/windows and five full-fledged Life/Family 
insurance companies, 25 general Islamic insurance windows, three full-fledged general Islamic 
insurance companies, and three reinsurance companies in Indonesia.404  
However, not all companies perform well. After operating for more than two decades, PT 
Asuransi Syariah Mubarakah was filed bankruptcy in court by Indonesia Financial Service 
Authority (OJK). PT Takaful General Insurance (ATU), the pioneer of Indonesia Islamic insurance, 
was closed at the beginning of 2017 because of lack of premium growth. However, PT Koperasi 
Simpan Pinjam Jasa (Kospin Jasa), one of the biggest credit unions in Indonesia, bought the ATU 
 






majority share in 2018 and revitalized it. Other companies are being merged to or acquired by 
other more prominent companies. Tokio Marine Group, a global insurance company originating 
from Japan, made an acquisition of MAA Life Assurance in 2012. PT Jaya Proteksi Takaful changed 
its name into PT Asuransi Chubb Syariah after being acquired by the US-based company, Chubb 
Corp in 2017. Other company such as PT Asuransi Tri Pakarta, a small company with an asset less 
than 200 billion IDR (13 million USD), thrives and becomes one of the best units of Islamic 
insurance companies.  
The new law No. 40 the year 2014 (UU40 2014) gives incentive for the spin-off of Islamic 
insurance windows (i.e., the split of Islamic insurance units from the conventional insurance 
companies into a separate standalone entity) within the framework of ten years. This regulation 
is expected to spur market activity. However, most of the existing companies have not enough 
Islamic insurance business to meet the immediate separation condition. Some companies may 
choose to make use of the full 10 years to plan for the spin-off as required by the UU40 2014. 
Meanwhile other companies may adopt a strategy of an early spin-off to gain the first-mover 
advantage.405 
In 2016, Islamic insurance in Indonesia contributed to 6.2 percent of the total insurance 
industry in Indonesia. In number, there was 2,168 billion IDR (145.3 million USD) of life & family 
Islamic insurance premium and 585 billion IDR (39.2 million USD) of general Islamic insurance 
and reinsurance. It was 10.25% growth from the previous year. The increase in asset and 
investment were much better. The asset of Islamic insurance grew about 21.69 percent, and the 
investment reached 23.64 percent growth. The total asset of Islamic insurance was 28,967 billion 
IDR (1.9 billion USD), and the total investment of Islamic insurance was 25,726 billion IDR (1.7 
billion USD). The increase in motor vehicle leasing contributed significantly for the premium of 
general Islamic insurance. Meanwhile, life insurance had not increased dramatically because of 
the economic recession during that year.406 
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The top three of life/family Islamic insurance players are Prudential Life Assurance, AIA 
Financial, and Asuransi Allianz Life Indonesia, all of which operated via windows. These 
companies make up a market share of more than 70% in 2015 for the life/family Islamic insurance 
industry in Indonesia in terms of total contributions/premiums. Based on the Financial Services 
Authority (OJK) report, a large proportion of the new business by these top three operators are 
on unit-linked products. A unit-linked insurance plan is a product offered by insurance companies 
that, unlike a pure insurance policy, gives members both insurance and investment under a single 
integrated plan. This model has been a significant factor driving the growth in the Indonesian 
life/family Islamic insurance sector. 407 
The key distribution channel in this market is predominantly agency.408 Companies are 
also using the existing banking networks as a more efficient means of distribution. However, 
Islamic banking in Indonesia is small compared with conventional banks in terms of assets. Islamic 
insurance has been more successful when there is a Bancassurance partnership with 
conventional banks. For instance, AIA has a long cooperation with the Bank of Central Asia (BCA) 
for both conventional and Islamic insurance segments. For this reason, AIA has increased its 
market significantly from 2% in 2010 to 24% in 2014 in terms of total contributions.  
The top three players for general Takaful or Islamic insurance sector are Asuransi Astra 
Buana, Asuransi Takaful Umum, and Asuransi Adira Dinamika. These companies make up around 
50% of the market share for general Islamic insurance in Indonesia. The key lines businesses of 
general Islamic insurance in Indonesia are motor, personal accident, health, and property. For 
general Islamic insurance in Indonesia, the retail business lines are predominantly sold via agency 
force, and the commercial business lines are predominantly sold via brokers.409  
The development of Islamic insurance elaborated above is a result of the rise of Muslim 
activism since the 1980s. Although the official establishment of Islamic insurance company did 
not start before 1994, the idea of Islamic insurance can be traced a few years back before that. 
It is more suitable to use the term Islamic economic movement in Indonesia preferably than 
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Islamic finance project as commonly known in Malaysia. It is because the initiative came from 
the periphery of the power, instead from the state. Muslim intellectuals, universities, religious 
organizations, and Islamic NGOs played a more important role than the government in 
developing ideals of Islamic economy. Adding to that, the term Islamic economy or economics is 
also more common to use in Indonesia compared to term Islamic finance. It is because the idea 
of Islamic economics is regarded to encompass broader aspects than mere finance by many 
Indonesian intellectuals and activists. 
The 1980s was a difficult time for Muslim activists in Indonesia. Any alternative ideas such 
as Islamic economy was considered subversive toward the state’s development agenda. For that 
reason, it was not possible to implement the concept of Islamic economics into formal 
institutions. In the 1990s, Soeharto regime changed its policy toward Muslim group. This decade 
was also a crucial period for the implementation of Islamic economics in Indonesia. The Bank 
Muamalat Indonesia established in1991 as the first Islamic bank in the country. 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars) and ICMI played a 
crucial role in this development. In the 1990s, both organizations were rising as meaningful 
representations of Muslim groups in their relationship with the state. Initially, Soeharto approved 
the establishment of these organization to appease and gain support from the Muslim 
population. Both organizations were also enjoying the patronage of the Soeharto regime. Several 
religious decrees of fatwas were issued to support the Soeharto developmental agenda, for 
instance, fatwa on contraception for supporting national family planning program and fatwa 
justifying state-sponsored sports lottery. 410 
In the late 1980s, the situation changed. Rather than an instrument of the state to 
influence and control the Muslim population, it was transformed into a canal of aspiration for 
Muslim groups to influence government policies.411 In 1989, Amin Aziz, one of the leading 
pioneers of Islamic economy movement and also a MUI member, introduced an initiative of 
establishing an Islamic bank. MUI then organized a series of workshop to discuss interest and 
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banking in Islamic perspective (18- 20 August 1990), which eventually led to the establishment 
of Bank Muamalat Indonesia in 1991.412  
On October 30th, 1992, the government issued Government Regulation No. 72/1992 on 
Profit-sharing Based Bank. The Indonesian Central Bank (BI) supported this development by 
issuing the operational guidance for Profit-sharing-based Banks with the BI Circular Letter 
No.25/4/BPPP on February 29th, 1993. Furthermore, the BI team sent personnel to Singapore, 
London, New York and Iran to learn about the practices of Islamic banking and finance.413 Many 
initiatives were launched in this period. Many of these initiatives were conducted as MUI or ICMI 
programs. Discussions and experiments by Islamic economy movement activists also resulted in 
the establishment of two Islamic insurance companies in 1992 and hundreds of Sharia 
microfinance of Baitul Maal wat Tamwil (BMT).  
After Soeharto regime collapsed in 1998, Islamic economic institutions have been growing 
more rapidly. There has been a stronger attachment between Islamic activists, intellectual and 
universities, politicians, and state bureaucrats on the idea of the Islamic economy. Moreover, the 
historical role of MUI in the establishment of Islamic financial institutions made its prominence 
in the governance of the Islamic economy industry is unquestionable. In 1999, the National Sharia 
Council of MUI (DSN-MUI), was born with the MUI Decision No. Kp. 754/MUI/II/1999. 
Furthermore, DSN-MUI is accepted as a significant authority in the governance of Islamic banking 
and finance, even though DSN-MUI is not a governmental institution. Based on DSN-MUI fatwas, 
the Central Bank (BI) issues regulations on Islamic-related finance, which are legally binding.414  
From 2000 until 2010, DSN-MUI has already issued 78 fatwas related to the Islamic 
economy industry.415 On January 24th, 2004, MUI formally issued a fatwa on the prohibition of 
interest, Fatwa MUI No. 1 the year 2004 strongly declared that the current practices of interest 
are clearly matched with the definition of usury. As a result, the Islamic economy has become an 
integral part of Indonesia economy. Moreover, DSN-MUI has become the primary actor in the 
operation of the Islamic economy in Indonesia. There was no public resistance against the 
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development of Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia, and more Islamic insurance companies, 
and governmental task forces or committees were established to support Islamic finance 
development in Indonesia.416 
Regulatory framework 
Currently, Insurance Law number 40/2014 (UU40 2014) regulates both Islamic insurance 
and insurance companies in Indonesia. UU40 2014 covers the aspect of corporate governance, 
market conduct, consumer protection, and licensing of insurance industry in Indonesia. Indonesia 
does not regulate Islamic insurance separately from conventional insurance. The Indonesian 
Financial Service Authority (OJK) collaborates with the religious institution, the Indonesia Council 
of Islamic Scholars (DSN-MUI), to enforce the Sharia compliance within the industry. Both 
institutions have different tasks. On one hand, the Indonesian Financial Authority (OJK) sets the 
minimum capital requirement, the solvency regulation, policyholder protection, and foreign 
ownership restrictions to protect the industry. On the other hand, DSN-MUI provides guidance 
and evaluates the implementation of Sharia in the insurance contract and practice. The purpose 
of the adoption of UU40 2014 is to boost Islamic insurance business expansion, and at the same 
time, to ensure the standard of Sharia-compliant of the service.417 
Before Law No. 40 of 2014, the growth of Islamic insurance was supported by regulatory 
provisions that guarantee certainty sharia insurance law. Legal provisions governing insurance 
sharia, among others: First, Law No. 2 of 1992 concerning Business Insurance. Secondly, 
Government Regulation No. 73 of 1992 concerning Implementation Insurance Business, as 
amended by Regulation Government No. 63 of 1992. Third, Decree of the Minister of Finance 
Number: 421 / KMK.06 / 2003 September 30, 2003, concerning Capability Assessment and 
Compliance for Directors and Commissioners of Insurance Companies. Fourth, Minister of 
Finance Decree Number: 422 / KMK.06 / 2003 September 30, 2003, concerning Managing 
Businesses of Insurance Companies and Companies Reinsurance. Fifth, Minister of Finance 
Decree Number: 423 / KMK.06 / 2003 dated September 30, 2003 concerning Inspection of an 
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Insurance Company. Sixth, Decree of the Minister of Finance Number: 424 / KMK.06 / 2003 dated 
30 September 2003 concerning Financial Health of Insurance Companies and Companies 
Reinsurance. Seventh, Decree of the Minister of Finance Number: 426 / KMK.06 /2003 dated 
September 30, 2003 concerning Business Licensing of Insurance Companies and Reinsurance 
Company. 418 
Law No. 2 of 1992 and other regulations mentioned above on insurance before UU40 
2014 did not correctly regulate Islamic insurance. In the Code of Commerce Law Article 246, 
namely: "Insurance is an agreement where someone is responsible tie yourself to an insured by 
accepting something premium, to provide compensation to him for a loss, damage or loss of 
possible expected benefits he will suffer because of an uncertain event." That definition could 
not be used as a legal basis for Islamic Insurance. The definition does not regulate the existence 
of insurance based on Sharia principles and does not regulate technical implementation 
insurance activities. Therefore, guidelines to run an Islamic insurance business was established 
in the Fatwa Council National Sharia Insurance Indonesian Ulama Council (DSN-MUI) No.21 / 
DSN-MUI / X / 2001 concerning General Guidelines for Islamic Insurance.419  
DSN-MUI is a non-state institution and has no legal force because it is not included in the 
laws and regulations in Indonesia. DSN-MUI is different from the National Sharia Advisory Council 
(NSAC) of Malaysia. The NSAC, which was established on May 1, 1997, functions as the highest 
authority in deciding Sharia matters in Islamic financial institutions bank or nonbank. NSAC is in 
the organizational structure of the Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM). Member NSAC was 
appointed by the board of directors of BNM for a three-year working period and can be re-elected 
in the next period.420 
 There are some legislations to give stronger legal certainty of Islamic insurance in 
Indonesia. Those regulations are the Decree Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia No. 
426 / KMK.06 / 2003, Ministerial Decree RI Finance No. 424 / KMK.06 / 2003 and Decree of the 
Directorate General Financial Institution No. 4499 / LK / 2000 and finally, the Regulation 








Also, the issuance of Law Number 3 the Year 2006 concerning Amendments to Law 
Number 7 of 1989 regarding Religious Courts, which in their provisions give authority to the 
Religious Court to handle sharia business disputes. In the event of a commercial dispute between 
customers and the company, there are three ways to solve it according to Indonesian law. First, 
peaceful settlement among the parties. Second, the parties choose facilities dispute resolution 
in the form of arbitrage and alternative dispute resolution. This arrangement is set in Law 
Number 30 of 1999 about Arbitrate and Alternative Settlement Disputes or called tahkim. Third, 
dispute resolution through court, which in this case is through a religious court. 421 
Since the development of the Islamic economic finance industry, it becomes a necessity 
to have specific authority to examine, hear, decide and complete the case. On this basis, a Law 
No: 3 was issued in 2006 stating that the Religious Courts has authority to examine, try, decide 
and resolve cases in the field Sharia Economy. The Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 93 / 
PUU / X / 2012 was also added, which states that the Religious Courts have absolute authority in 
examining, adjudicating, deciding and resolving cases Islamic economics is pursued through 
court, then the Court.422 
The new insurance law of 2014 favors full-fledged Islamic insurance entities, instead of 
window operations. The purpose is to stimulate growth and competitiveness of the Indonesian 
Sharia insurance industry in the longer term. Insurance companies are likely to focus on boosting 
their Sharia businesses, and gradually enhancing their capacity and capitalization to achieve the 
maturity needed to finally be independent of their conventional units.423 Also, article 1 Number 
8 of the Insurance Law UU40 year 2014 regulates the risk management business based on Sharia 
Principles  in order to help and protect all participants against losses.424 
Furthermore, Islamic insurance and Islamic Reinsurance businesses are regulated 
differently from conventional insurance and conventional reinsurance businesses. Insurance 
business and conventionally managed Reinsurance Businesses apply the concept of risk transfer, 
while Islamic insurance and Islamic Reinsurance Businesses are the application of the risk sharing 
 
421 Daod Wan Norhayate Wan et al., A Comparative Analysis on Takaful Acts between Malaysia and Indonesia, 1st 
Aceh Global Conference (AGC 2018) (Atlantis Press, 2019). 
422 Ibid. 
423 Bashar Al Natoor, Global Head of Islamic Finance, Fitch. 




concept. Considering the different conceptions underlying the business operation, the Islamic 
insurance business and Sharia Reinsurance Business will be encouraged to be held by separate 
entities from the conventional entities.425 
The article 54, Law No. 40 of 2014 regulates the obligation of Insurance Companies, Sharia 
Insurance Companies, reinsurance companies, and sharia-reinsurance companies. One of the 
obligations is the requirement of each Sharia Insurance Companies, reinsurance companies, and 
sharia reinsurance companies to be members of mediation institutions.426 
Furthermore, the article 57-67 of the Insurance Law describes the authority that can be 
carried out by the Financial Services Authority so-called OJK. OJK is the primary institution to 
regulate and supervise Insurance business activities. The regulation and supervision include 
aspects of governance, business behavior and health finance. What is meant by "supervision" 
includes analysis of reports, checks and investigations.  
There is also ruling for the obligation of every insurance company related to insurance 
business association. According to article 68, each Insurance Company to be obliged to become 
a member of one of the Insurance Business Associations by the type of business. This 
arrangement is intended to enhance the role of associations in regulating its members (self-
regulatory). It is also to facilitate better coordination with the Financial Services Authority.427 
Compared to Malaysia’s IFSA 2013, UU40 2014 referring to Islamic insurance company 
and conventional insurance company in Indonesia was simpler and only discuss on the headlines 
for insurance and Islamic insurance. The further explanation of it will be provided in the 
Peraturan Otaritas Jasa Keuangan (POJK) or Indonesia Financial Authority. On the contrary, IFSA 
2013 totally referred to Islamic insurance covered all the Islamic insurance rules and regulations 
and compiled of banking, Islamic insurance and money market. 428 
Indonesia regulates Islamic insurance together with conventional insurance. Although the 
new regulation gives more detail rulings on Islamic insurance compared to the previous 
regulations, the Law does not give detail instruction on Sharia transactions. The Law gives more 
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role to DSN-MUI to guide and monitor the implementation. Therefore, the DSN-MUI Fatwa 
Institution is considered to be the highest Sharia authority holder in Indonesia. The National 
Sharia Council (DSN) is an institution formed by the Ulama Council Indonesia (MUI) which has the 
function of carrying out the tasks of the MUI in handling issues related to the activities of sharia 
financial institutions. One of the main tasks of the DSN is to study, explore and formulate values 
and principles of Sharia (Islamic Law) in the form of fatwas (legal opinion of Islamic scholars) to 
be used as guidelines in activities transactions in Islamic financial institutions.429 Through the 
Sharia Supervisory Board, supervision of the application of Sharia principles in the system and 
management of the Islamic financial institution. However, DSN-MUI is not a governmental 
institution, therefore, its fatwas (legal opinions) are not legally binding. The fatwas must be 
sustained by the decree from the relevant governmental agency. 
Although Indonesia regulates Islamic insurance within the same regulatory framework of 
conventional insurance, Indonesia gives more role to the religious or Sharia court. It is the 
religious court who has the authority to settle a dispute concerning Islamic insurance in 
Indonesia. This is quite different from Malaysia that gives that authority to civil court.430 
Islamic insurance companies in Indonesia were developed based on the Malaysian model. 
Therefore, we cannot see much differences between the two countries in the way Islamic 
insurance company operates. However, Indonesia has a different regulatory framework from 
Malaysia. Indonesia acknowledges the existence of Islamic insurance as part of Indonesia 
economy and does not intervene on the detail of the Sharia rulings. The Indonesian state limits 
itself from being a direct participant and acts purely as a regulatory body, and not even as an 
incubator of Islamic insurance like Malaysia.  
Special features and challenges 
The lack of centralization effort by the Indonesian government creates a shortage of skills 
in the Islamic insurance industry, particularly in risk management, actuarial and underwriting 
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expertise. The education on Islamic insurance is mostly conducted by study groups in universities, 
Islamic NGOs, and the Islamic insurance agencies themselves. The role of insurance agents or 
marketers is vital in the implementation of Islamic insurance in society. Agents act as an 
intermediary between Islamic insurance companies with the community. Moreover, an Islamic 
insurance agent has several roles beside as influential marketers of Islamic insurance products. 
The agent has a role in providing access to information, guarding the excellent image of Islamic 
insurance companies, and providing solutions and services to prospective customers as well as 
insight to the public on Islamic insurance. 431 
Islamic insurance in Indonesia has a distribution challenge given the large geographical 
spread. This issue is not only resulted in term of lack of resources but also a huge gap on public 
awareness of Islamic insurance as a financial tool. Many companies who have Islamic insurance 
window dedicate more resources on the conventional product rather than Islamic insurance.432 
However, the lack of government support and skilled human resources motivated Islamic 
insurance companies to be more innovative in their unit-linked products. Unit-linked products 
enable investors to get both insurance and investment under a single integrated plan. Malaysia 
has been a pioneer in the Family Takaful plan, whereas members can invest in their children’s 
education fund and at the same time, receive insurance protection. Islamic insurance companies 
in Indonesia copied and extended this model. Not only education plan, but members can also 
invest in social investment such as Waqf (social endowment) or other religious obligation such as 
Hajj. Waqf is not private investment, but it is an endowment made by a Muslim to a religious, 
educational, or charitable cause. Rather than investment for the college entrance fee, Muslim 
can invest in building a mosque, school, or hospital.  
In 2017, PT Sun Life Financial Indonesia (“Sun Life”) launched a Waqf feature for an 
insurance policy of Sharia life insurance products. This feature will not only allow Sun Life to offer 
a solution for better financial planning and protection but also fulfill the needs of clients to serve 
religious obligation, particularly in doing a Waqf.433 In order to do so, members can utilize the 
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benefit of their insurance and investment. CIMB Malaysia adopted this model in 2018 by 
introducing product named Takaful Mulia.  
Some Islamic health insurance plan covers not only the costs of medical treatment but 
also the costs of alternative medicine, which is any of a range of medical therapies that are not 
regarded as orthodox by the medical profession, such as herbalism, homeopathy, acupuncture, 
and Islamic prophetic medicine.434 The later refers to the actions and words (hadiths) specifically 
of the Prophet Muhammad with regards to sickness, treatment and hygiene, and the genre of 
writings undertaken primarily by non-physician scholars to collect and explicate these 
traditions.435  
Furthermore, Indonesian Islamic insurance companies work together with Islamic NGOs 
to deliver their products to the consumer. Norman Nugraha, Chief Agency Officer Shariah Sun 
Life says that the company intends to assist Muslims in Indonesia participating in social program. 
Therefore, all investment returns of Islamic life insurance at Sun Life is changeable to waqf or 
social endowment, such as school, health clinic, or mosque. Moreover, the clients can choose 
any authorized waqf institution of which is Sun Life’s partner, such as Indonesian Waqf Board 
(Badan Wakaf Indonesia or BWI), Dompet Dhuafa, Rumah Waqf, and registered institution in 
Indonesian Waqf Board.436 
Accommodating Islamic insurance 
Malaysia and Indonesia are experiencing different result related to the development of 
Islamic insurance. The birth of Islamic insurance in Indonesia is attributed to the Indonesian 
Muslims activism of the late 1970s. The initiative was not coming from the center of the state 
power but from peripheral Muslims who demanded alternative economic platform to the failing 
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maintain a constant economic growth, however, it excluded part of the population from gaining 
its benefits. They considered Soeharto’s economic policies had increased inequality of income 
distribution between the people and between regions.  
Furthermore, economic liberalization under Soeharto had made Indonesia bound to the 
power of foreign capital. International institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank had been 
dominant forces in determining economic policies under Soeharto. Islamic insurance and other 
Islamic financial schemes in Indonesia were born out of criticism toward the economic policies of 
the New Order regime.  
The absence of direct government involvement and the lack of political support for Islamic 
insurance and Islamic financial institutions, in general, are the causes behind this slow 
development. Besides the competitive insurance structure of Indonesia, Indonesian State does 
not fully support Islamic insurance because it sees and treats it as a ‘political identity’ of a 
particular social group within a pluralistic Indonesia that needs to be accommodated and 
compensated, rather than a vital tool for national economic development. The deepening of 
Islamization within the contemporary Indonesian society makes the state not to ignore or even 
reject Islamic financial institutions. At the same time, any attempt to push the state beyond its 
current role as a regulator of Islamic insurance will create resistance not only from the non-
Muslim population but also from the Muslims of different cultural streams. The following 
sections present this argument thoroughly. 
The birth of a resistance 
The ‘New Order’ (Orde Baru) of Soeharto adopted a military method of dealing with 
political-economic problems faced by Indonesia. Soeharto rejected political mobilization and 
socialist ideology of Soekarno and established a tightly controlled regime that stabilized politics 
for economic growth. Contrast to the previous regime, Soeharto encouraged trade and foreign 
investment in Indonesia. Moreover, Soeharto since the 1970s boosted the capital intensive of oil 
and mining industries, so that the country's income from oil and gas increased from $ 0.6 billion 
in 1973 to $ 10.6 billion in 1980, which has a value equal to 80% of Indonesia's exports. Under 




1980s and had maintained economic growth 6% -7% per year. Also, Soeharto successfully 
reduced the national poverty level from 60% in 1970 to 17.74% in 1996.437  
Nevertheless, many critics suggested that the reliance of Soeharto's economic policies in 
oil and gas industries and economic liberalization had made Indonesia dependent on the power 
of foreign capital. Furthermore, as economic growth had been the priority, economic distribution 
had been neglected by the Soeharto regime. For over three decades (1966-1998), Soeharto 
implemented a socio-economic strategy based on the development trilogy: high economic 
growth, political stability, and equity. The policy goals of growth and stability were met by and 
large, but many experts indicate the income inequality increased rapidly under Soeharto, as well 
as the share of the labor force engaged in informal sector activities.438  
The inequality was exacerbated by the lack of social protection for Indonesians. 
Compared to Soekarno, Soeharto had invested significantly in providing nation-wide health 
services through primary health centers, known as Puskesmas. However, the centers provided 
access to health only at the most basic level. Also, many of them did not have any insurance 
protection. The state provided insurance only to civil servants and military personnel, while most 
of Indonesian live their live without any formal financial protection arrangement. In his attempts 
to restore stability to the nation, Soeharto relied very heavily on the military and the highly 
centralized, Javanese civil service. Health insurance for these two groups and their families was 
expanded significantly in 1968; it grew into a program eventually named Askes that had 17.5 
million members by 2003.439 
Combination of political control and economic liberalization at the beginning of 
Soeharto’s administration is not unique. It was commonly practiced by leaders in the East and 
Southeast Asia regions. Strict leadership style was considered vital to fix the messy economy in 
the late 1960s. This choice gave political consequences. All political forces, press, and NGOs 
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opposed to the New Order were then given no space. Moreover, the New Order regime was very 
repressive to these alternate voices, particularly toward Islamic movements. 
The global euphoria of the success of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 resonated well with 
Islamic movements in Indonesia. Although it was a Shia revolution, it did not prevent many 
Muslim intellectuals and activists in Indonesia to take inspiration from that. Prior to the Iranian 
Revolution, there was already an explosion of the usroh movement, which is initiated by Hasan 
al-Banna of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, on Indonesian college campuses in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s.  
The success of the Iranian Revolution provided a psychological boost for Muslim activists 
particularly in mosques around campuses. Muslim women activists in Indonesia especially college 
students, were struck and awakened by the women of Iran who dressed traditional garment but 
managed to repel the domination and influence of the superpower United States from their 
country. The Iranian Revolution has become a powerful inspiration for the affirmation of self-
esteem, confidence and a new identity for the dakwah (missionary) activists. It started from the 
image of Iranian women in their hijab then spread through the campus mosque network in 
Indonesia and extend its influence on all walks of life.440 
However, Soeharto continued his policy that dates back since the beginning of the 1970s 
to allow religious expression of Islam but not political Islam. In reality, the line between individual 
piety and political expression often blur. Wearing hijab is an individual choice, but in public space, 
it can be seen as an expression of a political identity. Soeharto regime did not allow public school 
students to wear hijab (headscarf) in school and any official photo identification. Soeharto’s 
government further his political control over civil organizations by declaring in 1984 that 
henceforth only Pancasila and not Islam or any other religion or ideology, could serve as the 
ideological basis for mass organizations in Indonesia.  
These socio-political circumstances forced the aspiration for Islamization including ideas 
of Islamic economy to be confined within campuses walls. Intellectuals and students studied the 
work of modern Muslim intellectuals including the work by prominent Shia cleric Muhammad 
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Baqir Sadr:  Our Economy (Arabic: "Iqtisaduna").  Written between 1960 and 1961, and published 
in 1982, Our Economy still forms much of the basis for modern Islamic banking. In his book, al-
Sadr shows that Islam has answers to problems of the modern world by presenting an Islamic 
alternative to both capitalism and socialism.441 He rejects socialism and capitalism by arguing 
both private and public property originate from God, and that the rights and obligations of both 
private individuals and rulers are therefore dictated by Islam. 
Not only from Iranian intellectuals, but Indonesia Muslims have also been developing 
ideas of Islamic economy other international economist such as who writes a series of books 
titled Islamic economic doctrine. In the book, the insurance model from an Islamic point of view 
is thoroughly explored. He argued that the practice of commercial insurance is not permitted by 
Islam. Also, he also contends that life insurance that makes the soul as an object of insurance is 
not in accordance with Islamic law. Aside from conventional insurance based on insurance 
practices in Europe, it also contains elements that are prohibited by Sharia.442 Other book 
Insurance in Islam by M. Nejatullah ash-Shiddiqie explains the risks, the nature of insurance and 
the bad things related to insurance. In addition, insurance in the capitalist, socialist and Islamic 
systems is discussed and argued for the supremacy of Islamic insurance.443 From these works, 
Indonesian Muslim intellectuals developed insurance plans adjusted for Indonesians.  
The pioneers of the Islamic economic movement, among others A.M Saefuddin, Dawam 
Raharjo, Adi Sasono and Amin Aziz, came from intellectual background of Pusat Pengembangan 
Agribisnis (Centre of Agribusiness development), Bogor Agricultural Institute.444 This center was 
established in 1982 as an intellectual forum focusing on a wide array of economic issues, 
including the idea of Islamic economy. Besides organizing conferences, several experiments on 
Islamic financial institutions were implemented. In 1984, Bandung Institute of Technology 
students found a Sharia microfinance called Baitut-Tamwil Teknosa. 445 
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In his book titled Nilai-Nilai Ekonomi Islam or the Principles of Islamic Economics 
published in 1984, AM Saefuddin mentions specifically Islamic insurance together with Zakat, 
Islamic Banking, and Waqf (social endowment) as instruments to implement the principles of 
Islamic economics.446 According to Saefuddin, there are three fundamental principles of Islamic 
economics: the optimum benefits of property ownership, moderation, and justice. Islam teaches 
that property should be utilized to bring benefits not only to individuals but also public at large. 
There is no concept of absolute ownership in Islam. Private and public property ownerships are 
acknowledged only when it is utilized to achieve that goal and remove any exploitation from one 
toward the others.  
Moreover, Islam also teaches Muslims to live in moderation, parsimony and avoid 
extravagance. Lastly, the principle of justice means that economy should bring benefit to all 
people and not particular individuals or groups within the society. Justice can be achieved both 
through a market and a non-market mechanism. Zakat and other forms of charity are used when 
individuals or groups cannot access economic benefit through market mechanism.  
Although Islam does not oppose the market mechanism and private sector, Islam 
regulates how business is conducted. The prohibition of usury is to ensure that there is no 
exploitation resulted from any business transaction. For this reason, Saefuddin advocates the 
establishment of Islamic Bank and Islamic insurance in Indonesia. Saefuddin argues that 
conventional banking and insurance ensure profit only to one party and leave another party with 
a higher risk of the business. Islamic insurance or Sharia insurance is based on mutual help so 
that people can share the burden and risk when one of them is facing economic difficulties. In 
sum, AM Saefuddin emphasizes the importance of economic activities to be grounded in religious 
values. The economy is not only a pursuit of profit, but it is also an activity toward ethical life. 
However, the 1980s was a difficult time for Muslim activists in Indonesia. Despite this 
development, the impact and scale of the Islamic economy project were still very minimal. The 
banking regulation (1967 Law on Banking) did not give any room for the establishment of any 
noninterest banking institution. The state was not supportive towards the idea of Islamic 
 




economy, which was considered subversive toward state’s development agenda. For that reason, 
it was not possible to implement the approaches of Islamic economics into a formal institution.447  
In the 1990s, Soeharto regime changed its policy toward Muslim group. This change was 
also an important period for the implementation of Islamic economics in Indonesia. The Bank 
Muamalat Indonesia established in1991 as the first Islamic bank in the country, and later, PT 
Syarikat Takaful Indonesia (PT STI) was established in 1994 as the first Islamic insurance company 
in Indonesia. The following paragraphs elaborate on the process of how these Islamic economics 
activists negotiate with the state and try to find space within the existing system. 
State as the regulator of Islamic insurance 
 Ever since taking office in 1967, President Soeharto committed to undertake the 
revitalization of Indonesia’s economy. Beyond his rhetoric of creating a just-and-equitably-
prosperous society in a material and spiritual sense based on Pancasila, Soeharto adopted the 
Western capitalist development model. the New Order recruited neo-classic economists mostly 
graduating from American universities, especially the University of California, Berkeley.448 
Minister of Finance, J.B. Sumarlin who was in office in 1988 until 1993, did not object the 
establishment of Islamic banks, because according to him, it did not contradict the Indonesian 
Constitution. The government started to accommodate the idea of Islamic economy. Choiruzzad 
documents this transformation in the government’s stand in more detail.  
Several organizations established Islamic banks in the form of baitul mal (financing house) 
had been set up such as the Co-operative for Professional Services (Kooperasi Jasa 
Keahlian) Teknosa Bandung in Bandung on 4 July 1984 and Koperasi Ridho Gusti in 
Jakarta. The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), especially with its Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB) greatly contributed to further development of Islamic banks in 
Indonesia. On June 1990, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ali Alatas, inaugurated the Jakarta 
OIC Economic Consultative Forum, to promote economic relations between Indonesian 
and other members of the OIC. On 19 March 1991 Minister of Home Affairs Rudini and 
Minister On 19 March 1991 Minister of Home Affairs Rudini and Minister of Religious 







Almsgiving Management Body (Badan Amil Zakat, Infaq, dan Shadaqah, BAZIS) which is a 
non-governmental organization, but worked under the government’s supervision. 449 
Moreover, the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) was given task preparing the 
establishment of an Islamic bank without interest, the Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI).  Soeharto 
promised an interest free loan from his Foundation of the Pancasila Muslim Action (Yayasan Amal 
Bhakti Muslim Pancasila) of the IRP 3 milliards. In addition, several Muslim big entrepreneurs, 
including Fadel Muhammad, Aburizal Bakrie, and Fahmi Idris, were interested in the creation of 
Islamic banks. The government’s support for the BMI suggests that Soeharto regime recognized 
the need to acknowledge the Muslim community in a more practical manner and to bring them 
into national, economic development.450 
Soeharto personally donated 50 million rupiah and 3 billion rupiah from the Foundation 
Amal Bakti Amal Pancasila which he led. In addition, there are 9 largest shareholders of the Bank 
Islam, all of which are individuals or offshore foundations, Bob Hasan (figure corporate) worth 25 
billion rupiah, GLC 4.5 billion, Krakatau Steel 3.5 billion, Hutomo Mandala Putra 3,3 billion, 
Pensiun Nusantara Foundation 3 billion, Pertamina 2 billion, Aburizal Bakrie 2 billion, Ibrahim 
Rasyid 2 billion and YDBKS 2 billion.451  
If in Malaysia, the largest accumulation of capital and bank owners is government 
institutions and state Islamic departments, in Indonesia Islamic bank ownership originated from 
private sector, social organizations and individuals known closely with Soeharto. This situation 
explains several things. First, Soeharto's approach uses those close to it as a stock owner the 
largest bank signals that Soeharto has more to act as individual rather than as a President. This 
means, though has the power to issue policies and regulations based on the constitution existing, 
but Soeharto does not use the state allocation for injection bank capital. Secondly, as it further 
emphasizes individual decisions, Soeharto wants to say that formally, the state is not involved in 
the Islamization process which is quite vibrant. In addition to the question that Soeharto needs 
to take care of not feeling Islam and avoid criticism of the existence of the bank, it can be seen 
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as Soeharto's consistent stance on Pancasila's ideology confirms Indonesia not as an Islamic and 
not a secular state.452 In the late 1980s, President Soeharto started to question the loyalty of top 
military leaders. Following the increasing distrust toward military, Suharto went closer to Muslim 
groups.  
However, the predatory environment of widespread corruption within Soeharto regime 
gave dilemma for the proponents of Islamic economics. On the one hand, they need support from 
the state, but on the other hand, they need to ensure that Islamic financial institutions were built 
independently and be consistent with the moral goals of Islamic economics.453   
Based on several experimentations and surveys, the Central Bank (BI) came into a view 
that rather than a threat to the conventional system, Islamic finance could play a supportive role 
to strengthen the existing national economic system. BI requested the participation of many 
Islamic economy activists in the process of developing the regulatory environment for Islamic 
banking in Indonesia. 454  
BI expected that this non-interest-based banking would be able to reach out a certain part 
of the population who see interest as usury and thus forbidden by the religion. More choices of 
financial services mean wider mobilization of public fund. 455 Islamic economics, according to BI, 
is not to replace the existing banking system, but instead to strengthen it. 
 Seeing BI’s positive response, some Islamic economy activists were becoming more and 
more moderate. Some started to think the possibility of the ʻcoexistenceʼ of Islamic economic 
within the existing system. On the other hand, many of BI officials were also becoming more 
supportive towards Islamic economy movement.456 
However, despite the convergence of interests, there was also continuing tensions, in 
which the state and Islamic economy movement negotiate the role of the state in the Islamic 
banking and finance. Choiruzzad describes this negotiation process, which led to a compromise 
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on the role of BI as representative of the state and DSN-MUI as the representative of the 
community withing the architecture of Indonesia’s Islamic economy. 
 During the legislation process of the 2008 Islamic Bank Law, BI wanted to establish Islamic 
banking committee (KPS) within the BI structure with significant power to regulate the 
Islamic banking industry. In the KPS, BI promised to fairly accommodate representatives 
from the business, Islamic religious scholars, and Islamic economists. This idea was not 
completely accepted by business actors due to their worries that BI will have stronger 
control to the industry and thus limiting its growth. MUI was also not really fond of the 
idea because it worried that the KPS will take over their role (for example: to issue fatwa 
regarding Islamic banking practices). Finally, the KPS was established under BI structure, 
but with an unclear role, more like an advisory board, and not as powerful as it was 
designed. The power to issue fatwa stayed in DSN-MUI (Dewan Syariah Nasional Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia, Indonesia Islamic Scholars Councilʼs National Council of Sharia). 
However, because MUI is not a state body, it has no legal power. Thus, as before, the 
fatwa only serves as an accepted agreement among the actors and only become a legal 
rule after BI issued a BI regulation (Peraturan Bank Indonesia) based on that fatwa.457  
Later, BI transferred the authority of managing financial services to the Financial Services 
Authority of Indonesia (OJK). At the end of 2011, as an effort to reform the financial sector, the 
government and the House of Representatives (DPR) agreed to establish OJK. Then, on November 
22, 2012, Law No. 21 concerning OJK was ratified. This so-called independent institution will 
function from December 31, 2012, which replaces the functions, duties and regulatory 
authorities that have been carried out by the Ministry of Finance through the Capital Market and 
Financial Institution Supervisory Agency (Bapepam-LK). Then at the end of 2013, the turn of 
functions, duties and authority for banking regulation and supervision by Bank Indonesia (BI) 
would also be transferred to OJK. 
A political accommodation in a multi-cultural society  
The moderation and stabilization effects provided by Indonesian state through its 
financial authorities has created a new challenge for the supporter of Islamic banking and 
insurance in Indonesia. Now, the Islamic financial services have been accepted as a private-based 






including the multinational insurance companies. Although the insurance law no 40/2014 gives 
permission for cooperatives to establish Islamic insurance, most of Islamic insurance providers 
are insurance companies. ICMI, MES, MUI, insurance companies, and Indonesian financial 
authorities are becoming the vital actors for Islamic insurance development and their dominance 
has raised criticism, including from the pioneer of Islamic economics themselves. The Muslim 
Brotherhood-inspired of political party of PKS clearly states in its platform that Islamic economy 
should be an integral part of Indonesia economic development. Indonesian state should take 
active role to expand market share and gradually transfer its dependence on international donors 
toward self-sufficient and international Sharia-based financing.  
Furthermore, Islamic banking and insurance as accommodating capitalism later become 
ideological barrier for many center-left politics (Muslim and non-Muslims) to support the 
establishment of these institutions. According to Dawam Rahardjo, as stated in the book Islamic 
Economic Architecture (2015), Islamic economics is currently still considered too focused on the 
discourse on finance and banking with sharia trademarks.458 The presence of Islamic finance or 
Islamic banks is indeed a symbol of Islamic economic revival. In the 21st century, perceptions of 
the rise of the Islamic economy are arguably rising significantly. This was triggered by great 
interest and curiosity in Western countries. 
However, there is a dilemma in the development of the Islamic finance industry. Among 
these are capital requirements, because most sources of capital come from foreign or non-
Muslim capital. In addition, Islamic banks and insurance also tend to adopt conventional banking 
and insurance techniques and loosen the basic principles of Sharia law. This is done because in 
order to be competitive, Islamic financial institutions must glance at large projects that are high 
in risk. 
For this reason, the Islamic economic system should ideally be developed with 
institutional economic epistemology. With epistemology, the concept of an Islamic economy that 
is operational is no longer limited to the financial sector. The Quran illustrates that the usury 
institution must be replaced with the zakat and tijarah institutions. While the Hadith or prophetic 
tradition also regulates the existence of waqf institutions that are directly related to the real 
 




economic sector. According to Dawam, zakat and waqf are actually instruments to solve poverty 
problems. Unfortunately, the practice of Islamic economics is still limited to the financial sector, 
so the essence of Islamic economics as an institutional economy has still not been achieved.459  
Other argue that Islamic economy should not be determined by a certain label. An 
important principle of a sound economic system is a system that does not contrary to moral 
values and does not impair the humanitarian value such as the existence of exploitation and 
injustice. It is a system that encourage competition in doing good deeds or fastabiqul khairat. 
According to this view, Islamic economy can be named anything as long as it is consistent with 
the moral values of the economy. 
 The modernist organization of Muhammadiyah has been slowly embraced this private-
based Islamic insurance. Before the establishment of the first Islamic insurance in Indonesia, on 
April 27, 1992, the Muhammadiyah sought cooperation with a conventional insurance company, 
PT Asuransi Jiwasraya. The cooperation was aimed to realize the program of economic 
development for Muslims, particularly the members of Muhammadiyah.460  
The Muhammadiyah considers conventional insurance is haram, however it can be 
accepted when it gives more benefit to individual and society.461 Therefore, according to 
Muhammadiyah social insurance provided by the state, such as Taspen, Askes, and insurance for 
social and religious reasons, such as insurance for hajj and education are not a violation against 
Islamic law.  
Historically, the Muhammadiyah prefers to manage the organization fund by itself. 
However, due to lack of expertise and resources in managing insurance business, recently the 
Muhammadiyah has made several agreements to work together with Islamic insurance company. 
For instance, Muhammadiyah of West Java (DPW Jabar) signed a memorandum of understanding 
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 Like the Muhammadiyah, the Muslim Traditionalists NU, which today claimed to have 
some 35 million members, had already carried out local economic activities since its 
establishment. The NU already discussed the permissibility of bank interest in the first forum in 
1927. The campaign of Islamic economics starting from early 1980s brought this topic to be a 
public issue. In 1982, forum in Bandar Lampung once again brought the issue of bank interest 
and even touched upon the issue of Islamic bank. Again, there was no single agreement. As in 
1927, there were three different views on the issue of interest: the view that interest is usury 
and thus it is prohibited (haram), the view that interest is not usury and thus it is allowed (halal), 
and the view that it is in doubt (shubhat) because of the existence of different views.462 However, 
there were also differences within the first camp. Within the first camp, which argued that 
interest is prohibited, there were differences between those who argued that interest is 
prohibited at all situation and those who argued that despite its haram status, interest is allowed 
due to the emergency until a bank which operates according to Islamic existed. Despite these 
differences, the idea of Islamic banking was generally considered positive among NU circles in 
1980s.  
 Abdurrahman Wahid, the grandson of the organization’s founder and the leader of this 
new generation of NU was very critical on the Islamic economics project, particularly when it is 
supported by the state. After he took the leadership of NU in 1984, his enmity toward modernist 
groups had put the organization against the establishment of Islamic banking and insurance. 
Wahid strongly criticized ICMI’s initiative on the establishment of Indonesia’s first Islamic 
bank. He said ICMI as willing to sacrifice the security of depositors’ fund just to comply with “an 
outdated tenet of Islamic scriptures.” He then described Islamic financial institutions as a’moral 
burden for Muslims”, arguing that “it is hard to imagine a financial vehicle more vulnerable to 
abuse”. Wahid saw the initiative, backed by ICMI, was part of the agenda of Political Islam. When 
Bank Muamalat Indonesia was finally established in 1991, he commented that it was “another 







The NU mostly suspicious with the motive of the Muslim Modernists, and not with the 
idea of prohibition of interest itself. Instead of supporting the Islamic economy project, the NU 
opened a People’s Credit Bank (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat, BPR) in 1990 by cooperating with the 
Summa Bank, a bank owned by a Catholic family, to establish some 2,000 BPRs. The Summa Bank 
would provide staff, financial share and training. It was hoped that the NU could contribute to 
economic growth especially in rural areas. Abdurrahman Wahid explained that there was nothing 
prohibited in the economic field to cooperate with people from other religions if they are capable 
and honest.464 
PDI-P shared the view of Abdurrahman Wahid of seeing Islamic finance and insurance as 
a mean for political Islam. However, as more Muslims and elite santri joined PDI-P, this party has 
become more responsive and less strict toward the aspiration of the Muslim population. 50% of 
PDI-P constituent are Muslim, and they are mostly the middle and poor of the Muslim population. 
According to PDI-P, Indonesia should develop its economic system according to Indonesian 
characteristic based on cooperation. PDI-P does not voice open opposition against the Islamic 
economy; however, it still sees the Islamic economy as a foreign product and gives benefit only 
to a small group of the society. PDI-P is very critical not on the religious aspect of the Islamic 
economy but how the idea is implemented according to the Constitution and other regulations. 
PDI-P promotes a middle ground between Islam and pluralistic Indonesia.465  
Furthermore, as the santri Modernists and Traditionalists are debating the legitimation of 
Islamic banking and insurance within Indonesia’s economy, PDI-P which mostly represents the 
abangan cultural stream and non-Muslim were advocating for a universal social security system 
for all Indonesian. Suharto’s downfall and the subsequent elections led to the euphoric embrace 
of the concept of citizens’ rights on the part of Indonesians who had heard about nothing other 
than their responsibilities for more than three decades.  
In 1999, in the first truly democratic elections in nearly 45 years, Indonesians favored the 
PDI-P party led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, which had campaigned on a platform of increased 
equity. The following year, the new parliament amended the 1945 constitution to include the 
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“right to receive medical services”. Two years later, a further constitutional amendment specified 
that the state was responsible for ensuring health service provision, as well as for developing a 
social security system for all citizens. The next clause, reminiscent of the declaration of 
independence, stated that the details would be worked out later. PDI-P leader Megawati, then 
Vice-President, set about working out the details. An unwieldy working group of over 60 people 
drafted a social security law that, in its first version, envisaged the fusion of all four state-owned 
insurance firms into a single entity, which would operate as a single payer, not-for-profit trust 
fund. Minutes of meetings and interview accounts show that this was hotly contested, not least 
by the existing insurance firms and those who benefited from the profits they generated. 
Besides being reluctant to lose their cash cows, directors of state firms were reportedly 
concerned that the restructuring would open their books to public scrutiny. Employers were 
afraid that the plan would raise costs, partly because they could no longer opt out of the state-
run scheme. They argued that the mandatory schemes violated human rights. Private sector 
employees and some labor unions also opposed the draft bill, because under the new structure, 
workers would have to contribute to premiums formerly covered entirely by employers. What’s 
more, they worried that premiums paid by workers and employers would be used to subsidize 
services for the poor and unwaged, leading to a cut in benefits for those in work. Advisors 
favoring private sector interests, including from the United States, objected to the fact that the 
state would have a virtual monopoly on provision of social insurance. 466 
The bill was reportedly revised 56 times before a draft was submitted to parliament in 
January 2004. In 2014, Indonesia embarked on an exciting and ambitious strategy to move 
towards universal health coverage through Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN), the country's 
single-payer national health insurance scheme. The Government of Indonesia spends significant 
resources to cover membership costs for the poor and near poor under JKN administered by BPJS, 
which stands for Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (Social Insurance Administration 
Organization). 
In conclusion, the development of Islamic insurance in Indonesia was influenced by the 
global Islamic revivalism of the 1980s, political repression by Soeharto regime, and economic 
 




deprivation experienced by many Indonesians. Compared to Malaysia’s experience, Indonesian 
Muslims have been emphasizing not only the un-Islamic practice of the conventional insurance 
in term of violation of Sharia ruling but also how this un-Islamic practice led to socio-economic 
problems of foreign domination, political disenfranchisement and economic deprivation of the 
Muslims. From the perspective of Soeharto economic policies, the idea of Islamic insurance and 
Islamic finance in general came from the ‘wrong side’ of Indonesia political spectrum. It came as 
a criticism toward the ruling regime of Soeharto, and only the change in the political attitude of 
Soeharto toward Islam and the political environment in the 1990s had made the idea of Islamic 
finance eventually took off.  
At the height of harsh authoritarian rule of the Soeharto era, Islamic political activism was 
often the focus of the most intense of state repression. Because the Indonesian Communist Party 
had been destroyed in the 1960s, only Islamic organizations possessed the potential to mobilize 
substantial grassroots support. Thus, they were considered a threat to the centralized and rigid 
authoritarianism of Soeharto’s New Order regime. However, as Soeharto experimenting 
totalitarianism by controlling Islamic affairs, the Islamist had become closer to Soeharto and 
endorse Islamization, including Islamic insurance from inside the system. Moreover, alongside 
the rapid expansion of the economic liberalization under Soeharto, the society witnessed the 
emergence of Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) involved in the penetration of Islamic 
economic concept and practices in the public sphere. 
However, this unique quality of the movement had never reached significant progress 
until complemented by the unexpected reorganization of the environmental setting of the 
political economy of the nation in the 1990s. Soeharto became more accommodative toward 
Islamic movement, particularly on the idea of Islamic or Sharia economics. As a result, Islamic 
financial institutions had started to gain legitimacy and support to co-exist with the conventional 
institutions and practices. These institutions take a role in capital and resource distribution, 
particularly in the poor rural and urban areas.467  
This political accommodation continues after the New Order regime of Soeharto 






Islamic financial institutions. Islamic insurance has become a legitimate scheme to fill the gap left 
out by the government’s social insurance and conventional insurance schemes.  
The introduction of Islamic banking and insurance within the public domain of the 
national economy has created another problem. Choiruzzad identifies continuing tensions could, 
in which the state and Islamic economy movement negotiate the role of the state in the Islamic 
banking and finance.468 
Indonesian state has taken the role as regulator of Islamic banking and insurance. The 
state limits itself from any direct involvement in funding or even acts as incubator like Malaysia. 
The slow development of Islamic insurance in Indonesia can be attributed to this choice. Also, 
Indonesia has not been a good regulator either. Many experts argue that the rampant condition 
of corruption during the New Order and the post-Soeharto era has dampened the development 
of Indonesia’s economy in general. 
Furthermore, the democratization of Indonesia’s socio-politico and socio-economic arena 
in the post-Soeharto era has imposed a change to the environmental setting of the Islamic 
economy. Instead of creating a regime-supportive setting like Sudan, Kuwait, and Malaysia, 
democratization in Indonesia generates a free contested market with extended and market-
based development likewise the case of Jordan and Turkey.469 Now, Islamic insurance companies 
must compete not only with conventional insurance companies whose service has become more 
available, but also with the provincial and state-funded social insurance schemes. There is less 
incentive for Indonesian Muslims to choose private-based Islamic insurance over other schemes. 
As a result, with the largest Muslim population in the world, the development of Islamic insurance 
in Indonesia seems to be running in the place.470 
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The absence of direct government involvement and the lack of political support for Islamic 
insurance and Islamic financial institutions, in general, are the causes behind this slow 
development. Indonesian State does not fully support Islamic insurance like Malaysia because it 
sees and treats it as a ‘political identity’ of a particular social group within a pluralistic Indonesia 
that needs to be accommodated and compensated, rather than a vital tool for national economic 
development. 
 The deepening of Islamization within the contemporary Indonesian society makes the 
state not to ignore or even reject Islamic financial institutions. At the same time, any attempt to 
push the state beyond its current role as a regulator of Islamic insurance will create resistance 
not only from the non-Muslim population, but also from the Muslims of different cultural 
streams.  
Islamic banking and insurance have been accepted by the political communities in 
Indonesia. Islam has penetrated the dominant nationalist, secular and Pancasila based political 
parties and has made them stronger in their contest against Islamic parties, which are no longer 
the lone channel for Islamic aspirations. Tanuwidjaja argues that the fact that almost all parties 
have accommodated religious aspirations and shied away from criticizing controversial religious 
issues shows the strength of religious influence in the contemporary Indonesian politics.471  
However, it does not mean that there is a single agenda of ‘Islamic economy’ agreed 
across the board. For the modernists, the current practice of Islamic economy finance is primarily 
a vehicle through which to call attention to a unique Muslim identity. The pioneers of Islamic 
economy in Indonesia appeared to identify strongly with the idea that Islamic finance offers more 
equitable means of distributing wealth than conventional finance. While for many, ‘Islamic 
economy’ should not be interpreted exclusively with a particular label. Moreover, they have 
criticized continuously the current implementation of Islamic banking and insurance which 
according to them, Islamic banking and insurance only provide an improvement to the 
exploitative system of capitalism, instead of altering it. 472 
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Civil Islam and the critical attitude towards Islamic insurance  
This section discusses the ‘social life of Islamic insurance’ meaning how Islamic insurance 
as a commodity is accommodated as a social practice within Indonesian society. It elaborates the 
redefinitions of Islamic economic beliefs and meanings that have shaped Indonesian 
understanding of entrepreneurship and human agency. The NEP and economic development in 
Malaysia created a new Malay entrepreneur class that is very receptive toward the private-based 
institution of Islamic economy. Moreover, the processes produce and emplace Islamic norms, 
ethics, hierarchies, practices, and gendered identities enacted in corporate life.473 There have 
been different processes happened in Indonesia that lead to a different trajectory of Islamic 
insurance development in Indonesia. 
The amalgamation of rich precedents of a communal economy, economic exclusion and 
foreign domination, and state repression by the New Order regime generate Islamic reform 
movement that emphasizes civil institutions and the communal economic ethics. Rather than 
creating vibrant Muslim entrepreneurs but with conservative mindset like in Malaysia, the Civil 
Islam of Indonesia, as Robert Hefner define it, repudiated the goal of the Islamic state, mobilized 
religiously ecumenical support, promoted women's rights, championed democratic ideals, and 
advocate an indigenous and egalitarian economy. As a result, the current practice of private-
based Islamic insurance does not receive wide support among Indonesian Muslims.474 
This section consists of two parts. The first part provides empirical finding on how Islamic 
insurance is presented by companies, agents, and religious organizations and how people 
respond to it. The second part contains discussion on the emergence of Civil Islam identity under 
the New Order regime and explains how this identity strengthens and reshapes the existing 
communal economic ethics within Indonesian society. The ethics determine how Indonesians, 
particularly the Muslims, perceive risk, economic insecurity, and how Islamic insurance can or 
cannot be the tool for solving those challenges.  
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Islamic insurance Vis a Vis ‘serve without self-interest’ 
The following section elaborates in detail how Islamic insurance is presented within 
Indonesian society and how they respond to it. Islamic insurance transcends Muslim 
understanding of risk and provides the non-usurious way to respond to it. However, as 
Indonesian Muslims become more pious and accept the prohibition of ‘interest’ practiced by the 
conventional insurance companies, they still have an objection with the ‘self-interest’ motive of 
Islamic insurance companies. It is hard to accept by majority Indonesian Muslims that a mutual 
help of bearing each other burden is managed through a private scheme. I argue that this is the 
main ‘social factor’ of the slow development of Islamic insurance in Indonesia.  
As Indonesians become wealthier due to economic modernization and more pious due to 
the deepen Islamization process within Indonesian society, the traditional ideals of surrender, 
acceptance, and gratitude toward tragedies are indeed being evaluated. The idea of making 
financial preparation for an unforeseen event such as illness, natural disasters, loss of job, and 
an increase in tuition fee is not strange anymore. However, the way to respond it does not 
necessarily through the implementation of Islamic insurance. Adeney-Risakotta states that 
Indonesian have resources for facing risk in four different kinds of knowledge: mimetic, mythic, 
ethical, and theoretic. Islamic insurance represents the ethical and theoretic knowledge that 
provide introspection and moral responsibility, and rational understanding of risk.475 However, 
this ethical and theoretic knowledge is still considered insufficient for many Indonesians. With 
this consideration, Islamic insurance in Indonesia is presented to the public with an emphasis on 
two aspects: religious validation and social features.  
Many scholars indicate the Javanese ideals such as surrender to God will (pasrah), 
acceptance (nrimo), and gratitude are the reasons behind the lack of an insurance system within 
Indonesian society.476 Islamic insurance is offered with a new theological narrative that 
 
475 Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, "Is There a Meaning in Natural Disasters? Constructions of Culture, Religion and 
Science," Exchange 38, no. 3 (2009 2009), http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157254309X449719. 
476 Cultural Psychology of Coping with Disasters: The Case of an Earthquake in ... 
edited by Manfred Zaumseil, Silke Schwarz, Mechthild von Vacano, Gavin Brent Sullivan, Johana E. Prawitasari-
Hadiyono. Safrina Thristiawati, Heath er Booth, Terence Hull, Iwu Dwisetyani Utomo. (2015) Self-rated Health of 




transcends people understanding of disaster, financial loss, and tragedy in general together with 
a practical solution to it.  
 The religious understanding of tragedies is a test from God, and it happens due to 
traditional disharmony in the society. Tragedies is something that we cannot control. It is in God’s 
hand. The Modernist view transcend this by saying that there is a cause and effect for everything. 
Moreover, even if we cannot totally control what happens in the future, we can prepare for it. 
Indonesia as the land of seventeen thousand islands and volcanoes is well acquainted with 
tragedy. Through insurance tragedy is translated as a risk that can be mitigated and 
compensated. Islamic insurance goes further to convince Indonesian Muslims by stating that the 
Muslim can be risk-aware, more prepared but still God-minded. Islamic insurance ensures that 
risk is managed according to the laws revealed by God himself. 
 The discussion of lawful and unlawful is often to be too complicated for any lay Muslim 
to understand. Therefore, the way Islamic insurance is presented by the agent is that Islamic 
insurance is Islamic because the service necessitates the existence of Sharia board within the 
company. This Sharia board are a group of trustworthy Islamic scholars who monitor and ensure 
the service is following Islamic law.  
 Although Malaysia has a similar practice, the emphasis on religious scholars or institution 
rather than state support makes Islamic insurance in Indonesia is unique. The absence of trust 
towards the private company and direct support from the state make Islamic insurance 
companies rely on the religious institution or Muslim religious leaders. Riaz Hassan and Taghi 
Azadarmaki argue that in a differentiated social formation society in which religion and state 
occupy different space like Indonesia, people’s trust toward religious institution tends to be 
higher than in un-differentiated social formation society.477 The trust of Kyai or Islamic clerics in 
Indonesia is much higher compared to other Muslim countries. 
 Although this strategy has contributed to the growth of Islamic insurance in Indonesia 
recently, it is still considerably low. One reason is, as discussed previously, the increase in piety 
among Muslims in Indonesia does not necessarily mean support for a single expression of Islam. 
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Majority Muslims in Indonesia put the moral principles or Islam, such as justice and solidarity 
above a specific injunction found in the religious texts. The other reason is the impersonality of 
Islamic insurance as a formal institution. Islamic insurance claims to be a scheme that enables 
mutual help among the Muslims, unlike the for-profit conventional insurance. However, people 
tend to be willing to help and be charitable when they know the face of the person they want to 
help. This condition is particularly important for the constant repeated interaction and not one-
off charity act.  
Although many Muslim societies become more modern, they still withhold their 
communitarian way of socio-economic interaction. For instance, people in many Arab countries 
developed an informal model of interest-free financial arrangement. This arrangement between 
a homogenous group of people based on the principle of Mutual Qard Hasan (counter no interest 
loan), is well known as Jamey'ah (literally, Society). Each member pays an equal particular 
amount of money each month and the collected sum of money from the group is given each 
month to one of them.478 In Kenya, almost 72 percent of the population participating in Saving 
and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOs) and have mobilized over Ksh.150 billion (USD 2.14 
billion) in savings i.e. more than 30 percent of the National Domestic savings.479 This type of 
informal arrangement is very popular especially with an estimated 72 percent of people living in 
Muslim-majority countries do not use formal financial services.480  
 In Indonesia, it is manifested in the tradition of Arisan or known as 'julu julu' or 'jula jula' 
in Sumatra. It is a form of informal rotating savings and credit association. Generally, this form of 
no-interest microfinance takes place during a social gathering at a fixed interval at each 
member’s home. This practice is still sustained nowadays representing a financial alternative to 
bank loans or other formal channels.481  
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Beyond finance, the peasants in these traditional villages help others mutually in various 
activities from spontaneous help for mourning neighbors, collective maintenance of ancestral 
grave, agricultural activities, religious ceremonies, to building public facilities. Usually, they work 
together voluntarily since the beginning to the end of the activity without expecting material 
rewards for their work. This mutual aid is conducted based on different kind of reasons.  Some 
societies implement this practice based on the principle of reciprocity. One will help someone 
else as long as he hopes he will get similar help from that person. Especially for major agricultural 
tasks in rice agriculture such as hoeing, plowing, planting, and harvesting, people will help others 
in order to get enough labor support when they need it.  
These people also set up a rice barn collectively as a common food supply system. In rice-
planting season, members of the group can use the rice or other staple foods (sagu, cassava, 
corn) for their need and repay it with equal amount when they harvest. Furthermore, this 
collective rice barn has two main functions; firstly, as emergency reserve during a famine and 
secondly as economic stability when there is oversupply and price of food goes down. Even for 
subsistence community such as Baduy, they do not sell their rice in the market but keep it in the 
rice barn called Leuit to provide community’s daily need. Nevertheless, this mutual assistance in 
subsistence communities important not only in term of the economy (commodity stability) but 
also as part cultural identity.482 
In this modern time, Indonesians try to implement this traditional way of mutual help in 
other matters too. Arisan for buying a car is one of the instances. Many of Indonesians are not 
wealthy enough to buy a car in cash. At the same time, they do not want to involve in a credit 
scheme because of the prohibition of usury. Therefore, they set up an informal saving group to 
help its member buying a car. This illustration shows that although Islamic insurance companies 
are successful in gaining trust from the public related to Sharia-compliant issues, Islamic 
insurance in Indonesia has not been successful in presenting the value of cooperation or risk 
sharing. In addition, one research in Medan, Sumatera island of Indonesia shows profit sharing 
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variable influences negatively and insignificantly on the local people’s interest in Islamic 
insurance.483 
The other strategy to boost public acceptance toward Islamic insurance, many Islamic 
insurance companies link their product with investment for social features. PT Sun Life Financial 
Indonesia promotes the waqf insurance benefits feature to attract customers. The feature that 
has been launched since August 2017. This service combines the concept of waqf (social 
endowment) and Islamic insurance that enables Muslims, in particular, to save continuously and 
at the same time assure their ability to establish an endowment. Customers who participate in 
such a plan will contribute to it regularly and, at the end of the policy, will bequest all benefit 
from it to appointed beneficiaries as a waqf endowment. The company works with Islamic NGOs 
to act as the trustee who allocates the funds collected to orphanages, religious schools, mosques, 
and other appointed beneficiaries. Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Berhad introduced a similar product 
in 2002. However, after 7 years of operation, the plan was canceled on 9 February 2009.484  
The other social feature is micro Islamic insurance or known as microtakaful. Microtakaful 
is usually delivered by an Islamic insurance company in collaboration with domestic NGOs, which 
support Islamic microfinance institutions who offer microcredits and savings products. The NGO 
acts as an intermediary between the insurance company and the microfinance institutions which 
sell the credit-life microtakaful product together with their loans. 
Takmin Working Group is a group of initiators who commit developing Islamic micro-
insurance in Indonesia. Its members consist of experts in Islamic insurance, micro finance and 
accounting. Takmin Working Group (TWG) at first worked with PT. Syarikat Takaful Indonesia in 
developing and marketing the products. This approach, in the world's Microinsurance practice is 
known as the institutional approach or "Partner Agent Model". The Islamic micro-insurance 
serves the low-income clients and is utilized to help needy children or orphans to school, to cure 
the sick, to celebrate a family wedding, and to settle funeral of the death, etc. 
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A robust civic tradition with distrust towards capitalism 
This section discusses how the political repression and economic exclusion by the New 
Order regime toward Indonesian Muslims unwittingly generated popular Islam with a robust civic 
tradition, but a weak political and entrepreneurial institution. Although the recent 
democratization and economic liberalization have opened political space and increased people’s 
welfare, there is still a high level of distrust towards state and market. This condition provides a 
path dependence that influences the development of Islamic insurance, which is presented as 
non-usurious but private-based insurance.  
The development of the private sector in Indonesia, in general, came in fits and starts. 
The reason was that there was a long-standing distrust of private capital in Indonesia, particularly 
among the Muslim community.485 Muslim population was considered as an important part of the 
country economic development and mobilizing them for achieving development goals through 
religious idioms had been vital for its success. President Soeharto, in his speeches, repeatedly 
regarded Islam and development as being inextricably interwoven. Soeharto argued these values 
should become the driving force and spirit of national development. Religion and development 
must equally support each other.486 
 Furthermore, Soeharto emphasized the critical role of the Islamic clerics (ulama) in 
revitalizing Islamic values as a positive spiritual and social force in national development. 
Soeharto urged the Islamic leaders to encourage the Muslim community to participate in the 
development and insisted that development is a religious duty. For this very reason, the 
government established the Council for Islamic Clerics (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) in 1975, 
in order to become a mediator between the government and the Muslim community as large.487  
However, Soeharto’s appeal to the Muslim population was an empty gesture. Not 
because, the lack of support from the Muslims, but because the priority of the New Order regime 
 







was creating conglomeration within Indonesia economy and not helping the small and medium 
enterprises. Soeharto’s rhetoric is merely a way to legitimize his economic agenda.488  
In the late 1980s, discontent rose about the perceived widening gap between the 
privileged rich and the large group of poor people, specifically between the visibly wealthy ethnic 
Chinese business tycoons and the pribumi majority. The leading conglomerates, many of them 
ethnic Chinese tycoons had overgrown during the New Order. Their rapid growth was possible 
because of the patronage of the dominant political elite, particularly President Soeharto. Under 
this patronage, the conglomerates enjoyed preferential treatment, including substantial 
subsidized credits from the state banks, protection, and monopoly positions, and assured 
government procurement.489 
 Furthermore, the New Order government began to be criticized for not involving the 
native entrepreneurs (pribumi) in the development process and for allowing the special privilege 
to the Chinese minority. Muslim entrepreneurs were encouraged to study economics and 
business in the West so that they could compete with the Chinese in business. Criticism was 
leveled against the Government’s marginalization of small-scale and middle-scale businesses in 
which many Muslims were involved. Soeharto’s economic policies relied on the rapid growth of 
large private conglomerates which emerged and thrived under the patronage of Soeharto’s ‘New 
Order’ regime. The too much emphasis on economic growth, rather than justice and dependence 
upon foreign aid rather than economic independence also became the target of critics. The 
criticisms came mostly from non-governmental organizations (NGO) with the support from 
international NGOs. Unlike in Malaysia under Mahathir Mohammad, the socio-political 
circumstances of the New Order had circumcised the development of Muslim entrepreneur class 
in Indonesia.   
However, the absence of market economies among Indonesian Muslims and political 
democracy under the New Order did not obliterate the creation of civil institutions and public 
civility in Indonesia. On the contrary, the combination of economic exclusion and political 







proselytizing Islam to the society, establishing educational facilities, and setting up diverse NGOs 
and cooperatives which ironically mostly, if not all, owned by members of the economically weak 
groups.490 
This emphasis on civil society rather than market or statist route is not new for Indonesian 
Muslims. Muslim Indonesia has historical precedence of creating public civility through the extra-
state Muslim associations in late colonial Indonesia. Comparative research on politics and 
democratization in the 1980s and 1990s show that there are other ingredients besides market 
forces and democratic state that can make democracy work. Those two ingredients are ‘social 
capital’ and ‘civil society’. Social capital consists of accumulative cultural endowments that 
facilitate the performance of specific social task. The common usage of civil society refers to the 
clubs, religious organizations, business groups, labor unions, human rights groups, and other 
associations located between the household and the state and organized on the basis of 
voluntarism and mutuality. According to Hefner, the practice of pesantren or traditional Islamic 
boarding school has civil precedence that provides a path of dependence for Indonesian Muslim 
society.491  
Pesantren was a result of the destruction of imperial Islam and the loss of native rulers’ 
authority during Colonialism. By doing that, the Dutch unwittingly reinvigorated popular Islam. 
The Dutch control of the state-led Muslim leaders in Indonesia to develop a cautious and critical 
attitude toward government and force them to rely on their own resources to build their 
institutions. Their situation contrasts with the experience of Muslims in much of the Middle East 
or even nearby Malaya (Malaysia). In Malaya, particularly in the native states subject to an 
indirect rule (where sultans retained a significant measure of authority), the British encouraged 
cooperation between state authorities and Muslim leaders. In Indonesia, little collaboration 
existed between colonial rulers and Muslims. In modern Indonesia, Pesantren has provided the 
leadership, organizational precedence for the birth of Civil Islam in Indonesia. 
Pesantren also has a strong affinity with Sufism. In his study on the role of the Sufi 







Sufi brotherhoods were at the forefront of a proto-globalization based on hemisphere-
wide networking between metropolitan regions, rural provinces, and nomadic 
formations. Furthermore, cities became nodes within wider circulations, rather than, as 
in European and Weberian models, centers of corporate powers. The emerging patterns 
of civility were open-ended, balancing inner cultivation, communicative skills, and 
outward etiquette.492 
Altogether, Hefner argues that Indonesia, in part due to deep pluralist traditions that 
predate colonial intervention and in part due to the role of civic associations in its recent 
democratic transformation, is a paradigmatic example of an 'emergent tradition' of civil Islam. 
According to Hefner, civil Islam is characterized by 'denying the wisdom of a monolithic "Islamic" 
state and instead affirming democracy, voluntarism, and a balance of countervailing powers in a 
state and society. According to Hefner, civil Islam of Indonesia confirms the commensurability of 
contemporary Islam and civil democratic traditions.493 However, the case of Indonesia also shows 
the civil Islam of Indonesia has distrust towards the norms of modern capitalism.  
 A study compares several countries to understand what people really think about 
capitalism. The surveys conducted in early September 2015 by asking ten questions of population 
in ten nations Britain, the United States of America and Germany (from the developed world) 
and Brazil, India, Indonesia and Thailand from the faster growing, emerging world.494 
The results show a high level of distrust towards capitalism among Indonesians. Only 3% 
of the respondents see the commensurability of business and the well-being of society. Almost 
half of the Indonesian respondents vie negatively toward the business practice of the 
company.495 On the other hand, there is a high percentage of Indonesians who put the strong 
community and family life as important to well-being as a strong economy. In addition, while 
more people in all seven nations believe that the free enterprise system is better at lifting people 
out of poverty than government, in Indonesia only 8% confirms this belief.496 
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These surveys provide us with the social circumstances in which Islamic insurance has 
been introduced and developed in Indonesia. The initial development of Islamic insurance and 
Islamic economy in Indonesia came from this path. It did not come from a new middle class who 
began to embrace liberalism’s privatization, or introduced by conservative Islam’s bully state 
from above, but come as a critical voice against the market excess and political repression. Islamic 
insurance was a cultural expression of the identity of Indonesian Muslims. However, as the state 
had started to regulate it in the 1990s and market had become dominant in the process and 
uprooted from the civil society, Islamic insurance has lost its appeal for many Indonesian 
Muslims.  
Also, the emphasis of Islamic insurance in the Sharia-compliant and not on the overall 
benefit of the products has only convinced the small number of Indonesian populations. As 
mentioned previously, with 91% of its population identify as Muslims, only 22% of the overall 
population (including the non-Muslims) perceive the laws in the country should strictly following 
the teaching of the Quran. In comparison, with 64% Muslim, there is 52% of the Malaysia 
population who has that view. The survey does not especially address Islamic insurance, and 
many of the proponents of Islamic insurance does not support the implementation of Sharia as 
a national law.497 However, their argument is different from Civil Islam, which the supporters of 
Islamic economy mostly see religion as an individual matter. However, this survey still says 
something how the practice of Sharia-based institutions and products in society. 
However, it does not mean that Islamic insurance is rejected by all Indonesian population. 
Rudnyckyj identifies a similar group as the New Malay entrepreneurs of Malaysia within many 
corporate settings.498 Movements for spiritual reform active in state-owned enterprises, private 
corporations, and government bureaucracies in contemporary Indonesia represent a different 
phenomenon that Rudnyckyj describes as Market Islam. These groups are not necessarily 
interested in achieving broad social transformation through party politics or direct advocacy. 
They are not concerned with questions of human rights, social justice, or political liberalism: 
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those who represent Islam as holding the key to economic success are, in general, not outspoken 
advocates for democracy.  
Further, market Islam involves designing a form of Muslim practice commensurate with 
the goals of eliminating corruption, promoting privatization, and enhancing productivity in an 
increasingly global market. These groups are dominance within Malaysian society, but in 
Indonesia, they are a relatively small number. Market Islam is the group that is most likely to 
support the implementation of Islamic insurance in Indonesia. 
Pepinsky further elaborates the characters of so-called Market Islam in Indonesia who is 
more likely to support Islamic financial institutions. He examines the socioeconomic origins of 
consumer demand for Islamic where expressed piety is on the rise. He discovers that piety is far 
less important as a factor in shaping individuals’ use of Islamic financial products than commonly 
believed. The results show that the most pious Indonesian Muslims are just as likely to report 
using banking products as their less pious counterparts. However, Indonesian Muslims who have 
a high level of income and strong ties with other Muslim countries tend to use Islamic financial 
product. In other words, modernization and globalization play decisive roles in shaping individual 
use of Islamic financial products. Pepinsky argues:  
Islamic finance is a uniquely powerful symbol of identity politics in the Muslim world 
precisely because it is so nearly indistinguishable from conventional finance. The choice 
of Islamic financial products—at least in plural banking systems such as those found in 
Indonesia—is, therefore, a window into the ways in which social and economic changes 
are filtered through religion.499  
Conclusion: distributional politics and critical Muslims in Indonesia 
The first Islamic insurance of Indonesia was founded in 1994, or ten years after the 
establishment of Islamic insurance of Malaysia. This fact has been causing another delay for 
expansion and consolidation of Islamic insurance in Indonesia. This delay was not without reason: 
at a time when the Soeharto regime was consolidating the liberal economy through a centralistic 
approach, such an idea integrating an experiment into a national plan was not a popular path in 
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developmental planning. Moreover, a negative stigma to the initiative that carries Islamic agenda 
as a result of unpopular political Islam in the past is worsening any attempt to bring this case 
legitimate. Hence, when it first came into the ground as a micro-level experiment, it is out of the 
initiative of a small group of Islamic economic enthusiast influenced by the global spread that 
was aware with the limited opportunity available for pushing for a bigger agenda of a meso-level 
institution. Therefore, this early stage development was uniquely bottom-up pushed within a 
possible opportunity and rather an unconducive environment of the early New Order regime. 
The changing environment of the New Order in the 1990s and afterward has provided a 
favorable circumstance for Islamic interest to advance their politics as in social and cultural 
affairs, but it must be emphasized that this does not mean the advance of a single, coherent 
ideology called ‘Islam’. In Malaysia, the cooptation of ABIM by Mahathir Mohamad created a 
supportive condition for the Islamic modernist agenda including the development of private-
based Islamic insurance. The state-led Islamization in Malaysia ensured that the development of 
Islamic insurance is compatible with the economic liberalization agenda and the ethnic politics 
of Malaysia. On the contrary, in Indonesia this agenda is only supported by the Modernist group 
of Indonesian Muslims. 
The practice of Islamic insurance and Islamic economy was not agreed by all Indonesian 
Muslims. Although there has been less opposition since its establishment in the 1990s, the 
majority of Muslims in Indonesia see it as just one among many alternatives of the 
implementation of the doctrine of the Islamic economy. The modernists mostly promoted it as 
an expression of revivalism of Islamic identity, which encompasses not only in ritual but also in 
all aspects of human lives. However, the traditionalists reject the strict interpretation and stiff 
political position of the Modernists. The Traditionalists can be very strict on ritual rulings of the 
religion, but they are often to be more flexible in their socio-political position. In the issue of 
Islamic economy, the Traditionalists tend to emphasize on public benefit and avoid any radical 
confrontation with state authority compared to the strict adherence on particular interpretation 
on Islamic economic doctrine of the Modernists. Therefore, the Traditionalists are more 
susceptible to the state-sponsored social insurance of JKN-BPJS than private-based of Islamic 




Islamic and Indonesian socio-economic values than the practice of contemporary Islamic 
insurance. The forum bahtsul masail pre-33th NU Congress held by PBNU at the Krapyak 
Yogyakarta boarding school on March 28, 2015, agreed to support the national health insurance 
program (JKN) which was handled by BPJS Kesehatan. They concluded that the JKN concept 
handled by BPJS Kesehatan was not problematic according to Islamic sharia. The forum which 
was attended by Muslim clerics from various regions in Indonesia determined that the BPJS was 
in accordance with Islamic law. They looked at the contract used by BPJS Kesehatan as ta'awun 
contract. When asked the question whether it contained usury, they answered that the BPJS 
contract did not contain usury.500 
Furthermore, the emphasis on social benefit has been the primary goal of Islamic 
economy for many activist-minded of the pioneer of Islamic economy in Indonesia. As the 
political environment changed in the 1990s, more actors became more involved in the 
development of Islamic insurance. Conventional economists, bankers, actuaries and also 
lawmakers have become the primary actors of the recent development of Islamic insurance. 
Many pioneers feel that the idea of Islamic economy has been ‘hijacked’ by private sectors who 
emphasis more on finance. According to the pioneers such as Dawam Raharjo, moral concerns 
such as addressing poverty, inequality, and economic injustice, must be the main parameter of 
the success of any Islamic financial institutions. At this moment, he argues that many of these 
institutions merely focus on the increase in business indicators.501 
Therefore, many Muslims in Indonesia are reluctant to support the Islamic economy and 
buy Islamic insurance premium. For many Indonesian Muslims Islamic model should be an 
alternative for capitalism and foreign domination and inculcated the spirit of self-help, solidarity, 
and cooperation. Recently, some Islamic insurance companies have been developing insurance-
linked products, which combine financial protection with socio-religious investment. Other 
companies work with Islamic NGOs to deliver micro-takaful or micro Islamic insurance to the 
poor. However, it is very early to evaluate their impact on overall Islamic insurance development.   
 






The abangan or the nominal Muslims and the Non-Muslims see the current practice of 
Islamic insurance is quite exclusive. PDIP had been the strong opposition of Sharia-inspired 
regulations in the post-Soeharto era. Islamic finance had been seen as a symbol for Sharia 
encroachment to the multi-cultural and multi-religious Indonesia. As the Islamization of 
Indonesia become deeper recently and many santri, both Traditionalist and Modernist, have 
joined and become the constituents of PDIP there is less opposition from this party toward 
Islamic economy. PDIP has never opposed the idea of Islamic economy because it has become an 
acceptable practice in the society, but PDIP has been very critical in the implementation 
procedure of Islamic economy, particularly in the direct involvement of the state.  According to 
PDIP, the Indonesian state should be neutral on this issue. The ideal Indonesian state should act 
only as a regulator of the Islamic economy, and not an incubator or supporter like the Islamist 
State of Malaysia. Moreover, any implementation of Sharia-based regulation must be in 
accordance with the national laws.   
The lack of support of the state differentiates Indonesia’s Islamic insurance with 
Malaysia’s. The success of any Islamization agenda owes much to the involvement of the state. 
However, the problem for Indonesia lies in the ambiguity of the role of religion within a secular 
state. Especially Islam historically was considered to be a threat for the national and secular 
identity of Indonesia. Therefore, mobilizing support for Islamic finance or Islamic insurance had 
never been in the mind of the Indonesian government. Indonesia government allow the 
development of Islamic insurance to co-opt Muslims political aspiration but never fully support 
it in order to become the dominant part of the Indonesia economy.  
Furthermore, the current government of Indonesia has been focusing more on building 
universal insurance coverage for its people.  In order to do that, Indonesia needs to create a 
bigger risk pool. Indonesian citizen is under obligation to subscribe to the JKN, the national social 
security system. The wealthier population can add with private insurance if they need more 
coverage in their plan. In the context of contemporary Indonesia, private insurance is no 
substitute for the social insurance, but it is a complementary. Without this obligation, it can have 
detrimental effects on the risk pool. The government does not forbid Islamic insurance, but it 




In sum, there is no full support from all political spectrums over Islamic insurance 
development in Indonesia. There are favorable circumstances for Islamic interest to advance 
their politics as in social and cultural affairs. However, it does not mean the advance of a single, 
coherent ideology called ‘Islam’, including ‘Islamic economy’. There is only accommodation for 
the current practice of Islamic insurance within a wide variety of interpretations of Islamic 
doctrine and practices of social protection. In particular, the current manifestation of Islamic 
insurance has not enough support from the Muslim traditionalists.  
Accordingly, the central question at the heart of the debate over Islamic finance in 
multicultural Indonesia, given that Islamic finance is nearly indistinguishable from conventional 
banking, is not one over the substance of the financial services provided by Islamic institutions 
rather. The question is about the extent to which the growth of an Islamic financial system in 
Indonesia is either costly or beneficial to Indonesians, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. In other 
words, the debate over Islamic finance is neither theological nor technical, it is distributional and 
political. The question is on how the Indonesian state should accommodate the demands of its 
citizens for financial products deemed to comply with Islamic principles.  
In addition, Indonesia has failed to develop a fully-fledged regulatory state. Unlike 
Malaysia, the capacity of the Indonesian state to supervise and regulate the economy in 
accordance with market principle remains weak with a widespread corruption practice. This 
condition gives impact not only the development of Islamic insurance, but also the overall 
economic development.502 
The social reason for the slow development of private-based Islamic insurance is the long-
standing distrust of private capital in Indonesia. The amalgamation of rich precedents of the 
communal economy, economic exclusion, and foreign domination, and state repression by the 
New Order regime generate Islamic reform movement that emphasizes civil institutions and 
communal economic ethics. Rather than creating vibrant Muslim entrepreneurs but with 
conservative mindset like in Malaysia, the Civil Islam of Indonesia, as Robert Hefner define it, 
repudiated the goal of the Islamic state, mobilized religiously ecumenical support, promoted 
 




women's rights, championed democratic ideals, and advocate an indigenous and egalitarian 
economy.  
The initial development of Islamic insurance and Islamic economy in Indonesia came from 
this path. It did not come from a new middle class who began to embrace liberalism’s 
privatization or introduced by conservative Islam’s bully state from above but come as a critical 
voice against the market excess and political repression. Islamic insurance was a cultural 
expression of the identity of Indonesian Muslims. However, as the state had started to regulate 
it in the 1990s and market had become dominant in the process and uprooted from the civil 








Pakistan is an ideological country. This country got independence from the British 
intending to provide a homeland for Muslims where they could live according to their religion. 
However, the goal had never been fulfilled as no government after independence paid serious 
attention to the Islamization of Pakistan. Although the constitution states Islam as the state 
religion, Pakistan retained the most law that inherited from the British and maintained the 
secularist traditions within the government. The concerted program of Islamization only started 
to take shape in 1977 when the left-wing government of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under 
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was ousted in a coup d'état led by a former Army general, Zia-
ul-Haq. He then became the sixth President of Pakistan with two cornerstones economic policy, 
including liberalization and Islamization of the economy. 
The new government of Zia-ul-Haq showed some interest and announced many steps for 
Islamization. Establishment of the system of Zakat and Islamization of the banking system are 
important steps that need to be mentioned. A mandatory religiously derived tax called Zakat was 
enforced in 1980, which applied to saving accounts and other investment and to agricultural 
produce. In January 1980, the Pakistani government opened approximately 7,000 interest-free 
counters at all the nationalized commercial banks. Pakistan becomes the first country in the 
world with the highest number of Islamic banking.503 Nevertheless, not enough attention was 
given to the insurance sector during that time. 
In 1992, the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) of Pakistan on its own initiative reviewed the 
insurance laws and proposed some changes. The council prepared a report "Islamization of 
Insurance" for the government in 1992, but the government did not consider implementing it 
practically. After a decade, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), through 
notification S.R.O 877(I)/2012 dated July 16, 2012, issued Islamic insurance regulation of Takaful 
 





rules, 2012, allowing conventional insurers to operate Islamic insurance windows alongside their 
existing conventional insurance business, and conduct Islamic insurance business. There were 
five Islamic insurance companies operated in 2015 with gross premium of US$ 64.34 million and 
an asset volume of US$ 114.38 million. The Islamic insurance industry comprised just about 2% 
of the insurance sector in Pakistan as at December 2015.504 This number was still quite small 
compared to Malaysia and Indonesia within the same year. 
This chapter examines the reason behind this existing gap between Pakistan and the two 
other countries: Indonesia and Malaysia in their Islamic insurance development. Moreover, it 
explains the reason why Pakistan delayed the development of Islamic insurance until 2012. In the 
early phase of its Islamization, Pakistan had preferred to focus on the implementation of Zakat in 
order to provide economic security for most of its poor population. This chapter begins with a 
brief section on the structure of Pakistan as an Islamic state. It elaborates its multinational 
characteristics, the status of Islam as the popular identity of the Pakistanis, the persistence of the 
kinship-based economic systems in the country, and the political actors related to Islamic 
insurance. This section focuses on the challenges that Pakistan has had in achieving a coherent 
national identity and becoming a stable nation. 
The next section provides detail information on the growth and institutional development 
of Islamic insurance within the existing structure of the insurance sector in Pakistan. This section 
also discusses the linkage between Islamic insurance regulatory frameworks within the broader 
context of insurance or social protection in Pakistan. The state of Pakistan had always been 
idealized and positioned as the primary provider of the protection within the idea of the Islamic 
welfare state, and not merely as an incubator of Islamic insurance as Malaysia does, or as a 
regulator as Indonesia does. 
 The last two sections explain the factors for Pakistan’s slow development of Islamic 
insurance through the lenses of ‘political life’ and ‘social life’ of Islamic insurance. The political 
life of Islamic insurance section explores the catalysts, the dynamics, and the political coalitions 
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behind the institutionalization of Islamic insurance, particularly during Zia’s state-sponsored 
Islamization (1977-1988), and his continuous legacy in the aftermath. The central puzzle to be 
addressed is why, as an Islamic state, Pakistan has been slow or even failing in creating Islamic 
reform for its insurance sector. Next, the social life of Islamic insurance section explores the 
process of how Islamic insurance was introduced by the Islamist modernizers within a highly 
conservative social-cultural environment of Pakistani society. Similarly, it asks the question of 
how Islamic insurance has not been receiving proper acceptance by a society where Islam is 
deeply ingrained in its norms, values, and identity.  
The structure of a ‘weak’ Islamic state  
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan had been created in the name of Islam. Muhammad Iqbal 
(1876–1938), a poet and philosopher who is called the ‘Spiritual Father of Pakistan’ pioneered 
the idea for a separate land for the Muslim of India in his famous 1930 Allahabad Address. Iqbal 
described Islam as a “social nizam” (social order) and argued that the religion of Islam was the 
best suited of all religions for the organization of life, as it applied to every aspect of the life of 
the individual and society.505 Furthermore, although few argued that Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the 
founding father had preferred a more secular type of Pakistan, it is commonly believed that the 
Muslim League leadership including Jinnah and the ulama (Islamic clergy) had articulated their 
vision of Pakistan in terms of an Islamic state as Iqbal previously described.  
The Constitution was adopted on 23 March 1956, and from then on, Pakistan is known as 
the world’s first Islamic republic. However, the role of Islam in the Republic was not clearly 
defined. In 1973, the new constitution was promulgated, in which Islam is stated as the state 
religion. The 1973 Constitution provides the framework that no law would be passed against the 
teaching of Quran and the Sunnah (Prophetic tradition). However, Islam was never enough to 
make Pakistan into a unified nation; Pakistanis are divided not only by different variations of 
Islam but also by a host of other ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and social difference.  
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A multinational country 
Pakistan is the world’s sixth-most populous country in the world and has the largest 
Muslim population after Indonesia.506 Like Indonesia and Malaysia, Pakistan is also a culturally 
diverse country. In term of geographical area, it is the 36th-largest country, spanning 881,889 
square kilometers (340,499 square miles). Pakistan has a 1,046-kilometre (650-mile) coastline 
along the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman in the south and is bordered by India to the east, 
Afghanistan to the west, Iran to the southwest, and China in the far northeast.507  
Pakistan is a federal parliamentary republic. Executive power is headed by the prime 
minister, who works coherently along with the bicameral parliament and the judicature. 
President is the head of the state. Like the presidential election system in the US, president is 
elected by the Electoral College for a five-year term. The president was the most important 
authority in the country until 2010. The 18th amendment, passed in 2010, stripped the 
presidency of its major powers.508 Before the amendment, the president had the ability to 
remove the prime minister and dissolve the Parliament. The amendment turned Pakistan from a 
semi-presidential to a parliamentary republic. 
The name Pakistan means Land of (the) Spiritually Pure in both Urdu and Persian 
languages. In 1933 Choudhary Rahmat Ali, a Pakistan Movement activist, proposed ‘Pakstan’ as 
the name of the country in his paper Now or Never; Are We to Live or Perish Forever? This paper 
is also known as the "Pakistan Declaration". The name of Pakistan is an acronym that stands for 
the "thirty million Muslim brethren who lived in PAKSTAN—by which we mean the Five Northern 
units of India: Punjab, Afghan Province, Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan". The letter i was added 
to ease pronunciation and forms the linguistically correct and meaningful name. 509 
Another prominent leader for Pakistan movement was the poet-philosopher, 
Muhammad Iqbal. Iqbal who was born on Nov 9, 1877, encouraged the creation of a “state in 
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north-western India for Muslims” in his 1930 India Muslim League presidential address at 
Allahabad, British India. As a leading philosophical and literary voice during the time of Indian 
independence and the eventual partition of the country, Iqbal was an essential political and social 
leader in the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. Although he died in 1938, which is long before 
the establishment of independence Pakistan, he gave vision to the people particularly to 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Quaid-i-Azam (the Great Leader) and Baba-i-Qaum (Father of the Nation) 
of Pakistan, through his poetic collections.510 
Following Iqbal’s vision, Jinnah tried to build a strong state relying on three principles of 
‘one nation, one culture, and one language’. He also believed that Pakistan could somehow be 
turned into not only an ideal Islamic state but also an ideal egalitarian socialist state. Jinnah 
aspired the very solid traditions of social justice in Islamic thought could somehow be made to 
flourish in an independent Pakistani state.511 However, many scholars argue that these visions 
neglected the social and geographical base of Pakistan. In reality, Pakistan has never been able 
to reach a consensual conception of the nation since its independence. The ideological 
foundation for Pakistani state nationalism led to the partition of India has failed to act as a 
unifying concept for the multinational country of Pakistan. 512 
The land of Pakistan was part of British India. As a state, Pakistan was born out of India’s 
partition in 1947. The initial rationale for separating Pakistan from India was the presumed need 
to provide a homeland for the minority Muslims in an overwhelmingly Hindu India. It was a result 
of the two-nation theory stating that Muslims and Hindus are two separate nations by every 
definition; therefore, Muslims should be able to have their separate homeland in the Muslim 
majority areas of India, in which Islam can be practiced as the dominant religion.  
In 1946, the Labor government in Britain decided to end the British rule of the Indian 
Subcontinent. The loss of international support on continuing India colonialization, numerous 
local protests, and financial burden of World War II forced the British to take this decision. The 
Indian National Congress demanded a single state, while the Muslim League, which made up 
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most of the Pakistani elite after 1947, expressed the idea of a separate Pakistan as an alternative. 
The British proposed a compromise in the form of a decentralized state with much power given 
to local governments. However, this proposal was rejected by both of the parties and resulted in 
several riots in South Asia. 
Eventually, the Parliament of the United Kingdom agreed to divide British India into the 
two new independent dominions; the Dominion of India (later to become the Republic of India) 
and the Dominion of Pakistan (later to become the Islamic Republic of Pakistan).513 Fifteen  
million people were displaced due to religious violence accompanied the partition across the 
subcontinent. On 14 August 1947, the new Dominion of Pakistan became independent, and 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah was sworn in as its first governor-general in Karachi.514The tragic 
experience of partition became the basis of a strong India-centric threat perception in Pakistan.  
At the time of its independence in 1956, Pakistan had two separate geographical entities. 
The eastern part is only one-sixth the size of the western part of Pakistan yet holding eight million 
more people. The western part of the country possessed 80 percent of the cultivable land and 
had the country’s capital and only port in Karachi. Meanwhile, East Pakistan had far less 
infrastructure and was much weaker economically.  
Both parts of Pakistan were mainly Muslim. However, there were differences in religious 
practice. The Muslims in the western part of Pakistan has a long history of communal strife, which 
influences the relationship between different religious communities in the area. On the contrary, 
religious interaction with Hindus had become routine for Bengalis in the east. According to 
Weightman, those cultural differences were some of the centrifugal forces that would ultimately 
result in its political demise leading to the transformation of East Pakistan into Bangladesh in 
1971.515  
 The split indeed created an Islamic trend within the country, but it did not necessarily 
create a cohesive nation of Pakistan. It is mainly due to the lack of linguistic cohesion among 
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Pakistanis. About two-thirds of the population speaks Punjabi. Punjab is the most economically 
productive province and contains the modern nation’s capital, Islamabad. Sindhi language is 
spoken by about 12 percent, mostly in Pakistan’s second industrial province of Sind. Urdu is 
spoken by only 8 percent, yet it was proclaimed the national language. Urdu is also the language 
of the state education system, of the national newspapers, and the film industry. It was the 
language of Muslims in the heartland of the old Mughal Empire, centered on cities of Delhi, Agra, 
Lucknow, Bhopal, and Hyderabad, rooted in what is now India.516 Along with English, Urdu is the 
language of the elite and government.  
The acknowledgment of Urdu as the official language of the country does not correspond 
with the social practice by majority Pakistanis. Urdu-speakers are concentrated in cities, 
especially the old capital of Karachi. Those are the Mohajirs, people who migrated from India 
after partition in 1947.  Several other languages are spoken, with the most enormous diversity in 
mountainous regions. Pashto and Baluchi belong to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European 
language family. Sindhi, Urdu, and Punjabi belong to the Indic branch. Brahui is a Dravidian 
language of about 2.2 million people with the vast majority found in Baluchistan. There is also 
Balti, which is a Sino-Tibetan language used by people living in Gilgit-Baltistan region of 
Pakistan.517  
 Nonetheless, Pakistan has a geographical unity that in some respects thousand years old, 
being the valley of the River Indus, which drains southward into the Arabian Sea plus neighboring 
mountains, deserts, and swamps. This Indus plain was the ancient site of one of the oldest 
civilizations of Mohenjo-Daro. After the coming of Islam, people in this geographical entity had 
been professed the religion Islam for hundreds of years and have often been ruled by the same 
Muslim dynasties.518 However, the geographical characteristics of having high altitudes and 
desserts have also limited the accessibility and people interaction, which foster cultural 
differentiation, communalism, and regionalism within the country.  
Pakistan is politically divided into four highly differentiated and unequal parts: Northwest 
Frontier Province (NWFP), Punjab, Sind, and Baluchistan. Waziristan is not a province but is part 
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of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).519 NWFP is capped by a dramatic knot where 
the Karakoram, Pamir, and the Hindu Kush have buckled together. Peshawar is the biggest city 
and industrial center of this region. Most people living in this area are Pathan and speak Pashto. 
Waziristan is also a mountainous region, but it is bordering with Afghanistan. The majority of 
followed the customary law of Pashtunwali, and only small number of them following the State 
law. Badal-revenging blood feuds to protect Zan (family), Zar (wealth), and Zameen (land) are 
central pillars of this code.520  
The Punjab region long had been the breadbasket of the subcontinent. Moreover, Punjab, 
on average, produced more than half of the GNP of Pakistan. Punjabi has continuously also 
dominated the armed forces. Sind region is located in the Indus delta, which make it very fertile 
for agriculture. Second to Punjab in size and wealth, Sind has excellent agricultural potential and 
in 1947 was in the process of being colonized by immigrants from Punjab. However, much of the 
rural Sind remains controlled by zamindari. Initially, zamindari collected taxes for the Moghuls 
and later the Raj. Zamindar were or became large landowners, especially in Sind and Punjab, and 
they continue to control both land and peasant farmers under the feudal system. Politically, 
Zamindari families are often voted in as members of Pakistan’s Parliament because they are 
relatively wealthy and come from prominent families. Baluchistan has twice the size of Punjab, 
but it is rugged and arid. Baluchistan possesses the smallest population and is the most 
impoverished province.521 
This diversity has created various localized ethnic identities and loyalties, arguing for 
cultural recognition in a more inclusive national narrative, struggling for political autonomy, or 
more significant share of the economic development. For instance, Sindhi nationalism evolves in 
a rural setting of Sind under the leadership of prominent large landowner families, Baloch 
nationalism flourishes in a tribal milieu requesting the more significant share of the profits from 
mining and other industries, and the Mohajir movement in an urban context of Karachi.522 Those 
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localized loyalties are counter-reactions toward the increasing dominance of the Punjabi in 
Pakistan’s bureaucracy, military, and industries.  
Modern multinational Pakistan has been governed by following the legacy the British in 
ruling British India. Instead of direct control through a powerful centralized government, the 
British relied on local chieftains, landowners, or provincial leaders to manage the population. 
Similarly, the ‘weak’ federal government of Pakistan has always depended on the very same old 
elites and families in governing the country. The framework of a federal parliamentary republic 
and meritocracy are supposed to overcome political problems generated from those diversities. 
However, those modern institutions have not been able to transform Pakistani society. 
Islam as the state and the popular identities 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, also known as the 1973 Constitution, 
incorporates many injunctions from the Sharia. The 1973 Constitution is considered to be one of 
the most Sharia-dense constitutions in the modern world.  Besides stating that Islam is the state 
religion, the 1973 Constitution uses language, norms, principles, prohibitions, and guarantees 
derived from Islamic law. 523  
Pakistan was the first country in the modern world to adopt the adjective "Islamic" to 
modify its republican status under its otherwise secular constitution in 1956. However, Islam has 
only become state religion after 1973, when a new constitution, more democratic and less 
secular, was adopted. The Constitution of 1973 is Pakistan’s most important document as it gives 
foundation of the current government. Article 227 of the Constitution holds that all existing laws 
"shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and 
Sunnah […] and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such injunctions." 524 Still, the very 
legal structure in Pakistan is common English law, which inherited from the former British ruler. 
With time, Pakistan introduces legal changes to accommodate new developments.  
 






Pakistan’s legal system contains State law, Sharia law and Customary laws. State law and 
Sharia law are both formal, written codes. Meanwhile, customary laws are informal and 
unwritten, but immensely strong, because they reflect the cultures of the people.525  In so-called 
Tribal Areas of the Northwest Frontier Province, the government in Pakistan relies on the local 
authority to maintain order.  Instead of Pakistani state law, a body of local elders and notables 
or the leading males of families so-called the Jirga implement Pashtunwali, the ethnic code of 
the Pathans. The Pashtunwali provides a general guideline for resolving disputes once they arise. 
The traditional codes of Pakistan do not provide detail rules for every contingency. The normative 
content of customary laws is very fluid; therefore, it is best thought as a code of honor rather 
than a legal code. Instead of trying to abolish crime altogether, maintaining collective honor and 
prestige, restoring peace, and retribution are the primary purpose of this ethnic code. Also, this 
code influences how they conduct their economy. 526 
Beside the Pathans, every traditional Pakistani community has its version of customary 
laws. The only significant population in Pakistan which has completely shed allegiance to 
traditional codes are the Mohajirs (the migrants) of Karachi.527 The Mohajirs of multi-ethnic 
origins migrated from various regions of India to Pakistan after the separation.  
The Sharia is often considered to be more progressive than Pashtunwali. For instance, 
Sharia guarantees a share of inheritance to girls, while Pashtunwali gives it only to boys; 
furthermore, Sharia law guarantees rights to wives in the case of divorce. However, the Sharia 
that was promoted by the Taliban, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, does not necessarily mean 
the Islamic law as understood and implemented in many other Muslim societies. The Sharia that 
is being advocated is the tribal interpretation of Sharia by the Taliban.528 Despite its 
progressiveness, the implementation of Sharia is complicated in Pakistan, because the different 
Islamist groups in Pakistan cannot have consensus which form of the Sharia is valid. 
According to Ian Talbot, one of the leading historians of South Asia, the separation of East 
Pakistan into an independent country of Bangladesh in 1971 contributed to the trend toward ‘a 
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more Islamic’ Pakistan in three ways. Firstly, it cut stroke the numerical strength of the non-
Muslim minority. Secondly, it strengthened anti-Hindu and anti-Indian sentiment by seeing that 
the East Bengali secession was a conspiracy, and lastly, it demolished the secular Pakistani 
nationalist ideology, which had huge supports among the Bengalis. The secession of East Pakistan 
into a new country of Bangladesh reinforced Islam as an ideological cement for the state of 
Pakistan.529 
After the secession, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under Bhutto (1973-1977) 
advocated a program compounded of agricultural and industrial reform and the promulgation of 
new constitution 1973, which defined Pakistan as an Islamic socialist republic. The president and 
prime minister were to be Muslims, and laws were to conform to Islam as determined by the 
council of Ulama (Islamic clergy). As Pakistan became increasingly dependent on oil-rich Arab 
states for loans, commerce, and employment of labor, Bhutto made further concessions to 
Islamic morality, such as prohibiting alcohol and gambling.530 Furthermore, the regime of Zia-ul-
Haq of the late seventies intensified this Islamization process by utilizing Islam as a tool for 
nation-building bypassing other traditional loyalties.  
 Islam is deeply ingrained in the identity of Pakistani people. Even the PPP, which is 
generally regarded as ‘secular’ party, has been using religious symbols to gain support from the 
population. The PPP recruited many of its politicians from the prominent families, specifically 
families of hereditary saints. However, Islam of Pakistani masses contains various traditions. 
Pakistan contains all the key facets contemporary Islam: Sufism; traditionalist scholars; the 
modern clergy and their madrasah and Islamic colleges; Islamic parties and their political 
activists; and Islamic modernism.531 Therefore, there is always a strong reaction when certain 
groups or the state itself tries to impose one monolithic version of Islam imitating, for instance, 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, or Iran.532On the other hand, the Pakistani state is too weak to achieve this 
even if it wanted too-as Zia-ul-Haq’s failed Islamization demonstrated. 
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The majority of Muslim in Pakistan is Sunnis, and most of them are traditionalists known 
as Barelvis. The name comes after the madrasah founded in 1880 in the town of Bareilly-also in 
Uttar Pradesh, India. They have a traditional religious attitude, which are inspired by Sufism. This 
popular Islam includes a belief in the intercession of saints with God, the validity of miracles by 
the saints, worship at the shrines of saints (though not strictly speaking worship of the saints), 
and local traditions attached to the saints.533 The practices of Barelvi may similar to the practice 
of the older Muslim societies; however, the traditionalist orientations had begun to take a 
recognizable shape only in the late nineteenth century as a response to modernism.534 
 Unlike the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia, the Barelvis have never created a significant and 
enduring political party of their own. They played a leading part in all the broader Muslim mass 
movements in India and Pakistan, and then formed part of the MMA Islamist alliance which 
governed the NWFP and Balochistan from 2002 to 2008. However, their political influence is very 
limited.  
Based on their theological understanding, all the Sunni Islamist groups, from the relatively 
moderate and democratic Jamaat-e-Islami to the Taliban and other extremists, are drawn from 
one of two traditions: the Deobandi and the Ahl-e-Hadith.535 The Deobandi, named after a 
famous madrasah founded in Deoband (now in Uttar Pradesh, India) in 1866, is a representation 
of one of the oldest Islamic modernisms.  Both Pakistan’s main Islamist parties today, the Jamaat-
e-Islami (JI) nationally and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islama (JUI) in the Pathan areas, are drawn from 
the Deobandi tradition.536 Another tradition is so-called Ahl-e-Hadith. It is a branch of the 
international Salafi tradition, heavily influenced by Wahabism. The Ahl-e-Hadith are more 
extreme than the Deobandis, and less concerned with questions of modern social justice and 
development.537  
The most central from all Islamist ideas is the idea that sovereignty belongs to God alone. 










mentioned in the Sharia. According to the Sunni Islamists, one could not be a Muslim without 
accepting this idea, nor could a state become Islamic without recognizing it.538  
 Beside this majority Sunnis, Pakistan also hosts so-called Muslim minorities. There are 
two ‘Muslim minorities’ in Pakistan: the Ahmadis and the Shias. Seven million or 2.2% of 
Pakistanis are Ahmadi. The Ahmadiyya follows the Sharia injunctions in their rituals and shares 
many ideas with the Islam modernists, except the Ahmadis believe that their leader, Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad, was also a prophet after Muhammad. Because of this belief, Ahmadiyya was 
declared as a non-Muslim minority of Pakistan in 1974.539  
The Shias of Pakistan are the world’s second-largest Shia community after that of Iran. 
The Shia comprises only 10-15 percent of Pakistan’s population (20-30 million). Although there 
are many incidents where Sunni extremists targeted the Shia group with hate propaganda and 
terrorism, Shias have always been fully integrated into all sections of political, professional, and 
social life without suffering any discrimination. In mainstream politics, the Shia-Sunni divide has 
never been an issue in Pakistan. Two prime ministers from Bhutto family, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and 
his daughter, Benazir Bhutto, were also Shia. Moreover, Shia clergy has been at the forefront of 
communal activism in Pakistan since 1949, but the general Shia people participated in such 
organizations, as they had in pre-partition India.540  
Islamist radicalism in Pakistan is influenced by a combination of ideology and conditions 
induced by the governing elites. Similar to what happened during the partition of 1947, Muslim 
masses can occasionally be stirred up to furious panic by the cry of “Islam in danger’.541 The 
governing elite and the military of Pakistan also often create conditions that foster Islamic 
radicalism. For instance, many of religiopolitical related violent incidents happened after 
Pakistan’s realignment in the US-led War on Terror in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.542 
All in all, traditional and popular forms of Islam do play a key role in holding Pakistan 
together. However, their role is not on the modern sense of transforming the sociopolitical 
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as a single homogenous ideology, is not present in the mind of the majority of Muslim 
Pakistanis.543 Islam indeed provide elements in the nation-building process of a multinational 
Pakistan. The religion also has a significant role in transforming the moral of the society, like the 
case of Malaysia’s corporate sector mentioned before where Islam is utilized to inculcate 
discipline and work ethics among the workers. Some Pakistani statesmen have tried to promote 
religion in public life as a way of trying to improve working ethics of public officials.544 However, 
Islam in Pakistan has failed to create loyalties and ethics, which transcend those of loyalty to kin. 
This kinship loyalties and ethics are quite robust that influence in not only politics but also the 
economy of Pakistan. 
‘Patronage to kinship’ economy 
In term of economy, around a quarter of Pakistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its 
export earnings are derived from the agricultural sector, which is controlled by a few thousand 
feudal families. With this concentration of economic power, the feudal families also have 
considerable political power upon the country. In addition to agriculture, remittance is an 
important part of Pakistan’s economy. Around 7 million Pakistani Diasporas contributed 
significantly to national economic stability. In 2015-2016, they transferred money to their 
families amounted US$19.9 billion of remittance or equaled to 7.11 % of Pakistan’s GDP.545 Ian 
Talbot argues that remittance was one of the contributing factors for Zia-ul-Haq longevity in 
power, rather than his hegemonic Islamic discourse.546  
Modern industries are rare, and they are only available within the metropolitan areas of 
Karachi and Lahore. Most of the urban population remains semi-employed or informally 
employed. Pakistan was ahead of South Korea in economic development in the early 1960s, but 
now, it is dreadfully far behind. Nonetheless, with the continuous conflict in the neighboring 
country, Afghanistan, the constant threat of violence and terrorism, and the prevalent corruption 
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within a weak government, Pakistan is not a fail state. In fact, Pakistan is quite functional as a 
state and even can be considered as one of the most resilient countries in the world.   
Pakistan's average economic growth rate in the first five decades (1947–1997) has been 
higher than the growth rate of the world economy during the same period. Also, Pakistan’s 
manufactured exports in the 1960s were higher than those of Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines 
or Indonesia. However, because of the lack of investment in education, training, skills, and health 
of the labor force, Pakistan is now behind those countries.547  
The country is one of the largest producers of natural commodities. Pakistan's most 
important industry is textiles, and this industry has an overwhelming impact on the economy of 
the country. The textile sector in Pakistan represents about 57% percent of the country's 
exports.548 This industry is the second-largest employment sector in Pakistan, with approximately 
40% labor force in the industry. Pakistan also develops other industries, such as mining, oil and 
gas extraction, and automotive.  
Although the agriculture sector still plays an important role, and the manufacturing starts 
to grow, the current economy of Pakistan is shifting toward services. The services sector share in 
GDP stands around 44.18 percent on average.549 The share of the services sector in total 
employment has been increasing over time. In 2009, 2.76 million people were employed in this 
sector. However, the financial sector, which includes insurance, real estate, and business service 
has still a small share in employment generation, which employed only around 820,000 people.550 
The Pakistani economy is also sustained by the remittance transferred by its diaspora. In 
2015-16, there was US$19.9 billion remittances came from 7 million Pakistani diasporas. The 
primary source countries of remittances to Pakistan are the United States and the Gulf states.  
Since the late 1980s, Pakistan has pursued a program of market-oriented economic 
adjustment, reform, and development with the support of the International Monetary Fund 
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(IMF) and bilateral donors. this program has aimed at enhancing macroeconomic stability, 
promoting the private sector and export-led industrial development, and reversing past neglect 
of critical social sectors such as health, education, and population planning. Unfortunately, the 
implementation of this program has mostly lagged expectations. The main reason was the 
liberalization program was absorbed by the Islamization of the economy.551 
Pakistan has everything needed to be successful economically. Although there are plenty 
of cheap labor, a large domestic market, and access to regional markets, foreign investors have 
been reluctant to invest their money in Pakistan. Its widespread corruption, lack of skilled labor, 
law and order problems, and outdated infrastructure are some of the reasons behind that. 
Another major problem is Pakistan's massive external debt and its continued dependence on 
financial aid. Debt and foreign grants provide approximately 25 percent of government revenue, 
and debt service obligations total nearly 50 percent of government expenditure.552 
Underlying most of the economic problems faced by Pakistan is the persistence of its 
‘patronage to kinship’ system. Patronage has long been the bedrock of politics in Pakistan, where 
votes are dictated by immediate concerns about legal protection and government handouts.553 
It explains the mass support for populist ideas and programs such as ‘Islamic welfare state’ 
introduced by Pakistan leaderships, including the current Prime Minister, Imran Khan.  
Pakistan is low in natural resources, such as oil and natural gas, there is no ‘traditional’ 
source of wealth for elites to control and monopolize, Lieven explained. In this environment, the 
only way to extract wealth is through control over the state. To achieve control over the state, 
communal leaders rely on “patronage to kinship” – an underlying dynamic of the Pakistani system 
where wealth and power are distributed along the kinship line. This deep kinship, Lieven noted, 
is a vital aspect of Pakistani society. Beside to gain wealth, kinship is used to maintain degrees of 
stability through power structures.554 This character provides the basis for the whole explanation 
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of the stagnation of Islamic insurance in Pakistan, which will be elaborated further in the 
upcoming sections. 
However, this endemic patronage does not necessarily make the economy of Pakistan a 
failure. On contrary, the strong kinship was one of the reasons for its resiliency. The economy 
proved to be resilient in the face of multiple adverse events concentrated into a four-year (1998–
2002) period: the Asian financial crisis, economic sanctions, the global recession of 2001–2002, a 
severe drought, and refugee crisis in the post-9/11 military action in neighboring Afghanistan. 
Political actors of Islamic politics  
The following paragraphs provide a brief map of the actors of Islamic politics in Pakistan, 
particularly on their positions regarding the institutionalization of Islamic insurance. As 
mentioned before, patronage and kinship form the essential elements of the Pakistani political 
system. In Pakistan, political factions, which support individual politicians or alliances of 
politicians are significant, but they are temporary. Politicians use factions to seek patronage 
because they need the foundation of strong kinship networks, which are the most important 
aspect of Pakistani politics.555 
Although there have been power shifts within the society, the landowners are still the 
dominant power in Pakistan’s politics. A few thousand feudal families control Pakistan’s 
agricultural sector. Only two percent of households have landholdings larger than 20 hectares, 
accounting for 30 percent of total land holdings.556 Although successive military and civilian 
governments have tried with to redress the land imbalance, the concentration of economic 
power in Pakistan still rests on these families. As a result, feudal lords continue to wield more 
power than civil authorities do in many rural areas. This concentration of economic power 
strengthens these individuals’ influence within the patronage and kinship patterns of the 
Pakistani political system. 
However, great individual landowners no longer dominate the southern part of Punjab 
and the NWFP. Several land reform program, the subdivision through inheritance of formerly 
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great estates, and social mobility due to economic change are responsible for this 
transformation.  The key rural politician in these areas is a relatively small landowner (with 
perhaps 100 acres or so), deeply embedded in the dominant local landowning clan, with influence 
over the police and administration.557Such Landowners are very often local urban politicians too 
because they own urban property. Nowadays, most of the wealth does not come from the land 
anymore, but the land is essential links to the people and their votes.558 
Landownership and the power of kinship are inevitably reflected in the political system of 
Pakistan. Just as in much of the rest of South Asia, a majority of Pakistan’s political parties are 
dynastic. For many years and particularly after the secession of Bangladesh in 1971, only two 
parties dominating the Pakistani politics: the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan 
Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). the PPP is led by Bhutto-Zardari family and has a strong 
supporter in the Sindhi countryside, while PML-N, which was founded by Zia-ul-Haq, has a very 
powerful Punjabi character and has been led by Sharif family almost for the last three decades.  
 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came from a family of large Shia landowners who could afford to send 
him for schooling in the US and the UK. He was very talented speaker. His oratory could 
manipulate public emotion as the best of Shia preachers could, and his call for social justice 
resonated with Shia values. His party’s flag conveniently displayed the colors of Shiism: black, 
red, and green. Although he never openly flaunted his Shia background, he commanded the 
loyalty of Pakistan’s Shia multitudes.559 
The Northern Punjab and the NWFP have less dynastic characters as they have always 
had a more egalitarian and meritocratic, as with the Pathans and the Jats. In these groups, it is 
often more accurate to talk of ‘big men’, risen through personal wealth and character, rather 
than hereditary leadership. Very often, the decisive moment in family’s rise was when they 
became sufficiently locally powerful to get into a political party as a candidate, and on that basis 
to get a government job- after that, they can make their fortunes by corruption.  
Recently, there has also been a sharp rise in the popularity of centrist parties such that 








only genuinely modern mass political party, which gains support from mostly the middle-class 
from the ethnic background of the Mohajir population of Karachi. PTI is also a centrist political 
party in Pakistan founded in 1996 by former international cricket captain Imran Khan. In 2018, 
PTI or Pakistan Movement for Justice ended the two-party dominance of the PPP and the PML-N 
by becoming the largest party in the National Assembly as a result of the 2018 general election. 
As the 19th Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan is leading Pakistan as a populist, religiously 
devout, anti-corruption reformist, and envisioning building an “Islamic welfare state”. The recent 
victory of PTI of Imran Khan seems to bring change to Pakistan’s political system. However, it is 
still too early to draw this conclusion. The patterns of political kinship and traditions concerned 
are very old and very deeply rooted in Pakistani society.560 
In sum, we may see a conflict of different ideologies, the tension between civil society 
and military, and fierce confrontation between the Islamists and secular parties within Pakistani 
politics, however, kinship consideration usually outweighs these differences. Defense of the 
honor and the interests of the kinship group is often considered to be more important than 
loyalty to a party, to a state, or to any code of professional ethics, not only for ordinary Pakistanis, 
but also for most politicians and officials. In Pakistan, waves of public sentiments including Islamic 
revivalism in many forms can topple regimes and bring new ones to power; but they do not 
change the basic structure of politics.561 
Both Pakistan’s main Islamist parties today, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) nationally and the 
Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islama (JUI) in the Pathan areas, are drawn from the modernist tradition of 
Deobandi. According to Lieven, the ideological stance of Deobandi can be described as both 
fundamentalist and reformist. Their aspiration to the pure teaching of the Quran and the Prophet 
makes them as a fundamentalist group. By its own description, Jamaat-e-Islami is “an ideological 
party” that stands for “complete Islam” and whose mission, according to Article 4 of the party’s 
constitution, is the “establishment of Divine Order or the Islamic way of life in its entirety, in 
individual and collective life, and whether it pertains to prayers or fasting, Haj or Zakat, socio-







They are also puritan (in the old Anglo-American sense), in their concern for strict public morality 
and their dislikes of both ostentatious wealth and the worship of saints and shrines. Their ideas 
of reform are quite modern, which concerned with questions of modern social justice and 
development. Majority of their supporter come from middle-class lay intellectuals concentrated 
in urban centers.562 
In 1977, these Islamic parties formed the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) with other 
political parties to run a political campaign against the left-oriented PPP in the 1977 general 
elections. This coalition was a populist and consolidated right-wing political alliance, consisting 
of nine political parties of the country. However, the alliance performed poorly in 1977 general 
elections. By 1978, the alliance met its end when parties have diverged in each of its agenda. The 
left-wing parties later would form the MRD alliance under PPP to oppose President Zia-ul-Haq in 
the 1980s and the right-wing forming the IDA alliance under PML.  
The Islamic parties have been consistently participating in the general elections.  In the 
1990s, the Islamic political parties united on a single platform in 1993 as "Islamic Front" against 
Benazir Bhutto of PPP and in 2002, they formed another political alliance of the Muttahida 
Majlis–e–Amal (MMA; "United Council of Action"). Despite its vast mass, populism, and support, 
the MMA alliance only retained 63 seats while the PPP retained 94 seats and the President 
Musharraf's PML (Q) securing 124 seats during the general elections held in 2002. In overall, the 
Islamic influence in the politics has been very limited in the public.563 
Islam was never enough to make Pakistan into a unified nation. On the contrary, the 
hostility toward India often provides a better unifying force for its people. This security concern 
has determined the content and contours of Pakistan’s foreign and domestic policy. As a result, 
this dominance of security policy also paved the way for the superior position of the military 
within state establishments and society. The Pakistan Armed Forces, the sixth largest in the world 
in terms of active military personnel and the largest among Muslim countries, have played an 







The Army is also the only institution that has succeeded to some extent in resisting 
‘feudal’ characters of the Pakistani political system in the name of state loyalty and professional 
meritocracy. However, “It succeeds in part only through turning itself into a kind of giant clan, 
serving its members’ collective interests at the expense of the state and society, and underpinned 
to some extent by ancient local kinship groups among the north-western Punjabis and Pathans,” 
argues Anatol Lieven.564 The Pakistani military considers itself as a big family or large kinship 
group, which maintain its power through extracting patronage from the state and distributing it 
to its members.   
There are longstanding Western fears that the social change in the country will ‘Islamize’ 
the Army, which increase their support Islamist revolutions or that there might be a mutiny by 
Islamist junior officers against the high command. These dangers do exist, but in Lieven’s, a 
Pakistani expert, view, most probably only a direct ground attack on Pakistan by the US could 
bring them to fruition.565 
The military officer’s ideology was first and foremost Pakistani nationalist. The military 
tied to Pakistan, not the universal Muslim Ummah of the radical Islamist’s dream; tied not only 
by sentiment and ideology but also by the reality of what supports the army. In the 1980s General 
Zia did undertake measures to make the army more Islamic. Many officers who wanted 
promotion adopted an Islamic trait in the hope furthering their chances of promotion. However, 
this did not lead to blocking the career of secular generals from promotion such as General 
Karamat and Musharraf. In the 1990s, and especially under Musharraf, most of Zia’s measures 
were rolled back.566 
Pakistan has a complex legal framework, a corrupt police institution, and court system, 
but a progressive group of lawyers.567 The Federal Sharia Court (FSC) of Pakistan is the most 
important institution regarding Islamization in Pakistan. The Federal Sharia Court was established 
in 1980 during the Zia-ul-Haq regime. It is in the federal capital, Islamabad. The FSC is a 









comply with Islamic Sharia law.  The declaration of Pakistan as the Islamic Republic in 1953 was 
also the result of the struggle of these Islamic parties.  
It consists of eight Muslim judges appointed by the President of Pakistan after consulting 
the Chief Justice of this Court, from amongst the serving or retired judges of the Supreme Court 
or a High Court or from amongst persons possessing the qualifications of judges of a High Court. 
Justice Najmul Hassan Sheikh is the current Chief Justice of the court in 2017. Of the eight judges, 
three are required to be Islamic clergy who are well versed in Islamic law. The judges hold office 
for three years, which may eventually be extended by the President. Related to Islamization 
program, this court represents the stricter voices of Islamic clergy against the pragmatic approach 
of the government, the State Bank of Pakistan, or the industry. 
The Insurance industry in Pakistan is regulated under the Insurance Ordinance, 2000. The 
Government of Pakistan established the Department of Insurance in April 1948 within the 
Ministry of Commerce. The purpose of this arrangement is to take care of affairs related to the 
insurance under economic and industrial policies. The insurance industry in Pakistan is relatively 
small compared to India, or even Bangladesh. However, the Pakistani insurance market has 
undergone significant structural changes in the last few years, particularly, through mergers of 
companies. According to Insurance Ordinance 2000, an insurance company must meet the 
increased statutory requirement of minimum paid-up capital. Some companies who were unable 
to raise this capital have been asked to close their operations. The ordinance increases the 
efficiency and competitiveness of insurance industry in Pakistan. 
Furthermore, the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), Insurance 
Division, issues directives on financial security and transparency, code of good governance and 
sound market practice to boost the industry. The year 2015 showed improvement in Pakistan’s 
overall economic indicators, including containment of current account deficit. However, many 
argues that this improvement was due to the continuing decline in international oil prices and an 
uplift in remittances from abroad, and not because the structural adjustment at home. 
The successful issue of Sukuk Bond in the international market also helped the investment 
in Pakistan. Many countries have started to see Pakistan as a potential country for investment. 




Economic Corridor (CPEC) between the two countries. As a result, many foreign companies start 
to open the insurance business in Pakistan. In overall, the Pakistan insurance market is relatively 
liberalized, with 100% foreign ownership and control of insurance companies permitted. 
However, in overall the insurance industry has little influence in the regulation of insurance in 
Pakistan. 
Stalling growth and development 
Pakistan has been the leader in advocating Islamic finance since its inception. After 
participating in the establishment of the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) at the first 
Organization of Islamic Conference (now called the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) in 1973, 
the Government of Pakistan initiated a national program to establish an interest-free economy 
in the eighties. However, this program failed, primarily due to the continuous legal dispute 
concerning the meaning of ‘true’ Islamic economy, the shortage of well-trained human resources, 
and its reliance on the inefficient public institutions.  
From the early 2000s onward, Pakistan changed its policy of systemic change of economy. 
Pakistan has promoted Islamic finance and started a parallel financial system to that of the 
conventional finance industry. This policy tried to replicate the success story of the Malaysian 
Islamic economy. By September 2016, 22 Islamic banks consisting of six full-fledged Islamic banks 
and 17 conventional banks with Islamic banking divisions, five Islamic insurance companies, and 
80 Islamic mutual funds are operating in Pakistan. Islamic financial services companies are 
managing an asset volume of about US$25 (PKR 2,492) billion including 57 Sukuk (Sharia-
compliant bond) issues with a volume of US$6.3 billion out of which Sukuk of US$1 billion 
matured by September 2013. 568 
In Pakistan, Islamic insurance just started very recently, and at present, only five Islamic 
insurance companies operate. However, the growth during the period 2009-15 is positive. In 
addition, assets of the Islamic insurance sector increased by 600% in seven years from PKR2.7 
billion in 2008 to PKR16.3 billion in 2015. Currently, these five Islamic insurance companies are 
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the backbone of Islamic insurance of Pakistan: Dawood Family Takaful Limited, Pak Qatar Family 
Takaful, Pak Qatar General Takaful, Pak-Kuwait Takaful Company Limited & Takaful Pakistan 
Limited. Several Islamic insurance models are being implemented by these companies. These 
include Mudarabah based model, which has been adopted by Dawood Family Takaful Limited & 
Pak Qatar Family Takaful & Wakalah Based Model, which has been adopted by Pak-Kuwait 
Takaful Company Limited.  
The reform on the legal framework of Islamic insurance in Pakistan has contributed 
significantly to its development. As part of the reform, Islamic insurance rules were introduced 
in 2005. Based on these new rules, Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) and the 
Central Sharia Advisory Board are working in close collaboration to aid Islamic insurance 
companies to provide Islamic insurance services as per Islamic Sharia. 
History and development 
 In 1978 the new president of Pakistan, Zia-ul-Haq, announced the Pakistani government 
would enforce Nizam-i-Mustafa, or the Islamic system. The Pakistani government intended to 
complete the Islamization process of the country, which had been ignored by the previous 
regimes. The Islamic system of the economy under Zia-ul-Haq was established through the 
implementation of Zakat and replacement of interest-based finance to profit and loss sharing 
system. Pakistan was not alone in conducting this initiative. This decade was a period of the global 
resurgence of Islamic finance when Muslim countries like Pakistan, Sudan and Malaysia and some 
Arab countries mobilized their efforts to transform their financial systems on Islamic lines.  
The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) Pakistan was given a task to consider the best strategy 
to achieve the objective of Islamization. To take help in its task, the CII set up a panel of 15 highly 
qualified economists, bankers, and financial experts. The panel submitted an interim report, 
which recommended the immediate removal of interest from the financial institutions whose 
transaction was relatively less complicated and from where interest could be removed with ease. 




recommendations for eliminating interest from all domestic transactions. The reports were 
submitted to the government on November 1978 and June 1979, respectively.569  
Besides drawing some strategies, the Council also examined the laws governing the 
insurance business in the country. The Council analyzed eleven such laws and expressed its 
opinion about them in a brief report to the government, which was in March 1984. The Council 
further decided to constitute a working group to analyze the existing system and frame a new 
system of surety and assurance following the Islamic teachings. At this time, the Council brought 
together economists, the heads of the government insurance company and other insurance 
experts as part of their working group.  
The 1984 report of the Council stated the insurance contracts contain prohibited 
elements including uncertainty in transaction, gambling, and usury.570 As discussed previously in 
the matter of prohibition of insurance, the Council also objected the existing insurance contract 
due to the element of uncertainty of transaction present in the differences between the premium 
paid and the service received. The Council also considered insurance as gambling in its extreme 
form. The Council considered those elements come within the definition of unlawful acquisition 
of others’ property. Therefore, the report stated, "insurance in all its forms, except postal 
insurance in Pakistan, is wrong, wicked, unlawful, prohibited and unenforceable".571 
According to the same report, cooperative insurance with the following characteristics 
would be lawful: (i) when an insured is paid a certain sum at the happening of an incidence, the 
sum paid is considered tabaru or donation from all the insured. In such cases, the presence of 
gharar or uncertainty in a transaction is accepted, (ii) as cooperative insurance is not meant to 
receive profit so gambling and usury will not be present in it, and (iii) the insured are eligible for 
receiving qard al-hasan (benevolent assistance) from the insurance fund.572 In overall, the 
acceptance of the cooperative model is due to the social element in the nature of cooperative 
itself. Cooperative insurance is considered to be closer to the ideal model of Islamic insurance. 
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Moreover, the Council recommended that the Islamic insurance business shall be 
conducted by an autonomous, non-profit, state organization. This perspective was like the view 
of many Muslim scholars in Indonesia, arguing that insurance should be a non-profit endeavor. 
The insurance fund shall be established as a permanent fund, with the status of a waqf 
(endowment), and not as a business investment. Installments paid by the participants towards 
short-term general insurance will be added to the Islamic insurance fund. Installments paid for 
long-term insurance plans will be divided into profit-sharing investment and insurance 
contributions.573 
As some of the members of the Council, especially the clergy were strict of the view that 
the insurance business should be based on mutual help and without any intention of making 
profit. Therefore, the Council did not find any of the experiences of Islamic insurance companies 
of that time suitable to be adopted for Pakistan. Majority of Islamic insurance services at that 
time were provided by the for-profit company from Malaysia and the Gulf countries. The Council 
was of the view that any insurance arrangement, which was not of the mutual type, will not be 
acceptable in Islam. Most of the members of the working group agreed that insurance should not 
be a money-making source for the organizers and should provide cover against those risks only 
which should be covered in public interest, i.e. insurance should cater to the requirements of the 
public and not to the requirements of the privileged class. Nevertheless, this effort was 
discontinued without any concrete policy on Islamic insurance.574 Besides, the government of 
Zia-ul-Haq decided to focus on establishing an Islamic welfare system of Zakat and agricultural 
tax of Ushr.  The Pakistan new welfare system was introduced on June 20, 1980, through the 
promulgation of the Zakat and Ushr ordinance of 1980. 
In 1990, a new council came into existence which decided to form another group to 
complete this task. The working group comprised of six members of the council and four 
representatives of major insurance corporations. Also, there were around twenty Islamic scholars 
and insurance experts advising the group on the nature and function of the present system. Their 
expertise was crucial for the Council to develop an alternative system. The group prepared a 
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report in 1992 and submitted for consideration by the government. In this report, the group 
reviewed the history of insurance and its present forms. It also investigated the status of 
insurance from Sharia point of view and found the same conclusion that in its present form, 
insurance involves the elements of usury, speculation, and gambling.575  
Like the conclusion of the prior report, the Council report of 1992 had also discarded 
existing Islamic insurance practices of that time which were considered Islamic alternatives to 
insurance. The Council reviewed the functioning of Islamic insurance companies, working in 
different Muslim countries, for developing a practical model for Islamic Insurance and suggested 
an alternative system based on the concept of Mudarabah and Waqf. The Council studied STMSB 
(Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad), IAIC (Islamic Arab Insurance Company) and IICS 
(Islamic Insurance Company Sudan). The Council rejected the IAIC model because, in its view, all 
conditions of occidental insurance are retained under Islamic nomenclature. The IICS model was 
also rejected because of the distribution of surplus from the Islamic insurance. According to the 
Council if the premium is considered debt then all principal amount must be returned, and if it is 
considered an investment then profits of some participants cannot be diverted in favor of others. 
As a result, the Council has recommended its model of Islamic insurance which is claimed to be 
"in complete agreement with Islamic teachings".576 
The main difference of the report of 1992 compared to 1984 is the Council in its 1992 
recommendations showed flexibility regarding private insurance provided the Sharia 
compatibility of its operations is guaranteed. In the early nineties, there was a huge 
disappointment toward the performance of state enterprises, including in the Islamdom. State-
run enterprises were considered to be inefficient. This fact is apparent from the collapse of the 
socialist system and the rise of privatization in most countries, including Pakistan. Many 
proponents of Islamic economy shifted from supporting nationalization to economic 
liberalization.577 
The Council opened an opportunity for the private sector to be involved in the 
Islamization of insurance in Pakistan. The Council recommended that the public sector runs the 
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business of Islamic insurance, so the government may take the responsibility of running this 
service according to Islamic law as suggested by the Council. If the above requirements can be 
guaranteed, the Islamic insurance business can also be run by private and semi-government 
corporations.578 
The government of Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan Muslim League (PMN-L) had shown its 
interest towards Islamization of the insurance business in the country and formed a commission 
to develop a scheme for this purpose. Moreover, in 1993, the government put in place the Sharia 
Enforcement Act. However, the Islamization Commission’s interim report was never presented 
to Parliament, and plans were never implemented. Like previous effort, despite all elaborations 
and sophisticated recommendations, there was no practical step has been yet taken for the 
Islamization of insurance.579 
Nawaz Sharif won again in the 1997 election and defeated the Pakistan People’s Party 
(PPP) led by incumbent Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Sharif was sworn in as Prime Minister on 
17 February. Following this victory, Sharif reconstituted Islamization Commission in 1997, 
drawing largely on the Report of the Self-Reliance Committee, of which Professor Khurshid 
Ahmad was the chairman. He was the person summoned back by President Zia in the early 
Islamization program in 1984 with the task of overlooking the Islamization of Pakistan’s economy. 
He was a Pakistani economist based in the University of Leicester who specializes in research, 
education, and publication, working to advance Islamic economics and Islam in general. He was 
summoned back from the United Kingdom, and he assumed the position of deputy chairman of 
the Planning Commission. Professor Khurshid went on to become chairman of the Standing 
Committee on Finance, Economic Affairs, and Planning during his first tenure in the Pakistani 
Senate from 1985 to 1997.580 
On December 23, 1999, the Sharia Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court strengthened 
the Islamization effort by upholding the 1992 judgment and directed the government to 
eliminate all forms of interest-based banking by June 30, 2001. The historical verdict consisted of 
three detailed judgments by Justice Khalilur Rehman, Justice Wajihuddin and Justice Mohammad 
 






Taqi Usmani. After that things began to change slightly and somehow the Central Bank started 
to be more supportive toward Islamization of economy and move in that direction and that is 
how, according to Professor Khurshid, “From 2002 onwards, Islamic banks or banks which would 
have totally self-contained Islamic units came into existence.” He added, “Now, [progress] is very 
slow, but the direction is correct. Pakistan had two parallel streams, about 90 percent in interest-
based and about 10 percent Islamic-based.”581 
The Islamization of insurance efforts gained momentum after the promulgation of 
insurance ordinance 2000 followed by Takaful Rules 2005 issued by the ministry of commerce 
(MOC) to regulate the Islamic insurance business in Pakistan. Since then, international players 
are taking keen interest to initiate Islamic insurance business in Pakistan.582 
Furthermore, the Islamic insurance business in Pakistan entered a new era in the year 
2012. Based on Takaful Rules 2012 issued by SECP, conventional insurance companies can open 
Islamic insurance window. The Takaful Rules 2012 was a step for promoting the industry rapidly 
at the national level, and the masses would have an opportunity to fulfill their insurance needs 
under Sharia.583 
Many players have become more involved in the development of Islamic insurance in 
Pakistan. Based on data provided by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), there were 51 insurance 
companies (7 life insurance, 39 general insurance, and 5 Islamic insurance), with an asset volume 
of PKR876 billion (US$9 billion approximately), by the end of December 2015.584 Assets of the 
insurance sector have shown a stable growth, with a median of 15%, over the 2009-15 period. 
The size of the insurance sector is about 3% of GDP (9/271), showing a huge potential yet to be 
capitalized. 
Despite its open and ‘liberalized’ insurance market, structure of the insurance industry in 
Pakistan had been highly skewed towards state-owned insurance companies. State Life Insurance 
Corporation (SLIC) and National Insurance Company Limited (NICL) constituted 74% of the total 
insurance market, particularly before 2005.  Currently, there are five life insurance companies 
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and 50 general insurance companies in the country. Most of the companies are private, local, 
and foreign insurers. 
The asset volume of 5 Islamic insurance companies was worth of PKR16 billion (99.5 
million USD) by the end of December 2015. The Islamic insurance business has gained 
momentum in Pakistan after 2005 since the promulgation of Takaful Rules 2005 by SECP. Pak-
Kuwait Investment Company (PKIC), a joint venture between Pakistan and Kuwait, started its 
efforts in 2002 to introduce Islamic insurance in the country. Its major shareholders include 
Takaful National of Malaysia (25%), PKIC (30%), Meezan Bank (10%) and others (35%). In 2007, a 
second Islamic insurance company, Takaful Pakistan Limited, started its operations in the 
country. In August 2007, Pak-Qatar Takaful Group obtained two separate licenses from SECP to 
start operations in family as well as in general Islamic insurance business in the country. The size 
of Islamic insurance stream was just about 2% of the insurance sector in Pakistan as of December 
2012.585 
As Malaysia and Indonesia, Islamic insurance products in Pakistan are broadly categorized 
as family and general Islamic insurance business. In addition, seeing the lower purchasing power 
as reflected in low GDP per capita and vast population of the rural areas of Pakistan, there is vast 
scope for micro-Islamic insurance schemes. 
Hanif’s study presents the growth of assets under Islamic insurance in Pakistan during the 
period 2009-2015 showing an increasing trend. It shows that the assets of Islamic insurance 
doubled in three years [2009-11] and were six times more in 2015 than those in 2008. It is 
important to note that during the seven years period (2009-2015), conventional industry assets 
increased to three times only, and the GDP growth rate in the country remained below 5%.586 
This trend shows a significant increase in assets under Islamic insurance than conventional 
insurance, clear evidence of market interest and potential for growth in Islamic insurance in 
Pakistan. 
To conclude, there is an excellent potential for Islamic insurance companies in Pakistan. 
New rules and policies have been promulgated to develop this industry. The growth and 
 





expansion over the seven years of 2009-15 are very healthy; however, profitability during this 
period is extremely low. Pakistan’s share of global Islamic insurance for the year 2015 was 
projected to be US$75 million, which is about 1% of the total global Islamic insurance premium. 
This proportion still quite small as compared to other countries (e.g., Malaysia, Indonesia, USA, 
and the UK).587 
Regulatory framework 
Unlike Malaysia, there is no separate regulation for Islamic insurance in Pakistan. 
Pakistan’s regulatory framework is also different from Indonesia because there are additional 
regulations for Islamic insurance in Pakistan, whereas in Indonesia, both conventional and Islamic 
insurance follow the same regulations. Islamic insurance companies in Pakistan must follow both 
specific regulations on Islamic insurance and general insurance regulation, such as the Insurance 
Ordinance 2000 and Insurance Rules 2002. These rules regulate all insurance business in the 
country, including Islamic insurance business. The Takaful Rules 2005 and later the Takaful rules 
2012 were however made to provide for the additional requirements of Islamic insurance in 
Pakistan.588  
In detail, the Islamic insurance business in Pakistan is regulated by several different 
regulatory regimes from the rules related to establishing a company in general to the law 
specifically on Islamic insurance. Islamic insurance companies have to follow legal requirements 
such as   the Companies Ordinance 1984 (SECP-2002); Companies (Issue of Capital) Rules 1996 
(SECP-1996); The Insurance Ordinance 2000 (SECP-2011); The Insurance Rules2002 (SECP-2002); 
The Takaful Rules 2005 (SECP-2005); The Insurance Companies (Sound and Prudent 
Management) Regulations 2012 (SECP-2012); and Takaful Rules 2012 (SECP-2012). The Takaful 
Rules cover all aspects of Islamic insurance operations from the nature of operating models to 
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In Pakistan, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SECP) is the general overseer for 
both Islamic insurance and conventional insurance operators of the country. As a comparison, 
the oversight functions for the Islamic insurance industry in Malaysia are performed by the 
Malaysian Central Bank (Bank Negara Malaysia) and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). 
Also, to ensure the exercise of self-regulation within the Islamic insurance industry, the Malaysian 
Takaful Association (MTA), which is organized by the operators itself, sets a common standard 
for all Islamic insurance operators to regulate on and control matters concerning the pre-contract 
examination of agents, agency registration systems, code of ethics, and compliance on Islamic 
insurance tariffs. In Indonesia, Law number 40, the year 2014 states that the conventional and 
Islamic insurance businesses are regulated and supervised by the Financial Service Authority (the 
OJK). However, the specific guidelines for Islamic insurance are provided by an autonomous 
Fatwa of Nasional Sharia board of DSN-MUI. DSN-MUI is a non-state institution that issued fatwas 
related to Islamic transaction, including Islamic insurance in Indonesia.590 
The Companies’ Ordinance 1984 governs the corporate sector in Pakistan.591 To start an 
Islamic insurance business, a company must register under Companies’ Ordinance 1984. 
According to this ordinance, a foreign Islamic insurance company with 100% ownership can 
operate in Pakistan by meeting the minimum capital requirement of US$4 million, 50% of which 
must come from abroad. The minimum capital to conduct life insurance business is PKR500 
million, and for general Islamic insurance, it is PKR 300 million, irrespective whether the intended 
business falls under conventional or Islamic insurance sectors, respectively. Upon incorporation, 
the company is required to get itself registered under the Insurance Ordinance (2000) with the 
insurance division of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP). Section 6 of the 
Ordinance (2000) provides detail criteria for all registered insurer, which ensures transparency, 
managerial skills, and justice among the stakeholders.592 
 Also, Islamic insurance company needs to comply with the Takaful Companies’ Rules (of 
2005 and 2012). These rules allow an Islamic insurance company to provide both for conventional 
insurance and Islamic insurance. However, the company cannot provide a different product (life 
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and general). Life insurance must be provided only life insurance Company, which does not 
provide general insurance product (section 4(2) Takaful Rules).593  
The Rules allow for both stand-alone and window Islamic insurance operations (Section 3 
of the Takaful Rules) even though a window operator is required to display this status below the 
company name in its place of business and all other relevant correspondences (section 11). 
Notwithstanding, a conventional insurer may transform itself into an Islamic insurance operator 
upon application to the Commission and meeting certain requirements set out by the 
Commission (Section 7(1). In Pakistan and Indonesia, conventional insurance companies can 
open Islamic insurance window, which is not allowed in Malaysia. In Malaysia, Islamic insurance 
products can only be delivered by Islamic insurance companies.594 
Also, the principal operational model of Islamic insurance is Wakala (for risk 
management) and Mudaraba (for investment); however, Wakala is also allowed for investment 
management.595 Investments must be made according to the Islamic finance principles under the 
supervision of the Sharia board. the Pakistani framework, though not having specific sections 
with limitations, in its definition section (section 2 of the Takaful Rules 2012), necessitates the 
operators to choose between these two models only. Malaysia’s framework is more flexible in 
term of Islamic insurance model compared to Pakistan’s model. Malaysia Islamic insurance 
operators may choose from any of the operating models available worldwide provided the 
operational model has been approved by its Sharia Committee and Board of Directors, but by 
virtue of section 8.2 of the Malaysian Guidelines for Islamic Insurance Operation, the approval of 
the Central Bank must be sought where the Islamic insurance operator wishes to use a model 
which is to be introduced in Malaysia for the first time. The Fatwa from DSN-MUI No: 
21/DSNMUI/X/2001 gives a guideline for Islamic insurance companies in Indonesia to use the 
profit-sharing model of Mudaraba.596 
Establishment of Sharia board and Sharia compliance audit is necessary. Except for a 
detailed criterion for liquidation and distribution of surplus in PTF, in the case of ceasing 
 







operations, a comprehensive accounting and regulatory framework are being laid down by SECP 
to regulate Islamic insurance business in Pakistan.597 The SECP as regulator, has the power to 
appoint its own Sharia Advisory Board which shall formulate policies and guidelines for Sharia 
compliance and resolve differences in Sharia rulings relating to treatment of operational issues 
that may arise amongst Takaful operators Legislation has also included a reference to the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) accounting 
standards. Additionally, a reference to Sharia-compliant filters for investments is cited.598 
An Islamic insurance operator is only required to appoint one Sharia advisor, a Sharia 
compliance auditor, and a Sharia compliance officer. Like in Malaysia and Indonesia, the Sharia 
committee shall consist of members all of whom must have knowledge in Islamic jurisprudence 
and/or Islamic commercial law. However, Pakistan has more paper qualification for the 
committee member. The Sharia advisor needs to have several certifications and degree that show 
the advisor’s knowledge of Islamic finance and Takaful, enough command of the English language 
and knowledge of Pakistani laws. Moreover, any Sharia advisor needs to have at least four years’ 
experience in giving Sharia rulings.599 Furthermore, in order to cover further risk, the rules 2012 
also mentions about the establishment of reinsurance company for Islamic insurance companies. 
As there is no local Islamic Reinsurance Company in Pakistan, The SECP has authorized the 
Pakistan Reinsurance Company Limited (PRCL), a conventional insurance company, to conduct 
window Islamic reinsurance operations.  
There is a considerable difference between Pakistan and the other two countries in 
conflict resolution mechanism. The Pakistan framework gives authority to the SCEP to sets up a 
Dispute Resolution Committee via the Small Disputes Resolution Committee Rules 2015. The 
Committee sits in the major cities of Karachi, Islamabad, Lahore and such other places as may be 
designated by the Commission and has the power to arbitrate disputes arising from individual 
life, domestic and motor insurance policy provided the claim does not exceed one million rupees. 
Also, operators providing micro-Takaful are required to establish an internal dispute resolution 








Commission (Microinsurance Rules) 2013. In Malaysia, the Civil Court under the commercial 
division of the court, referred to as the Muamalat Bench, has been dedicated to solving matters 
in Islamic financial conflicts. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the Religious Court has the authority in 
resolving conflict related to Islamic financial services based on Law number 3-year 2006.600 
Special features and challenges 
In comparison with other countries, there are some unique features and challenges of 
developing Islamic insurance in Pakistan. Throughout its history over the last four decades, 
Pakistan has been stressing on developing an ‘ideal’ and ‘perfect’ alternative of a model from the 
Islamic perspective. It has emphasized more on its legal compliance of Islamic law rather than its 
practicality and economic substance of Islamic economic transaction. The elaborative processes 
within the Council of Islamic Ideology and public debates on what it means to be an Islamic 
system had been the primary concern of developing Islamic model of Islamic insurance. One of 
the indicators of this tendency is its reliance on a good Sharia education and certification rather 
than finance education in developing its human resources. 
Moreover, Islamization intended to have a systemic change within the Pakistani economy. 
A sectoral reform approach had been accused of “dualism and half-heartedness”. This intention 
of having systemic change had been stumbling block for Pakistan to imitate Malaysian model in 
the first place. Creating Islamic alternatives within a ‘non-Islamic’ system was considered by many 
proponents of Islamic system against the mandate of the Constitution.  
Another significant debate in the development of Islamic insurance in Pakistan was the 
issue on who is the provider of Islamic insurance. Many Islamic scholars argued that the state 
was the provider of this service based on their interpretation of Islamic law. Being non-profit, 
mutual, and public had been continuously articulated by the scholars as to the features of Islamic 
insurance model of Pakistan. Only recently, the scholars have started to accept the involvement 
of the private sector. They start to mobilize the Pakistani masses in a bottom-up approach 






top-down from the state level and bottom-up involving and inculcating the private sector, 
especially the agricultural sector and the cottage industries in Pakistan.601 
Nevertheless, the current regulatory framework of Islamic insurance in Pakistan relies 
heavily on the role of the state to provide the guideline, supervise, and resolve conflict. The SECP, 
which was established in 1999, is the primary regulator and market enabler in the development 
of Islamic insurance in Pakistan. This centralized feature helps to avoid disagreements in the 
implementation of Islamic insurance as experienced in the previous decades. However, it also 
has given an overwhelming burden for this institution. Many critics argue that the SECP has 
performed well in providing regulations but lack of human resources capability in its overall 
governance of Islamic finance in Pakistan.602 
Moreover, private-based Islamic insurance is still considered as an auxiliary of the Islamic 
welfare system, which has always been promoted by the politicians during each general election. 
Zakat and Ushr are still the main tools for the government to give economic assistance to the 
poor population. In addition, in 2015, Pakistan has launched the Prime Minister's National Health 
Insurance Program (PMNHIP), which aims to provide health insurance to low-income families in 
23 provinces. Through the scheme, they will be given health cards covering them for up to 
Rs50,000 (US$477) of treatment in public or private hospitals, including emergencies, maternity 
care, post-hospital treatment and even transportation costs.603 The Islamic welfare system is still 
the dominant political program as this program provide a short-term political outcome compared 
to overhauling the entire social security framework into a more efficient system. This feature will 
be elaborated further in the upcoming section when discussing ‘political life’ of Islamic insurance 
in Pakistan. 
In overall market assessment, Islamic insurance business in Pakistan still has a low market 
share, although growing at a faster pace. The past financial performance appears to be weak, 
though with significant potential depicted by healthy growth. After the enactment of The Takaful 
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Rules 2005 and later the Takaful rules 2012, and the establishment of SECP in 1999, Pakistan has 
a reasonably good regulatory framework in place. Also, the market sentiments are still mixed 
about Islamic insurance in Pakistan, as many still hardly see the difference between conventional 
insurance and Islamic insurance.604 Pakistan’s Islamic finance industry in general and Islamic 
insurance sector in particular needs to educate the public through different venues and platforms 
about the differences in conventional and Islamic financial industry. 
Islamic insurance in a divisive nation 
Zia-ul-Haq thought Islam could be a unifying force for the multinational country of 
Pakistan. However, this state-sponsored Islamization opened sectarian fissures within a far from 
monolithic Pakistani Islam. Islam was, however, less effective in providing a cohesive national 
force than Zia anticipated. According to Ian Talbot, one of the prominent historians in Pakistan 
history, the most significant tension of all was between the state legalistic imposition of Islam 
and the humanist tradition of Sufism.605 Although we can dispute the notions of legal Islam vis a 
vis humanist tradition provided by Talbot, we can agree  that ‘Islam’ is a contested concept in 
Pakistan. Each Islamist group in Pakistan consciously promote their understanding of Islam as 
valid Islam. 
At the same time, there was no incentive for the government to promote private-based 
Islamic insurance as the underlying assumption for the state behind the Islamization was having 
the redistributive policies that can give an immediate impact of growing state’s capacity, and by 
implication, deepen its penetration of society. Islamization in Pakistan’s politics can be described 
as continuous tension between the expansion of state power and social resistance to it.  
This section examines coalitional politics behind Pakistan’s slow development in Islamic 
insurance. The main problem for developing Islamic insurance in Pakistan was even though 
Pakistan is officially an Islamic state; there has been no consensus on how to put Islam into 
practical programs. The country has been experiencing continuous legal battles over 
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interpretation and bureaucratic neglect by post-Zia administrations who had continued to 
emasculate Islamization project. Moreover, the obsession of political actors in Pakistan, 
particularly the Islamic parties, toward the idea of ‘Islamic State’ as an unnegotiable package of 
Islamization necessitates all reforms start from and by the state (étatisme). As a result, all 
discussions regarding Islamizing insurance sector in Pakistan had always been translated in the 
term of the Islamic welfare state. In comparison, the Islamists of Malaysia and Indonesia have 
been moving from state-centric reform toward the market and civil society channels due to their 
respective political environments. 
Contention over operationalizing Islam 
Muslims agree that the Quran condemns usury, but do not all agree over what the 
meaning of the term is.606 Most Pakistanis agree that usury is any interest on the debt; others 
believe Quran refers to unethical loans that unfairly enrich the lender and not interest charged 
under state-regulated banking practices. The economists, bankers, politicians, and bureaucrats 
who would be responsible to administer the conventional economic system are the ones who 
usually hold the second view mentioned before.  
Meanwhile, Jamat-e-Islami and other Islamist group, with financial support from Saudi 
Arabia, have advocated the elimination of any interest on the debt and organized numerous 
symposia to elaborate and develop concepts and practices of the interest-free economy. 
According to Khurshid Ahmad, the Pakistani intellectual and proponent of this movement, the 
concept of Islamic economics, including Islamic insurance, is an essential part of the very concept 
of Pakistan. The Objectives Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1949, 
and the Constitution of Pakistan contains essential elements of the vision of Islamic economics.607 
It means there is a mandate to establish an Islamic system of economy. Moreover, the aspiration 
of establishing Nizam-i-Mustafa or Islamic system in Pakistan has always been present in every 
politicians’ rhetoric across the ideological spectrum and throughout Pakistan modern political 
history. However, the Islamization reforms have had only a minor impact on political, legal, social, 
 





and economic institutions of the state and Islamic insurance was left far behind. The main reason 
was the continuous contention over what constitutes Islamization itself.  
Muhammad Iqbal and Ali Jinnah provided the imagination of an independent Muslim 
state and the need to revive Islam as a complete system of life, however it was Sayyid Abul A’la 
Maududi (1903-1979) and Jamaat-e-Islami (established in 1941) who articulated how Islamic 
revivalism could be brought about in political, social, cultural, and economic arenas. He 
attempted to make the religion more operational to mobilize the masses. On the Indian 
subcontinent, Maududi has been hailed as the person who established the economics of Islam as 
a separate branch of knowledge.608  
Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, was a journalist and activist who was 
sympathetic to Indian nationalism initially, but then began to blame nationalism for dividing 
Muslims. After partition, Maududi chose to come to Pakistan and brought a faction of the Jamaat-
e-Islami to Pakistan, and along with other prominent Islamic clergy tried to establish a political 
role in the new state of Pakistan. Jamaat-e-Islami made the achievement of an Islamic 
Constitution in the land of Pakistan its central goal.609  
Jamaat-e-Islami is ‘an ideological party’ whose mission, according to Article 4 of the 
party’s constitution, is the: “establishment of Divine Order or the Islamic way of life in its entirety, 
in individual and collective life, and whether it pertains to prayers or fasting, Haj or Zakat, 
socioeconomic or political issues of life.”610 For Jamaat-e-Islami, being Muslim means both 
performing the religious rituals and improving the social life. 
One of the prominent experts on Jamaat-e-Islami, Humeira Iqtidar, describes this party as 
a Leninist cadre-based party; Maududi’s focus on ideology, ideological training, and structured 
organizational management with the modernist aspirations of removing the backward traditions, 
which are considered to be influenced by local customs and feudalism.  From its ideological roots, 
Jamaat-e-Islami moved into a more political phase when Maududi decided that the party would 
participate in Pakistan’s 1958 national elections. However, the party did not gain much political 
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success until 1977 with the arrival of General Zia-ul-Haq in a military coup that overthrew Prime 
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. With Zia as their patron, Jamaat-e-Islami together with other 
Islamists group started introducing their concept of Islamization through state’s apparatus. 
Islamic economics, including the idea of Islamic insurance, grew naturally from the Islamic 
revival and political Islam such as the Jamaat-e-Islami whose adherents considered Islam to be a 
complete system of life in all its aspects, rather than a spiritual formula and believed that it 
logically followed that Islam must have an economic system, unique from and superior to non-
Islamic economic systems. According to them, through the Islamic economic system, the gap 
between the rich and the poor will be reduced and prosperity enhanced by such means as the 
discouraging of the hoarding of wealth, taxing wealth (through Zakat) but not trade, exposing 
lenders to risk through profit sharing and venture capital. Islamic system does not allow 
speculation and other activities that bring benefits to certain individuals and bring damage to the 
society.611 
Compared to the Islamic economics version of the Iranian revolution, Jamaat-e-Islami was 
more relax regarding private ownership. Jamaat-e-Islami were opposing the state’s land reform 
policy and did not support nationalization program. They did not call for public ownership of land 
and large industrial enterprise. However, they advocated on large public sector and public 
subsidy policies (utilities, public transport, health care, energy resources such as oil, and unused 
farmland).612 
 The main achievement of the clergy and the Islamic parties in Islamizing Pakistan’s 
economy was the establishment of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) and the Federal Sharia 
Court (FSC) of Pakistan. The Council of Islamic Ideology was established for the purpose of 
advising the government about bringing its laws and provisions into conformity with the 
injunctions of Islam. CII made numerous recommendations that interest should be eliminated in 
Pakistan as it is forbidden by Sharia.  
In 1977, CII was entrusted by the next president of Pakistan, Zia-ul-Haq, with the task of 







with specific goal of eradicating interest from the economy. As a result, the issue of interest or 
usury gained central issue in country’s policy arena. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) appointed a 
panel of economists and bankers in November 1977 to assist the Council in the delicate task of 
finding ways and means to eliminate interest from the financial institutions and re-model 
(Islamize) Pakistan’s economy. CII submitted several reports and made several recommendations 
to transform the socio-political and economic system into a system conforming to the tenets of 
the Sharia. Those included the reports and recommendations on Islamic insurance as discussed 
earlier.  
The Federal Sharia Court (FSC) was established in 1980 also during the Zia-ul-Haq regime. 
The FSC office is in the federal capital, Islamabad. It is a prestigious court which has the power to 
examine and determine whether the laws of the country comply with Islamic Sharia law. Beside 
these two institutions, the declaration of Pakistan as an Islamic Republic in 1953 was also the 
result of the struggle of these Islamic parties.  
The Islamic parties, including Jamaat-e-Islami have not become the force in politics it had 
hoped to be and only achieved a minor result in the elections. It is partly because there was no 
massive support from most of the Muslim population. A majority of Sunni Pakistanis are the 
Barelvis or traditionalists, which have traditional religious attitudes and resistance toward the 
modernist agenda offered by the Deobandis group such as Jamaat-e-Islami. Also, Maududi’s 
insistence on a cadre-based system and his desire to control the organization meant that while 
his writings influenced many and found avid readers across North India, the Jamaat-e-Islami 
remained a small, relatively tight-knit group for many decades after its inception. Indeed, the 
Jamaat-e-Islami can be considered as the best example of Leninist party in terms of its 
organizational structure and modus operandi.613 Nevertheless, Islamic parties have continued to 
have an influence in Pakistani politics due to the patronage received under Zia-ul-Haq. The 
Islamization Program of Zia-ul-Haq, Islamization amendments in Pakistan’s Constitution, and the 






On the other spectrum, Islamization was not defined as an establishment of an Islamic 
state. The aspiration for Islamization was expressed in the leftist idiom of ‘Islamic Socialism’ and 
not in term of Sharia implementation in Pakistan. From 1970 to 1977 West Pakistan was under 
the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). PPP advocated a program 
compounded of agricultural and industrial reform and the promulgation of a new constitution 
which defined Pakistan as an Islamic socialist republic. The president and prime minister were to 
be Muslims, and laws were to conform with Islam as determined by the Council of the Islamic 
clergy.614 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with PPP had laid a foundation to use Islam in addressing the nation’s 
unbalanced economic development. PPP’s Foundation Documents, authored by J.A. Rahim and 
Mubashir Hasan, stated the intention to merge Islam with socialist ideas and liberal democratic 
values. They claimed that this attempt, of so-called ‘Islamic Socialism’ would serve the interests 
of the masses, not the capitalists, it was said, had pillaged the country and left people more 
destitute that during the period of colonialism.615  
 Moreover, Bhutto attempted to transcend Islam in Pakistan from merely personal piety 
into a pragmatic religion. For instance, Bhutto interpreted Jihad as synonymous with the idea of 
Islamic Socialism. Jihad was interpreted as applying to everyday human struggle the dedication 
of abolishing artificial distinctions and making righteousness the criterion of honor among men 
and establishing a democratic and egalitarian social order.616 Bhutto adapted socialist 
expressions of the charismatic Mao Zedong by saying that the party’s purpose was social change 
based on Islamic teachings, not a socialist revolution. 
 Furthermore, Bhutto used this idea to threaten or reduce the power of his political 
adversaries, particularly in the metropolitan centers. Thus, Bhutto did not hesitate to nationalize 
the economy and conduct land reform. Since 1976, Bhutto extended his earlier nationalization 
program when he ordered the government to take control of all cotton-ginning, paddy-husking, 
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and flour milling. Bhutto’s actions were pleasing to many farmers in the rural areas but generated 
resentment in the broader public.617 
Bhutto argued that his Islamic Socialism was not communism. Islamic Socialism 
acknowledged the right to private property but always be subordinate to the interests of the 
community. His socialist regime, it was said, would never threaten Islamic tradition, and it was 
often repeated that no law would be enacted that was repugnant to Islam.618 
 Although he was not religious himself, Bhutto showed his support to Islamic causes by 
the promulgation of 1973 Constitution. Considering the previous experience, the Constitution of 
the 1973 was more Islamic in character than the previous ones. Under Bhutto leadership, PPP 
framed a Constitution that true to the aspirations of people and principles of Islam. The 
Constitution of 1973 recognized Islam as the religion of the country and enjoined upon the State 
to serve the cause of Islam and to bring all existing laws in conformity with Islam. The Islamic 
Advisory Council (later, was re-designated as Council of Islamic Ideology) was set up to 
recommend ways and means to bring existing laws of the country in conformity with the Islamic 
principles. The Constitution explicitly requires the state to take necessary steps for the 
prosecution of social justice, and eradication of social evils, such as prostitution, gambling and 
taking of harmful drugs, and pornography. 
 Despite his effort to soften his socialist programs with Islamic idioms, the clergy and the 
religious political parties like Jamaat-e-Islami and JUP were continue opposing his idea of Islamic 
Socialism. They argued that Bhutto had the intention to implement his ideas in the same pattern 
as practiced in China. Bhutto’s ideas were also considered to be secular based on Western 
worldview. At that time, the religious parties had only 18 members in National Assembly, but this 
tiny group had a stronger voice in the Assembly and support among the population concerning 
Islamic issues. Many people were convinced that Bhutto economic program as merely an Islam-
coated socialism, instead of a genuine Islamization of Pakistan economy. 
Despite little success in the general elections, Islamic parties have continued to influence 
Pakistani politics. This continuous effort obtained enormous support by Zia-ul-Haq who thought 
 





that Islam could be a unifying force for the divisive nation of Pakistan. After the removal of Bhutto 
government in 1977, General Zia became the patron of Islamization in Pakistan and for the first 
time in the country’s history, opened the bureaucracy, the military, and various state institutions 
to Islamic parties. 
Islamic reforms accelerated during the beginning of the Zia regime. However, this state-
sponsored Islamization opened further sectarian fissures within a far from monolithic Pakistani 
Islam.619 Islamization, which means putting Islamic ideas into practical programs, including in 
economy, received challenges from many fronts.  
It was different compared to the Islamization of Iran during the 1979 Revolution. In Iran, 
the Islamist force agreed to develop a new form of the Sharia that is modern and more adapted 
to the contemporary world. Meanwhile, there was no consensus like that in Pakistan. The 
different Islamist groups in Pakistan cannot agree on which form of the Sharia they wanted to 
implement. There were different structure and process that happened in those two countries. 
While Iran has a unitary and centralized form of Shia Islam that has been established by an empire 
for hundreds of years. Pakistan has a diverse form of Sunni Islam and tension between Sunni and 
Shia Islam.620 This continuous contention over operationalizing Islam has led the actions of 
executive authority to postpone several times the project of the complex Islamization of the 
banking and insurance sectors, and the economy as a whole. 
A ‘providing state’ in an Islamic patrimonial system 
Beside the contention mentioned above, there was little incentive for the Pakistani state 
to support the development of private-based Islamic insurance within a ‘patronage to kinship’ 
economy of the country. The underlying assumption behind the Islamization project since the 
1980s was in an Islamic setting, state will be responsible for fulfilling the needs of every citizen 
with enough protection against any worries. “Islamization” of redistribution or the creation of an 
Islamic patrimonial within a concept of Islamic welfare system has been the state’s essential tool 







groups. Therefore, the redistributive policies such as the implementation of Zakat and Ushr, and 
not private-based Islamic insurance, were the backbone of Zia’s Islamization project of Pakistan.  
Zia Ul-Haq regime inherited weak economic indicators from Z.A. Bhutto in term of 
growing debt servicing and declining GDP growth. However, Zia managed to avert those 
indicators due to generous western aid to the tune of $ 3.2 billion from the US after Soviet 
interference in Afghanistan in 1979 and increasing volume of remittances from $ 0.5 in 1978 to 
$ 3.2 billion in early 1980s.621  It helped greatly to stimulate growth increase in GDP to 6.6% from 
5% during Bhutto period. Under the jargon of Islamization, Zia regime also brought shift form 
socialist economy of nationalization to capitalist economy. Zia regime gave a major role to private 
sector in the process of growth.622 
The government employed and adopted many recommendations by professionals, 
engineers, and economists to meet the goals of economic reforms. The new policy relied upon 
building private-sector and enterprises to achieve economic goals. Under a new policy, the 
private-sector investment grew from ~33% in 1980 to ~44% in 1989.623 However, Zia’s economic 
development was still dominated by étatisme, a policy which started since 1958 emphasizing on 
the state’s dominant role in directing industrialization through licensing practices and subsidies. 
Several industries were privatized but not banks and insurance that were kept under 
government-ownership management. At the time of independence in 1947, 84 insurance 
companies were operative in Pakistan, but the insurance industry was nationalized in 1972, and 
merged into State Life of Pakistan and only in the 1990s, the financial reforms allowed private 
and foreign companies to establish their business in the insurance sector.624  
The reason for not changing the status quo of insurance was the political importance of 
redistributive policies for both Zia and Jamaat-e-Islami. Although, Zia’s new economic policy 
focused on liberalization of the economy, it fell under the Islamization program, which aimed for 
the creation of an Islamic welfare system. The new Islamic ordinances, particularly on the 
religious taxes which were promulgated since 1979, absorbed the liberalization of the economy 
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under a new economic system. According to Nasr, these redistributive policies was essential for 
the close alliance between the military-led by General Zia and the Islamic parties.625 
Moreover, Nasr argues that the core issue of Pakistani politics has always been the 
expansion of the (weak) state power and social resistance to it. In “weak state,” autonomy of 
state institutions cannot be preserved, and as a result, industrial policy making and relations 
between public and private sectors become directly reducible to pursuit of private interest.626 
Redistributive policy is a way for the state to gain power and legitimacy among the people. 
In addition, in pre-capitalist society such as Pakistan, redistribution and gift giving are 
essential in buying political loyalty. As the state of Pakistan has been fundamentally weak since 
its inception, in order to contend with powerful ‘feudal’ alliance and other political actors, the 
state needs to rely on redistributive policies in order to increase its capacity and influences. 
Therefore, redistributive policies either in the form of land reform, or Zakat during Islamization 
of Zia-ul-Haq were very significant in strengthening state capacity against those diverse social 
forces.627  
In Pakistan, land reform has been the primary vehicle for redistributive policies. Since its 
independence, the Pakistani state had become dependent on the landed elite and their networks 
of authority to maintain order in rural areas; so much that they had been integrated into state 
organization. The state was, therefore, hard-pressed to push through meaningful land reforms. 
Ayub Khan (1959-69) and Z. A. Bhutto (1971-77) introduced only modest land reforms—after the 
two land reforms of 1959 and 1972 still 30 percent of Pakistan’s farmlands were owned by 0.5 
percent of the landowners.628  
Zia ul-Haq, backed by Islamist parties, opposed land reform programs of previous 
regimes. Zia needed to find another mean of redistributive policy, which consistent with the ideas 
and interests of his supporters. As a new military regime, Zia was under pressure from the 
powerful anti-Bhutto alliance (landowners and the Islamist parties) to undo Bhutto’s socialist 
policies, including land reforms and nationalization. To compensate for this shortcoming, the 
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state has sought to promote equity through other channels, including taking over religious lands 
and endowments, and the collection of religious taxes and distribution of the proceeds. By the 
end of the 1980s, the distribution of religious taxes approximated the level of all government 
subsidies, which shows how central Islamization measures have become to the state’s 
redistribution policies.629 
During the first years of his rule (1977-84), Zia co-opted Islamic forces to balance the 
power of the landed elite. Zia showed strong pro-Islamic stance by reintroducing traditional 
Islamic punishments, prohibiting gambling and alcohol consumption, and creating a new judicial 
review system. Moreover, Zia sought to introduce a number of distributive programs as part of 
his Islamization package. These were designed both to aid the poor, and to consolidate the state’s 
control over Islamic institutions—a continuation of the policy first introduced by Ayub Khan in 
1959. This control would extend the state’s presence to the private sphere.  
Zia introduced the system of Zakat, which is the Islamic requirement that Muslims share 
their wealth with the less fortunate members of the community. Pursuant to his zakat ordinance, 
monies derived by the government were to be divided into three parts: a local account, provincial 
account, and a central account. Such funds were earmarked for community use and were 
intended to spark development schemes from the village upwards. A hierarchy of control boards 
was created to administer zakat collections, and Zia also appointed an Administrator-General to 
oversee the entire program making him directly answerable to the President.  
 This mandatory religious tax was enforced in 1980, which applied to saving accounts and 
other investment at the rate of 2.5% per annum. In addition, there was mandatory 10% tax called 
Ushr that applied on the farm harvests and imported products. Ushr laid the foundation for an 
Islamic welfare state, and that funds generated by ushr would be used to expand Pakistani 
industry, construct pukka roads, and build modern state-of-the-art hospitals. Also, the monies 
collected through the Islamization program would help social services for all Muslims, Sunnis and 
Shia alike.630 
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 However, there was a strong reaction came from the country’s Shia community, which 
claimed that zakat tax was a Sunni Muslim contrivance and that they had their own collection 
practices. The Shia argued that their religious observances had been undermined by the 
ordinance, and that it exposed the community to the manipulative capabilities of the majority 
Sunnis. At the height of the controversy, a Shia group had stormed the Federal Secretariat in 
Islamabad and had held it hostage for three days when the government refused to answer their 
complaints. Following that episode, and not wanting to further excite religious passions, Zia 
exempted the Shia from the otherwise obligatory rule.631  
During Zia’s Islamization, the state coalesces with social force (the Islamists) using Islam 
as the symbol. For Zia, Islamization of economy was not meant to implement Islamic rulings in 
economic transaction including insurance, but it was primarily as a disguise of a new 
redistributive policies. This strategy strengthened the state against the strong kinship networks 
of the feudal class, and at the same time, presented Zia’s government as an Islamic government. 
As a military officer without feudal kinship support, Zia tried to find support from the Islamic 
clergy and general public with his Islamic redistributive policies of Zakat and Ushr.  
In addition, the state’s takeover of the collection and distribution of religious taxes was 
aimed at improving social welfare, but also to help the government’s budget deficits. In fact, since 
1988 Zakat and Ushr funds have been officially integrated into the government revenue accounts. 
In sum, Zia used Islamization more as a strategy to strengthen the state power rather than simply 
an honest aspiration or reviving Islamic laws in Pakistan economy as the clergy and Islamic parties 
suggested.  
At the same time, the Islamist parties of Jamaat-e-Islami was continuously holding the 
idea of ‘the Islamic state’ in their political imagination. It was the imagination of the ability of 
particular institutions associated with the state in managing and directing individual behavior.632 
Any kind of Islamic reform had to be conducted through the instrument of the state. It is the state 
and no other institutions, including market, can tackle this task. It is a type of statism, which is 
the belief that the state should control either economic or social policy, or both, to some degree. 
 





Therefore, controlling the state was the primary objective of any Islamic reforms promulgated at 
that time.  
Zia’s Islamization of economy program was translated in as creating welfare system where 
state will be responsible to fulfill the needs of every citizens with an enough protection against 
any economic difficulties. For many Islamic intellectuals and activists, it was absolutely unjustified 
not to term the Islamic state as a welfare state. The economic implication of this comprehensive 
welfare concept is that the Islamic state is responsible for eradicating poverty and creating 
conditions for full employment and a high rate of growth and also arranging social security and 
foster equitable distribution of income and wealth. 
The debate within the Council of Islamic Ideology on Islamization of insurance had shown 
the insistence of the clergy for having the state as the primary provider of economic protection. 
The Council recommended that the Islamic insurance business shall be conducted by an 
autonomous, non-profit, state organization. Moreover, they were strictly of the view that the 
insurance business should be based on mutual help and without any intention of making profit, 
therefore the Council did not find any of the experiences of Islamic insurance companies of that 
time suitable to be adopted for Pakistan. The Council was of the view that any insurance 
arrangement, which was not of the mutual type, will not be acceptable in Islam. Only in the 
Council’s recommendations of year 1992 showed its flexibility regarding private insurance. The 
Council recommended that the business of Islamic insurance be run by the public sector, so the 
government may take the responsibility of running this requirements and details according to 
Islamic law as suggested by the Council. If the above requirements can be guaranteed, Islamic 
insurance business can also be run by private and semi-government corporations 
Besides, the primacy of the idea of Islamic welfare state gave political benefit to the 
Islamist parties. “Islamization” of redistribution has by itself Islamized national politics to the 
advantage of Islamic groups. Throughout the 1950s the Jammat-e-Islami helped galvanize 
support for the landed elite against land reform by underscoring the sanctity of private property. 
The alliance was able to undo the government’s plans. Adversely, the problem of rural poverty 
and the socioeconomic position of the landed elite too elicited a response from Islamic groups. 




Zia included Islamic parties in the drafting of Zakat and Ushr ordinances and gave them access to 
various state resources. Religious leaders then became one of primary actors in promoting rural 
development projects and rural development. As a result, the redistributive policies were used 
to increase popular support toward the Islamic groups and gave these groups more access to the 
state’s policies. However, the reliance on the idea of Islamic welfare state had stalled the 
development of private sector in Pakistan, thus there were no Islamic insurance companies prior 
to the year 2004.  
The Zakat and Ushr laws may have helped the state’s revenues and to a modest extent 
contributed to its provision of social welfare, but only after exacting a steep political cost in terms 
of entrenching Islamization in state policy and national politics, fanning the flames of sectarian 
conflict, and expanding state capacity.633 Eventually the increase in the capacity of the state 
through Islamization would also bring about tensions in the relations between the state and its 
Islamic allies. The Islamic parties were increasingly unhappy with the increase in the state’s 
control of Islamic institutions.  
It is important to note that Islamization has been a manifestation of deep-seated struggles 
between the weak and developing Pakistan state and powerful social forces. As such, 
Islamization’s impact on Pakistan’s economy must be gauged in terms of the extent to which it 
has facilitated the state’s penetration of the society and control of the economy.634 In 
comparison, Mahathir of Malaysia encouraged Islamic insurance in a way that consistent with 
Malaysia’s economic liberalization agenda. Supporting Islamic insurance was a political way of 
demonstrating that Mahathir and UMNO remain connected with their constituents’ Islamic 
roots, and at the same time, building a working Islamic insurance-backed economy, especially 
one without heavy state subsidies, would reinforce the transformation toward a modern and 
entrepreneurial Malay society. On the contrary, in Pakistan the underlying assumption behind 
Islamization was having the redistributive policies that can give an immediate impact of growing 
state’s capacity. “Islamization” of redistribution—creation of an Islamic patrimonial and/or 
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welfare system—has by itself Islamized national politics to the advantage of both Zia regime and 
Islamic groups.  
In summary, the Pakistani state’s emphasis on state redistribution by using Islamic 
institutions reflects its desire to gain public acquiescence to its domination in the same fashion 
as it has been extended to the landed elite and their kinship network. Domination in pre-capitalist 
society largely occurred in various forms. It can be in acts of generosity and distribution of 
resources were reciprocated by loyalty. As the state sought to replace traditional elite, the state 
was compelled to contemplate a similar normative order, but one in which state institutions 
would extend generosity and receive loyalty. According to Nasr, as the state of Pakistan 
implements redistributive policies of religious taxes, and not empowering market through state 
support of private-based institutions, its capacity grows. By implication, its penetration of 
Pakistani society deepens.635   
From failed co-optation to negligence 
There were series of attempt to co-opt Islamization ideas and Islamic forces throughout 
Pakistan history, but all failed. General Ayub Khan and Pervez Musharraf tried modernizing the 
country by implementing secular nationalist model like Turkish republic. General Zia-ul-Haq 
made effort to co-opt Islamization demand and unite Pakistan through enforced adherence to a 
stricter and more puritanical form of Islam mixed with Pakistani nationalism. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 
founder of the Pakistani People’s Party and civilian ruler of Pakistan in 1970s, for his part tried to 
rally the Pakistani masses behind him with a program of anti-elitist economic populism of ‘Islamic 
socialism’, also mixed with Pakistani nationalism. 636  
To stay in power Z.A. Bhutto was compelled to devise a new strategy. He actively 
championed Islamization in the hope of co-opting a part of the opposition. Bhutto made further 
concessions to Islamic morality, such as prohibiting alcohol and gambling. In addition, he initiated 
the establishment of the Council of Islamic Ideology under the supervision of Mufti Mahmud. The 
task of this Council was to oversee the implementation of government-sponsored Islamization. 
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Indeed, the ‘secular’ government of Bhutto was the one who started the Islamization process in 
Pakistan. This concession for Islamization was also influenced by the fact of Pakistan became 
increasingly dependent to oil rich Arab states for loans, commerce, and employment of labor. 
However, the Islamic parties did not fully support this initiative due to their rejection of the heavy 
influence of socialism in the practice of Islamization. The PPP eventually was defeated in July 
1977 by demonstrations and the intervention of the army. 
The new military regime, led by General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88) and influenced by the 
Jamaat-e-Islami, again attempted to base its authority on a strong pro-Islamic stance. The 
government reintroduced traditional Islamic punishments, prohibited gambling and alcohol 
consumption, and created a new judicial review system. More importantly, the government of 
Zia-ul-Haq pushed further Islamic economy ideas into practice. Zia introduced the redistributive 
system of Zakat and Islamization of banking system to be implemented in Pakistan.  
Zia’s Islamization established approximately 7,000 interest-free counters at all the 
nationalized commercial banks in January 1980, making Pakistan the first country in the Muslim 
world with the largest number of Islamic banking.637 However, although the attempt at the 
Islamization of the economy was initially started under the umbrella of the constitution, the 
constitutional authorities were never persuaded to take the implications of these efforts 
seriously, except in the implementation of religious taxes of Zakat and Ushr. 
In 1979, Zia’s government declared that the enforcement of an interest-free Islamic 
economic system would be completed within a three-year time frame. However, this very same 
government on June 25th, 1980, limited the jurisdiction of Federal Sharia Court for a period of 
three years from entertaining any petition to consider fiscal issues including bank interest. With 
the exception of establishing the Council of Islamic Ideology, the Zia government did not contrive 
firm provisions and effective strategic policies for facilitating the Islamization process of the 
economy.638  
One of the reasons for the lack of support from Zia’s government toward the Islamization 
promoted by the clergy and Islamic parties was due to the miniscule results by Islamic parties in 
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the 1985 national elections. In this election, Jamaat-e-Islami won only 10 of the 68 seats it 
contested in the National Assembly and 13 of the 102 for various provincial assemblies. With 
Jamaat-e-Islami proving to be less of a force than expected on the national stage, Zia’s support 
for the party and its Islamization agenda waned.  
Benazir, the daughter or late Zulfiqar Bhutto from the left-wing party of PPP, campaigned 
strenuously against Zia’s Islamization both before and after Zia’s death in 1988. Benazir criticized 
the “anti-female” bias in the Zia’s Islamization program, and this theme became a major issue of 
the PPP campaign in 1988. This campaign strategy was successful in bringing Benazir to the 
power. 
Subsequent to the election, however, the issue of Islamic reform has faded from center-
stage. Although, her ‘anti-Zia’s Islamization’ campaign contributed to her victory, Benazir’s 
government had done little to hinder the operation of the Islamization as implemented by Zia. 
Her administration has not dismantled the Federal Sharia Court nor the Sharia Appellate Bench 
of the Supreme Court. 
Benazir’s administration was constrained from dismantling Zia’s Islamic reforms due to 
its narrow electoral mandate. She had been well-advised to moderate her opposition to 
Islamization as directly challenging the reform would entail considerable political costs to her 
administration. Her administration continued to incrementally emasculate through bureaucratic 
neglect the already anemic program that she inherited from her predecessor.639 
Nawaz Sharif became the 12th Prime Minister of Pakistan on 1 November 1990, 
succeeding Bhutto. The subsequent government manifested a similar attitude except for its 
establishment of the Commission for Islamization of the Economy (CIE) in June 1991 to promote 
Islamic Banking. Furthermore, the ruling government of Nawaz Sharif challenged the 1991 FSC 
judgment on riba in the Supreme Court. The government contended that bank interest is not riba 
and that it was utterly impossible to run the economy without interest in present day 
circumstances. 640 
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Islamization, which means putting Islamic ideas into practical programs including in 
economy, received challenges from many fronts. Between Muslim groups, there has been 
unrelenting debate on what exactly Islam says on the matters: Zakat, Ushr, Islamic insurance, etc. 
Furthermore, there has been series of legal battles over the interpretation of Islamic laws. This 
continuous contention over operationalizing Islam has led the actions of executive authority to 
postpone several times the project of the complex Islamization of the banking and insurance 
sectors, and the economy as a whole. 
The divisive political environment of Pakistan made the issue of Islamization of the 
Pakistani economy becoming a very salient policy issue, where a large number of actors feels that 
the issue affects them, and that the political system is a way to address the issue. Moreover, 
rather than debating regulation on accounting practices, setting utility rates, and premium rates, 
the issue is always associated with ideology and political interests. Unlike in Indonesia and 
Malaysia with their State or Central Bank, there was no institution that strong enough to solve 
the differences. In Pakistan, the realization of the Islamic economic model was entrusted to the 
Council of Islamic Ideology, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, and the Federal Sharia Court, while the 
State Bank appeared on a roadside of this process and was content with technical functions.  This 
represents the dominance of the ulama (Islamic clergy) and Islamist political parties in the 
Islamization agenda in Pakistan.  
Furthermore, a critical study on the performance of Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SECP) who is responsible to regulate the insurance industry in Pakistan founds that there is 
evidence of partial degree of institutionalized corruption which led to the questioning the 
credibility and competence of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan as their 
rightful regulator. This shows the high level of distrust toward state institution due to the 
relationship-based culture that motivates corrupt behavior.641 
The main problem for the developing Islamic insurance in Pakistan was despite the fact 
that Pakistan is officially an Islamic state, there has been no consensus on how to put Islam into 
practical programs. Both Z. A. Bhutto and Zia regimes tried to co-opt the pressure of Islamization 
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from the Islamic groups but failed. Pakistani state was too weak to achieve this even if it wanted 
too-as Zia-ul-Haq’s failed Islamization demonstrated. Moreover, the obsession of political actors 
in Pakistan, particularly the Islamic parties, toward the idea of ‘Islamic state’ as an unnegotiable 
package of Islamization necessitates all reforms start from and by the state (étatisme). As a result, 
all discussions regarding Islamizing insurance sector in Pakistan had been always translated in 
term of Islamic welfare state as history of Council of Islamic ideology has documented. In 
comparison, the Islamists of Malaysia and Indonesia have been moving from state-centric reform 
toward market and civil society channels due to their respective political environments. 
Beyond the textual argument and ideologies, it was also battling overpower and interests. 
The post-Zia administrations continued to incrementally emasculate Islamization project as they 
could not abort it due to its high political cost. Simultaneously, there was no political incentive 
for government to promote Islamic insurance as it has little political benefit for them. 
Consequently, Pakistan has been experiencing continuous legal battles over interpretation and 
bureaucratic neglect of Islamization project until the present. Consequently, the Islamic 
insurance Industry in Pakistan suffers from absence of standardization that affects their business 
especially companies with cross-border selling.  
Tribal Islam and conservative attitude toward Islamic insurance 
This section addresses the issue of why Pakistani society resists Islamic reform or even 
the best-designed and best-intentioned attempt at reform and positive development such as the 
establishment of Islamic insurance. There had been constant radical top-down efforts to 
transform the country. After Jinnah, various leaders came up with their novel ideas of reforming 
Islam. Ayub Khan introduced ‘modern’ Islam, whereas Zulfikar Bhutto came up with his version 
of a ‘socialist’ Islam. The ‘fundamentalist’ version Islam became dominant under Zia military 
regime. Benazir Bhutto came and put down the radical tone of Islamization and introduced the 
‘compromising’ Islam. Lastly, Nawaz Sharif wanted to boost the private sector under the 




conditions but they could not stay long enough to continue the reform because there was no 
political support outside their respective feudal and kinship networks.642 
Like Indonesia, Pakistan has levels of socioeconomic problems which would seem to be a 
fertile ground for a mass reformist movement in the name of Islam. Also, it has inherited from 
India before 1947 on of the leading intellectual traditions of Islamist modernism and reformism. 
However, the ‘reformed types’ of Islam failed to transform Pakistani society. It is mainly because 
the Muslims of Pakistan, like other societies in the Indian subcontinent, have tended to remain 
socially and religiously conservative. Moreover, due to the strength of kinship loyalty, Pakistani 
society has little incentive to modify their social institutions and religious practices, including 
embracing an Islamic but novel and private-based insurance mechanism. 
This section begins by elaborating the idea of insurance within Pakistani society, and then 
explore the social stagnation for the reluctance in accepting the modern scheme of Sharia-
compliant insurance. The concepts of risk and risk sharing are tied to the values or culture in local 
worlds.643 Pakistani society tends to be resistance to any effort of changing their traditional risk 
management. This part of this chapter focuses on how Pakistani consume, rework, and hesitate 
to accept Islamic insurance, whereas, the religious conservativeness and kinship bonds play the 
most critical part in it.  
Islamic insurance and the multiple risk managements  
About 97% of Pakistanis are Muslims. They also live in a country that claimed to be an 
Islamic state. Our assumption is Islamic insurance would be embraced by Pakistani society who 
are seeking for alternative scheme of conventional insurance. On the contrary, Islamic insurance 
industry in Pakistan took so much time to take off and there were not enough investment vehicles 
for Islamic insurance companies to invest in. Islamic insurance has been existing for several 
decades, yet it hasn’t grown as quickly as other Islamic financial services. The answer is Pakistanis 
rely upon channels of social charity, state assistance, and kinship network for their economic 







Insurance is a relatively small sector in Pakistan. Insurance is considered as a ‘luxury’ good 
and hence is considered for purchase only by those who are wealthy. However, many of these 
rich families prefer not to use insurance and rather prefer to invest in property and family 
business as a form of insurance and life cycle risk management. But for some who chose to buy 
insurance, they tend to choose Islamic insurance over conventional insurance with various 
reasons. Abdul Wahab’s study shows out of 80 respondents 22 are of the view that they have 
selected the Islamic insurance model because it is Islamic, 16 are of the view that they are using 
it because of religious reasons while 30 respondents when asked said that, it is because they are 
personally satisfied with the Islamic insurance on the other hand, 15 are of the view that, they 
have chosen Islamic insurance because others (family and friends) ask them to choose it.644 
Private health insurance in Pakistan is underdeveloped. Only about 7% of health financing 
is through mandatory and voluntary prepaid health insurance. Private for-profit and not-for-
profit health insurance schemes are funded through contributions and mainly based in large 
cities. Large private employers are increasingly buying private group health insurance for their 
employees. Still, in Pakistan, the health system is dominated by private financing, in the form of 
out-of-pocket payments, (at 55% of total funding in 2012). This number of private financing was 
extremely high in global terms (where the average was 21%). It was also well above the 20% limit 
suggested by the 2010 World Health Report.645 
The low level of insurance is due to the small effective market size. In the developing 
Muslim countries like Pakistan, only public sector employees are forced to save in the form of 
their pension and social security contributions. Pakistan’s Public sector employment is tiny 
compared to the total Pakistan’s workforce. As a result, the market size for insurance and related 
products are restricted to this group. Moreover, like Indonesia, majority of workers in Pakistan 
work in informal sectors that are lack of insurance protection.   
For majority Pakistani, the state’s welfare framework has been their primary scheme for 
receiving assistance. Therefore, the welfare system is entirely to be the buzzword in daily political 
debate in Pakistan, mainly due to the prevalent poverty in the rural and urban areas. The 
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Economic Survey 2018 revealed Pakistan’s percentage of people living below the poverty line in 
2015-16 is 24.3 percent of the overall population. This number is a radical improvement of the 
previous decade of 2005-2006 where 50.4 percent of the people are deficient.646 The rhetoric of 
‘Islamic welfare state’ partly contributed to the victory of PTI party, which brought Imran Khan 
to the prime minister seat.  Imran Khan’s rhetoric on the Islamic Welfare State has gained 
multiple supports, particularly the Jamaat-e-Islami supporters, and people the urban literate 
population. These urban literates may not agree in the Jamaat-e-Islami kind of Islam, but they 
are interested in how Islam is being or is going to be promoted to protect the disadvantaged in 
the community. 
 Imran Khan’s welfare program is a continuation of different types of distributive policies 
that had been conducted since Pakistani independence. As discussed in the previous section, the 
distributive policies are embedded in Pakistan as a ‘weak’ state. Before Imran Khan’s program, 
there have been land reform, Zakat or religious taxes, and the latest, Bhutto Income Support 
Program (BISP). BISP is funded through the federal budget in 2008 to provide unconditional cash 
grants to the most impoverished families in the country.  
 Regarding the religion of Islam itself, the majority of Pakistani Muslims are traditionalists. 
For Muslim traditionalist, Islam is an individual religious commitment. Their leaders present Islam 
in devotional rather than collective term, unlike the modernist of Deobandis (including the 
Jamaat-e-Islami). The modernist group advocates more than a program for an individual spiritual 
improvement. For Jamaat-e-Islami and their like-minded groups, Islam offers a systemic 
transformation of the society based on the formal ruling of the Sharia.647 Islamic economics, 
including the idea of Islamic insurance, grew naturally from the Islamic revival and political Islam 
such as the Jamaat-e-Islami whose adherents considered Islam to be a complete system of life in 
all its aspects. Islam must have an economic system, unique from and superior to non-Islamic 
economic systems. The modernist Muslims are the ones who are more receptive toward the idea 
of Islamic insurance, even though, they initially advocated more on public-funded rather than 








More conservative Salafi have shown less interest in socioeconomic issues, arguing that 
the Prophet of Islam and his companions did not study `laws` of economics, look for patterns, 
strive for understanding of what happens in commerce, production, consumption, therefore it is 
not necessary for contemporary Muslims to put efforts on those matters. Not only conventional 
insurance, this group not even entertain with the whole idea of Islamic insurance itself. 
Moreover, they reject the religious argument of Islamic insurance and contend that transaction 
is unlawful. 
  The majority of Pakistani Muslims are traditional who reluctance toward Islamic insurance 
not because of its legal argument, but because the whole idea of Islamic insurance is too modern. 
For them, the fundamental concept of Islam is on personal and ethical, not the communal-
political aspect of Islam. This traditional understanding of the religion is expressed in the social 
practices of charity. Islam in Pakistan is having effective role in that softening the misery of 
Pakistan’s poor through charity. One of the prominent charity organizations is The Citizens’ 
Foundation, with more than 600 schools and 85,000 pupils. The Citizens’ Foundation is a non-
religious organization but a majority if its founding members from the business community are 
practicing Muslims from different strains of Islam.648 
 Charities with a religious character also tend to be more favored and more trusted by the 
population. Pakistan’s most famous private charitable institution by far, the Edhi Foundation, 
which is non-religious; however, it is led by a very religious individual, Abdus Sattar Edhi. This 
charity is vital for a country like Pakistan, where public expenditure for social welfare including 
health sector were only 5% of government expenditure. Moreover, the charity organization 
usually plays important role where the level of trust toward state institutions is extremely low. 
Pakistan has one of the lowest levels of tax collection outside Africa, which shows the public’s 
low level of trust toward the state. However, charitable donation in Pakistan, at almost 5 percent 
of GDP, is one of the highest rates in the world. 
 Another religious institution that is central for helping the disadvantaged groups in 
Pakistan is the madrassah or religious school. For instance, the Red Mosque in Islamabad, which 






6,000 students. The funding mostly comes from local individual donations and Zakat from abroad. 
Many people in the oil-rich Gulf States Muslims send zakat abroad - an estimated £50m a year 
from Saudi Arabia. 
The poor Pakistani families prefer to send their children to madrassah even compared to 
free public school. It is because madrassah is taking care all the needs of their children, not only 
for their academic need but also for their daily needs. Madrassah removes the financial burden 
for many poor parents. Report says over 35,000 madrassahs are currently operating in Pakistan, 
which is very huge for a country like Pakistan. According to a report issued in Karachi, there were 
only fewer than 300 madrassahs during country’s independence in 1947. 
These religious institutions are the genuine voluntary sector of Pakistan. While there are 
some other ‘secular’ NGOs with linkage to the International aid organization, but many of them 
are lack of skills and below the standard required by those international organizations.649 
Nonetheless, many foreign aids are controlled by state apparatus or semi-governmental 
institutions, and NGOs are under state surveillance because of political suspicion.   
The other risk management available and used by many Pakistanis is the remittance 
through an official money transfer or black-market services of hawala. Hawala is black market 
money transfers that can transfer money any amount, to anywhere, in almost no time. Quick, 
cheap, and paperless, the age-old hawala money transfer is thriving in Pakistan. Millions of 
emigrants use it to remit their wages to families back home. 
This remittance system relates to the strong kinship of Pakistani society. One study 
examines the relationship between remittance and family member sickness and shows that the 
level of remittance increases when there is a family member who gets sick. At the same time, the 
study found no money transfer among the village members. It shows that the risk-sharing 
happens between individual within kinship networks and not among individual in a similar 
location. This habit is quite different from the communitarian model happen in many Indonesian 
villages where geographical proximity and modern association replace many of kinship ties.  This 
issue will be elaborated further in the next section.  
 





As mentioned before, Islamic insurance was presented to the public as the ‘Islamic’ 
alternative of conventional insurance. Several studies show that many customers in Pakistan 
choose Islamic insurance because of a religious reason. Ninety percent of the customers come 
because the service complies with their religious beliefs.650 However, this appeals only for the 
well-off individuals in the urban center, which is quite small. Moreover, the survey of 150 life 
insurance customers conducted by Akhter revealed that majority of the respondents is unaware 
of Islamic insurance concept.651 Some of the upper-income group tends to disregard Islamic 
insurance partly due to their lack of awareness concerning the Islamic aspect of Islamic insurance. 
Many hardly found differences between Islamic insurance and conventional insurance. 
Moreover, the commitment toward Islamic economics among the Muslim modernists 
does not necessarily lead to actual participation. As comparison, a separate dataset based on 
interviews conducted in the Middle East and North Africa alone shows as much as 45 percent of 
the respondents would choose an Islamic product over an otherwise identical conventional 
alternative. Moreover, these respondents will still choose Islamic products even if it required 
paying an additional charge equivalent to 5 percent of the loan amount. However, only 2 percent 
report current use of Islamic finance. There is considerable gap between expressed preferences 
and actual behavior.652 
There are some initiatives to promote Islamic microinsurance to the poor population of 
Pakistan. This service provides life, health, crop and livestock protection, and small-scale 
businesses, especially for the rural community. However, the population is more interested in 
participating in the programs conducted by the State and NGOs, and not Islamic insurance 
companies. Despite the promotion of Islamic insurance from its religious aspect, the general 
population of Pakistan tend to use more traditional ways, non-market approaches, of risk 
management. In overall, the economic activities within Pakistani society are more influenced by 
tribal ethics of hospitality, honor, and mutual help among kin rather than modern and rational 
profit seeking motive economy.653  
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How could this happen? The following section elaborates why there is no transformation 
within Pakistani Muslim society, which resulted in their reluctance in using Islamic insurance. The 
religious conservatism and the strong kinship bond are influential in the way they manage 
economic risks. 
The stagnation of social reform 
Stating Islamic insurance as the Sharia-compliant service does not necessarily change the 
beliefs and behavior of most of the Pakistan population, which are deeply conservative. Most 
ordinary Pakistani aspire of the implementation of Sharia, but it is because of the conditions of 
lack of justice, security, and welfare within the society. People use ‘Sharia’ as a sort of code for a 
better, simpler, more equal, more honest, more protective, and more accessible form of the 
economic system and not so much about the content of the law dealing with the economy. 654 
On the other hand, the Islamist political parties have never achieved sufficient political control in 
the parliament and could not successfully organize a massive movement for Islamic reform. All 
in all, the Islamic reform in Pakistan is more concern about putting more religious ruling rather 
than on the actual implementation of it. 
This phenomenon of Islamization of economy is not an isolated phenomenon but is 
closely connected not only to the internal socioeconomic conditions of the semi-feudal Pakistani 
society. Historically, the scheme of 'Islamization' of the economy was introduced by a Martial 
Law regime of Zia-ul-Haq in an arbitrary and undemocratic way. It was a political instrument 
devised by the ruling elites to maintain the status quo, block land other radical social change. 
However, the conservative forms of Islam play a more critical role in the lives of Pakistanis than 
the modernist ideas of Islamic reform. Islam in Pakistan is more presented in term of devotional 
and ethical, rather than in term of political and collective identities.655 
Furthermore, there is strong tribal nature presented by Pakistani society. To be more 
exact, the loyalties and social life of the Pakistani people revolves around the sub-ethnic 
categories of the family and kin or so-called baradari. The family is the basis of social organization, 
 





providing its members with both identity and protection. Rarely does an individual live apart from 
relatives; even male urban migrants usually live with relatives or friends of kin. Children live with 
their parents until marriage, and sons often stay with their parents after marriage, forming a joint 
family.656 This kinship relationship defines to whom their children will be married to, to what 
political party they will vote in the next election, and to whom they will ask for job and help.  
According to Lieven, kinship relations play a central role in wealth creation and 
distribution for a country with low natural resources, such as Pakistan. In Pakistan, there is no 
‘traditional’ source of wealth for elites to control and monopolize, Lieven further explained. The 
primary way for aspiring leaders to extract wealth is through a control over state. To achieve this 
end, communal leaders rely on “patronage to kinship” - a basic dynamic of the Pakistani system. 
This deep kinship, Lieven noted, is an extremely important aspect of society, used to maintain 
degrees of stability through power structures.657 
However, patronage in Pakistan should not therefore be the preserve of the elites, and as 
simply top-down relationship. A mixture of the importance of kinship loyalty and the need for 
politicians to win votes, and -on occasions-to mobilized armed supporters. Quite poor people can 
thus form part of ‘human resource networks’ and mobilize some degree of help or protection 
from their superior. Even the very poorest in the village often benefit from the deg tradition 
whereby local landowners and big men distribute free food to the entire village to celebrate some 
happy event, to boost local prestige through public generosity.658  
People gain access to patronage by using their position within kinship network to mobilize 
support for a politician who then repays them in various ways when in office, or by using kinship 
links to some policemen or official to obtain favor for relatives or allies. In certain circumstances, 
this can benefit the whole village through the provision of electricity, roads or water. The effects 
on the resources, and on the state’s ability to do things are just the same, but more the results 
are ploughed back into the society, rather than making their ways straight to bank accounts in 
the West. This is an important difference between Pakistan and Nigeria, argues Lieven.659.  
 







Facing with these multiple problems and weak government, the Pakistani population turn 
to their kin and biradari to support their economy. In theory, members of a biradari are co-
residents of a single village. In some areas, however, land fragmentation and generations of out-
migration have led to the dispersal of many members of the biradari among various villages, 
regions, and cities. Patrilineal kin continue to maintain ties with their natal village and enjoy the 
legal right of first refusal in any biradari land sale.660 
Members of a biradari celebrate the major life events together. Patrilineal kin are 
expected to contribute food and to help with guests in the ceremonies accompanying birth, 
marriage, death, and major religious holidays. The biradari has traditionally served as a combined 
mutual aid society and welfare agency, arranging loans to members, assisting in finding 
employment, and contributing to the dowries of poorer families.661 
Kinship is central to the weakness of the Pakistani state, but also to its stability, above all 
because of its relationship with class. Because the Pakistani political elites, especially in the 
countryside, rely for their strength not just on wealth but their leadership of clans of kinship 
networks, kinship plays a vital part in maintaining the dominance of the ‘feudal elites and many 
of the urban bosses. 
 By helping to enforce on the elites a certain degree of responsibility for their followers, 
and circulating patronage downwards, kinship also plays a role in softening-to a limited extent- 
class domination. Kinship is therefore partially responsible for Pakistan’s surprisingly low rating 
of social inequality according to the Gini Co-efficient. In both these ways, kinship is a critical anti-
revolutionary force, whether the revolution is of a socialist or Islamist variety. 
On the other hand, urbanization and economic development have given ordinary people 
in much of northern and central Punjab more significant opportunities to exploit the system for 
their advantage. The power of the big landowners and tribal chiefs has been much reduced and 
has shifted to lower and much more numerous strata of rival landowners and local bosses. This 
situation gives people more chance to extract benefits by switching between them. Urbanization 







Lieven argues that a combination of the weakness of the state and the power of kinship 
is one critical reason why urbanization has had much smaller impact on political patterns and 
structure that one might otherwise expect. For in the cities, albeit not as much as in the 
countryside, you also need protection from the police, the courts and political linked urban 
gangs.” Moreover, rather than new urban population emerging, what we have seen so far is vast 
numbers of peasants going to live in the cities while remaining peasants culturally. They remain 
deeply attached to their kinship groups. They still need their kinship groups to help them for 
many of the same reasons they needed them in the countryside. Underlying all of this is the fact 
that so much of the urban population remains semi-employed, rather than moving into modern 
sectors of the economy-because these usually do not exist.662 
Conclusion: contention and conservative society in Pakistan 
The underlying assumption behind the Islamization project since the 1980s was in an 
Islamic setting, the state will be responsible for fulfilling the needs of every citizen with enough 
protection against any worries. Also, the mandatory systemic change had been the main theme 
of Islamization of Pakistan. Consequently, there has been continuous tension between the 
theocratic element of the state represented by Sharia Court and the ruling regimes- after Zia-ul-
Haq until the present days. The Sharia Court judgment decreed that the whole economic system 
must be based on interest-free instruments. Meanwhile, various regimes after Zia-ul-Haq have 
stalled full application of this order. Multiple ways of delaying implementation and modifying the 
injunctions have been found. Legal battles over interpretation have been fought and subtle ways 
found to avoid a clash over the order to convert to an “Islamic economy.” 
As a social product, Islamic insurance has been promoted as an Islamic alternative to 
conventional insurance, which considered to be suitable for Islamic society such as Pakistan. 
There has been a growing awareness among the educated and urban professionals. However, it 
continuously receives low support within the general Pakistani society. Most people still rely on 






and tribal and religious communities still hold prominence role in providing that protection. Like 
Indonesian society, Pakistanis have a low trust in the private sector concerning providing 
insurance. There is a general agreement, particularly among the Ulama (clergy) in Pakistan that 
the insurance business should be based on mutual help and without any intention of making a 
profit. Any insurance arrangement, which was not of the mutual type, will not be acceptable in 
Islam. Therefore, the adoption of private-based Islamic insurance model has not received wide 










The purpose of this research is to understand the development gap of Islamic insurance 
between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan. The central question is, why have Islamic insurance 
systems developed well in some countries, but not in others. Malaysia has shown a significant 
growth rate in Islamic insurance demand and outpacing conventional insurance, while Indonesia 
and Pakistan are still standing far behind Malaysia. Previous studies as already highlighted in the 
introduction and literature review chapters cannot fully explain the reason why the government 
and its people supporting or rejecting Islamic insurance as an accepted policy and normative 
practice within the country. This dissertation is the first such comparative study of the political 
and societal determinants for the development of Islamic insurance in three Muslim majority 
countries in Asia.  
This dissertation draws on secondary works in several other disciplines in order to answer 
the research question. Not just political science and history, but this dissertation also utilizes 
insights from anthropology, economics, sociology, and religious studies. The design of this study 
mostly follows a qualitative research methodology, specifically case study and combines a range 
of primarily qualitative approaches. It analyzes political parties and coalition platforms, 
organizations’ charters, and press releases to trace contemporary and prior political norms, 
priorities, and strategies. Ethnographic and historical studies, documents, and secondary sources 
help to understand the social and cultural circumstances. Quantitative resources, such as survey 
data and statistics are used when possible. The paragraphs below provide a summary of the 
findings in more detail, set recommendations for future research, and a reflection on the overall 
dissertation process.  
The elite, the niche, and the neglected 
Islamic insurance is part of the whole package of Islamization, which dated back to the 




movements within the Muslim societies created a ‘double pressures’ of Islamization demand to 
the states, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan. After several decades of the Islamization 
process, these three countries have achieved different results in their Islamic insurance 
development. Upon critical review of the preliminary data, it was discovered that Islamic 
insurance system in all three countries produced different results not only quantitatively, but also 
qualitatively.  
Malaysia has shown a significant growth rate in Islamic insurance demand and outpacing 
conventional insurance, while other countries, including Indonesia and Pakistan are still standing 
far behind Malaysia. In 2015, Malaysia continued to be the largest Islamic insurance market in 
South East Asia, with a 62% market share and the largest Family Takaful market globally. 
Indonesia Islamic insurance sector recently has been showing significant growth by having a 
contribution of 19% of the total regional market. While Pakistan is falling behind with Islamic 
insurance comprised just about 2% of the insurance sector in Pakistan as at December 2015, this 
number was still quite small compared to Malaysia and Indonesia within the same year. 
Regarding the regulatory frameworks, all three countries have enacted specific laws for 
the regulation of Islamic insurance though Malaysia has a fully enacted Islamic Financial Services 
Act while Indonesia and Pakistan have guidelines passed by their respective insurance regulatory 
body. Malaysia only permits stand-alone (fully-fledged) Islamic insurance operators, while 
Indonesia and Pakistan are currently still allowing for Islamic insurance window operations.  
All three countries insist on the existence of a Sharia supervisory board for an Islamic 
insurance operator to ensure Sharia compliance. Malaysia develops a sophisticated network of 
government agencies, businesses practitioners, and religious institutions to create a national 
platform and standard. Indonesia state provides the necessary legal framework for Islamic 
insurance to operate in its jurisdiction. However, it gives autonomy to the non-state religious 
institution of DSN-MUI to give detail guidelines. In Pakistan, the state very much dominates the 
regulatory process, and there is less participation from the business community and the public 
at large.   
Regarding dispute resolution mechanism to cater to Islamic insurance-related disputes, 




disputes and a Financial Mediation Bureau that provides arbitration services for disputes arising 
from Islamic financial matters including those from Islamic insurance. In Indonesia, the religious 
court has authority in solving any dispute related to Islamic insurance and other Islamic financial 
related transactions. In Pakistan, though a similar court has not been created the Small Disputes 
Resolution Committee sits in significant cities and entertains Islamic insurance-related disputes. 
Despite the differences in detail numbers, statistic growth, and features mentioned 
thoroughly in the previous chapters, there is one primary qualitative difference need to be 
highlighted. Islamic insurance in Malaysia, developed as a systematic national program, has 
achieved maturity and elite status at the global level.  In Indonesia, the service is continually 
growing but within a limited scope. It is more precise to describe Islamic insurance in Indonesia 
as a growing niche market.  Pakistan’s Islamic insurance came later and had slower growth 
compared to the two countries mentioned earlier.  
This dissertation founds that the coalitional politics behind the decision of political actors 
to embrace and regulate Islamic insurance as a state’s policy and the economic ethics of the 
societies behind their acceptance (or rejection) of Islamic insurance in their daily lives influence 
the development gap of Islamic insurance between the three countries.  
Firstly, both Malaysia and Pakistan chose to co-opt the Islamization agenda. However, 
they achieved different results. The successful co-optation in Malaysia owed to the ability of 
Malaysian leaders to harmonize Islamization with economic liberalization, which led to national-
wide support on the agenda. Pakistan failed because Islamization was used as an ideological tool 
by the state to expand state power against social resistances within Pakistani society. As a result, 
legal battles over interpretation have been fought and subtle ways found to avoid a clash over 
the order to convert Pakistani economy to an “Islamic economy”. Indonesia took accommodation 
policy as the state had to respond to the growing influence of the Muslim middle class, but at the 
same time, it was constricted by the pluralistic nature of Indonesian polity. In sum, the country’s 
fundamental political institutions construct these complex bargains made between various 






Figure 6-1: The Political Life of Islamic Insurance 
 
Mahathir’s Islamization has led to state active participation to ensure uninterrupted 
public support toward the regime and its liberal economic programs. The Islamization was also 
intended to transform the Malay population’s socio-economic condition, but without disrupting 
the very capitalist structure of the Malaysian economy. From a political perspective, encouraging 
Islamic insurance has the advantage of demonstrating that Mahathir and UMNO remain 
connected with his constituents’ Islamic roots. In addition, encouraging investment in Islamic 
reinsurance has strong potential to reassure underwriters, possibly spurring new investment and 
creating economic opportunities among Malays where Mahathir and UMNO draw the majority 
of their support. Building a working Islamic insurance-backed economy, especially one without 
massive state subsidies, would reinforce the transformation toward a modern and 
entrepreneurial Malay society. Besides the state, the significant actors behind all of these 
concerted efforts are a group of scholars with impeccable Islamic and technical expertise and 
pedigrees. They are generally Sharia trained in the Middle East (most often the renowned Al-
Azhar University in Cairo) and PhDs in Islamic finance from universities in the West (often 
Loughborough or Edinburgh), who proudly call themselves “Islamic business developers” and 
“entrepreneurs.” 
In Indonesia, Soeharto’s Islamization represented the limited role of the state in 
accommodating the Islamization demand of a group of Muslim modernists in Indonesia, within 
the context of its multicultural society. The initiative started as a micro-level experiment by a 
country the initiator/s State’s response State’s role 
Islamic insurance as 
a political product 
Indonesia professor-activist from repression to 
accommodation 
regulator distributional  
Malaysia The state & Islamic 
business developer 
co-optation manager a national agenda 
Pakistan cleric-politician from (failed) co-optation to 
neglect 




small group of Islamic economic enthusiast in Indonesian universities influenced by the global 
spread of critical ideas toward the practices of a secular and capitalist economic development at 
that time. It was a bottom-up initiative then later accommodated by the Indonesian state during 
the last phase of the New Order regime.663 The changing environment of the New Order in the 
1990s and afterward has provided a favorable circumstance for Islamic interest to advance their 
politics as in social and cultural affairs, but it must be emphasized that this does not mean the 
advance of a single, coherent ideology called ‘Islam’. In Indonesia, Islamic insurance is regulated 
to accommodate the small number of the urban, middle class, and the modernist group of 
Indonesian Muslims. 
Theoretically, the Islamic state of Pakistan should provide the best ground for Islamic 
insurance to develop. However, the underlying assumption behind the Islamization project since 
the 1980s was in an Islamic setting, the state would be responsible for fulfilling the needs of every 
citizen with enough protection against any worries. This assumption has made the Islamists 
focused more on the creation of an Islamic welfare state, instead of developing private-based 
Islamic insurance. Also, the mandatory systemic change had been the main theme of Islamization 
of Pakistan. Consequently, there has been continuous tension between the theocratic element 
of the state represented by Sharia Court and the ruling regimes- after to Zia-ul-Haq until the 
present days. Legal battles over interpretation have been fought and subtle ways found to avoid 
a clash over the order to convert to an “Islamic economy.” 
Moreover, redistribution policies play a significant role in a weak and patrimonial state 
like Pakistan. As the state implements redistributive policies, its capacity grows, and by 
implication, its penetration of society deepens.664 In overall, the Islamic economy program in 
Pakistan, including Islamic insurance, would receive enough state support only when it enhances 
the political goals of the ruling regime.  
Secondly, at the social level, the economic ethics of the societies are the reasons behind 
their acceptance (or rejection) of Islamic insurance in their daily lives. The new Malay class has 
reshaped ‘Islam’ as a new entrepreneurial and corporate ethics, which is supportive of the 
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development of Islamic insurance in Malaysia. Meanwhile, the robust civic tradition in Indonesia 
has developed a critical attitude toward the private-based scheme of Islamic insurance. Lastly, 
Pakistan religious conservatism, counter-intuitively, mostly ignore the modern scheme of Islamic 
insurance.   
 
Figure 4-2: The Social Life of Islamic Insurance 
 
The Malays has re-articulated their kampong values-sharing, fairness, equality, and 
balance- into a modern and entrepreneurial society of Malays. Entrepreneurship has become the 
primary vector of ethnic, religious, and moral worth, and a test of virtue and modernity among 
the new Malay middle class.665 This type of society of market Islam seeks less to create 
commensurability between Islam and democracy. It is instead designed to merge Muslim 
religious practice and capitalist ethics.666 In Malaysia, Islamic insurance has been widely accepted 
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Although, this attitude seems similar to the Calvinist ethics, Muslim scholars in Malaysia argue 
that Islamic insurance is unique.  In general, the revival of Islamic principles in Malaysian Muslims 
economic life produces new Islamic norms, identities, ethics, and practices that manifested itself 
in Muslims’ engagement in the markets while still maintaining their Islamic ritual devotions and 
conservative attitude.   
In Indonesia, the emphasis on social benefit has been the primary goal of Islamic economy 
for many activist-minded of the pioneer of Islamic economy. For many Indonesians, the moral 
concerns such as addressing poverty, inequality, and economic injustice, must be the main 
parameter of the success of any Islamic financial institutions, including Islamic insurance. Those 
social justice values, and not merely legal requirements and profitability of insurance are the 
priority in defining their economy.  
At this moment, many Indonesian Muslims are reluctant to support and subscribe to 
Islamic insurance premium because the model has not clearly distinguished itself as an 
alternative for capitalism and foreign economic domination. According to many Indonesian 
Muslims, Islamic insurance should inculcate the spirit of self-help, solidarity, and cooperation 
rather than mere economic benefits. Therefore, some Islamic insurance companies in Indonesia 
have been developing insurance-linked products, which combine financial protection with socio-
religious investment to attract Muslim consumers. Others set up a collaboration with Islamic 
NGOs to deliver micro Islamic insurance to the poor population of Indonesia. 
As a social product, Islamic insurance has been promoted as an Islamic alternative to 
conventional insurance, which considered being suitable for Islamic society such as Pakistan. 
There has been a growing awareness among educated and urban professionals. However, it 
continuously receives low support within the general Pakistani society. Most people still rely on 
traditional methods for risk mitigation and financial protection. Moreover, the state, feudal lords, 
and tribal and religious communities still hold prominence role in providing that protection. 
Similar to Indonesian society, Pakistanis have low trust in the private sector giving financial 
protection. There is a general agreement, particularly among the Ulama (clergy) in Pakistan that 
the insurance business should be based on mutual help and without any intention of making a 




Islam. Therefore, the adoption of private-based Islamic insurance model has not received 
extensive support among the people of Pakistan.  
Moving forward 
Ira Lapidus once said that the economically defined social classes were relatively less 
significant. He stated:  
…(historically) the role of indigenous elites, institutions, and cultures in determining the 
pattern of development must be emphasized because of some important differences 
between Muslim and European societies. In the 19th and 20th centuries, European 
societies were to a considerable extent organized in terms of economically derived social 
classes. In many European countries, bourgeois elites were the principal forces behind 
economic development, state organization, and world conquest. Industrial working 
classes were a principal force in production. In Muslim societies, economically defined 
social classes were relatively less significant. In these societies, the economy was 
embedded in and regulated by tribal, communal, associational, and state political 
structures. State elites -and tribal and religious notables- used political power to control 
land and trading resources and to extract the surplus product of peasants and other 
producers.”667 
Our case studies confirm this statement. The economically defined social classes were not 
the dominant actor in the Islamization of insurance in Indonesia, Pakistan, and even in liberal 
Malaysia. The high degree of modernization through its latest neoliberal economic development 
does not necessarily remove the communal pattern and state political structure of Malaysia. 
Some scholars to describe the process introduce the term ‘ethnicized neoliberalism’. The 
government and ethnic collectives continue to strategically use these liberal economic 
development models for the social and political positioning of these ethnic groups in 
contemporary Malaysia.668  
Nonetheless, are there any market systems in the world that are free from any of this 
distinctive cultural pattern, anyway? In order to exist, the market needs to have certain customs 
and rules, which then bring identities, norms, associations based on tribal ties, ethnicity, religion, 
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or gender in the process. Islamic insurance is not merely a process of calculating the risks and 
compensating damage, but it is also a cultural process where people construct the meaning of 
their faith, fate, and good faith within their social interaction.    
Furthermore, this dissertation provides rich, thick description and analysis of the 
phenomena of Islamic insurance in three countries. Therefore, it cannot generalize the result for 
broader population. Its reliance on secondary sources has created another challenge. Malaysia 
has huge resources on Islamic insurance compared to Indonesia and Pakistan. Therefore, more 
field works are needed, particularly in the case of Pakistan, to expand this research further. 
Potentially, future studies can assess other countries using the similar approach. This 
dissertation links the Islamic insurance development of the three countries to the quality of the 
prior colonial institutions. As Timur Kuran suggests, there is a need to have more research on 
Muslim majority countries who escaped colonization, such as Iran and Turkey. 669 Studying their 
Islamic insurance institutions might bring more insight into the performance of Islamic economic 
institutions in general. In addition, it may be interesting to deepen our understanding of the 
nature of religion and risk by making a comparison with other late modernizers with strong 
religious-based communities such as China, India, and Latin America. This dissertation should 
inform the scholars of religious studies that the social, economic and political processes can be 
as important as the religious doctrines in informing the individual decision of participating in any 
risk management mechanism.  
Similarly, this dissertation should convince Islamic economists and Islamic business 
practitioners that Islamic insurance is a complex phenomenon that requires wide ranging 
intellectual input beyond the confines of business and economics.670 They should seek for greater 
inter-disciplinary ties and impact for the socio-historical study of Islamic insurance. The 
development of Islamic insurance in a country does not only depend on the economic 
improvement or other macro-economic factors, but also on the dynamic of socio-political 
environment of the country. 
 
669 Kuran. 




For practical recommendation, the supporters of Islamic economic movement might like 
to design insurance frameworks based on the local political and social circumstances in the light 
of findings of this study. For some countries, the faith-based non-profit health care ministry in 
the US may serve as a better model than the current private-based Islamic insurance. 
Strengthening regulation and empowering the non-profit organizations for a country with strong 
civic tradition such as Indonesia can be an alternative route for developing an Islamic but also an 
indigenous mechanism to protect the population against economic insecurity. This strategy may 
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